Does the Rich Content View of Experience Matter?

Abstract

Does it matter whether we perceptually represent tomato-hood?

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Adam Pautz
Brown University

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References found in this work

The Contents of Visual Experience.Susanna Siegel - 2010 - , US: Oxford University Press USA.
Consciousness and Experience.William G. Lycan - 1996 - Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Teleological theories of mental content.Peter Schulte & Karen Neander - 2022 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Consciousness and Experience.William G. Lycan - 1996 - Philosophy 72 (282):602-604.
Does Phenomenology Ground Mental Content?Adam Pautz - 2013 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. Oxford University Press. pp. 194-234.

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