BEGINNING with G. E. M. Anscombe's "Modern Moral Philosophy" in 1958, various critics--e.g., Frankena, Foot, MacIntyre, and Murdock--have, to one extent or another, expressed dissatisfaction with the condition of modern moral philosophy. Prior to this round of critiques, H. A. Prichard in 1912 asked the question "Is Moral Philosophy Based on a Mistake?" in an essay of that title in Mind. One finds precedent for these expressions of discontent with the ground rules of moral philosophy in both Aristotle and Kant, (...) two thinkers whose reformulations of the questions and procedures of ethics proved seminal for the discipline. Even neglecting other important developments in contemporary moral philosophy, the diversity and rigour of these critiques alone suggest that the prognosis for the discipline of ethics is quite favorable. Philosophy in at least one of its dimensions has recovered that self-reflective attentiveness that marks its most productive phases. So it is that several of these contemporary critiques raise the suspicion that what is wrong with moral philosophy is that it operates outside of a context in terms of which talk about moral laws or moral goods would be intelligible. Our contemporary situation can thus be contrasted with, for example, that of Aristotle for whom a discussion of "magnificence" was firmly rooted in an Athenian context in terms of which an argument over the merits of that particular virtue might be resolved. Alasdair MacIntyre's After Virtue brings this line of reflection into sharp new focus with a series of illuminating discussions concerning the role of the virtues both in the history of moral practices and in the logic of moral argument. In general, MacIntyre tries to show that "contemporary moral debate is interminable" ; that is, he tries to show why, given the nature of contemporary moral philosophy, there is "no rational way of securing moral agreement". Because I believe MacIntyre is successful in his demonstration, I shall, in this paper, take that demonstration for granted and try to construct a set of arguments designed to show how, in terms of a universally accessible paradigmatic character, we have at hand a way of avoiding the "interminable" regress of moral debate. Thus although my argument is derivative to MacIntyre's diagnosis and dependent, in part, upon his treatment of the concept of virtue, the proposal I develop here for the resolution of moral arguments is, sadly to say, somewhat at odds with his own. (shrink)

Being for Heidegger, Professor Alderman tells us, is like the mountain, it challenges us because it is simply there. In whatever we do, we cannot help "using" Being with a kind of comfortableness. However, there is the challenge to "mention" Being which brings a new and better kind of atunement. Man can think Being because he can be ontological. Man is both questioner and context. Any clarity in our understanding of Heidegger is a step. Professor Alderman helps us take this (...) step. While we might find ourselves returning to dark forest-paths, for a brief moment we will have broken out into the clearing. And after that we will walk the forest-paths differently. (shrink)

Being for Heidegger, Professor Alderman tells us, is like the mountain, it challenges us because it is simply there. In whatever we do, we cannot help "using" Being with a kind of comfortableness. However, there is the challenge to "mention" Being which brings a new and better kind of atunement. Man can think Being because he can be ontological. Man is both questioner and context. Any clarity in our understanding of Heidegger is a step. Professor Alderman helps us take this (...) step. While we might find ourselves returning to dark forest-paths, for a brief moment we will have broken out into the clearing. And after that we will walk the forest-paths differently. (shrink)

The paper clarifies heidegger's analysis of what it means to be human by: comparing it with other inquiries into the nature of man, By stating the most general features of his analysis, And by indicating how man's temporal nature provides access to being. A concluding section shows the relationship between the analysis of man and the post-Kehre seinsfrage.