The widespread introduction of accreditation procedures contradicts the centrality of freedom in research and teaching which Wilhelm von Humboldt paradigmatically supported. The logic of accreditation propagated during the last decades implies in fact a reversal of Hulmboldt’s perspective: priority is given to standardization and – not necessarily sheer – competition, which shifts the human being into a peripheral position within academic education. With regard to the reductionist anthropology presupposed by accreditation procedures, Humboldt’s Menschenbild manifests a breaking contrastivity. Humboldt in fact (...) intends human beings not as merely biological or psychological subjects, but as spiritual selves capable of a fruitful development with the help of science, whereas science is primarily perceived as spiritual and dialogical activity. This notion of science, which echoes Socrates’ midwifery, could represent a more human alternative to future sceneries in which universities would be exclusively considered as institutions providing services. (shrink)

A pesar de que el concepto de sophia ocupa un lugar central en el pensamiento de Platón, hasta ahora no se han analizado adecuadamente los pocos pasajes de los diálogos platónicos en los que este concepto se examina directamente. A partir de estos pasajes, se puede mostrar que la sophia es una unidad viva de conocimiento y acción basada en la experiencia del principio supremo, esto es, del Bien. Esta experiencia lleva al hombre a transcenderse a sí mismo y volverse (...) semejante al Intelecto (nous) que crea y guía al universo. De esta manera, el hombre se vuelve capaz de transformar la propia vida en un cosmos que, permeado por el Bien, se revela como una manifestación de la verdadera belleza. --- “Self-knowledge and Creation of a Cosmos. Dimensions of sofia in Plato’s Thought”. Even though the concept of sophia holds a central role in Plato’s thought, the few passages of the Platonic dialogues in which this concept is examined directly have not been adequately analyzed until now. In the consideration of these passages, one can prove that sophia is a living unity of knowledge and action based on the experience of the supreme principle, that is, of the Good. This experience leads man to transcend himself and to become similar to the Intellect (nous) that creates and guides the universe. This way, man becomes capable of transforming his own life into a cosmos that, permeated by the Good, reveals itself as a manifestation of true beauty. (shrink)

This article intends to characterize the constructive function that the Indeterminate Duality may have played in Plato’s oral teaching. Far from being in itself – as some testimonia seem to suggest – the primary origin of evil, as origin of multiplicity the Indeterminate Duality can be perceived as intrinsically presupposed by Plato’s identification of the source of being with the supreme Good. The notion of good implicates for Plato namely an unconditioned impulse to relationality, which indicates that the supreme Good (...) is to be considered as supreme origin not only of unity, but also of multiplicity and alterity. In the absence of multiplicity and alterity, no real relation, and, therefore, no real manifestation of the Good could in fact take place. As a consequence, the Indeterminate Duality may be considered as source of that original differentiation as well as of that generativity without which the supreme Good would be discordant with its goodness. (shrink)

Dieser Beitrag zeigt, daß die Idee der,,Angleichung an Gott" als der Kern von Platons Philosophie betrachtet werden kann. Den Ausgangspunkt bildet eine skizzenhafte Erörterung des platonischen Philosophiebegriffs. Daran anschließend wird die Verwurzelung der oμoιωσιζ θεω in Platons Theologie hervorgehoben. Die Behandlung ihrer dem platonischen Denken immanenten Voraussetzungen wie ihres konkreten Inhalts führt schließlich im letzten Teil der Arbeit zu der Frage nach der Rolle der oμoιωσιζ θεω in den verschiedenen Dimensionen der platonischen Philosophie. So ergibt sich ein einheitliches Bild von (...) Platons Philosophieren, in dem alle Bestandteile vom Begriff der,,Angleichung an Gott" zusammengehalten und getragen werden. (shrink)

In Resp. 509c7 and 9 Socrates declares that he has omitted many things in the exposition of the analogy between the supreme Good and the sun. In fact Socrates’ exposition leaves some questions open which are seminal with regard to the interpretation of the aforesaid analogy : 1) Why Plato designates the sun as analogon of the Good? 2) Why the original manifestation of the Good consists in a plurality of intelligible beings? 3) Why the original manifestation of the Good (...) consists not only in a purely objective intelligible being, but also in an intellect, that is in a form of consciousness? 4) How can be explained the fact that Plato perceives the Good as origin not only of intelligible, but also of physical reality? While the first question can be simply answered by referring to the infinite manifestativity of the Good, the other three questions require a significant effort in the field of speculation. Basing on some clues given by Plato in the exposition of the analogy between the Good and the sun, this article attempts to answer these questions by conjecturing that Plato could have presupposed the image of an infinite sphere consisting in intelligible light. This image, which could have already been presupposed by Parmenides, would offer a conceptual background capable of explaining on the one hand the unity of intelligibility and intellect characterizing the original manifestation of the Good, on the other hand why in Plato’s perspective the Good can be perceived as origin not only of intelligible, but also of physical light. (shrink)

Trotz der Zentralität des Begriffs σ^φια in Platons Denken wurden bis jetzt die nicht zahlreichen Stellen der platonischen Dialoge, wo die σ^φια direkt charakterisiert wird, nie einer angemessenen Analyse unterzogen. Ausgehend von diesen Stellen erweist sich die σ^φια als lebendige Einheit von Erkennen und Handeln, die auf der Erfahrung des höchsten Prinzips bzw. des Guten fußt. Die genannte Erfahrung führt den Menschen dazu, sich selbst zu transzendieren und dem Intellekt ν^υζ) ähnlich zu werden, der das Weltall erschafft und lenkt. Dadurch (...) wird der Mensch fähig, das eigene Leben in einen Kosmos zu verwandeln, der sich, vom Guten durchdrungen, als Manifestation der wahren Schönheit offenbart. (shrink)

This article focuses on certain dimensions of Plotinus’ notion of the noetic self, which so far have not received sufficient scholarly atten­tion. The evidence of Enn. V 8 makes clear the assumption about the inexhaustible generativity of the noetic self. This generativity implies an intimate relation with the notions of image and suddenness: the former is intended as a medium of unconditional self-transparency, whereas the latter is understood as pointing to the unlimited newness that is char­acteristic of the noetic life, (...) which, according to Plotinus, consists in an indissoluble unity of identity and alterity. The aforesaid notions make it reasonable to view Plotinus’ concept of noetic self as pointing to a predominantly relational and dynamic ontology, in which essentialism presupposes no staticity whatsoever, but can rather be seen as a perspective that leads to the development of a harmonious and non-narcissistic creativity. (shrink)

In Plato’s Republic the prime cause of all things, the Good, is presented both as transcending every form of being and as the supreme Idea, that is to say as the supreme being. The inconsistency between these two characterizations seems to point to the paradoxical relation subsisting between the absolutely transcendent Good and its supreme self-revelation : by revealing itself, the ἀγαϑὸν ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας constitutes the highest being and therefore has to be considered to be identical with the ἰδέα (...) τοῦ ἀγαϑοῦ; on the other hand its absolute transcendence implies a clear supereminence in regard to the Idea of the Good. This article tries to highlight and illustrate these antinomic aspects of Plato’s notion of the Good with the help of both the so-called ἄγραφα δόγματα and the representation of the Demiurge in Plato’s work. (shrink)

In Plato’s Republic the prime cause of all things, the Good, is presented both as transcending every form of being and as the supreme Idea, that is to say as the supreme being. The inconsistency between these two characterizations seems to point to the paradoxical relation subsisting between the absolutely transcendent Good and its supreme self-revelation : by revealing itself, the ἀγαϑὸν ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας constitutes the highest being and therefore has to be considered to be identical with the ἰδέα (...) τοῦ ἀγαϑοῦ; on the other hand its absolute transcendence implies a clear supereminence in regard to the Idea of the Good. This article tries to highlight and illustrate these antinomic aspects of Plato’s notion of the Good with the help of both the so-called ἄγραφα δόγματα and the representation of the Demiurge in Plato’s work. (shrink)

Semantic theories based on a hierarchy of types have prominently been used to defend the possibility of unrestricted quantification. However, they also pose a prima facie problem for it: each quantifier ranges over at most one level of the hierarchy and is therefore not unrestricted. It is difficult to evaluate this problem without a principled account of what it is for a quantifier to be unrestricted. Drawing on an insight of Russell’s about the relationship between quantification and the structure of (...) predication, we offer such an account. We use this account to examine the problem in three different type-theoretic settings, which are increasingly permissive with respect to predication. We conclude that unrestricted quantification is available in all but the most permissive kind of type theory. (shrink)

Plural expressions found in natural languages allow us to talk about many objects simultaneously. Plural logic — a logical system that takes plurals at face value — has seen a surge of interest in recent years. This book explores its broader significance for philosophy, logic, and linguistics. What can plural logic do for us? Are the bold claims made on its behalf correct? After introducing plural logic and its main applications, the book provides a systematic analysis of the relation between (...) this logic and other theoretical frameworks such as set theory, mereology, higher-order logic, and modal logic. The applications of plural logic rely on two assumptions, namely that this logic is ontologically innocent and has great expressive power. These assumptions are shown to be problematic. The result is a more nuanced picture of plural logic's applications than has been given thus far. Questions about the correct logic of plurals play a central role in the final chapters, where traditional plural logic is rejected in favor of a "critical" alternative. The most striking feature of this alternative is that there is no universal plurality. This leads to a novel approach to the relation between the many and the one. In particular, critical plural logic paves the way for an account of sets capable of solving the set-theoretic paradoxes. (shrink)

L'opera sviluppa una riflessione politico-simbolica sul rapporto identità-alterità per rintracciare le valenze, che favoriscono il riconoscimento dell'incontro, al di là del possibile scontro alternativo escludente. Due i simboli politici esaminati, Prometeo e Cristo, che danno di che pensare, sollecitando a ri-pensare, il rapporto con l'altro. Aut aut: da una parte la croce di Cristo che simbolicamente, con i suoi bracci che si intersecano l'uno attraverso l'altro, rappresenta l'apertura della dimensione immanente, nella sua orizzontalità, a quella trascendente, nella sua verticalità, ossia (...) la tensione al supra e al prius quale esigenza di progresso ascensionale di ricerca del massimo bene umano; dall'altra la rupe di Prometeo, espressione dell'attaccamento ctonico al piano immanente, che, se assolutizzato, opprime e mortifica l'essere incatenandolo e affossandolo. Con un'originale apertura della politica alla pedagogia, l'autrice affronta la questione cruciale del la libertà che, intesa come liberazione responsabile dall'insignificanza all'infinito, richiede di essere educata per rendere concretamente possibile il progetto di una convivenza più autenticamente umana. (shrink)

We construct an explicit covariant Majorana formulation of Maxwell electromagnetism which does not make use of vector 4-potential. This allows us to write a “Dirac” equation for the photon containing all the known properties of it. In particular, the spin and (intrinsic) boost matrices are derived and the helicity properties of the photon are studied.

Plural logic is widely assumed to have two important virtues: ontological innocence and determinacy. It is claimed to be innocent in the sense that it incurs no ontological commitments beyond those already incurred by the first-order quantifiers. It is claimed to be determinate in the sense that it is immune to the threat of non-standard interpretations that confronts higher-order logics on their more traditional, set-based semantics. We challenge both claims. Our challenge is based on a Henkin-style semantics for plural logic (...) that does not resort to sets or set-like objects to interpret plural variables, but adopts the view that a plural variable has many objects as its values. Using this semantics, we also articulate a generalized notion of ontological commitment which enables us to develop some ideas of earlier critics of the alleged ontological innocence of plural logic. (shrink)

This paper presents a case study of the “electric hypothesis” of the causes of earthquakes, which emerged in the second half of the eighteenth century as part of the first studies of seismology. This hypothesis was related to Franklin’s views on atmospheric electricity and developed in a period when electric phenomena were widely studied, and was essentially based on solid empirical evidence and confirmed by model experiments. Even though it resulted from scientific reasoning, the theory remained strongly empirical, and was (...) supported by Italian scholars who were familiar with seismic events. Among these, Giuseppe Saverio Poli, a follower of Franklin, was able to provide a careful and comprehensive explanation of the disastrous earthquake of 1783, which occurred in Calabria, a region of southern Italy, and the St. Anne earthquake of 1805, by drawing not just upon the electric evidence, but all the relevant phenomenology available. We outline here the emergence, the development, and the later evolution (up to the beginning of the nineteenth century) of the “electric earthquake” paradigm by focusing on different works by Poli, including a previously unknown manuscript containing a thorough account of the Calabria earthquake prepared by the Neapolitan scholar for the Royal Society. The present case study therefore offers the opportunity to illustrate how electrical science shaped earthquake science to a degree not usually appreciated in the literature, and is also supported to some extent by the transition from Enlightenment scientific ideals to the Romantic conception of unity in the natural world, in search of common causes among phenomena belonging to different fields. (shrink)