The manuscript explores the plausibility of care-based epistemology in a comparative key. Investigating the epistemic virtue of care-giving, the work weaves together insights from care ethics, virtue epistemology and a particular reading of the Mah=abh=arata which, left to themselves, do not appear compatible with one another. Drawing on these traditions, the work goes on to provide a feminist vision of search for truth that is consistent with both ethical relations and interventions for justice.

This paper argues that the concept of care is significant not only for ethics, but for epistemology as well. After elucidating caring as a five-step dyadic relation, I go on to show its epistemic significance within the general framework of virtue epistemology as developed by Ernest Sosa, Alvin Goldman, and Linda Zagzebski. The notions of "care-knowing" and "care-based epistemology" emerge from construing caring (respectively) as a reliabilist and responsibilist virtue.

This paper argues that the concept of care is significant not only for ethics, but for epistemology as well. After elucidating caring as a five-step dyadic relation, I go on to show its epistemic significance within the general framework of virtue epistemology as developed by Ernest Sosa, Alvin Goldman, and Linda Zagzebski. The notions of “care-knowing” and “care-based epistemology” emerge from construing caring as a reliabilist and responsibilist virtue.

It is a privilege to have such extensive engagement with one's work as in the responses of Linda Alcoff, Eva Kittay, Keya Maitra, and Nilanjan Das. I am sincerely thankful for the intellectual generosity and thoughtfulness of their critiques. Before responding to their specific concerns, however, I lay out the general argument of Caring to Know in broad strokes to serve as the common backdrop to their comments.The central idea of Caring to Know is that notions of 'knowing well' are (...) intertwined with ideas of 'living well,' and so epistemology is linked with ethics and politics, and epistemic normativity is reconfigured to involve goodness and justice. Of course, reference to moral concepts when delineating epistemic... (shrink)

The Mahabharata, one of the major epics of India, is a sourcebook complete by itself as well as an open text constantly under construction. This volume looks at transactions between its modern discourses and ancient vocabulary. Located amid conversations between these two conceptual worlds, the volume grapples with the epic's problematisation of dharma or righteousness, and consequently, of the ideal person and the good life through a cluster of issues surrounding the concept of agency and action. Drawing on several interdisciplinary (...) approaches, the essays reflect on a range of issues in the Mahabharata, including those of duty, motivation, freedom, selfhood, choice, autonomy, and justice, both in the context of philosophical debates and their ethical and political ramifications for contemporary times. This book will be of interest to scholars and researchers engaged with philosophy, literature, religion, history, politics, culture, gender, South Asian studies, and Indology. It will also appeal to the general reader interested in South Asian epics and the Mahabharata. (shrink)

Makes a case for redirecting epistemology by basing it on a virtue approach and the method of care. According to virtue epistemology, what confers epistemic value are properties of the epistemic subject: his or her epistemic character, belief‐forming habits, and cognitive dispositions. The method of care is a complex, interactive process of acquiring justified beliefs or knowledge, a process that integrates the subject into a social and ethical context. Starting out with a discussion of knowledge of other minds, the writer (...) moves on to an examination of the role the knowing self plays within the kind of epistemology she wishes to advocate. One important element of that kind of epistemology is epistemic responsibility, understood not as epistemic duty fulfillment but instead as the endeavor to cultivate and reinforce attitudes that are deemed admirable in the epistemic community. (shrink)

The feminist significance of the Goddess Kali lies in an indigenous worshipful attitude of “Kali-bhakti” rather than in the mere image of the Goddess. The peculiar mother-child motif at the core of the poet Ramprasad Sen's Kali-bhakti represents, I argue, not only a dramatic reconstruction of femininity but of selfhood in general. The spiritual goal of a devotee here involves a deconstruction of “master identity” necessary also for ethico-political struggles for justice.

: The feminist significance of the Goddess Kali lies in an indigenous worshipful attitude of "Kali-bhakti" rather than in the mere image of the Goddess. The peculiar mother-child motif at the core of the poet Ramprasad Sen's Kali-bhakti represents, I argue, not only a dramatic reconstruction of femininity but of selfhood in general. The spiritual goal of a devotee here involves a deconstruction of "master identity" necessary also for ethico-political struggles for justice.

Alessandra Tanesini’s The Mismeasure of the Self can be read as promoting non-ideal theory in epistemology. Tanesini articulates the virtue of intellectual humility (central for accurate self-assessment) in close connection with the human vices of superiority and inferiority. I begin by showing how her novel analysis that situates humility in a cluster of differently-functioning ‘attitudes’ enriches both the positive motivational resources and the pitfalls that a knower must negotiate. The proximity of virtues and vices in the conceptual map that constitutes (...) humility, explains feminist claims of how subjects who are harmed as knowers can still flourish and even resist their cognitive marginalization. I then move on to critiquing Tanesini’s understanding of intellectual humility because it fails to be a truly ‘liberatory virtue.’ I suggest alternative ways of connecting intellectual humility to shame and hope that still remain true to Tanesini’s broader ethical context but make it potent for social justice. In spite of mindfulness of social context, Tanesini works with an epistemic selfhood bleached out of its historical and social embeddedness and hence, whose self-knowledge through humility does not involve the knowledge of the world and of others. Such an intellectual humility, I argue, cannot be justice-conducive. (shrink)

The dialogue between Pūjanī and Brahmadatta is a lesser known episode in the Mahābhārata. This paper explores how Pūjanī’s voice is relevant when rethinking autonomy for feminist relational selves. I first unravel the different ‘stories’ that can be told through this single but multi-layered narrative. Then, by re-arranging their insights and using the idea of ‘normative authority’ proposed by Catriona Mackenzie, I piece together a picture of autonomy foregrounding dependence on others and volatile emotionality––both of which are generally thought to (...) be opposed to ‘being in control’ or being autonomous. This emerging picture of self-governance indicates how even selves constituted by relationships to others can exit relational situations that are or become harmful. I also show that the episode leaves behind ‘internalist’ conceptions of autonomy for more capacious notions of self-determination that incorporate the importance of structural changes for agentive freedom. This goes beyond the insights of the Mahābhārata in a self-reflexive move built into the story itself. (shrink)

I examine the kind of alliances and ironic crossing of borders that constitute an ecofeminist subjectivity by appeal to a postcolonial literary imagination and ahistorical philosophical argumentation. I link the theoretical insights of a modern short story “Bestiality” with a concept of “congenital debt” found in the ancient Vedic corpus to suggest a notion of ecological selfhood that transforms into the idea of a “gift community” to encompass nonhumans as well as people on the fringes of society, but without the (...) usual problems associated with such a two-pronged extensionism. (shrink)

I examine the kind of alliances and ironic crossing of borders that constitute an ecofeminist subjectivity by appeal to a postcolonial literary imagination and ahistorical philosophical argumentation. I link the theoretical insights of a modern short story “Bestiality” with a concept of “congenital debt” found in the ancient Vedic corpus to suggest a notion of ecological selfhood that transforms into the idea of a “gift community” to encompass nonhumans as well as people on the fringes of society, but without the (...) usual problems associated with such a two-pronged extensionism. (shrink)

This dissertation attempts to defend the justifiability of our belief that there is an external world. I begin by investigating what such a claim means and how it fits in with a common sense "realism." The idea put forth is that the latter asserts not only that there is an external world but also what there is in it. So, the bare assertion about the existence of the external world is only a part of common sense. However, I claim that (...) even such a 'mitigated realism' can be interesting and indicate how Putnam's internal realism amounts to just this. ;I then discuss "epistemological arguments" against realism so defined. These are arguments that begin with the epistemological theses and conclude the denial of realism--a strategy found even in the classic idealist Bishop Berkeley. The steps from such epistemic premises to a metaphysical conclusion are spelled out and the general conception of the epistemological project that underlies and warrants such an inference is explored. What emerges is that to be relevant for metaphysics, epistemic debates must be both non-question-begging and epistemic justifiability must be defined in terms of truth-conduciveness. A model of how epistemology can incorporate these features is suggested. ;The last part of the discussion aims at rejecting the epistemic premises of such anti-realist arguments. This amounts to claiming that an external world is both believable and justified. The arguments of Donald Davidson and Laurence Bonjour claiming to establish this are discussed and criticised. A final vindication, however, is given by reformulating Hilary Putnam's brains-in-a-vat argument. What emerges from the discussion is that just as metaphysics cannot be done in isolation from epistemology, epistemology too cannot be done independently of a theory of intentionality and belief. (shrink)

Adopting the framework of Anglo Analytic Virtue Epistemology, I ask of the Sanskrit epic, the Mahrata, the question: What sort of character or must a have? Then, inspired by broadly feminist sensibilities, I raise the concern whether dispositions for knowing the world can be associated with motivations to rectify injustices in that world just knower.virtues of truth’ in the epic to see whether they can establish a connection between knowing and justice.

Cet article traite des articulations spécifiques du care proposées par trois éminentes théoriciennes du concept – Eva Kittay, Joan Tronto, et Maria Puig de la Bellacasa – afin d’analyser les aspects pratiques du Covid-19 aux États-Unis et en Inde. La question centrale est de savoir si une analyse de la pandémie par le care peut amorcer des imaginations radicalement différentes du “vivre ensemble” dans un monde post-Covid. Après avoir examiné certains obstacles à l’adoption des changements profondément relationnels de la perspective (...) du soin, j’examinerai si notre réponse aux crises contient une « auto-réflexion pragmatique » implicite des cadres néolibéraux bien enracinés et fondés sur l’individualité atomisée, la responsabilité individualisée et les valeurs du fondamentalisme de marché. (shrink)

This is a comment on Minds Without Fear.

The politics of the us/them or West/East divide forms the backdrop to philosophizing about, for and by women in India. Starting with an awareness that “Western woman” cannot mean the same as “Indian woman,” the philosopher here is easily led to an antiessentialism and explosion of a monolithic idea of woman. With such diffusion comes also a variegation in a monochrome “feminism”; for if subjects are multiple, so also are the blueprints for their emancipation. Resting content with a plurality of (...) feminisms might seem an obvious solution here; but then, it is also natural to wonder whether a simple grammatical pluralization can create space for genuine conceptual diversity, given the entrenched (and Western) associations of the term. (shrink)

In this paper I compare two very different deployments of love in ethics. Swami Vivekananda's concept of ethical love ties into the project of constructing an alternative masculinity for a colonized people; while feminist care ethics uses love to escape the perceived masculinity of traditional ethical theory. Using Kenneth Goodpaster's distinction between ‘framework questions’ and ‘application questions,’ I try to show that love in Practical Vedanta addresses the former while feminist care ethics concerns itself with the latter. Even though this (...) difference, I suggest, could be a function of their varying historical-political contexts, the two issues need to be taken together for a more complete understanding of the ethical subject. (shrink)

Many thanks to Mark Siderits for extended conversations and comments. Also to Arindam Chakrabarti.

In this response I address concerns raised by Dalmiya (2022) and McElroy-Heltzel (2022) about features of the account of intellectual humility developed in The Mismeasure of the Self (2021). I focus on the worries that humility is insufficiently relational, compatible with apathy, and potentially ineffective in the service of liberatory projects. I conclude with a brief discussion of the measurement of humility.

'Caring to Know' argues that “caring is not the ‘other’ of reason and that our lived experiences of caring and being cared for can be useful resources for truth-seeking” (1). This claim is fleshed out over six chapters using a creative blend of analytical feminist theory, virtue theory of knowledge, and cross-cultural philosophy. The brief conclusion braids together different strands of the argument. The review examines the potential of Dalmiya's 'humble relational knowers' for cross-cultural philosophy.

Environmental, social, and governance (ESG) investing is synonymous with sustainable investment for socially responsible investors. Unfortunately, the diversity of ESG investing remains unattended amidst the growth in ESG literature, as the academic literature focuses dominantly on measuring performance. An understanding of a wide range of subjects entailing ESG is required before future research on ESG investing is performed. To overcome the challenge, this systematic literature review uses bibliometric mapping to reveal four significant research themes within the ESG investing literature: investor (...) behavior and motivations for ESG investing; cost and risk mitigation in ESG investing; portfolio screening and ESG investing; and ESG performance. The review critically examines each theme and broadens the research agenda for future studies. In addition to the significant themes, this paper also discusses theoretical and recent research trends in the ESG investing literature. The review identifies clashes and crossovers between these themes to appropriately interpret one theme using another and emphasizes the heterogeneity in ESG investing. Lastly, discussion over concerns and criticisms of ESG investing highlights greenwashing as a major cause of concern for investors. (shrink)

Vrinda Dalmiya's Caring to Know is an exciting, impressive, and above all important work on caring in ethics and epistemology. Its central focus is to articulate what Dalmiya calls "care-knowing"—which proposes care as a basic intellectual virtue. In developing its dual aspects—caring as a process and caring as a disposition—Dalmiya offers a systematic argument that defends the viability and efficacy of care-knowing. The early chapters set the stage by offering a "thumbnail" account of the main moves (...) in the literature on care ethics and virtue epistemology. All the building blocks are then assembled to develop the central concept of the book, namely the virtue of "relational humility," a... (shrink)

Caring to Know by Vrinda Dalmiya is a remarkable, and remarkably original, work. It develops a significant extension of the care-ethical framework for epistemology, builds on as well as critiques Western feminist philosophy, and offers an original interpretation of the Mahābhārata's implication for epistemic norms. But perhaps most importantly, it invents an entirely original epistemology unlike anything, really, in English. The revolutionary dimensions of the book are clear from the beginning: this is a work of decolonial epistemology.For the (...) period of our shared presence in the profession of philosophy, moral theory and epistemology have begun a cautious conversation. There is now moral epistemology, a field of... (shrink)

In this article, we explicate evidence-based nursing (EBN), critically appraise its framework and respond to nurses’ concern that EBN sidelines the caring elements of nursing practice. We use resources from care ethics, especially Vrinda Dalmiya’s work that considers care as crucial for both epistemology and ethics, to show how EBN is compatible with, and indeed can be enhanced by, the caring aspects of nursing practice. We demonstrate that caring can act as a bridge between ‘external’ evidence and the (...) other pillars of the EBN framework: clinical expertise; patient preferences and values. Drawing on an influential EBN handbook, section 1 presents the aims and features of EBN, including the normative principle that EBN should take place within a ‘context of caring’. We aim to understand this context and whether it can be neatly detached from the EBN framework, as the handbook seems to suggest. In section 2, we highlight the grounds for resistance to EBN from the nursing community, before mounting the argument that nursing practices can be understood fruitfully through feminist care ethics and/or virtue ethics lenses. In section 3, we deepen that analysis using Dalmiya’s concepts of care-knowing and care as a hybrid ethico-epistemic virtue, which are ideally suited to the complex practices of nursing. In section 4, we bring this rich understanding of care into conversation with EBN, showing that its framework cannot be adequately theorised without paying proper attention to care. Caring can be neither an innocuous background assumption of nor an afterthought to the EBN framework. (shrink)

How care can resist the stifling force of the neoliberal paradigm In a world brimming with tremendous wealth and resources, too many are suffering the oppression of precarious existences--and with no adequate relief from free market-driven institutions. Care Ethics in the Age of Precarity assembles an international group of interdisciplinary scholars to explore the question of care theory as a response to market-driven capitalism, addressing the relationship of three of the most compelling social and political subjects today: care, precarity, and (...) neoliberalism. While care theory often centers on questions of individual actions and choices, this collection instead connects theory to the contemporary political moment and public sphere. The contributors address the link between neoliberal values--such as individualism, productive exchange, and the free market--and the pervasive state of precarity and vulnerability in which so many find themselves. From disability studies and medical ethics to natural-disaster responses and the posthuman, examples from Māori, Dutch, and Japanese politics to the COVID-19 pandemic and the Black Lives Matter movement, this collection presents illuminating new ways of considering precarity in our world. Care Ethics in the Age of Precarity offers a hopeful tone in the growing valorization of care, demonstrating the need for an innovative approach to precarity within entrenched systems of oppression and a change in priorities around the basic needs of humanity. Contributors: Andries Baart, U Medical Center Utrecht, Tilburg U, and Catholic Theological U Utrecht, the Netherlands; Vrinda Dalmiya, U of Hawaii, Mānoa; Emilie Dionne, U Laval; Maggie FitzGerald, U of Saskatchewan; Sacha Ghandeharian, Carleton U; Eva Feder Kittay, Stony Brook U/SUNY; Carlo Leget, U of Humanistic Studies in Utrecht, the Netherlands; Sarah Clark Miller, Penn State U; Luigina Mortari, U of Verona; Yayo Okano, Doshisha U, Kyoto, Japan; Elena Pulcini, U of Florence. (shrink)

The first half of the paper consists of a philosophical reflection upon a historical exchange. I discuss Buber’s famous letter, and another letter by J. L. Magnes, to Mahatma Gandhi, both challenging the universality of the principle of ahiṃsā. I also touch on Buber’s interest and acquaintance with Indian philosophy, as an instance of dialogue de-facto across cultures. Gandhi never answered these letters, but his grandson and philosopher extraordinaire Ramchandra Gandhi ›answers‹ Buber, not on the letter but about the ideal (...) of dialogue at large, and the interconnection of dialogue and ahiṃsā. The second half of the paper focuses on the work of Daya Krishna, another ›philosopher of dialogue.‹ from within Daya Krishna’s vast philosophical corpus, I underscore one of his last projects, in which he sketches the outlines of what he refers to as »knowledge without certainty,« contrary to common and traditional ways of perceiving the concept of knowledge. I argue that the pramāṇa, means and measure of knowledge, in the intriguing case of »knowledge without certainty,« depicted by Daya Krishna as open-ended, dynamic, constantly evolving, is inevitably dialogue, and I aim to disclose the meaning and salience of dialogue in Daya Krishna’s oeuvre. However, not just the content, but also the form, or the ›how,‹ matters in my paper. I use different materials across genres and disciplines to rethink, in dialogue with Buber and Daya Krishna, the possibilities and impossibilities of dialogue. These ›materials‹ include Milan Kundera and Richard Rorty, Krishna and Arjuna, Vrinda Dalmiya who works with the notion of care as bridging between epistemology and ethics, Wes Anderson on seeing through the eyes of the other, and Ben Okri on hospitality in the realm of ideas. As author of the present paper I am moderating an imagined a multi-vocal dialogue between these ›participants‹ on dialogue as concept, as craft and especially, as a great necessity in the world in which we live. (shrink)

Every ethic, if it is not to be a feather in the wind, needs an epistemology. As we look at epistemologies from Plato's Theaetetus to Kant's First Critique to contemporary virtue epistemology, the question of knowledge is always tethered to an ethics, sometimes tightly, sometimes loosely. To live a good life and act rightly toward others, we need to know what we need to know to do this well; we need to know how to know that what we are doing (...) is what is good or right; and we need to know how we can know what is good and right. That is, if we wish to know that what we are doing is right, what principles or precepts to follow, we need to reflect on the nature and the possibility of knowledge itself.What Vrinda Dalmiya... (shrink)