How is evidential reasoning conducted in archaeology to enable us to refine our understanding of the past? This thesis explores this question using Hadrian’s Wall as a case study. The function of the Wall remains a controversial topic and has fallen from favour in recent research. However, not least given the Wall’s continuing importance in modern discourse, the question of function remains pertinent. This thesis collates and examines the archaeological evidence for the Wall, including how that knowledge has itself been (...) constructed, and how it corresponds with multiple working hypotheses. This approach aims to mitigate bias, ensure multivocality, and encourage reflexive thinking. The research examines existing interpretations of the Wall and tacks between them, drawing out consistencies to generate a new interpretation centred on deterrence. The latter considers the Wall as a means to inspire awe and enable punitive action, focussing on the cognitive and perceptual elements of Roman power. By examining both the theory and prevalence of deterrence in classical antiquity this research seeks to assess the Wall from a new perspective, but one nevertheless rooted in the Roman experience. Examining the Wall’s capacity to inspire awe and terror, rather than as a static demarcation of the limits of imperial pretensions, can challenge the dichotomy in Roman scholarship between the archaeology of conquest and post-conquest limes studies. This thesis aims to capture the ongoing debates surrounding evidence and interpretation and use these as a catalyst, rather than an obstacle, to further research. The inherent subjectivity of archaeological data and theory does not negate a testing approach; rather, examining the relationship between a number of theories and the available evidence can challenge assumptions, prompt new avenues of research and contribute to the continuing discussion around frontiers and artificial boundaries. (shrink)

The role of Kant’s Critique of Judgment in his overall theory of freedom has been largely confined to making room for the possibility of the realization of our ultimate moral goals in the world. While this is a central task Kant endeavoured to address with the third Critique, that work had a more overreaching impact in his general metaphysical picture of nature, which is instrumental in making sense of the core tenets of his theory of freedom. In this dissertation, I (...) argue that Kant’s solution to what I term the real agency problem, namely, how actions that are determined by the laws of nature can be nevertheless said to be freely caused by agents, is riddled with problems unless we incorporate the requirements brought by the power of judgment into it. I argue that, according to Kant, judgment compels us to posit a purposive ground of nature that accounts for the necessity of empirical laws, and in such a way that the causality of organisms can be made possible. By doing so, we gain a warrant to judge human beings as intelligibly grounded. Insofar as humans exhibit rational behaviour, this opens a space to our judging them as having an intelligible character which grounds actions as freely caused. Thus, the new insights provided by the third Critique are instrumental in understanding Kant’s metaphysics of freedom. (shrink)

Generalisation, universal knowledge claims, and recommendations within disaster studies are problematic because they lead to miscommunication and the misapplication of actionable knowledge. The consequences and impacts thereof are not often considered by experts; forgone as irrelevant to the academic division of labour. There is a disconnect between expert assertions for disaster risk reduction (DRR) and their practical suitability for laypersons. Experts currently assert independently of the context within which protective action measures (PAMs) are to be used, measures unconnected to the (...) people for whom they are developed. This has knock-on effects for DRR: much expert-generated science and policy remains unused, unimplemented, and sometimes misapplied. I use philosophical accounts of assertion and epistemic blame to highlight the epistemic relationship between experts and laypersons. This relationship includes responsibilities and agreements between epistemic agents. Since multilevel DRR knowledge still transfers top-down from experts to laypersons, if experts impair the epistemic relationship, they can be held epistemically blameworthy. To address the pervasiveness of top-down systems, I analyse the epistemic framings and narratives currently shaping DRR, and more specifically PAMs and campaigns. I deconstruct universal perspectives that dominate the epistemic processes of generating, disseminating, and implementing DRR knowledge and specifically for co-seismic landslide PAMs for Nepal. I argue for more inclusive, contextual, and epistemically responsible DRR. Co-production of knowledge should begin from the standpoints of marginalised persons who may have an epistemic advantage due to their socio-politically marginalised positions. Often these epistemic contributions are left out of DRR efforts because marginalised persons are rarely afforded equal, if any, epistemic agency, which results in epistemic gaps and a large pool of relevant knowledge remaining unincorporated and unused in DRR research and policy. (shrink)

In recent decades, there have been major theoretical changes within evolutionary biology. In this dissertation, I critically reconstruct these developments through philosophy to assess how it may inform these debates. The overall aim is to show the mutual relevance between current trends in biology and the dialectical approach to nature. I argue that the repetition of the neglected tradition of organicism is anticipated both by a dialectical tradition within science and by Hegel’s philosophy – and that these theories may together (...) inform the ongoing shift within evolutionary biology called the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis (EES). I stage the discussion by outlining the tenets and history of the modern synthesis (MS) and the alternative: the extended evolutionary synthesis (EES). It takes us into topics such as autonomy, organisation, reduction, and autopoiesis. Based on these discussions, I make the case that the most promising alternative to the MS is the so-called organisational approach formulated within theoretical biology and apply dialectics to strengthen this claim. In my view, they share a fundamental premise: Biology must surpass the physical worldview and adopt a more complex model to comprehend life as an ongoing regeneration of organisation and an expression of self-determination. To bring out the philosophical stakes of this shift, I take on Hegel’s writings on nature, life, and purposiveness and relate them to contemporary thinkers. The main contribution of this work lies not in a particularly novel reading of any of the theories I examine but in bringing them together – both within philosophy and biology and between them – and systematically mapping how philosophy and the humanities should deal with the natural sciences. The new kind of naturalism suggested here, which places life at its core, also calls for another scientific ideal which strives for unification without subsumption or eradication of differences. (shrink)

The Stoics commit to a view of the universe as a unified living being endowed with a mind. But what is the explanatory value of this cosmological model? Generally speaking, most scholars believe Stoic cosmic psychology to work either as a metaphor for the unification produced by natural processes, or to be a consequence of the fact that mind is a primitive component of the Stoic system, given that one of the Stoic first principles is usually considered to be endowed (...) with intelligence. In this thesis, I will argue against both views by claiming that the Stoics developed a highly sophisticated cosmic psychology in order to articulate an original theory of the unity of the cosmos. In doing so, I will first show how the Stoics introduce a new use of the notion of sympathy or co-affection (συμπάθεια) in order to produce an emergentist account of cosmic mental faculties. Then, I will then examine the unifying functions performed by the two main faculties of the cosmic mind: perception (αἴσθησις), which unifies the cosmos by endowing it with the ability of representing itself as a subject, and therefore, as an agent; and will (βούλησις), which unifies the cosmos by granting its activity a unified teleological orientation. I will thus make a strong claim regarding the relation between mental faculties and corporealism in the Stoics, showing how they are neither a metaphor for natural processes, but instead develop naturally from the principles on which Stoic philosophy is based, with the aim of articulating and unifying the complexity of the cosmos into a coherent whole. (shrink)

Musical conservatism is a concept that is regularly invoked in both musicological literature and popular discourse, but is almost never defined or explained. The words ‘conservative’ or ‘reactionary’ are also often used as derogatory terms to denote insincerity, naivety, or lack of artistic depth. Edward German (1862-1936), Charles Villiers Stanford (1852-1924), and Edward Elgar (1857-1934), the primary case studies of this thesis, have each been identified – and often self-identified – with both musical conservatism and conservatism more broadly. Each of (...) these composers also acted as a political activist for conservative causes, which they supported through their music and writings. Through an in depth study of a large volume of primary materials and the discourse surrounding the music of these three composers, this thesis provides an examination of the claim that the music and politics of conservative composers are intrinsically linked because they emerge from the same philosophical foundations. Their writings and music are also analysed through an assessment of their adherence to the first principles of conservatism, newly theorised here as a four part series of philosophical statements. Conservatism, in this conceptualisation (drawn from the writings of conservative and anticonservative theorists from Burke to Scruton) is to be understood as belief in the primacy of precedent, flawed and imperfectible human nature, the acceptability of inequality, and the importance of the pursuit of beauty in art. It addresses previously unanswered definitional questions on the subject of musical conservatism, its problems as a term, and its intrinsic nature. It also explores the relationship between musical conservatism and the pervading philosophical and political conservatism of late Victorian and Edwardian England. (shrink)

This analysis of the English-speaking popular reception of Nietzsche from 1895 to the present will follow Nietzsche in bringing history and philosophy together. I will argue that Nietzsche’s philosophy provides explanatory power for understanding the reception of his atheism and that his reception history in turn sheds light on the meaning of his atheism. Chapter One explores how Nietzsche employs form and style to establish the event of God’s death as the chasm of understanding that lies between himself and other (...) atheists. Chapter Two considers the defining features and concerns of Nietzsche’s atheism – nihilism, Dionysianism, asceticism, naturalism, eternal recurrence and the übermensch – in the context of Nietzsche’s soteriological project. Against this backdrop, the remaining chapters will explore the reception of Nietzsche’s atheism that has not been conveyed to a popular audience through the details of his philosophy but rather through the themes and categories that naturally arose between the established poles of debate of the broader culture of the time. Chapters 3–5 demonstrate how Nietzsche’s popular reception has been shaped through debates over Nietzsche’s alleged madness, nationalism, social Darwinism, decadence, warmongering and nazism, while chapter 6 explores why most authors attempting to popularise atheism today either make little mention of Nietzsche or conspicuously do not mention him at all. The question throughout this account of Nietzsche’s reception is not simply ‘How has Nietzsche been received?’ but rather ‘What would Nietzsche make of his own popular reception?’ A Nietzschean evaluation of his own reception history is made feasible by Nietzsche himself who not only predicts that he and the majority of atheists who read him will remain at a vast distance from each other, but having measured the distance that lies between them, he also takes the trouble to explain why that distance exists. (shrink)

This thesis is a sceptical investigation into the notion that the metaphorical wave-particle binary of Virginia Woolf's To the Lighthouse is related to quantum physics. Indeed, the field of literature and science has employed conceptual similarities as the main means of connecting quantum concepts to novels, however, this has led to a host of scholarly difficulties, prompting the need for a re-examination of analogical linkages. Woolf is the model candidate for such a re-examination, given her historical and philosophical proximity with (...) the developments of quantum mechanics. To the Lighthouse, in particular, was written between 1925 and 1927: precisely when quantum physicists were attempting to resolve the wave-particle duality, leading to Niels Bohr's complementarity. This parallel has been noted by researchers as relevant to the novel, as it too displays a general binary that can be read as wave-particle-like, which the author also attempts to resolve along similar philosophical lines. Nevertheless, other than proximity and similarity, there are no reasons to affirm that the science is related to the novel; hence, it is an ideal case study to examine in order to ascertain the value of conceptual similarities in literature and science. To do so, To the Lighthouse's binary and its resolution are interpreted in a thesis-long close reading, in order to compare aspects of it firstly to Woolf's personal thought, and secondly to various non-quantum intellectual contexts that preceded and surrounded her. In doing so, it becomes clear not only that invoking quantum physics serves no clear purpose in better understanding the novel, but also that the notion of resolving wave- particle-like binaries was a widespread philosophical procedure at the turn of the century, decades before Bohr's concept. This negative conclusion interrogates what the scholarly value of interpreting similarities is, though a hypothetical solution can be found in conceptual metaphor theory. (shrink)

Consider the following two commonly held views in Ethics. Firstly, that for something to be a reason for an agent to act it must be capable of motivating them. Secondly, that agents have reasons – most obviously moral reasons - to act in at least some ways whatever their motivations may be. These two views would at least appear to be in conflict with each other. Internalists however, maintain that they can be reconciled. It is argued that, given the nature (...) of moral reasons, no such reconciliation could succeed. The argument is based in part on exploring the different attempts at reconciliation offered by three contemporary philosophers within the internalist tradition – David Gauthier, Mark Schroeder & Christine Korsgaard – each of which is shown to fail. It is then argued that this failure at reconciliation is endemic to internalism; internalism necessarily involves imposing a flawed constraint on what normative reasons can exist, which in practice makes it incompatible with the existence of moral reasons. (shrink)

This thesis examines the evolution of cosmology in the first half of the seventeenth century through a case study of the erudite Alessandro Tassoni and his Pensieri diversi, an encylopedia covering scientific, literary, historical, and philosophical topics. Highly successful during the seventeenth century, read even by Galileo Galilei, the Pensieri diversi has received little scholarly attention. However, it offers a significant contribution to our understanding of the evolution of early modern cosmology because it was published during the early seventeenth century (...) when profound changes in representations of the structure of the cosmos were occurring. Specifically, it sheds light on scientific debates in the decades immediately preceding Galileo’s Dialogo sopra i due massimi sistemi del mondo. With his Pensieri diversi, Tassoni facilitated the dissemination of scientific disputes across a wider public of erudite non-specialists by using an easy-to-read question and answer format. Yet, he did not simply reproduce opinions from late medieval thought and contemporaneous cosmological debates but instead offered his own critique. I analyse three key themes from the Pensieri diversi. These topics open up more nuanced understanding of those complex issues that, over time, led to epistemological changes in the field of the history of science. In order to point out Tassoni’s contribution to the science of early seventeenth century, I set his scientific and philosophical speculations in their historical and sociological context, and I also provide close textual and theoretical analysis of Tassoni’s cosmological ideas. Thus, I address, more generally, the relationship between scientific and scholarly culture at the dawn of the Scientific Revolution. (shrink)

This thesis offers a sacramental account of learning through a thematic reading of the mystagogical homilies of four fourth century bishops: Ambrose of Milan, Cyril of Jerusalem, John Chrysostom, and Theodore of Mopsuestia. In the initiatory practices of the fourth century, mystagogy was the portion of catechetical instruction given to explain and interpret the rites and liturgy of initiation. My reading of the mystagogies will argue that these homilies reflect a theology of learning in which the end of knowledge is (...) to encounter and embrace God with all of the faculties given to our nature; both the humbly material and the intellective and spiritual. I will propose an analogical relation between mundane learning and the movement into the intimate and divinizing knowledge of God one receives in the sacraments. I present the mystagogues’ teachings in terms of the ‘capacitation’ of our nature for this knowledge of God; a knowledge that becomes indistinguishable from union. The sacraments make humanity capable of receiving God, chōrētikos theou. I will demonstrate how the mystagogues understand the sacraments as a true participation in union with God here and now and how the Holy Spirit makes humanity capable of union with the divine through conformation to Christ. I will also show how mystagogy proposes a consonance and continuity between mundane learning and the sacramental formation of humanity into a creature capable of heavenly participation. These belong to one divinizing grace. And, thus, learning is primarily intelligible through its relation to salvation and theōsis. This account of mystagogy’s ‘mystery of learning’ will be proposed as a remedial challenge to the impoverishments of modern conceptions of the nature and end of knowledge. The beatific end of being divinely capacitated for heavenly communion sits at the heart of the human capacity to learn. (shrink)

Whilst lost to the Latin West since the end of the Patristic era, the full reintroduction of peripatetic philosophy – more commonly known as “Aristotelianism” – into Christian Europe during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries fundamentally challenged and reshaped the medieval interpretation of the relationship between faith and reason. The subject of much debate, the place of St. Bonaventure – the “Seraphic Doctor” – within the narrative of Aristotelianism’s assimilation into the Latin West, and his attitude towards philosophy and natural (...) reason in general, has divided scholarly opinion for nearly a century. Where for some, Bonaventure is an ardent critic of Aristotle who rejects peripatetic philosophy from his very first contact with it; for others, by contrast, he is a respectful – though not uncritical – pupil of the Greek philosopher. Having generated significant disagreement amongst some of the most eminent Bonaventurian scholars – including Étienne Gilson, Fernand Van Steenberghen and Joseph Ratzinger/Pope Emeritus Benedict XVI – contemporary scholarship has failed to reach a consensus as to the Seraphic Doctor’s attitude towards Aristotelianism and philosophy. Subsequently, a notable amount of confusion has also arisen as to what constitutes an authentically “Bonaventurian” reading of the relationship between faith and reason; indeed, it is sometimes asked if such a thing exists at all. By using Bonaventure’s much neglected writings on Christ’s knowledge as an interpretative tool for his statements on Aristotelianism and philosophy, this study seeks to offer the basis for a fresh interpretation of the Seraphic Doctor’s thought on faith and reason; one which explains both the subtleties and apparent contradictions at work within his attitude towards peripatetic philosophy, whilst identifying the driving force behind the anti-Aristotelian narrative which develops throughout his works. (shrink)

Through a sustained engagement with Jean-Luc Marion and Søren Kierkegaard, this thesis explores themes of love and selfhood from a philosophical and theological perspective—drawing on several other sources from the Christian tradition at relevant points. It focuses on these themes with an eye to contemporary problems that arise for a theological engagement with phenomenology. While Kierkegaard’s writings both anticipate and directly influence later phenomenology, one of this study’s contributions is to highlight the underappreciated impact of a presupposed doctrine of creation (...) ex nihilo on his existential reflections. Exploring this impact’s relevance, I show how Kierkegaard’s reflections—influenced by an underlying theology of creation—offer a corrective to Marion’s strictly phenomenological approach to love and selfhood. Resourcing Kierkegaard to address key (post)modern debates surrounding these themes, the project’s primary aim is to examine how his writings inadvertently point to the contemporary relevance of something like a classical theology of creation. The secondary aim is more methodological, as the analysis results in a constructive proposal that furthers discussions of how theology might engage the methods and insights of phenomenology without neglecting its own resources. (shrink)

People care very much about being listened to. In everyday talk, we make moral-sounding judgements of people as listeners: praising a doctor who listens well even if she does not have a ready solution, or blaming a boss who does not listen even if the employee manages to get her situation addressed. In this sense, listening is a normative behaviour: that is, we ought to be good listeners. Whilst several disciplines have addressed the normative importance of interpersonal listening—particularly in sociology, (...) psychology, media and culture studies—analytic philosophy does not have a framework for dealing with listening as a normative interpersonal behaviour. Listening usually gets reduced mere speech-parsing, or into a matter of belief and trust in the testimony of credible knowers. My preliminary task is to analyse why this reductive view is taken for granted in the discipline; to diagnose the problem behind the reduction and propose a more useful alternative approach. The central task of my work is to give an account of listening which captures its distinctively normative quality as an interpersonal way of relating to someone: one listens not because the speaker is an epistemic expert, but because the speaker is a person, worthy of recognition and care. I created a framework which accomplishes this by deploying the conceptual resources of conversation sociology and psycholinguistics, in counterpoint to the standing philosophical work on the ethics and politics of speech and silencing, to create a practical ethics of listening to people. (shrink)

Dispositional Essentialism and Ontic Structural Realism aim to account for modality. Dispositional Essentialism takes properties to account for laws. In particular, it takes determinate properties to account for laws of nature, which are determinable. Ontic Structural Realism does the reverse. According to Steven French, Ontic Structural Realism takes laws and symmetries to be part of the fundamental structure of the world. Determinate properties are “dependent” on laws. The core difference between Dispositional Essentialism and Ontic Structural Realism’s accounts of modality is (...) the direction of the dependence between properties and laws. As a result, French describes Ontic Structural Realism as a reverse-engineering of Dispositional Essentialism, and Chakravartty differentiates them by saying that Dispositional Essentialism gives a bottom-up account of modality whereas Ontic Structural Realism’s is top-down. Both views face significant problems. The main problems these views face stem from relational individuation. Properties are individuated by their relations to further properties. As such, it is hard to see how they can be metaphysically prior to those relations as per Dispositional Essentialism. Equally, laws are relations between properties. As such, it is hard to see how they could be metaphysically prior to the properties they relate as per Ontic Structural Realism. Both properties and laws seem dependent on each other. By requiring one to come first and explain the other, dispositional essentialists and ontic structural realists end up in a chicken-egg scenario. I propose a hybrid between Dispositional Essentialism and Ontic Structural Realism. My hybrid view does away with the dogma of ontological priority between properties and laws. Instead, properties and laws symmetrically depend. I argue that my hybrid view is the way out of the chicken-egg-property-law conundrum. It paves a new way for making sense of modality from a structuralist perspective. (shrink)

In this thesis I investigate the question of whether or not dispositional properties are able to necessitate their manifestations. I provide three main discussions that reflect three aspects of my question. The first and second discussions concern different aspects of the 'problem of prevention'. This is the premise that causal interactions can be subject to interference/prevention, generally construed. A number of philosophers have argued that the problem of prevention undercuts the necessitation of lawful regularities in the context of dispositional essentialism. (...) We can term this issue the 'necessitation issue'. In the first discussion I examine whether or not antidotes qua preventative entities are metaphysically possible within the context of Alexander Bird's dispositional monism. I argue that Bird's theory raises a problem of ontological representation re antidotes. The line of thought in this discussion is that it is difficult for Bird to say what antidotes are and how they operate; nevertheless, in this discussion I provide a solution to my problem that stays within the confines of Bird's dispositional monism. In this section of the thesis I remain neutral on the necessitation issue, but I take myself to clarify the question of whether or not dispositional properties are able to necessitate their manifestations by criticising Bird's model of antidotes/prevention and setting out a replacement. In the second discussion I examine Stephen Mumford and Rani Lill Anjum's anti-necessitarian strategies. Mumford and Anjum's 'causal dispositionalism' encompasses a theory of dispositional properties, antidotes, and prevention. Mumford and Anjum's causal dispositionalism is not subject to the problem of ontological representation that Bird's theory raises; nevertheless, I argue that their theory is multiply problematic. The purpose of this discussion, taken as a whole, is to show that a recent strategy for attacking the necessitarian claim of dispositional essentialism is weaker than it has appeared to a number of philosophers. In this section of the thesis I move from a neutral stance on necessitation to a defensive stance. In the first two stages of the thesis, which concern the problem of prevention, I work with the background assumption that dispositional essentialism is a tenable position. In the third section of this thesis, however, I begin by endorsing Stephen Barker's essay The Emperor's New Metaphysics of Powers, which argues that the main articulations of dispositional essentialism are either internally inconsistent or otherwise disguised versions of brute modalism, where brute modalism focuses upon possible worlds as oppose to properties. In response, I develop a replacement position for dispositional essentialism that I term 'temporal essentialism'. I advance temporal essentialism as a prototype position in the properties and laws debate. It aims to provide a metaphysical explanation for lawful regularities by drawing upon the passage of time. In short, temporal essentialism is the position that it is built into a system of ontology that it dynamically adds new entities to its ontological categories and constructs states of affairs in a rule-following way. (shrink)

The dissertation aims at a comprehensive understanding of Qoheleth’s system of values, his thought as to what is good and bad in the human experience and how these values relate. It utilizes both standard exegetical methods as well as certain strands of contemporary philosophy—including value theory, theory of well-being, meaning of life philosophy, philosophy of death, and philosophy of pleasure—in order to clarify Qoheleth’s concepts and implicit philosophical assumptions. The work proceeds by uncovering and reconstructing the layers of Qoheleth’s value-centered (...) philosophical vision with each consecutive chapter, at each step articulating his views in the terms of contemporary philosophy, as well as comparing Qoheleth’s constructive philosophy to the views of certain contemporary philosophers. My central thesis is that, among the variety of Qoheleth’s themes, his message is unified by the concept of value and he expresses a distinct, coherent vision as to where value is found—and not found—in human lives. Part I one of the work (Chapters 2 through 4) concerns the negative side of Qoheleth’s values by coming to grips with Qoheleth’s conception and denial of “meaning” in human life. Chapter 2 articulates this notion of meaning, Chapter 3 explores the hindrance it finds in death, and Chapter 4 examines Qoheleth’s concept of time’s cyclicality as a further obstacle to meaning. Part II of the dissertation (Chapters 5 and 6) transitions to the more positive side of Qoheleth’s values, his understanding of “what is good” in human life despite the absence of meaning. The question of the value of existence as such is taken up, as are Qoheleth’s understandings of well-being and enjoyment. The conclusions about the sage’s theme of enjoyment lead to a wider conclusion that, while he denies a certain type of human value in his resistance to the prospect of attaining meaning, Qoheleth does nonetheless subscribe to the possibility of genuine value in the human project. (shrink)

In this dissertation, I develop a metaphysics of powers to ground Dispositionalism, the theory of the source of modality according to which all alethic modal truths are grounded in dispositional properties instantiated in the actual world. I consider a number of key theses that powers metaphysics display, and investigate which can be incorporated in the metaphysical base of Dispositionalism, and how. In the first part I examine the interaction of two core principles of powers ontologies: Directedness, the thesis that powers (...) ‘point at’ their manifestations, and Independence, the thesis that powers can fail to manifest. These two principles are in tension: there is an argument, known as Too Much Possibility, to the effect that they are inconsistent. I examine various strategies to resist the argument. These involve Physical Intentionality, numerical identity between power and manifestation, process ontologies, and platonic universals. I conclude that they are all unsatisfactory. In the second part, I develop a ‘minimal metaphysics of powers’ that is immune from the threat of Too Much Possibility. This involves considering unmanifested manifestations to be akin to Mere Logical Existents. I argue that the best way to avoid the tension at the heart of powers ontologies is to conceive of unmanifested manifestations as non-essentially non-spatiotemporally located entities. I then consider some consequences of minimal metaphysics: I examine which ontological category the manifestations of power can belong to, and what are the prospects of grounding metaphysical, as opposed to natural, modality. Finally, in the third part, I investigate whether further key theses of powers ontologies can be incorporated into the minimal metaphysics. This leads to discuss the relationship of the minimal metaphysics with grounding and dependency relations, the metaphysics of time, the truthmaking principle, and tendential theories of powers. (shrink)

How do we explain the phenomenon of trust? Catholic theologians on the one hand, and economists on the other, will provide differing answers. The reason is that their assumptions about human behaviour are at odds: whilst theologians tend to assume a moral economy where individuals and societies are called to act on their free will to pursue the common good by trusting and being trustworthy, economists tend to assume that human beings are driven by a utility-maximising self-interested behaviour. How trust (...) is construed in turn directly shapes how economic experiments are built and influences their results; these then impact policy-making. Theologians with a different understanding of trust would be particularly naïve to accept the insights of those experiments; they must question how their conclusions were drawn, especially if political decisions on which they are based impact the lives of many. This thesis explores two main claims: firstly, that experimental economics is highly problematic from a theological perspective and that a differentiated method is necessary to apprehend the full reality of trust within a moral economy. That is because differing anthropological and metaphysical assumptions underly the two disciplines. Secondly, that theologians ought to attend to the empirical world in order to inform their own economic ethics. That is because theology stands a better chance of being heard in a public context if it is able to depart from an abstract normativity and engage with empirical sciences. Finally, this thesis shows how an intelligent dialogue between theology and economics can only take place if both disciplines engage with a shared epistemology to engage with the empirical world and develop a common approach with their respective functional specialisations. It does so building particularly on the critical realist thought of Bernard Lonergan SJ and Tony Lawson. (shrink)

Philosophical theories of evidence have been on offer, but they are mostly evaluated in terms of all-or-none desiderata — if they fail to meet one of the desiderata, they are not a satisfactory theory. In this thesis, I aim to accomplish three missions. Firstly, I construct a new way of evaluating theories of evidence, which I call a tool-based view. Secondly, I analyse the nature of what I will call the various relevance-mediating vehicles that each theory of evidence employs. Thirdly, (...) I articulate the comparative core of evidential reasoning in the historical sciences, one which is overlooked in major theories of evidence. On the first mission, I endorse a meta-thesis of pluralism on theories of evidence, namely a tool-based view. I regard a theory of evidence as a purpose-specific and setting-sensitive tool which has its own strengths, difficulties and limitations. Among the major theories of evidence I have reviewed, I focus on Achinstein’s explanationist theory, Cartwright’s argument theory and Reiss’s inferentialist account, scrutinising and evaluating them against the purposes they set out and the scope of their applications. On the second mission, I note that there is no such thing as intrinsically ‘being evidence’. Rather, I hold that relevance-mediating vehicles configure data, materials or claims in such ways that some of them are labelled evidence. I identify the relevance-mediating vehicles that the theories of evidence employ. On the final mission, I argue that the likelihoodist account is an appropriate tool for explaining the evidential reasoning in poorly specified settings where likelihoods can be only imprecisely compared. Such settings, I believe, are typical in the historical sciences. Using the reconstruction of proto-sounds in historical linguistics as a case study, I formalise the rationale behind it by means of the law of likelihood. (shrink)

Is time reversible? The debate is ongoing, and has at times been misunderstood. This thesis examines the history and philosophy of backwards time, particularly from the mid-nineteenth century onwards, along with its representations and uses in fictional narratives and the argumentation of scientific papers. Focussing on Lewis Carroll, Vladimir Nabokov and Martin Amis - literary figures preoccupied with time who are interrelated in revealing ways - the thesis draws out the satirical, comic and serious effects of backwards-moving temporal processes. In (...) doing so, it suggests that our conception of time depends in large part upon the modes of reasoning we deploy to make sense of it. The discussion of the idea of backwards time in this thesis includes a wide range of phenomena (see keywords) to reflect on the broader cultural-historical aspects of ideas about time and to suggest some of the ways in which they impinge on e.g. the moral and political spheres. (shrink)

My thesis examines Shelley’s usage of Islamic tropes and Qur’anic symbolism in order to further poeticise his belief that through the revision and combination of mythic patterns poetry could produce an ameliorative effect on the evolution of human consciousness. By combining his Eastern-inspired poetics with his ruminations on interanimation, Shelley consolidates the faith within a mythographic schema where concepts are reinterpreted through the meandering lineage of tradition. I argue a deeper understanding of the Islamic tradition on a theological and philosophical (...) level will help contextualise his mythopoetics as an exploration of how communal sign systems can meaningfully revise previous myths without dogmatic overtones. The structure of the thesis is centred on Shelley’s poetic engagement with Islam during the years of 1814-18; part one examines The Assassins from an Ismaili perspective and draws links between Shelley’s melodic strain of poets and the Imamate chain of hierophants whilst also investigating the significance of using Muslim figures as a means of expressing his own enthusiastic world-historical call for reform. Part two explores Alastor; or, The Spirit of Solitude from a sufistic perspective by offsetting the paradoxical relation between lover and Beloved in Hafez and Rumi’s poetry against the Shelleyan dynamic between poet and muse whilst offering a comparative analysis of Shelley’s allegorical commentary on material idealism with Ibn Tufayl’s natural mysticism. Part three delves into The Revolt of Islam as a revolution of, rather than against, the titular faith by assessing how Shelley reimagines two concepts : the former transfigures Ash’arite fatalistic atomism where Power and miracles rule into a Lucretian materialistic form of atomism where birth and decay is not governed by transcendent forces but fissures within organic processes; the latter adapts Sunni historiography regarding the conquest of Mecca and rewrites Muhammad’s revolution into Laon and Cythna’s Oriental uprising. (shrink)

What would an approach to constitutional theory grounded in morally sceptical philosophy look like? This is the core question underlying this thesis. The thesis seeks to pose some answers by first elaborating a form of moral scepticism – drawing on a linguistic anti-foundationalism inspired by the pragmatic, anti-metaphysical philosophy of Richard Rorty to set aside the idea of “objective moral truth” – and applying it to issues of constitutional theory. In drawing on the internal logic of the moral scepticism set (...) out, with an effort to exclude as many external assumptions as possible, what results can be described as a sceptical contribution to constitutional theory. The core conclusion is that morally sceptical, anti-foundationalist philosophy has significant and constructive contributions to make in this area. To demonstrate this, the thesis contributes to some of the most fundamental issues of constitutional theory: namely, the basis of legitimate collective decision-making authority; the potential limits to such authority; and the issue of entrenchment. The road to these contributions is wider than pure constitutional theory, however: the task at hand also requires this thesis to engage in detail with more fundamental issues of moral, political, and most prominently democratic, theory, thus laying out a sceptical take on these further topics in the process. The results will be of interest to constitutional lawyers and philosophers alike. They will certainly come as a surprise to some, given the widely-held view of moral scepticism as an entirely destructive, debilitating, or otherwise dangerous philosophy. In a sense, then, this thesis can be seen as a counter to such negative pictures: in a climate where “post-truth” has become something of a dirty word, owing largely to recent outcomes in democratic politics, the positive and empowering contribution of this thesis, along with the robust defence of majoritarian democracy it offers, seems timely. (shrink)

This thesis seeks to provide the first comprehensive response to the interrelated two questions of what it means to be good with the past and what role should be entrusted to the archaeological academy. I will be adopting a neo-Aristotelian approach in my response to these questions, using observations of the human animal and its lifecycle to inform my understanding of what being good entails generally, before applying it to what being good with the past entails specifically. The first third (...) of the thesis will provide my argument for turning to the virtue ethical tradition, and a naturalistic approach to virtue for the purposes of archaeological ethics. Meanwhile, the second third will focus on the implications this perspective has on the role we should entrust to archaeologists. And the final third is devoted to how the good of archaeology and the role of the archaeologist should be understood in a world with goods other than the good of archaeology. (shrink)

My thesis explores the concept and manifestations of Transcendence in selected poems and prose written by Samuel Taylor Coleridge between 1796 and 1817. Amid the dissenting atmosphere in Britain, in the wake of the French Revolution, religious Truth is rigorously contested by Romantic writers and thinkers. For Kant, Transcendence is displaced by Transcendentalism in order to separate speculative reasoning from rational metaphysics. Aspiring to defend religious Truth, Coleridge feels the need to keep the transcendent faith in a living God alive (...) in ways that find congruence with transcendental philosophy. Accordingly, Coleridge explores the meaning of Truth in his writings and seeks to salvage Religion from being sheer dogmatism or superstition. Tracing different versions of Transcendence across the development of the term’s transformation in Coleridge’s thoughts and poetry is central to my reassessment of the religious and spiritual aspects of the Coleridgean Imagination. My Introduction explores the dual meanings of ‘Versions of Transcendence’ in terms of the critical approach adopted in this thesis and its content. Chapter one focuses on ‘Religious Musings’, ‘The Eolian Harp’ and ‘This Lime-Tree Bower My Prison’ to demonstrate Coleridge’s Theism and his concept of Transcendence in the late 1790s. Chapter two and three explore the ways in which Original Sin can be viewed as the impediment of Transcendence in ‘The Ancient Mariner’ and ‘Kubla Khan’ during the period 1798-1804. Chapter four and five argues for the compatibility between Transcendence and Transcendentalism in ‘A Letter to——’, ‘Dejection: An Ode’ and ‘To W. Wordsworth’ during the 1800s. Chapter six explores Coleridge’s struggles to reconcile the Fall with God’s benevolence in Christabel. Chapter seven offers a coda to the thesis and suggests through a discussion of Biographia Literaria that, for Coleridge, the highest worth of the human mind is to know the invisible God through an intuitive knowledge accessible through the Imagination. (shrink)

This thesis is about the crisis in representation that accompanies the attempt to account for lived experience, with particular reference to bodily pain in social science. The diagnosis of this problem of experience identifies epistemology as an inappropriate means of knowing that initiates a translational paradox unable to satisfy the simultaneous demands of making lived experience familiar in representational form yet retaining the foreignness of the original experience at the same time. This problem of simultaneity is not a problem, however, (...) if it is built into a way of knowing, something that escapes epistemological conditions of possibility with its either/or of singularities. To know in such ‘double vision’, or fractionally, characterises post-epistemological thinking. This thesis draws on a relatively underdeveloped method for practicing a fractional means of knowing from post- actor-network theory, that of the pinboard, and explores how it might be usefully applied to the problem of experience. The thesis constitutes an experiment in producing a social science account of the lived experience of chronic pain using this method as an alternative to conventional epistemological techniques that initiate the problem of experience. Through initial theoretical discussion, followed by reflection on its practical application involving the construction of fractional accounts of lived experience for five participants experiencing chronic pain, the pinboard is developed as a technique that seeks to maintain ‘double vision’ whilst inherently resisting attempts to resolve the juxtaposition it makes visible, enacting and engaging in an ontological politics with conventional methods of social analysis. This includes discussion of how the method might be transported from methodological knowledge spaces to effectively intervene on such conventional methods. (shrink)

Philosophy for Children is a school-based intervention currently implemented in more than 60 countries. This thesis examines the evidence regarding the effectiveness of Philosophy for Children for developing pupils’ cognitive and non-cognitive skills. Three different approaches were used. A systematic literature review was conducted of the evidence published in the last 40 years. A new comparative evaluation study was conducted with Year 5 pupils in 17 primary schools in England. The intervention lasted for an academic year, and a pre-test and (...) a post-test were given at the beginning and end of the school year to evaluate students’ critical thinking and creativity. Secondary data analysis of the National Pupil Database from the Department of Education was used to examine the long-term effect of P4C implementation on attainment. The results of 34 schools which implemented P4C during Key Stage 2 were compared with 14,791 mainstream schools in England which did not, and the same analysis was repeated based only on these pupils in both groups known to be eligible for Free School Meals during the last six years. The review results suggested that P4C generally has a positive impact on reasoning skills. In most studies, P4C also has a positive impact on literacy and some non-cognitive skills. However, the new comparative evaluation study found no evidence that P4C has a positive impact on Year 5 students’ critical thinking or creativity. This comparative study has some limitations in terms of design and inevitable attrition. The more robust secondary data analysis showed that students eligible for Free School Meals develop their reading and writing more after long-term P4C implementation than in non-P4C schools, during Key Stage 2. By combining all of the evidence from the review, comparative evaluation study and secondary data analysis, this study suggests that the implementation of P4C in primary schools is still worthwhile, both in its own terms and for its added benefits in terms of cognitive and perhaps non-cognitive outcomes. The programme is likely to help improve students’ reasoning skills. P4C can improve the literacy of disadvantaged students in the classrooms, relative to their peers, and so contribute towards closing the attainment gap between advantaged and disadvantaged students. However, the new evaluation creates a caution about what can be expected from P4C and, if it used, the programme may need adjusting in order to provide opportunities for practicing a wider range of thinking skills. (shrink)

Christian churches must assess the suitability of applicants who believe themselves called to ministry. Discerning this vocation requires that Assessors, alongside an external criterion-based evaluation of applicants’ personal qualities, address a less easily definable question: is this applicant called by God? This research aims to determine how Assessors sense, authenticate, and verbally articulate a spiritual discernment within the necessary practical confines of ecclesial assessment processes. Consonant with the subject matter, it employs the action-research methodology of Jane Leach’s “Practical Theology as (...) Attention”, to a range of voices in mutual conversation. The mixed-methods approach utilized here is grounded in ethnographic studies of assessment conferences in five UK denominations, and on interview data from a purposive sample of their Assessors, to establish empirically the Assessor’s experience of discerning call. Thereafter, it draws on Ignatian spirituality to consider the reliability of a maturing spiritual “sense” in decision-making, both individual and corporate; and on Quaker practice for a contrasting communal discernment model. To address the identified challenge of utilizing intuitive knowledge, it engages with Iain McGilchrist’s scientific perspective on how the brain processes information through a bi-lateral pattern of attentiveness. Turning to the specifically theological epistemology, two conversation partners are selected for their divergent perspectives on how God may be known. Newman represents a Catholic continuity between grace and nature, by contrast with Barth, whose negative ontology grounds a distinctive Reformed view of revelation inaccessible to unaided human reason. Attention to all of these voices illuminates how Assessors experience knowing and affirming an authentic call from God. It also provides a basis for suggesting what personal qualities and procedural tools may be required to facilitate this highly distinctive element of their task. (shrink)

The nature of self has been discussed for centuries, with myriad theories specifying propositions of the form ‘The self is X’. Recently, psychology and neuroscience have added further such propositions and have sought to specify neural correlates for X. In this thesis, theories leading to all such propositions are subjected to methodological criticism. Specifically targeted are those theories that construct metaphysical, essentialist propositions on the nature of the self, and all other abstract concepts, more generally. On this point, it is (...) concluded that theories of this type would benefit from taking into account the nature of language and the role it plays in the development of a theory. Theories that fail to consider language, run the risk of producing theoretical work affected by linguistic biases, those inherent to the language faculty. In this thesis, the biases of interest are referred to as ‘noun phrase reification’ and ‘clausal reification’, and an awareness of these is important for they can subvert the meanings of propositions, rendering them, and the theories built upon them, true by definition. In consideration of this methodological critique, a new theoretical approach to the self and to other abstract concepts is argued for. This new way of theorising combines aspects of basic scientific methodology with statistical modelling and linguistic theory, in which, the triangulation between two or more people, engaged in the act of naming objects and behaviours plays a formative role. Building on this new method in the context of the self, two experiments are performed using the electroencephalography neuroimaging technique; first in neurotypical adults, then in patients with a diagnosis of schizophrenia, a disorder commonly associated with an attenuated selfhood. It is hoped that this body of theoretical and empirical work will facilitate and catalyse progress on abstract concepts and their associated problems. (shrink)

This thesis argues that new readings of Hegel’s philosophical system generate a post-secular, philosophical political theology. This political theology is able to engage with the apocalyptic elements of the Christian tradition in order to understand the dual function of religion: the cultivation of social solidarity and the annihilation of the present world. After an initial discussion of Hegel’s role in the development of political theology and the current divisions in Hegel scholarship, this study turns to the significance of Hegel’s understanding (...) of religion as representation. In particular it focuses on the implications of the ‘non-metaphysical’ reading of Hegel. In this reading, religion is not concerned with an external, transcendent deity, but represents the emergence of a self-conscious, self-determining community. While drawing on this shift in the nature of religion, this thesis argues that the ‘non-metaphysical’ reading subordinates religion to the state, diminishing religion’s role in social critique. This subordination to the state can be corrected by introducing apocalypticism as a representation of the negative moment of Hegel’s philosophical system, resulting in a greater emphasis on contingency and contradiction. This expanded understanding of religion is the basis of an apocalyptic, Hegelian political theology. Precedent for this form political theology is found in the work of Jacob Taubes. In addition to analysing Taubes’s explicit discussions of Hegel, this study argues that Hegel’s philosophy of religion draws out the methodology behind Taubes’s intervention. Having drawn out these underlying Hegelian aspects, affinities between Taubes and contemporary work on Hegel becomes apparent. In particular, Catherine Malabou’s understanding of plasticity is shown to closely parallel Taubes’s understanding of apocalypse. Reading Malabou and Taubes together results in a political theology of plastic apocalypticism. This political theology is a model of a post-secular theology operating, beyond the contradiction between philosophy and theology. (shrink)

This thesis advances and defends a novel two-category ontology of objects and dimensions, latterly conceived as respects of comparability. The proposed 'dimensionist' ontology is set out and brought to bear on discussions of determinables and determinates, the problem of universals, fact ontologies, and nomic governance. Dimensionism is argued to fare well in comparison to a range of rival ontological accounts of property possession. A metametaphysical framework is set out to undergird the discussion, which draws on both realist and pragmatist resources.

In this thesis I will examine the philosophy of the physicist Max Born. As well as his scientific work, Born wrote on a number of philosophical topics: causation, realism, determinism, and probability. They appear as an interest throughout his career, but he particularly concentrates on them from the 1940s onwards. Born is a significant figure in the development of quantum mechanics whose philosophical work has been left largely unexamined. It is the aim of this thesis to elucidate and to critically (...) examine that work. I will give a defence of presentist historiography in the history and philosophy of science and a brief biography of Born. With regards to causation, the thesis will argue that he holds that there exist principles regarding causal relations that have guided the development of physics and have, in the modern formulation of the subject, been confirmed as having an empirical status. I will argue that he is a selective realist, initially with regards to invariant properties and, later on, a structural realist. With regards to determinism, I will argue that Born has produced an argument, compatible with modern philosophical definitions of determinism, that we were never entitled to conclude from the success of classical mechanics that the world was deterministic. Finally, I will argue that Born holds an objective interpretation of probabilities in quantum mechanics which, due to his strong belief in the physical reality of quantum-mechanical probabilities and his apparent disbelief in the superposition of the wave-function, is most likely a long-run propensity theory. (shrink)

This thesis seeks to engage with and give answers to the fundamental question of rights interpretation confronting the British judiciary under the Human Rights Act 1998. As a premise, it recognises that the textual openness and consequential semantic uncertainty of the requirements of the Convention rights necessitates their interpretation. In determining the approach the courts should apply, this thesis takes as its structural foundation an analysis of the current approach of the domestic courts and the European Court of Human Rights (...) to the five pivotal questions of interpretation: who has rights, the substantive nature of those rights, how rights are to be weighted and balanced in cases of conflict, whether they are rights under a will or an interest conception, and against whom the rights are held? From this basis, the thesis builds upon the existing knowledge to apply Alan Gewirth’s Principle of Generic Consistency to the current judicial position, to critique its compatibility with this principle’s requirements. Through analysis of core settled characteristics of the Convention rights, the substance of the courts’ judgements and the ECtHR’s jurisprudence, and supported by both dialectically necessary and contingent arguments, it is ultimately argued that it is, theoretically and practically, both necessary and possible for the domestic courts to be guided by the PGC in their interpretive approach. Finally, an improved understanding of the principle of human dignity will be advocated as a means through which the domestic courts can apply the PGC’s requirements. By this means, this thesis ultimately proposes an interpretive approach to the Convention rights which gives compelling guidance in answering the fundamental questions of rights interpretation and, by encouraging direct principled engagement with these questions, increases the public understanding of the fundamental nature of rights and the acceptability of the HRA and judgements under it. (shrink)

My doctoral project is a study of epistemological and ethical issues in Evidence-Based Medicine, a movement in medicine which emphasizes the use of randomized controlled trials. Much of the research on EBM suggests that, for a large part of the movement's history, EBM considered expertise, mechanisms, and values to be forces contrary to its goals and has sought to remove them, both from medical research and from the clinical encounter. I argue, however, that expertise, mechanisms and values have important epistemological (...) and ethical roles to play and can be incorporated into the current EBM movement. (shrink)

I explore virtue and love in Maximus the Confessor’s theology with an aim to drawing an ethics from it relevant to the present day. I use a meta-ethical framework derived from contemporary virtue ethics and look at virtue as an instance of love within the context of Maximus’ cosmic theology. Virtue becomes a path that leads us towards love – who is God Himself. Virtue is thus about movement towards theosis. I describe virtue as a relationship between humans and God, (...) brought about through the mutual practice of a life of ascesis from humans and grace from God. I look at the mediatoral role of humans as microcosms gathering up the universe in an image of Christ’s activity. In particular I analyse the way that human activity is simultaneously cosmic and ascetic; personal and communal. The ethic of virtue that we pursue is always caught up in a conversation about what creation gathered in love looks like. Using a number of tools derived from Maximus’ thought, I suggest that this ethics will necessarily transform our current communities and personal practices. Recognising the cosmic dimension of personal behaviour means that our communities must be scrutinised as extensions of our actions. As an example, I critique the state as an inadequate form of loving relationship, illustrating its systemic reliance on violence and ideologies of alienation and hatred. I give examples of alternative ways of human organising drawn from anarchist thought that might better enable us to love and, more importantly, enable us to call to account failures to love. I conclude that to seek theosis after the manner Maximus describes involves recognising our personal and communal failures to love. His holistic understanding of human purpose can help us see the cosmic dimension to personal ascetic practice and consequently set our sights on a more cosmic vision of love here in the present world. (shrink)

The combination of ethics and physics in Seneca’s Natural Questions has frequently puzzled scholars. Although a number of studies have attempted to reconcile the work’s ethical and physical parts, others maintain that there is no substantial connection between them. Both positions are problematic. The former glosses over the quite obvious ways in which these vivid accounts of vice are thematically at odds with the physics; the latter results in a bifurcation of the aims of the work. This study argues that (...) the incongruous character of these passages plays an integral part in the work’s overall goal: to defend the Stoic account of the ‘the good’. This account was under attack from Platonist rivals. The Stoics argue that the good is grounded ultimately in the wellbeing of the cosmos as a whole; Platonists maintain that conceptualising the good as such is impossible because, as empiricists, the Stoics can only account for a subjective understanding of the good, grounded first and foremost in the wellbeing of the body. Seneca’s engagement with this debate is indicated by the frequent allusions to Plato in the work, particularly the idea of ‘separating soul from body’. Seneca suggests that a carefully structured study of nature can achieve this ‘separation’. This process helps agents to overcome the subjective, body-focussed perspective that the Platonists associate with empiricism. Seneca thus demonstrates a therapeutic means through which an empiricist agent could come to conceive of the good as the Stoics envisage it. This same process of separation from one’s body, however, also provides an ideal opportunity to reflect critically on the objects that we tend to misidentify as goods. It is here that the moralising passages prove useful. These arresting accounts of vice serve to jar us into critical reflection on where we ground our understanding of the good. (shrink)

Since the initial discovery of Traherne at the turn of the twentieth century, studies of his work have often neglected theological and philosophical analyses. Early caricatures of Traherne as a proto-Romantic have also colored his reception as a serious theologian. By placing the critical emphasis on the literary dynamics within the corpus, the intellectual history influencing Traherne and the construction of his ideas has subsequently been lightly addressed in scholarship over the years. This dissertation presents Traherne as a sophisticated thinker (...) who draws on the resources of Christian Platonism in an effort to create a philosophy for life. The argument puts him in dialogue with three other writers he knew well: Plotinus, Marsilio Ficino, and Thomas Hobbes. Plotinus and Ficino help locate the Platonist philosophical stream Traherne participates in. Thomas Hobbes helps illuminate the nascent empiricism indicative of the early modern period, a mechanical philosophy Traherne critiques in various ways. With all four voices engaged, the topics of evil, soul, sense, and memory are investigated in order to reveal the textures of a Trahernian anthropology. A portrait then emerges where Traherne opens up, for the reader, possibilities of transformation arising from ordinary experience. The argument ultimately provides a re-interpretation of innocence in view of Traherne’s Christian Platonism, showing how the concept of innocence works as a Platonic call to transformation and originary wholeness. (shrink)

What are the relationships between doubt and truth, thinking and writing in Montaigne’s Essais? We usually see Montaigne’s doubt through the lens of ancient schools of Scepticism and yet he notes that the Pyrrhonians ‘ne peuvent exprimer leur generale conception en aucune maniere de parler’: these philosophers describe their doubtful thought in negative affirmations but these are affirmations – ‘propositions affirmatives’ – all the same. This thesis approaches Montaigne’s doubt differently: I investigate the Essais not as an attempt to indicate (...) or describe doubtful, ‘double et divers’ thought but as a tool for thinking doubtfully in writing. Montaigne’s literary use of language is therefore central to my analysis. Irony, ambiguity, the practices of rewriting and overwriting, the ‘polyphony’ of cited authors who advocate different positions: these afford ways of thinking that sustain duality and doubt. I focus on Montaigne’s engagement with Seneca and Plutarch, ancient authors who are, superficially, unrelated to doubt: the Essais constitute a particular form of humanistic engagement with ancient texts, concerned with practices and forms of writing as much as, if not more than, with philosophical concepts. These ‘dogmatic’ authors – they defend philosophical positions of certainty – were, counter-intuitively, seen by Montaigne to have a ‘forme d’escrire douteuse et irresolue’. This doubtful ‘forme’ shaped Montaigne’s own and it was, I argue, in working with and on these authors – reading, writing, and thinking with them – that he constructed a way of writing doubtful in both form and thought: a text that is double, unresolved, ambiguous, and yet ‘truthful’ in its capacity to perform and make legible the complex, multiple nature of his thought and his thinking. (shrink)

This thesis draws a distinction between reasoning about which scientific hypothesis to accept, reasoning concerned with generating new hypotheses and reasoning about which hypothesis to pursue. I argue that and should be evaluated according to the same normative standard, namely whether the hypotheses generated/selected are pursuit worthy. A consequentialist account of pursuit worthiness is defended, based on C. S. Peirce’s notion of ‘abduction’ and the ‘economy of research’, and developed as a family of formal, decision-theoretic models. This account is then (...) deployed to discuss four more specific topics concerning scientific reasoning. First, I defend an account according to which explanatory reasoning mainly provides reasons for pursuing hypotheses, and criticise empirical arguments for the view that it also provides reasons for acceptance. Second, I discuss a number of pursuit worthiness accounts of analogical reasoning in science, arguing that, in some cases, analogies allow scientists to transfer an already well-understood modelling framework to a new domain. Third, I discuss the use of analogies within archaeological theorising, arguing that the distinction between using analogies for acceptance, generation and pursuit is implicit in methodological discussions in archaeology. A philosophical analysis of these uses is presented. Fourth, diagnostic reasoning in medicine is analysed from the perspective of Peircean abduction, where the conception of abduction as strategic reasoning is shown to be particularly important. (shrink)

Throughout the last century there has been much discussion over what it is that makes an activity or a theory 'scientific'. In the philosophy of science, conversation has focused on differentiating legitimate science from so-called 'pseudoscience'. In the broader cultural sphere this topic has received attention in multiple legal debates regarding the status of creationism, where it has been generally agreed that the 'supernatural' nature of the claims involved renders them unscientific. In this thesis I focus upon the latter of (...) these issues, arguing that although there may be merit in the larger demarcation project of separating science from pseudoscience, the notion of 'supernaturality' does not belong in this adjudication. Due to the complex cultural issues that have played a role in the history of this topic, this will involve a degree of historical and normative analysis alongside more philosophically abstract considerations. Complicating the discussion is thefact that neither the term 'science' nor 'supernatural' enjoys a widely agreed upon definition. In order to assess the question then, I will survey a wide variety of definitions of each term in order to identify areas of potential conflict. I argue that in none of the prevalent understandings can we find impediment to scientific investigation inherent in the supernaturality of a claim, but rather posit that where difficulty arises it does so for more mundane reasons. I conclude that not only is there no inherent issue with scientific investigation of the supernatural, but that the term 'supernatural' itself is too poorly defined to provide a useful role in philosophical discussion. While I argue that notions of supernaturality should be abandoned entirely when assessing demarcation criteria, I concede that numerous extraneous factors, including the significant degree of overlap between the supernatural and the 'religious', warrant consideration of a compromise position. (shrink)

Current sentencing practice in England and Wales is incoherent. This stems from the combination of conflicting philosophies of punishment, with no clear method adopted by sentencers in choosing between them. This presents a significant challenge as sentencing can have a profound impact on an offender’s life, as well as having wider implications for family members. Therefore, a coherent decision-making process is essential in order to limit arbitrary sentencing and support the legitimacy of the penal system. This thesis argues that Restorative (...) Justice might offer a more coherent decision-making process. Restorative Justice is hypothesised to operate as a kind of mediation process between the philosophies of punishment and understandings of justice held by participants. Their voluntarily agreed outcome should therefore represent the best possible compromise between participants’ ideas of justice and philosophies of punishment. Analysis of existing empirical research has been undertaken, involving the examination of existing studies of Restorative Justice in Northern Ireland, England and Wales, Australia and New Zealand. This empirical research has explored problems which can arise in practice for the theoretical conception of Restorative Justice as a mediation process between ideas. The thesis concludes that Restorative Justice can in theory offer a more coherent process of sentencing, but that there are a number of obstacles to realising this in practice. (shrink)

This thesis is a study of Archaic and Early Classical philosophical poetry within the competitive context which characterized the poetic production of that period. In particular, I evaluate the ideas and arguments of Xenophanes, Parmenides, Epicharmus and Empedocles in the context of the social and cultural aspects of Archaic poetic performance in order to evaluate their response to traditional agonism. As I argue, these figures entered the poetic contest not only to defeat their poetic adversaries, but also to transform and (...) redefine the terms of the competition itself. Chapter 1 is devoted to the analysis of three institutionalized forms of poetic agonism: sympotic games, rhapsodic contests, and dramatic performances. In chapter 2, I evaluate the socio-political import of Xenophanes' poetry and argue that his conception of the greatest god serves to substantiate his moral prescriptions aimed at eliminating civic conflict. In chapter 3, I examine Parmenides' original notion of alētheia as logical deduction, whereby he provides a solution to the problem of the truth-status of poetry stemming from the Muses' ability to inspire both genuine and false accounts, as narrated in Hesiod's Theogony. Chapter 4 provides an analysis of Empedocles' polemic allusions to his poetic and philosophical predecessors. I argue that Empedocles' confidence in his poetic authority is ultimately grounded on his self-declared divine status, which grants him a unique and comprehensive poetic knowledge. In chapter 5, I evaluate Epicharmus' philosophical fragments against the background of early rhetoric and argue that, through the use of philosophically inspired arguments, Epicharmus aimed to make manifest philosophy's agonistic potential and to show how it could be exploited to one's own advantage. (shrink)

Probing the “New Atheism” reveals not an isolated phenomenon, but a contemporary expression of a longer tradition of atheist advocacy and antagonism toward religion, beliefs about the Divine, and associated practices. Although not all critics of religion are atheists, and atheists display diversity among themselves, A Wesleyan Open Inclusivist Approach to Religious Diversity and New Atheism argues that New Atheists are sufficiently similar to religious people to be fruitfully approached utilizing conceptual tools that pertain to religious diversity, interaction, and dialogue. (...) Specifically, it proposes that an optimistic Open Inclusivist attitude from the philosophy of religion, grounded by and employing methodological, biblical, historical, and ethical resources supplied and integrated by the Wesleyan tradition, is productive for approaching religious diversity issues that incorporate atheism and New Atheists. A Wesleyan variety of Open Inclusivism lessens or eliminates difficulties that competing paradigms from philosophy of religion exhibit, and eschews complications implicit or explicit to select Reformed, Catholic, and Universalist theologies. It coherently urges genuinely significant, reciprocal learning among religious believers and atheists and a hopeful urgency about salvation. Insisting that every person possesses sacred worth or inherent dignity, it undergirds ir/religious liberty and constructive attempts to persuade. It prods collaboration around common priorities, empowers prudent opposition where necessary, and operates in what John Wesley called the more excellent way of love. As one exemplar of ecumenical, Creedal, and evangelical Christianity; A Wesleyan Open Inclusivist Approach to Religious Diversity and New Atheism aims to interpret the Bible faithfully and to critically utilize historical precedents, reason, logic, and the sciences listening to existential and practical experience. Honoring each voice in conference, it effectively mediates ongoing dialogue on topics vital to atheism and religion, including the relationships of religion and science, problems of evil and suffering, and optimal ethical flourishing for physical as well as spiritual realities. (shrink)

The phenomenon of wonder has fascinated scholars for centuries, yet today the subject is understudied and not rooted in any specific academic discipline. Attempts at building a preliminary account of wonder reveals that the experience of wonder is characterised by seven properties: wonder is sudden, extraordinary and personal; intensifies the cognitive focus; intensifies the use of imagination; instigates awareness of ignorance; causes temporary displacement; makes the world newly present; and brings emotional upheaval. Furthermore, wonder can be distinguished from other similar (...) altered states, including awe, horror, the sublime, curiosity, amazement, admiration and astonishment. Human flourishing is a concept in ethics that has enjoyed a revival since Elizabeth Anscombe’s 1958 article ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’. Through the work of Neo-Aristotelian philosophers Douglas Rasmussen, Alasdair McIntyre and Martha Nussbaum who have contributed to the field a working model of human flourishing attentive to human nature was established. As a result of in-depth examination of the contribution of both emotion and imagination in the experience of wonder through a Neo-Aristotelian lens it becomes evident that wonder may contribute to human flourishing via a number of effects, including widening of perception, extension of moral scope or sensitivity and prompting deep wonder, a wondrous afterglow, openness, humility, an imaginative attitude, reverence and gratitude. Importantly, for wonder to act as a strong contributor to human flourishing one needs to wonder at the right thing, in the right amount, in the right time, in the right way and for the right purpose. Cultivating a balanced sense of wonder is thus by no means an easy task but having a critical attitude towards one’s wonderment would aid one to wonder in a virtuous way. (shrink)

This thesis provides an original reconstruction of Gillian Rose’s work as a distinctive social philosophy within the Frankfurt School tradition that holds together the methodological, logical, descriptive, metaphysical and normative moments of social theory; provides a critical theory of modern society; and offers distinctive versions of ideology critique based on the history of jurisprudence, and mutual recognition based on a Hegelian view of appropriation. Rose’s philosophy integrates three key moments of the Frankfurt tradition: a view of the social totality as (...) both an epistemological necessity and normative ideal; a philosophy that is its own metaphilosophy because it integrates its own logical and social preconditions within itself; and a critical analysis of modern society that is simultaneously a critique of social theory. Rose’s work is original in the way it organises these three moments around absolute ethical life as the social totality, its Hegelian basis, and its metaphysical focus on law and jurisprudence. Rose’s Hegelian philosophy includes an account of reason that is both social and logical without reducing philosophy to the sociology of knowledge, thereby steering between dogmatism and relativism. Central to this position are the historically developing nature of rationality and knowing, and an account of the nature of explanation as depending on a necessarily and necessarily imperfectly posited totality. No totality is ever fully attained but is brought to view through the Hegelian-speculative exposition of history, dirempted experience, and the tensions immanent to social theories. Rose explored one main social totality within her social philosophy – absolute ethical life – as the implied unity of law and ethics, and of finite and infinite. This enables a critique simultaneously and immanently of society and social philosophy in three ways. First, of both the social form of bourgeois property law and social contract theories reflective of it. Second, of social theorising that insufficiently appreciates its jurisprudential determinations and/or attempts to eliminate metaphysics. Third, the broken middle shows the state-civil society and the law-ethics diremptions as two fundamental features of modern society and as frequently unacknowledged influences on social theorising. (shrink)

This thesis develops an interdisciplinary dialogue between philosophy and the social sciences through an investigation of ‘belief.’ Drawing on anthropology, epistemology, and social psychology, the thesis argues that epistemology can assist social science through its analytic utility and capacity for clarification in distinguishing the textures of ‘belief’ while social science challenges epistemology to develop a more descriptive, interactive, and multidimensional account of ‘belief.’ The thesis further argues that ‘beliefs’ bind society and individual together and serve as the units of embodiment (...) and cultural history. Beginning with the anthropology of religion, the problematization of ‘belief’ is first addressed through critiques from Ludwig Wittgenstein, Rodney Needham, Talal Asad, and Malcolm Ruel. In continuation, contemporary anthropological proposals are outlined and an initial set of characteristics are presented to launch the interdisciplinary dialogue. The thesis then introduces an epistemological distinction between belief and acceptance as a conversational partner, which not only provides nuance and texture but situates ‘belief’ within the paradigm of embodiment. Noting the observation of inconsistent ‘beliefs,’ the thesis engages with the theory of cognitive dissonance to provide additional insight. This exchange between philosophy and the social sciences produces a more sophisticated and dynamic epistemology as well as a sharper focus for discerning ‘belief.’ This discussion is then brought into methodological focus through the themes of ‘crisis’ and ‘conversion.’ After discussing the literature on these themes, the thesis applies the combined treatment of philosophy and social science to three case studies: When Prophecy Fails, Believing Identity: Pentecostalism and the Mediation of Jamaican Ethnicity and Gender in England, and Divinity and Experience: Religion of the Dinka. The thesis concludes with a discussion of the respective contributions epistemology and the social sciences make to each other as well as future possibilities for research. (shrink)

In this essay I make use of the resources of ‘naturalized ontology’ in order to determine what quantum mechanics implies about answers to fundamental metaphysical questions. Naturalized ontology is a methodology for metaphysics influenced by the philosopher Willard Van Orman Quine which makes explicit reference to our best scientific theories in order to answer questions which have traditionally been reckoned to belong solely to the realm of philosophy such as ‘What is the nature of reality in the most general sense?’ (...) Quantum mechanics faces a unique interpretational problem known as the ‘measurement problem’ which makes determining the answer to such general metaphysical questions on this view especially problematic; nevertheless, naturalized ontology interprets and evaluates the various responses to this problem via measures of ‘theoretical virtue’, and ultimately concludes that the best interpretation of quantum mechanics—and thus reality—is absurd. (shrink)

The constitutionalist debate - over where decision-making power in society should lie, and how it should be exercised - is one which is of fundamental importance not only in academia and constitutional theory, but in society generally. The main aim of this thesis is to critically examine the current debate from a particular, sceptical philosophical perspective - one which questions the possibility of convincingly defending moral premises. This controversial perspective, which goes to the heart of debates over moral realism, objectivity, (...) and epistemology is set out and defended in detail, drawing on the work of the sceptical and strongly anti-foundationalist legal theorist, Arthur Leff, and the pragmatic philosophy of Richard Rorty. Some implications of this perspective for the constitutionalist debate and key approaches within it are then considered in the rest of the thesis . This examination includes instrumentalist arguments and "democratic" arguments often relied on by various sides in the debate. It is argued that, when taken to their underlying premises and assumptions, each approach is misguided from the perspective defended here and, therefore, that the current constitutionalist debate is unsatisfactory. Some suggestions of the way forward following this argument are then made. (shrink)

The aim of this thesis is to investigate the role that the imagination plays in the later philosophy of René Descartes. The thesis will look at two related questions: the status of the imagination as a mode of thought dependent on the body; the role of the imagination in object-perception. Throughout, the traditional view of Descartes as a Cartesian Dualist is rejected and a more holistic approach is taken towards the relationship between mind and body, in which Descartes’ claims that (...) the two make up a “substantial union” are taken seriously. Part One deals with the relationship between mind and body. I argue that Cartesian Dualism cannot account for the faculties of sensation and imagination, because they have a corporeal basis. However, the ‘union of mind and body’, Descartes’ device for explaining their interaction, can. I end Part One by identifying a problem with the paradigm case of mind-body interaction, object-perception. To determine the object of an idea there needs to be a mechanism to marry the two ingredients of perception: the innate ideas of geometry in the intellect, and ‘adventitious’ ideas of the object delivered by the senses. Otherwise we have no explanation for how the essentially ‘inward-looking’ intellect can apply its ideas to the essentially passive sensations. Part Two focuses on the imagination and the question of object-perception raised in Part One. I argue against the largely-held view in the secondary literature that, with the advent of the cogito, the imagination’s cognitive profile declined sharply. I argue that, in fact, the corporeal basis of the imagination places it beautifully to bridge the gap in object-perception, and that this is part of its role in all Descartes’ discussions on the topic. The other, related, role of the imagination is to conjure fictions and hypotheses, suiting it for scientific and epistemological endeavours. The fact that the imagination is not tied to what is present to the senses, even though it receives its original content from them, means that it can manipulate ideas of corporeal things; including the innate notions of extension, shape and motion so key to gaining a clear and distinct idea of matter. (shrink)

How do practices contribute to the formation of the mind of Christ in community such that the community truly becomes the body of Christ?” This dissertation demonstrates that Christ acts on his Church through a complex interaction of community and practices to generate the identity, diversity, and virtue of his body. This is a controversial claim because many hold that the matter of virtue rightly consists of adherence to cherished foundations like Scripture and tradition accompanied by calls to obedience. Nonetheless, (...) this study seeks to identify resources to help the Church imagine a virtue ethics appropriate to a 21st century communion ecclesiology. It does so by reading Richard Hooker as an ecclesial ethicist. Examining Hooker’s accounts of Scripture, participation, and liturgical practices, the dissertation develops a Hookerian account that extends the ecclesial ethics of Stanley Hauerwas and Sam Wells on both ends. On the front end, it derives from first principles an account of how humans come to see themselves as part of the theodrama in which improvisation is required. On the back end, it grounds improvisation in a theory of mimetic virtue. Along the way it shows how a largely Barthian Christology coheres with a positive account of sacramental practices and that a Hauerwasian emphasis on practices is not sectarian. Hooker’s repudiation of appeals to timeless absolutes in ethical reasoning and his demonstration that the self-ordering of the Church is phronetic action means that contemporary “liberal accommodationism” and “postliberal traditionalism” can no longer coopt Hooker to justify their ideologies. (shrink)

In this thesis, I show that the commitments of a theological tradition are a conceptual resource which allows new and more robust responses to criticisms of virtue ethics. Until now, theological virtue ethics has not provided a distinctive response to these criticisms and has had to rely on arguments made by secular virtue ethicists. These arguments do not always address theological concerns and do not take advantage of the unique assets of theological ethics. This thesis resolves this problem by providing (...) a chapter-by-chapter confrontation of criticisms of virtue ethics and offering a specifically theological response to each one. In so doing, it identifies the key theological commitments that enable these responses and constitute a particular strength of theological virtue ethics. I consider criticisms that attack the internal coherence or completeness of virtue ethics as well as those which associate virtue ethics with other problematic philosophical positions. In the former group, I address the claims that virtue ethics is not a complete moral theory, that it cannot explain right action, and that it relies on a flawed concept of character. In the latter, I deal with the arguments that virtue ethics must subscribe to moral particularism, moral relativism or egoism. The final part of the thesis returns to the previous chapters to draw out the concepts that are central to these responses. Theological work on the virtues has made important contributions to ethics but has so far been vulnerable to criticism. This thesis addresses this gap and highlights the advantages that theological commitments have to offer virtue ethics. (shrink)

This study entails a theoretical reading of the Iranian modern history and follows an interdisciplinary agenda at the intersection of philosophy, economics, and politics and intends to offer a novel framework for the analysis of socio-economic underdevelopment in Iran in the modern era. A brief review of Iranian modern history from the constitutional revolution, to the oil nationalization movement, the 1979 Islamic Revolution, and the recent Reformist and Green movements demonstrates that Iranian people travelled full circle. This historical experience of (...) socio-economic underdevelopment revolving around the bitter question of “why are we backward?” and its manifestation in perpetual socio-political instability and violence is the subject matter of this study. Foucault’s conceived relation between the production of truth and production of wealth captures the essence of hypothesis offered in this study. Michel Foucault maintains that “In the last analysis, we must produce truth as we must produce wealth, indeed we must produce truth in order to produce wealth in the first place”. Based on a hybrid methodology combining hermeneutics of understanding and hermeneutics of suspicion, this study proposes that the failure to produce wealth has had particular roots in the failure in the production of truth. At the heart of the proposed theoretical model is the following formula: The Iranian dasein’s confused preference structure culminates in the formation of unstable coalitions which in turn leads to institutional failure, creating a chaotic social order and a turbulent history as experienced by the Iranian nation in the modern era. The following set of interrelated propositions elaborate further on the core formula of the model: Each and every Iranian person and her subjectivity and preference structure is the site of three distinct warring regimes of truth and identity choice sets related to the ancient Persian empire, Islam, and modernity. These three historical a priori and regimes of truth act as conditions of possibility for social interactions, and are unities in multiplicities. They, in their perpetual state of tension and conflict, constitute the mutually exclusive, contradictory, and confused dimensions of the prism of the Iranian dasein. The confused preference structure prevents Iranian people from organizing themselves in stable coalitions required for collective action to achieve the desired socio-economic change. The complex interplay between the state of inbetweenness and the state of belatedness makes it impossible to form stable coalitions in any areas of life, work, and language to achieve the desired social transformations, turning Iran into a country of unstable coalitions and alliances in macro, meso and micro levels. This in turn leads to failure in the construction of stable institutions due to perpetual tension between alternative regimes of truth manifested in warring discursive formations, relations of power, and techniques of subjectification and their associated economies of affectivity. This in turn culminates in relations of power in all micro, meso, and macro levels to become discretionary, atomic, and unpredictable, producing perpetual tensions and social violence in almost all sites of social interactions, and generating small and large social earthquakes as experienced by the Iranian people in their modern history. As such, the society oscillates between the chaotic states of socio-political anarchy emanating from irreconcilable differences between and within social assemblages and their affiliated hybrid forms of regimes of truth in the springs of freedom and repressive states of order in the winters of discontent. Each time, after the experience of chaos, the order is restored based on the emergence of a final arbiter as the evolved coping strategy for achieving conflict resolution. This highly volatile truth cycle produces the experience of socio-economic backwardness. The explanatory power of the theoretical framework offered in the study exploring the relation between the production of truth, trust and wealth is tested on three strong events of Iranian modern history: the Constitutional Revolution, the Oil-Nationalization Movement and the Islamic Revolution. The significant policy implications of the model are explored. (shrink)

Meister Eckhart’s theology is indisputably controversial and the Papal Bull in agro dominico demonstrates the concern that the church had in Eckhart’s own time. Several scholars however, notably Bernard McGinn and Frank Tobin, have presented a more orthodox reading of Eckhart’s theology that reveals his commitment to the church and to Christian doctrine. It is unusual therefore that scholars continue to view Eckhart’s teaching on the ground and the soul’s ‘indistinct’ union with the Godhead or essence, as the pinnacle of (...) his theology. These themes are undoubtedly a major part of Eckhart’s unique contribution to Christian thought, as McGinn and Tobin have pointed out. However, they are most often cited by scholars who focus primarily upon the German sermons and tractates, often at the expense of the Latin commentaries and sermons and also at the expense of other equally significant features of Eckhart’s theology. This thesis questions the emphasis placed upon Eckhart’s teaching on the soul’s ‘indistinct’ union with the Godhead or essence and upon the essence itself. Drawing on the Latin and German works, it will demonstrate that Eckhart is deeply trinitarian and show that he views the Trinity and essence in a way that does not prioritise one over the other. Only once we recognise this non-hierarchical metaphysics can we also understand how Eckhart conceives of the soul’s existence and identity which, this thesis will show, is not absorbed or lost through the soul’s union with God, but perfected and fulfilled. The soul’s identity and indeed, all distinction – everything that exists – is properly understood, therefore, only in terms of the freedom and grace that defines God’s own identity in eternity; as a Trinity of persons whose distinction is not in terms of their separateness from one another, but in terms of their relations to each other. (shrink)

The law of England and Wales provides that an adult with capacity has the right to refuse medical treatment both contemporaneously and in an advance refusal. Legislation separates general advance refusals of treatment from advance refusals of life-sustaining treatment. The law, outlined in ss.24 to 26 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005, is stricter for creation of the latter. These sections brought with them a new age of interests by purporting to elevate individual autonomy as the primary concern. Beginning with (...) the classical tale of Odysseus and a general discussion of the value to be found in a law seeking to preserve individual autonomy, this thesis seeks to act as a critique of the current enactment in practice. The provisions are already under-used and under-applied; without change, they may never reach the stage where they are ethically and practically viable. It is argued that the advance refusals provisions are not taking full effect due to a combination of lacking moral grounding and general dismissal of key ethical dilemmas at the forefront of application. Building on this, the moral basis for this thesis is found in Alan Gewirth’s Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC) which links directly with the general application of human rights. The PGC becomes a compass for determining how best to treat persons when addressing the three most prominent challenges faced by the 2005 Act which are: the debate between the conferred right of autonomy versus the right to life; the issue of personhood; and, the personal identity problem. Ultimately, unless framework provisions are strengthened, and the Mental Capacity Act 2005 is rethought in light of prominent ethical, legal and social considerations, the constraints of the Act on paper will continue to suppress the important underlying values promulgating individual autonomy. (shrink)

Metaphysics has had a long history of debate over its viability, and substantivity. This thesis explores issues connected to the realism question within the domain of metaphysics, ultimately aiming to defend a realist, substantive metaphysics by responding to so-called deflationary approaches, which have become prominent, and well supported within the recent metametaphysical and metaontological literature. To this end, I begin by examining the changing nature of the realism question. I argue that characterising realism and anti-realism through theories of truth unduly (...) places epistemology prior to ontology, and is unwarranted in assuming a non-neutrality between theories of truth and positions within the realism debate. I therefore propose a characterisation of realism and anti-realism understood through truthmaking. This produces a suitable working characterisation of realism that will be used within the remainder of this project. In the second section, I trace the historical influences upon current deflationary approaches to metaphysics, most prominently those of Carnap, and Putnam. I argue that Quine’s supposed attack on Carnap’s anti-metaphysical thought fails, and show how current deflationary thought, most prominently exhibited by Hirsch, came to focus on linguistically derived concerns over the substantivity of metaphysics. In the third section, I outline a number of issues for the deflationist, and defend the coherency and legitimacy of the unrestricted existential quantifier. Focusing on the linguistic aspect of deflationism, I argue that the conception of language that the deflationist relies upon lacks suitable empirical and theoretical support within linguistics and other related domains. Furthermore, I suggest that linguistic analysis in fact supports the claim that the quantifier carries no inherent restrictions. This restores our ability to suitably posit the unrestricted existential quantifier, as a quantifier wherein the domain is only restricted by metaphysically substantive restrictions. Through this, I argue that metaphysics is a substantive domain of discourse. Lastly, I sketch a positive account of how, under an empirically and theoretically justified conception of language, metaphysics can be coherently held to be a realist, substantive enterprise, contra claims that hold that the nature of language inherently prevents metaphysics being considered to be a substantive domain of discourse. (shrink)