Epistemic instrumentalism, exceeding our grasp

Philosophical Studies 137 (1):135-139 (2008)
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Abstract

In the concluding chapter of Exceeding our Grasp Kyle Stanford outlines a positive response to the central issue raised brilliantly by his book, the problem of unconceived alternatives. This response, called "epistemic instrumentalism", relies on a distinction between instrumental and literal belief. We examine this distinction and with it the viability of Stanford's instrumentalism, which may well be another case of exceeding our grasp.

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Arthur Fine
University of Washington

Citations of this work

Historical Inductions: New Cherries, Same Old Cherry-picking.Moti Mizrahi - 2015 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 29 (2):129-148.

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References found in this work

Epistemic instrumentalism, exceeding our grasp.Kyle Stanford - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 137 (1):135-139.
Einstein, Podolsky, Rosen, and Shannon.Asher Peres - 2005 - Foundations of Physics 35 (3):511-514.

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