On an inconsistency in constructive empiricism

Philosophy of Science 64 (3):511-514 (1997)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I show that van Fraassen's empiricism leads to mutually incompatible claims with regard to empirical theories. He is committed to the claim that reasons for accepting a theory and believing it are always identical, insofar as the theory in question is an empirical theory. He also makes a general claim that reasons for accepting a theory are not always reasons for believing it irrespective of whether the theory is an empirical theory

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,616

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Kuhn, nominalism, and empiricism.Alexander Bird - 2003 - Philosophy of Science 70 (4):690-719.
Constructive Empiricism and Anti-Realism.Sam Mitchell - 1988 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:174 - 180.
On rejecting Foss's image of Van Fraassen.Warren Bourgeois - 1987 - Philosophy of Science 54 (2):303-308.
Constructive empiricism and the vices of voluntarism.Paul Dicken - 2009 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17 (2):189 – 201.
Constructive empiricism and the problem of aboutness.Elliott Sober - 1985 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36 (1):11-18.
Constructive empiricism and modal metaphysics: A reply to Monton and Van Fraassen.James Ladyman - 2004 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (4):755-765.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
197 (#93,267)

6 months
5 (#246,492)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

References found in this work

The Scientific Image.William Demopoulos & Bas C. van Fraassen - 1982 - Philosophical Review 91 (4):603.
The Scientific Image by Bas C. van Fraassen. [REVIEW]Michael Friedman - 1982 - Journal of Philosophy 79 (5):274-283.
Testing Scientific Theories.John Earman (ed.) - 1983 - Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Testing Scientific Theories.John Earman - 1988 - Philosophy of Science 55 (2):292-303.

Add more references