Le statut de Pierre Bayle dans l'histoire des idées philosophiques et religieuses de l'époque classique a changé du tout au tout. D'observateur, il est devenu, dans l'historiographie actuelle, un acteur majeur dans les débats philosophiques, religieux et politiques de son époque, dont les écrits nourriront la réflexion des philosophes clandestins qui fondent les Lumières radicales. Ce volume d'études contribue à cette nouvelle interprétation du statut et de la portée du rationalisme de Bayle.

Pascal founds his interpretation of the Augustinian doctrine of the corruption of human nature on a philosophy of faith inherited from Montaigne: « we are Christians in just the same way as we are Périgordians or Germans » (Essais, II, 12) : this conception of « human faith » is analysed, in turn, by means of concepts drawn from Descartes (passion) and Gassendi (imagination). He thus leads us to a very modern conception of « human faith » – without grace (...) – as being the product of education and habit, a « sentiment » like so many others. (shrink)

L'anthropologie pascalienne de la "misère de l'homme sans Dieu" frappe par sa pertinence : aucun apologiste chrétien n'a exprimé avec tant de justesse le point de vue d'un incroyant sur le monde et sur sa propre nature. C'est le point de départ de son argumentation apologétique, que cet ouvrage suit pas à pas, en précisant ses sources cartésiennes et gassendistes, en examinant le statut du sentiment et en restituant la cohérence de la foi de la "seconde nature". Les Pensées constituent (...) l'expression complexe d'une philosophie chrétienne et la cohérence de l'argumentation représente un témoignage privilégié sur le libertinage tel que Pascal le concevait. Le profil intellectuel de son libertin apparaît entre les lignes de l'argumentation apologétique."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Far from being a product of Locke’s philosophical genius, the theory of the divine superaddition of thought to matter is rooted in the discussions about Descartes’ conception of the soul as res cogitans which took place in France and in the Netherlands in the years 1640-1680, from Mersenne to Regius and Bayle. Locke’s historical and theoretical relationship with these sources can be clearly documented, as well as the influence of the superaddition theory in the eighteenth century, mostly in the realm (...) of free-thinking, from Collins to Bolingbroke and above all Voltaire. In the light of this intellectual genealogy, the accusations of materialism, or even Spinozism, frequently levelled against Locke acquire a new significance and are worth exploring again. (shrink)

Il s’agit de montrer comment le rapport de Bayle à un scepticisme pyrrhonien ou académique, loin d’être d’adhésion comme le tient l’interprétation courante, évolue et se transforme. Il va en effet de la nécessaire concordance entre foi et raison sur le plan de la morale à l’impossibilité de tout accord entre elles, y compris sur le même plan. C’est que le contexte dans lequel s’inscrit ce rapport pèse dans la manière de le vivre, en particulier quand Bayle doit organiser sa (...) défense contre les attaques d’un Jurieu. (shrink)

Cette étude a l'ambition de couvrir à la fois la réception et l'influence des Pensées de Pascal jusqu'en 1734. Elle se fonde sur une analyse des influences philosophiques à l'uvre dans la composition même de l'uvre de Pascal, concluant à la forte influence de Gassendi sur la conception pascalienne du libertinage. Cette orientation de l'apologie est cependant contrariée par le fait que les Pensées sont éditées en 1670 par les théologiens cartésiens de Port-Royal, Arnauld et Nicole. Au-delà de la forte (...) influence des Pensées sur les Essais de morale de Nicole, les premières années de la réception sont marquées par la réfutation implicite contenue dans les uvres de Malebranche, de sorte qu'on observe la rivalité de deux conceptions de l'apologétique à cette époque: l'une, celle de Pascal, historique, vise à démontrer l'authenticité de la révélation du Dieu d'Abraham, d'Isaac et de Jacob par le témoignage de l'Ecriture Sainte; l'autre, malebranchiste, se base sur l'évidence des 'preuves de simple vue' et démontre l'existence de celui que Pascal avait désigné comme le 'Dieu des philosophes'. Or, jamais les apologistes ne renonceront aux preuves 'naturelles' et s'enfermeront dans le piège dénoncé par Pascal: ils célèbrent le triomphe du rationalisme chrétien et se font défenseurs du déisme. Lorsque Bayle met en évidence l'échec du rationalisme théologique, les philosophes clandestins auront beau jeu de transformer le rationalisme malebranchiste en rationalisme antichrétien. (shrink)

Bayle propose une déconstruction philosophique des fondements de la souveraineté politique, qui semble faire fi des souffrances des huguenots dans la conjoncture historique complexe dont ils font l'expérience douloureuse. Son analyse mérite certainement d'être étudiée de nouveau, à la fois dans la perspective de la cohérence propre de sa propre philosophie, dans celle de l'héritage (Machiavel, Naudé, Hobbes, Pascal, Spinoza) et dans celle de la réception (Locke, Leibniz, Montesquieu, l'Encyclopédie, Gottsched, Wolff et les Lumières allemandes).

Le dernier ouvrage d’Antony McKenna, intitulé Pascal et son libertin, présente en une synthèse claire et précise les résultats de plus de trente années consacrées par l’auteur aux études pascaliennes et à l’étude de la pensée libertine de la période classique. Auteur d’une thèse d’État publiée sous le titre De Pascal à Voltaire : le rôle des Pensées de Pascal dans l’histoire des idées entre 1670 et 1734 puis de plus d’une centaine d’études d’histoire de la philosophie du (...) XVIIe et du XVIIIe si... (shrink)

Theophrastus redivivus (hereafter TR) is a voluminous, clandestine manuscript composed around 1659. TR is commonly recognised as the first-known atheistic treatise in the history of philosophical t...

Robin McKenna argues that we need to make space for an approach to epistemology that avoids the idealizations typical of the field. He applies this approach to topics in applied and social epistemology, such as what to do about science denial, whether we should try to be intellectually autonomous, and what our obligations are to other inquirers.

Causation appears to present us with an interpretative difficulty. While arguably a redundant relation given fundamental physics, it is nevertheless apparently pragmatically indispensable. This chapter revisits certain arguments made previously by the author for these claims with the benefit of hindsight, starting with the role of causal models in the human sciences, and attempting to explain why it is not possible to straightforwardly ground such models in fundamental physics. This suggests that further constraints, going beyond physics, are needed to legitimate (...) such models. These supplementary constraints could be reified, but that would seem to conflict with the completeness of physics. A response is to emphasize the practical role of causal talk, and the author suggests that a fictionalist approach might be worth exploring. After clarifying fictionalism as a general approach, they carry out in some detail the project of clarifying what a fictionalist attitude to causation would involve. (shrink)

Early work on the frequency theory of probability made extensive use of the notion of randomness, conceived of as a property possessed by disorderly collections of outcomes. Growing out of this work, a rich mathematical literature on algorithmic randomness and Kolmogorov complexity developed through the twentieth century, but largely lost contact with the philosophical literature on physical probability. The present chapter begins with a clarification of the notions of randomness and probability, conceiving of the former as a property of a (...) sequence of outcomes, and the latter as a property of the process generating those outcomes. A discussion follows of the nature and limits of the relationship between the two notions, with largely negative verdicts on the prospects for any reduction of one to the other, although the existence of an apparently random sequence of outcomes is good evidence for the involvement of a genuinely chancy process. (shrink)

Atheists are frequently demonized as arrogant intellectuals, antagonistic to religion, devoid of moral sentiments, advocates of an "anything goes" lifestyle. Now, in this revealing volume, nineteen leading philosophers open a window on the inner life of atheism, shattering these common stereotypes as they reveal how they came to turn away from religious belief. These highly engaging personal essays capture the marvelous diversity to be found among atheists, providing a portrait that will surprise most readers. Many of the authors, for example, (...) express great affection for particular religious traditions, even as they explain why they cannot, in good conscience, embrace them. None of the contributors dismiss religious belief as stupid or primitive, and several even express regret that they cannot, or can no longer, believe. Perhaps more important, in these reflective pieces, they offer fresh insight into some of the oldest and most difficult problems facing the human mind and spirit. For instance, if God is dead, is everything permitted? Philosophers without Gods demonstrates convincingly, with arguments that date back to Plato, that morality is independent of the existence of God. Indeed, every writer in this volume adamantly affirms the objectivity of right and wrong. Moreover, they contend that secular life can provide rewards as great and as rich as religious life. A naturalistic understanding of the human condition presents a set of challenges--to pursue our goals without illusions, to act morally without hope of reward--challenges that can impart a lasting value to finite and fragile human lives. Collectively, these essays highlight the richness of atheistic belief--not only as a valid alternative to religion, but as a profoundly fulfilling and moral way of life. "This Atheists R Us compilation differs markedly in tone from Hitchens and Dawkins. Excellent fare for Christian small groups whose members are genuinely interested in the arguments raised by atheists." --Christianity Today "Readable, personal, and provocative.... Contrary to the popular image, atheism isn't all rebellious trumpets and defiant drums.... Here we have all the varieties of unreligious experience, a full symphony of unbelief." --Free Inquiry "Compelling and sophisticated arguments that religious people ought to confront." --Tikkun. (shrink)

_Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings_ is the first anthology to collect essential readings in this important area of philosophy. Featuring the work of leading philosophers in the field such as Carnap, Hájek, Jeffrey, Joyce, Lewis, Loewer, Popper, Ramsey, van Fraassen, von Mises, and many others, the book looks in depth at the following key topics: subjective probability and credence probability updating: conditionalization and reflection Bayesian confirmation theory classical, logical, and evidential probability frequentism physical probability: propensities and objective chances. The book (...) features a useful primer on the mathematics of probability, and each section includes an introduction by the editor, as well as a guide to further reading. A broad-ranging and highly accessible exploration of the subject, _Philosophy of Probability_ is ideal for any student of formal epistemology, philosophy of science, metaphysics, or philosophy of mathematics. (shrink)

We applaud Ray and Cooper (2024) for emphasizing environmental health as a bioethics issue. As a team of interdisciplinary pediatric researchers and providers who are part of an institutional clima...

This chapter discusses fundamental problems and prospects for ethical naturalism. Section 1 explains what is meant by “ethical naturalism” and surveys different versions of the view. Section 2 discusses the central philosophical challenge to ethical naturalism, viz., the “Normativity Objection.” Section 3 offers a battery of responses to it on behalf of the ethical naturalist. Section 4 explores a promising and novel approach to ethical naturalism, viz., a moral nativist theory that that combines a Chomskian approach to moral competence with (...) a structuralist metaphysics. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Response 2: “Pessimism of the Intellect, Optimism of the Will”Antonis BalasopoulosLet me begin with a few words on my title, which was chosen as reflecting the nature of the orientation of my work in the field of utopian studies and therefore also of my orientation toward the theme of this roundtable. As Francesca Antonini puts it in a recent essay, the phrase, which became associated with the work of (...) Antonio Gramsci though it originates in Romain Rolland, describes “the (seemingly contradictory) coexistence of a realistic description of the status quo, on the one hand, and a genuine commitment to the possibility of transforming reality, on the other.”1Anyone who has read Thomas More’s Utopia knows that Rolland’s and Gramsci’s formula very much describes that book’s bifurcation between a voice of relentless critique of what exists in Europe—and particularly in England—in More’s time (in Book 1) and a voice preoccupied with the description of an alternative, and arguably better, world (in Book 2). This bifurcation, it is equally well known, is part of the genetic material More’s book bequeathed to its successors, so that one calls a “utopia” a (mostly, though not always) literary text, where the “realistic description of the status quo” coexists with a vision arising out of a “commitment to the possibility of transforming reality”—admittedly in different admixtures and proportions of [End Page 544] the critical or negative and the anticipatory, projective or prefigurative elements. Though Ernst Bloch’s distinction between “cold” and warm” streams within Marxism is not identical to this first binary, it is certainly related to it, so that the “cold” stream is one that privileges the rational and analytical element (usually, I would propose, in relation to the part of the Marxist tradition we know as “critique of political economy”), while the “warm stream” is one that rather foregrounds that which relates to affect, to desire, hope, or fidelity to the transformative project (these are frequently correlated to those elements of Marxism that correspond to its also being a political and philosophically imbued creed).2 What follows here, then, explores the implications of the dialectical interplay between these two sets of oppositions—and hopefully justifies such insistence on dialectic itself.3To the extent that I can see, the basic themes and areas of concentration in my colleagues’ essays involve decolonizing utopian studies as a project; addressing, in that connection, the heterogeneity of utopianisms that emerge out of a number of marginalized subjectivities; the provenance of the questions of ecology, sustainability, animal life for the present and future of utopian studies (and to some degree, for utopianism’s past); and finally, the question of utopian forms of social activism and therefore also the search for spaces beyond the walls of academic insularity. These are important and largely interconnected questions, but I am afraid I will only have the space to touch on them briefly and sketchily here.In her cogent and multifaceted intervention, Caroline Edwards begins her reflections on the task of decolonizing utopian studies by noting the high investment of fin-de-siècle utopian fiction in notions of industrial progress, noting that such notions have involved “lasting damage” for “Black writers, artists, and thinkers.” Within this framework, she evokes Joseph R. Winters’s argument that “modern notions of progress and freedom are inherently flawed,” since they are founded on the oppressive traditions of capitalism and colonialism. In turn, this leads to an argument against the teleological futurism of most nineteenth-century utopias and in support of the deconstruction of “the idea of historical progress unfolding in Hegelian dialectical stages.” What is to replace this is a hauntological (after Derrida) conception of the relation between the present and the past, for which “the present is always a site of potential breaks and ruptures that can signify both dislocation and pain as well as novelty and possibility.” In a similar vein, Heather Alberro questions the teleological futurism of an earlier tradition of utopia, evoking Laurence Davis’s observation on the importance of [End Page 545] “neglected or suppressed possibilities for qualitatively better forms of life” within the “Now.” The desideratum is, again... (shrink)

The first book to fully explore and explain the concept of yin yang, breaking it down in easy-to-follow terms for all those interested in Daoism, alternative medicine, martial arts and other Eastern fields of study. Illustrated with striking red/black graphics that make the concepts more accessible.

La question du nihilisme a une longue histoire. Elle émerge au sein de l'idéalisme allemand, se déploie ensuite dans l'intelligentsia et la littérature russes, puis trouve chez Nietzsche et Heidegger ses explorations les plus influentes. Si le mot semble moins courant depuis un demi-siècle -- comme d'autres termes aussi chargés, pensons à celui d'aliénation -- les enjeux qu'il soulève demeurent toutefois au cœur de la pensée contemporaine. Les risques environnementaux nourrissent d'ailleurs plus que jamais l'inquiétante intuition que de puissantes dynamiques (...) de dévalorisation du réel sont à l'œuvre dans les sociétés modernes. Ces douze essais, qui font largement entendre la voix d'une nouvelle génération, n'ont pourtant pas pour but de défendre une thèse commune. Ils explorent plutôt les multiples aspects du nihilisme et se confrontent à ses grandes interprétations. Sont ainsi proposées autant de pistes pour rejoindre les débats sur le capitalisme, la technique, l'éducation, le patriarcat, le roman ou la démocratie. Pluralité revendiquée, qui illustre néanmoins un même ancrage dans les défis du monde actuel. (shrink)

Despite the readily available discussion on counseling supervision models for over a quarter of a century, there is little attention in the literature with respect to how developmental supervision models align with existential philosophy. One model, The Integrated Developmental Model (IDM), is a robust and well-accepted model of supervision with embedded undertones of existentialism requiring scholarly discussion. The primary goal of this article is to emphasize the parallels between the IDM and Sartre’s philosophical principles of existentialism thereby creating a meaning (...) making framework for supervisors to enhance developmental growth of their supervisees. (shrink)

In order to understand what we are talking about when we talk about joint attention, I will scrutinize how the mainstream view that builds on representational and intentionalist theories of mind is constituted. My aim is to show that much of the theory of joint attention is quite narrowly constructed and comes with tacit disciplinary biases that exclude much of what is existentially important in our practices of sharing our perceptions and guiding others to attend to the world in novel (...) ways. By using the frameworks of classical phenomenology and enactivist theories of mind, I aim to show how we, in our interactions, share our perceptions even with beings that are distinctly different from us. And, that this _difference_ in our personal worldview, our cognitive capacities, and our sensory modalities should be seen as a constitutive aspect of our practices of shared attention. I will articulate attention as a revelatory practice that aids us in discovering a shared world through the plurality, rather than similarity, of our perceptual actions. Attention is, in this sense, not solely driven by subjective intentions; it is also formed and co-constituted by my being addressed by the other. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titles: Abilities Concepts Conclusion.

Epistemological internalists have a problem about perceptual knowledge: how can perceptual experience both provide faithful information about the external world and justification for empirical belief? This is Sellars’s famous problem about “the given.” Chapter 12 argues, first, that this problem is not just for internalists—a version of it arises for naturalistic externalists. But, second, it argues that the problem can be solved within naturalistic bounds, by appealing to a category of causal relations called “intelligible causation.”.