I argue that sentences ascribing beliefs to non-human animals have the same logical form as sentences of the "perceives that" variety. Pace D.M. Armstrong, I argue that animal belief sentences can be referentially opaque, just as perception sentences containing a propositional clause are. In both cases, referential opacity requires our assuming that the animal believer and the human perceiver has each identified the object of the belief or perception.

I argue that the time-gap argument poses no objection to Direct Realism. In the case of exploded stars many light years from us, what we see is no longer the star, but its light. I argue that in all cases of seeing we see light, but only when physical objects exist at the time of our seeing do we see them.

I defend the view that propositional knowledge can be defined as follows: A knows that p if and only if A believes that p because p. Spelling out the meaning of 'because' in this formula results in a causal-explanatory view of knowledge.

If skepticism is once again fashionable, then much of the credit must go to Peter Unger who gives a sustained defense of an ultra-pyrrhonian position in his book, Ignorance: A case for Skepticism. Starting with a version of the traditional argument that we know nothing about the external world, Unger plunges deeper into skeptical waters by next arguing that there is at most hardly anything which we know to be so; and he scarcely pauses before proceeding to defend the stronger (...) conclusion of ‘universal ignorance,’ the thesis that nobody ever knows anything to be the case. I view Unger's thesis and the arguments that led him to it as a challenge to be overcome, not by an appeal to dogmatism - which Unger sees as the only alternative to skepticism - but by recourse to hard-biting arguments of the sort in which Unger himself puts his faith. In what follows I shall attempt to restate Unger's three main skeptical arguments with a view to showing that their bite is not nearly so hard as he imagines. (shrink)

I argue that there are perverse actions, in the sense that they are acts performed in the belief that they are wrong. They are also, however, acts done in the belief that they are right. What makes them perverse is, not only that they have conflicting motivations, but that the motivation that wins out is not in accord with reason. That is, a perverse act is one resulting from one's strongest motivation but not based on all one's available reasons.

I argue that Davidson's anti-skeptical thesis can survive objections made against it by treating skepticism as logically possible, but not epistemically possible. That is, the skeptical hypothesis of massive error conflicts with what we must take ourselves to know if we are to have coherent thought and speech.

I argue that a modern gloss on Aristotle’s notions of Form and Matter not only allows us to escape a dualism of the psychological and the physical, but also results in a plausible sort of materialism. This is because Aristotle held that the essential nature of any psychological state, including perception and human thought, is to be some physical property. I also show that Hilary Putnam and Martha Nussbaum are mistaken in saying that Aristotle was not a materialist, but a (...) functionalist. His functionalism should instead be given a materialistic interpretation, since he holds that only the appropriate sort of matter can realize the human psyche. Aristotle’s functionalism is therefore best viewed as a “causal functionalism,” in which functional descriptions enable us to find the right sort of material embodiment. By sidestepping dualistic assumptions, Aristotle also avoids having to deal with any further notion of consciousness. (shrink)

I argue for the following analysis of a freely willed action: an act is done of one's own free will, if and only if, it is an intentional act performed by one acting as a rational agent from unobstructed reasons, and so situated that he or she has the capacity to forbear from performing it.

Bredo C. Johnsen1 misconceives my strictures concerning acceptance of the following principle : If A both knows that p and knows that p entails q, then A can come to know that q.Johnsen seems unaware that my criticism was intended to apply only after is made to appear in its most plausible light; that is, only after its consequent is interpreted as: ’It is logically possible for A to know that q.’ Without this interpretation might be dismissed simply on the (...) grounds that A suffers from some physical or psychological disability that prevents him from drawing inferences from what he knows.Properly interpreted, remains acceptable as long as the propositions substituted for p and q are such that it is at least logically possible for A to get evidence enough to make them known. Agreement on this point is itself enough to render Johnsen's own examples irrelevant. For instance, even though it may be physically impossible for A to get adequate evidence that in the constellation Andromeda there is a planet intermediate in size between Venus and Earth, the foregoing is still a fit substitution instance for q; but since such a q does not suffice to falsify the consequent of, it does nothing to generate any skeptical argument, either. (shrink)

In this article it is argued that it is impossible to give a reductive analysis of knowledge, given that knowledge is an "epistemic" concept with these marks: (1) like necessity, it is only partially truth-functional; and, (2) unlike necessity, it includes an "intentional" component (belief) which is completely non-truth-functional. a reductive analysis would have to contain at least one extensional component, one intentional component, and none that is itself epistemic. but any plausible analysis then turns out either to be non-reductive, (...) e.g., causal, or else falls prey to "gettier" counterexamples. my positive suggestion is that we eschew reductive analyses of epistemic concepts in favor of non-reductive analyses. (shrink)

I answer objections to my article, "The Time-Gap Argument," made by C. Daniels in his "Seeing Through a Time Gap.".

I argue that Robert Almeder's "Blind Realism," although instructive, fails to show that recourse to completely justified belief defuses Gettier counterexamples. This is because Almeder's notion of complete justification involves conflating truth with "warranted assertibility," thus making truth relative to what was scientifically fashionable at the time.

Edmund Gettier has cited familiar cases in which it seems plausible to conclude that a person has a true and justified belief, yet lacks knowledge. Robert Almeder denies that Gettier’s cases falsify the traditional account. What they show is that Gettier’s subjects lack knowledge because they are not completely justified in their beliefs, where being completely justified in believing that p entails the truth of the proposition that p. This move blocks Gettier’s counterexamples, which rely on the possibility that one (...) might be justified in believing something false. (shrink)

Résumé Sans négliger les autres documents pertinents dans un tour d’horizon final et comparatif, cette étude s’efforce de dépeindre l’enseignement universitaire de la philosophie tel qu’il se reflète dans le miroir des textes didascaliques artiens de Paris jusqu’au mitan du xiiie siècle, tout en fournissant en annexe un premier répertoire, encore partiel, de ce corpus, avec ses éditions et ses traductions. Malgré son caractère généralement pratique et institutionnel, certains de ses éléments théoriques — comme la mise en relief de la (...) liaison intime, trame sapientielle de ces écrits de maîtres ès arts, entre théologie cosmique et éthique philosophique — permettent d’espérer que cet article apporte une véritable contribution à l’Histoire de la philosophie.Without neglecting the other relevant documents in a final comparative survey, this study tries to depict the university teaching of philosophy as reflected in the mirror of the Parisian didascalical texts of the Arts Faculty during the first half of the thirteenth century, while giving in appendix a first repertory, still partial, of this corpus, with its editions and translations. Notwithstanding its generally practical and institutional character, some of its theoretical elements — such as the highlighting of the close relationship between cosmical theology and ethical philosophy, a sapiential thread in those arts masters writings — it is hoped that this article may prove a genuine contribution to the History of philosophy. (shrink)

Cet article propose un nouvel examen de l'image d'Alexis Ier Comnène dans l'Historia Ierosolimitana d'Albert d'Aix, afin d'en apprécier les nuances et les subtilités. Bien qu'Albert d'Aix soit reconnu pour son impression généralement positive d'Alexis Ier, une relecture attentive de son œuvre démontre plutôt une image ambivalente de l'empereur et des Byzantins. En scrutant les motifs d'Albert d'Aix, il est possible de constater une disposition favorable du chroniqueur lorsqu'il s'agit de souligner les relations privilégiées entre Alexis Ier et les souverains (...) lotharingiens de Jérusalem. En contrepartie, lorsque les Byzantins ne répondent plus à ce besoin, l'opinion de l'auteur se veut généralement moins clémente en reflétant davantage les accusations dirigées contre les Grecs au début du XIIe siècle. Un examen du vocabulaire employé par Albert d'Aix révèle également une évolution des impressions du chroniqueur à travers les différentes phases d'écriture de son récit et témoigne de l'évolution des desseins politiques de l'auteur dans le temps. Bien que l'Historia Ierosolimitana se distingue à bien des égards de la tradition des Gesta Francorum et des autres récits de la première croisade, l'étude conclut que les intentions de son auteur n'étaient pas moins tendancieuses. (shrink)

Résumé Comme théologie pratique de libération, la prédication romérienne oppose le péché à l’oeuvre dans toute société, à l’importance d’avoir une idée claire du Salut-Libération. L’Ancien Testament lui sert de canevas pour exposer l’intention de Dieu qui est de former un peuple afin qu’il participe à l’édification d’un Règne de justice et de paix. Il insiste sur l’importance d’avoir une vision déterminée de la personne et de la mission du Jésus historique et du Christ ressuscité. Cela implique une restauration du (...) vécu ecclésial conçu désormais comme une présence organique et mystique du Christ dans l’histoire. C’est alors que les chrétiens et le peuple conscients de cette mission peuvent devenir les hérauts de Dieu par leurs attitudes et leur parole prophétique.As a practical liberation theology, Romero’s preaching opposes sin at work in the whole of society, in order to have a clear idea of salvation-liberation. The Old Testament served as the background against which he depicted the intention of God, that is, to create a people that can participate in the construction of a kingdom of justice and peace. He insists on the importance of having a clear vision of the person and mission of the historical Jesus and of the resurrected Christ. This implies a real ecclesial restoration conceived from now on as an organic and mystical presence of Christ in history. It is then that Christians and people conscious of this mission can become heralds of God as a result of their attitudes and their prophetic word. (shrink)

Résumé Étude préliminaire à la nouvelle édition critique et à la traduction inédite offertes, dans ce numéro thématique, du début de la Logica « Ingredientibus » : Super Porphyrium d’Abélard, cet article opère d’abord un survol d’ensemble du texte, avec insistance sur l’exposé relatif aux universaux, et approfondit ensuite trois points de doctrine difficiles, sur lesquels l’historiographie récente a parfois hésité ou buté : la troisième signification des noms universels ; la conception prisciano-platonicienne de la pensée divine ; l’univocité de (...) la notion de status. Ce faisant, quant aux thèmes de l’intellection et de l’abstraction en particulier, une attention constante est portée au lien, parfois critique mais toujours fécond, existant entre cette portion de la Logica « Ingredientibus » et sa source principale, l’In « Isagogen » Porphyrii Commentorum Editio secunda de Boèce, dont l’article précédent fournit une présentation, le texte latin révisé et la première traduction française.As a preliminary study to the new critical edition and to the original French translation presented, in this thematic issue, of the first part of Abelard’s Logica “Ingredientibus” : Super Porphyrium, this article first operates a global survey of the text, dwelling upon the account of universals, and then elaborates upon three difficult doctrinal points, somehow problematic in recent historiography : the third signification of universal nouns ; the prisciano-platonic conception of divine thought ; the univocity of the notion of status. So doing, especially in regard to the themes of intellection and abstraction, a constant attention is given to the link, sometimes critical but always fruitful, existing between this portion of the Logica « Ingredientibus » and its main source, Boethius’ In “Isagogen” Porphyrii Commentorum Editio secunda, of which the preceding article offers a presentation, the revised Latin text, and the first French translation. (shrink)

Résumé Appuyée sur une collation systématique — incluant l’orthographe — de l’unique manuscrit subsistant, cette nouvelle édition critique du début de la Logica « Ingredientibus » : Super Porphyrium, accompagnée d’une traduction française inédite et complétée par une abondante annotation, rend ainsi accessible l’exposé le plus détaillé d’Abélard sur les universaux, des pages célèbres où, dans une approche sémantique non exempte de perspectives métaphysiques, on trouve, comme l’étude précédente l’a laissé voir, des développements philosophiques importants relatifs à l’intellection et à (...) l’abstraction.Based on a systematic collation — including the orthography — of the only surviving manuscript, this new critical edition of the beginning of Abelard’s Logica “Ingredientibus” : Super Porphyrium, accompanied by an original French translation and an abundant annotation, thus makes accessible Abelard’s most elaborate account on universals, well known pages where, in a semantical approach non exempt of metaphysical perspectives, one finds, as the preceding study as shown, important philosophical developments on intellection and abstraction. (shrink)

Les Questiones in libros Phisicorum Aristotelis, putativement discutées en public au Studium franciscain de Londres par Ockham avant son départ d’Angleterre pour Avignon au printemps 1324, s’ouvrent par sept questions sur la nature du concept. Sont ici offertes une traduction française et une édition orthographique, avec un tableau de correspondance intertextuelle, de ce De conceptu, qui, massivement, paraît avoir été « magistralement » compilé à partir de l’excursus de l’Expositio in Prohemium libri Peryermenias Aristotelis, aussi traduit et édité de la (...) sorte, ci-dessus, dans ce dossier. (shrink)

L’incommensurabilité sémantique est comprise comme la non-traduisibilité de concepts appartenant à différentes théories. L’objectif de l’article est de proposer une reconstruction rationnelle de la notion d’incommensurabilité qui sous-tend les écrits de Feyerabend et du dernier Kuhn. L’incommensurabilité, prétend-on, peut être reconstruite sur cette base en tant que notion cohérente, et des exemples pertinents peuvent en être donnés. L’impossibilité de la traduction entre concepts incommensurables provient de l’impossibilité de satisfaire conjointement deux conditions d’adéquation que la théorie contextuelle de la signification impose (...) aux traductions. Les analogues conceptuels potentiels s’avèrent, soit ne pas préserver les conditions d’application, soit ne pas reproduire les relations inférentielles pertinentes. L’incommensurabilité est ainsi construite comme le résultat d’un type particulier de relations conceptuelles produit par l’incompatibilité des théories correspondantes. Ces relations conceptuelles sont suffisamment étroites pour rendre possible une comparaison empirique des assertions théoriques pertinentes. L’article s’efforce de rendre ces thèses plausibles en développant des exemples tirés de l’électrodynamique classique et de la relativité spéciale. (shrink)

L’incommensurabilité sémantique est comprise comme la non-traduisibilité de concepts appartenant à différentes théories. L’objectif de l’article est de proposer une reconstruction rationnelle de la notion d’incommensurabilité qui sous-tend les écrits de Feyerabend et du dernier Kuhn. L’incommensurabilité, prétend-on, peut être reconstruite sur cette base en tant que notion cohérente, et des exemples pertinents peuvent en être donnés. L’impossibilité de la traduction entre concepts incommensurables provient de l’impossibilité de satisfaire conjointement deux conditions d’adéquation que la théorie contextuelle de la signification impose (...) aux traductions. Les analogues conceptuels potentiels s’avèrent, soit ne pas préserver les conditions d’application, soit ne pas reproduire les relations inférentielles pertinentes. L’incommensurabilité est ainsi construite comme le résultat d’un type particulier de relations conceptuelles produit par l’incompatibilité des théories correspondantes. Ces relations conceptuelles sont suffisamment étroites pour rendre possible une comparaison empirique des assertions théoriques pertinentes. L’article s’efforce de rendre ces thèses plausibles en développant des exemples tirés de l’électrodynamique classique et de la relativité spéciale. (shrink)

Extensive research has demonstrated that rs1360780, a common single nucleotide polymorphism within the FKBP5 gene, interacts with early-life stress in predicting psychopathology. Previous results suggest that carriers of the TT genotype of rs1360780 who were exposed to child abuse show differences in structure and functional activation of emotion-processing brain areas belonging to the salience network. Extending these findings on intermediate phenotypes of psychopathology, we examined if the interaction between rs1360780 and child abuse predicts resting-state functional connectivity (rsFC) between the amygdala (...) and other areas of the salience network. We analyzed data of young European adults from the general population (N = 774; mean age = 18.76 years) who took part in the IMAGEN study. In the absence of main effects of genotype and abuse, a significant interaction effect was observed for rsFC between the right centromedial amygdala and right posterior insula (p <.025, FWE-corrected), which was driven by stronger rsFC in TT allele carriers with a history of abuse. Our results suggest that the TT genotype of rs1360780 may render individuals with a history of abuse more vulnerable to functional changes in communication between brain areas processing emotions and bodily sensations, which could underlie or increase the risk for psychopathology. (shrink)

Variant Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease is a fatal, transmissible, neurodegenerative disorder for which there is currently no effective treatment. vCJD arose from the zoonotic spread of bovine spongiform encephalopathy. There is now compelling evidence for human to human transmission through blood transfusions from presymptomatic carriers and experts are warning that the real epidemic may be yet to come. Imperatives exist for the development of reliable, non-invasive presymptomatic diagnostic tests. Research into such tests is well advanced. In this article the ethical implications of (...) the availability of these tests are elaborated and comparisons drawn with predictive genetic testing for Huntington’s disease and screening for HIV. Paramount to considerations is the issue of whom to test, weighing up respect for personal autonomy against obligations to benefit and protect society. A paradigm is proposed similar to that used for HIV screening but with unique features: compulsory testing of all blood/organ donors and individuals undergoing surgery or invasive procedures who have a significant risk of disease transmission. (shrink)