In the series University of Florida Digital Collections.

In the series University of Florida Digital Collections.

(Statement of Responsibility) door Henri Borel.

Title from title page of source document.

Title from title page of source document.

An analysis of the claim that Descartes was a substance trialist.

(Thesis) Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Florida, 1986.

In this book on George Bernard Shaw's philosophy of religion, Stuart Baker examines Shaw's insistence that a religion for the contemporary world must be a true guide to daily living, as well as consistent with science. Baker concludes that Shaw was right and presents Shaw's arguments in analytical, logical, and scientific terms. Where previous work on Shaw's religious thought approaches the subject from the point of view of traditional religion, this study approaches his unusual religious ideas on their own terms, (...) which differ from those of either traditional faith or modern atheistic materialism. Baker supports Shaw's contention that his metaphysical principles provide a more solid foundation for ethics and progressive politics than do most alternatives. Baker also endorses Shaw's belief that the scientific principles of rigorousness, logic, and analytical thinking bear out his argument that teleological principles are at work in the world and that the universe can be said to have a will that could be the subject of careful scientific investigation. (shrink)

(Thesis) Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Florida, 1990.

The status of the individual in Hegel has been the subject of much controversy, yet no one has given an adequate account of the role in the individual in Hegel's System. This dissertation attempts to fill this lacuna in Hegel scholarship by developing Hegel's socially significant argument that individuality is, in a sense, illusory. The heart of this argument is found in his Phenomenology . Prior to this work, Hegel was concerned with the problem of alienation and the creation of (...) a human community which would alleviate this problem. By 1800, he saw that alienation and thinking of ourselves as individuals are linked. In the Phenomenology, Hegel sees that education is the means whereby the illusion of individuality can be disspelled, because through it we can come to remember the cognitive process which leads to individuality. Within the structure of consciousness, which is examined as an ontological condition, there is a legitimate epistemological demand for unity. It is the misrepresentation of the nature of this unity and attributing this unity to consciousness which leads to the phenomenon of individuality. The educational process which must, in order to respect man's rational autonomy , attend to the structure of consciousness reveals both the source of the need for unity and the one-sidedness of certain concepts of unity. This source is directly related to the unities we attribute to the world. Hegel's argument is that we develop a sense of alienation because we can, by reflecting on our activity, separate ourselves from the world. This separation, however, is effected through thought only. Attributing individuality to ourselves is one such mode of separation. Thus the individual is important for Hegel because he sees that individuality is the necessary result of the process of consciousness and that when the significance of individuality is misrepresented, problems and contradictions arise. The realization of the limitations of a one-sided notion of individuality prepares the foundation for one's entrance into a true human community. (shrink)

This dissertation offers some arguments for amending both the theory underlying and the practice associated with the duty of beneficence. It develops a principle of cooperative beneficence for evaluating the current macroallocation of health care in the United States. The first argument is historical. It argues that both Immanuel Kant's and John Stuart Mill's moral theories support a principle of beneficence that justifies enforcing plans to help the needy. This principle of beneficence requires individuals to cooperate in such plans. The (...) second argument further develops this duty to cooperate in institutional relief efforts by distinguishing it from acts of supererogation, which are praiseworthy but not universally required. Using R. M. Hare's two-level theory of moral thinking, the dissertation argues for a principle of cooperative beneficence that we can reasonably require everybody to follow. This principle requires individuals to cooperate to help the needy by fulfilling some well-defined equitable role toward that end. The third argument responds to the charge that a duty to help the needy is too demanding, and so not a viable requirement of morality. This criticism is mistaken since it conflates what a single individual can do with what only a collective effort can do. The duty to help the needy belongs to a class of duties that requires collective efforts to fulfill them. Thus, one's duty to help the needy does not require endless giving, but fulfilling one's role as the principle of cooperative beneficence prescribes. The fourth argument aims to justify legally enforcing this principle using as an example legislating a universal health-care program for helping the medically needy . Enforcement is both necessary and effective for compelling individuals to discharge their duty and for overcoming the free-rider problem. Finally, the dissertation uses this principle of cooperative beneficence to outline some ethical criteria for evaluating three current health-care reform strategies: a market reform strategy; a single-payer, Canadian style strategy; and a single-payer, American style strategy. It suggests that the single-payer, American style strategy best meets these ethical criteria and similar strategies are worthy of further consideration. (shrink)

In this dissertation we will be concerned with the nature of persons. Many philosophers have wanted to hold that persons are radically different types of entities from ordinary persisting physical objects. The main aim of this dissertation is to show that any view of this kind is completely wrong, that a correct account of the nature and persistences of persons must be a physicalistic one. We shall defend this physicalistic account of persons both by attacking historical and contemporary arguments which (...) purport to support a nonphysicalistic view of persons as well as by producing positive arguments of our own. ;This dissertation is made up of six chapters. The four middle chapters constitute the main body of the dissertation. ;In chapter two we shall show that Cartesian arguments, although sympathetically interpreted for the view that persons are nonphysical "spiritual substances" do not succeed. ;In chapter three we shall show sympathy for Locke's seemingly nonphysicalistic "memory" criterion for the persistence of persons but argue that there is no conflict between Locke's account and memory must appeal to some sort of physical continuity. ;In chapter four we will provide further reinforcement for our physicalistic account by showing that the whole conception of a purely nonphysical substance or event is incoherent by developing an argument from causation which shows that the whole conception of a nonphysical substance or event is incoherent. Taken together chapters three and four constitute the core of our positive argument that persons are physical. ;Finally in chapter five we shall examine certain residual arguments from the imagination suggested by Kant's Paralogisms which purport to show that persons are nonphysical and we shall argue that there is no reason to be persuaded by them. (shrink)

(Thesis) Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Florida, 1984.

(Thesis) Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Florida, 1985.

Ecosystems and their component organisms are being destroyed at an unprecedented rate today by the space and resource demands of an exponentially growing human population. Ethical theories developed for addressing environmental problems have generally followed one of two different lines. Individual-centered theories that expand moral consideration to include some nonhumans draw support from traditional ethical thinking but encounter difficulties with defining the limits of moral considerability, with countenancing such natural processes as predation, and with according relevance to the extinction of (...) species. Ecocentric theories accommodate species interactions but show a relative lack of historical grounding and are often unclear about the moral status accorded human and nonhuman individuals, facing charges of "environmental fascism" to the extent that the good of individuals may be subordinated to the good of the ecosystem. Current ecocentric views have further problems of consistency, since the human being is seemingly still accorded special privileges within the ecosystem, leading them to collapse into merely enlightened versions of anthropocentrism, and of effectiveness, since as yet they have demonstrated little of substance in addressing population problems. Anthropocentrism is rejected as incongruent with our empirical picture of the world, which shows evolutionary continuity, rather than sharp gaps, existing among living organisms, and hence individual-centered approaches that accord nonhumans continuity of consideration appear preferable. Of these approaches, the utilitarian theories of Singer and Attfield have the advantage of an ongoing dialogue concerning population, but at least one utilitarian view appears to encourage additional human population growth. I argue that it may be possible to develop an individual-centered ethic according equal respect for the equal interests of all living beings that, in the process of concretizing the content of the interests of those beings, reflects the coarse-grained, interconnected kinds within the ecosystem and thereby discovers limits on the numbers of those beings there should be. We find we humans have choices to make with respect to accommodating those interests as we discover our own coarse-grained niche within the ecosystem, and a very important choice is the extent to which we ourselves should procreate. (shrink)

"Constructing a transatlantic arc of literature, Brantley explores how John Wesley and Jonathan Edwards provide an empirical as well as evangelical framework for interpreting their spiritual descendants, Thomas Carlyle and Ralph Waldo Emerson. He finds that the four Anglo-American writers share a simultaneously rational and sensational reliance on experience as the avenue to knowledge.

(Bibliography) Includes bibliographical references (p. 197-203) and index.

(Thesis) Thesis -- University of Florida.

(Statement of Responsibility) by Barbara Lynn McNeal.

(Statement of Responsibility) by Timothy Earl Ackley.

(Funding) Digitized with funding from the Digital Library of the Caribbean grant awarded by TICFIA.

(Funding) Digitized with funding from the Digital Library of the Caribbean grant awarded by TICFIA.

(Statement of Responsibility) by Lewis Carroll ; with illustrations in colors.

(Statement of Responsibility) by Lewis Carroll ; with ninety-two illustrations by John Tenniel.

(Statement of Responsibility) by Timothy S. Huebner.

(Statement of Responsibility) by C.A. Stephens ; illustrated.

(Citation/Reference) Williams, S. H. Lewis Carroll handbook.

(Thesis) Thesis (M.S.) -- Florida A&M University, 1990.

An introduction to sentential logic and first-order predicate logic with identity, logical systems that significantly influenced twentieth-century analytic philosophy. After working through the material in this book, a student should be able to understand most quantified expressions that arise in their philosophical reading. -/- This books treats symbolization, formal semantics, and proof theory for each language. The discussion of formal semantics is more direct than in many introductory texts. Although forall x does not contain proofs of soundness and completeness, it (...) lays the groundwork for understanding why these are things that need to be proven. -/- The book highlights the choices involved in developing sentential and predicate logic. Students should realize that these two are not the only possible formal languages. In translating to a formal language, we simplify and profit in clarity. The simplification comes at a cost, and different formal languages are suited to translating different parts of natural language. (shrink)