The purpose of this paper is to confront a well-known problem in interreligious engagement in European institutions, namely the tendency to exclude contributions that do not conform to certain European expectations. It diagnoses problems produced not only by the problem but by certain solutions to it, and to propose in outline an alternative approach. Chief among these problems is the imperative that members of traditions articulate their deepest moral commitments, in order to secure a common moral ground. This imperative has (...) the unintended but drastic effect of excluding important voices in dialogue. Drawing on the figures of Cordelia (in Shakespeare’s King Lear) and Antigone (in Sophocles’ Antigone) it is argued that forced articulation distorts its objects. The theoretical framework of discussion is drawn from Hegel, Schelling, and Adorno as in interpreted by Alasdair MacIntyre, Charles Taylor, and Andrew Bowie. The originality of the argument is the use of aesthetic theory in German philosophy to inform a critique of attempts to make morality central to interreligious engagement. (shrink)

I am grateful for the five thoughtful and generous responses by Petruschka Schaafsma, Ariën Voogt, Sophia Höff, Dominique Gosewisch, and Rob Compaijen. I propose to summarise their responses and to...

On the view that Nicholas Adams advocates in ‘Alternatives to Moral Common Ground’, ethics is complicit in undermining the commitments that constitute our moral lives, because by forcing us to articulate those commitments they lose their hold on us. In this paper I take Adams’ views as a starting point to explore the idea that ethics might be complicit in undermining our moral lives. Aiming to shed light on the relation between reflection and commitment, I will do two things. First, (...) I try to explain why ethics, as a reflective enterprise, undermines the unspoken hold our commitments have on us. Second, I will explore the idea that reflection is destructive in the sense that it falsifies our pre-reflective commitments. (shrink)

In response to Adam’s concern that when one tries to articulate a moral commitment, the commitment is ‘falsified,’ I examine the importance of a particular articulation in the process of moral development and look for a way to engage in this articulation, while avoiding the pitfalls Adams identified. Via the example of moral formation, and more specifically, exemplarity, I show the role of articulation in moral growth. Moreover, I attempt to show that partial and imperfect articulation can lead to moral (...) growth. For if this articulation is understood as inherently partial, it does not fall into the pitfall of ‘falsification,’ nor other well-known pitfalls in the process of moral formation through exemplarity. (shrink)

Nicholas Adams argues that one should not force the articulation of moral common ground as this might lead to a distortion or collapse of what is being articulated. Instead, one should strive for an articulation as practised in Scriptural Reasoning, where the common ground remains implicit and interwoven with contextual understandings. These arguments concern the question of what language can do. Following Walter Benjamin, I would like to link the question of what language can or cannot do more closely to (...) an analysis of what language is. Referring to a certain potential of language, I will argue with Benjamin that linguistic creations can serve the value of Scriptural Reasoning to engage in a fruitful conversation about moral matters. In this context, I will consider the question of whether only sacred texts are suitable for Scriptural Reasoning. (shrink)

In this contribution, I take Nicholas Adams’ discussion of the paradox of ethics as an occasion to further explore our present moral situation and the possibilities of ethics in it. This situation is characterised by pluralism of moral views, which gives rise to relativist and cynical reactions as well as to strong, polarising expressions. These tendencies feed a suspicion towards ethical reflection. In light of the paradox of ethics as discussed by Adams this may seem justified. I will argue, however, (...) for a more constructive role for ethics. This can be elaborated by focusing on the transcendent character of the good, which is implied in the paradox. I will explore this transcendent character by turning to a Christian perspective on morality that elaborates this transcendence in a specific constructive way. From this perspective, the experience of the loss of self-evidence around which the paradox of ethics revolves may be seen as beneficial. It opens human beings to a transcendent good to which they can entrust themselves for a renewal of life. Thus, the good can be seen as something that makes an appeal to us that can liberate to a love that transcends doing good as a human project. (shrink)

This article responds to Nicholas Adams by exploring the affinities between his account and Hegel, with a particular focus on the dialectic of articulation. They seem to agree on the undermining effect of articulation and reflection on implicit commitments. However, Adams diverges from Hegel by questioning the consequence and supposed inevitability of this dialectical process. Whereas Hegel argues for the desirability of conscious articulation in the progress towards modernity, Adams contends that it is actually a destructive and oppressive process, challenging (...) Hegel’s Enlightenment optimism and Eurocentrism. Still, I suggest that Hegel’s concern for rational dialogue as an indispensable condition for modern life and community should be taken seriously. Scriptural reasoning, as discussed by Adams, provides a model how we can have a form of rational dialogue that escapes from the dilemma posed by the Hegelian dialectic, and that it may be possible to combine strong ethical commitments with an openness to pluralistic dialogue. (shrink)

This Special Issue questions a basic assumption in thinking about morality: the idea that the explicit articulation of moral commitments that usually remain implicit is the basis par excellence for dialogue and rapprochement between people of opposing views. Nicholas Adams shows in the main article of this Special Issue that there is a paradox behind this assumption concerning ethics itself: articulating moral commitments may end up undermining them. It inherently stands in tension with forms of life as people actually inhabit (...) them. Adams associates this basic paradox of ethics with the problem of forced articulation in particular discursive regimes, such as interreligious dialogue. The practice of Scriptural Reasoning is introduced as an alternative mode of dialogue that is less vulnerable to the distortions of articulation. The five response articles (by Petruschka Schaafsma, Ariën Voogt, Rob Compaijen, Dominique Gosewisch, and Sophia Höff) address aspects of Adams’ challenge to articulation in relation to morality, rather than the setting of interreligious engagement. They point out the value of articulation in spite of its inherent imperfection, or constructively elaborate on how to deal with the paradox of ethics as analyzed by Adams. Finally, Adams responds by addressing the concerns of these replies. (shrink)

Descartes claims that we can love God sensuously. However, it is prima facie unclear how this is possible, given that he is also committed to the impossibility of sensing or imagining God. In this essay, I show that Descartes has the metaphysical and psychophysical resources necessary to alleviate this tension. First, I discuss Descartes’s account of the intellectual love of God, demonstrating that the intellectual love of God constitutively involves the love of God’s creation. Second, I argue that an image (...) of God’s creation is sufficient for communicating the intellectual love of God to the body, so as to produce a sensuous love of God. And third, I discuss Descartes’s reasons for developing an account of the sensuous love of God. (shrink)

When considered in the field of aesthetics, the Bilderverbot (biblical ban on pictures) is received with a variety of attitudes ranging between the extremes of Kant’s praise and Hegel’s criticism. Despite being at odds with each other, Kant’s and Hegel’s interpretations suffer from the same theoretical flaw: both assume that the pictures the Bible talks about are representations related to their objects by way of reference. This assumption is proven wrong in the pars destruens of this essay, in which it (...) will be argued that using the notion of ‘representation’ as a key to the reading of the Bilderverbot is a misconception that leads to an anachronistic and partial view of the matter. The concept of ‘gaze,’ elaborated by Régis Debray and other scholars of visual studies, is introduced in the pars construens of this essay to show that the biblical prohibition is actually aimed at a different kind of pictures, to wit at presentifications, which, instead of referring to their objects in a representational way, are rather thought to embody and dominate them. In conclusion, through Nietzsche’s insights into the reasons behind religious cults, the point is finally made that the notion of ‘power’ surpasses that of ‘representation’ in capturing and accounting for the authentic meaning of the Bilderverbot. (shrink)

This paper examines the controversy between Franz von Baader and Schelling as it takes place in Schelling’s lecture course Das System der Weltalter. This particular instance of their disagreement involves Schelling criticising Baader for his notion of the biblical Elohim as divine proxies. The paper first provides a background to Baader-Schelling philosophical feud before examining Schelling’s remarks against Baader in the System der Weltalter. Then, Baader’s writings on Elohim are looked into in the light of their connection to Baader’s conception (...) of creation as falling-away and Baader’s source for interpreting Elohim as proxies, including Saint Martin and Kabbalah. Thereafter, Schelling’s criticism of Baader is analysed and interpreted in the context of the System der Weltalter. The paper aims to achieve several things: to show the presence of distorted kabbalistic influence in Baader and its discussion in Schelling; to revise Koslowski’s view on Baader’s creation narrative by pointing out how Baader’s Elohim/divine proxies function to form a rather dualistic relation between God and creation; and to interpret Schelling’s convoluted and difficult reply to Baader displaying that at stake between the two thinkers were questions of God’s ineffability and freedom as well as God’s involvement into creation. (shrink)

During the heyday of the medieval period of the Scholastics, robust philosophical speculations about spiritual realities apart from God flourished. Since then, discussions by philosophers about thi...

Controverting Kierkegaard is the fourth and final volume in the series Selected Works of K. E. Løgstrup. The other books are Kierkegaard’s and Heidegger’s Analysis of Existence and Its Relation to...

Using poststructural criticism, we explore how the book of Job deconstructs the deed/consequence nexus that stands at the core of the Hebrew Bible’s theological framework – i.e. the doctrine of reward and punishment. Building on both Derridean deconstruction and Foucauldian resistance, we show that the book of Job refuses to comply with the opposite binary of reward and punishment. First, we demonstrate how the friends in their speeches enforce the binary and, thereby, exercise power over Job. Secondly, we consider Job’s (...) resistance and deconstruction of this binary through both his lived experience and desire to argue with God. Finally, we argue how Job’s desire to argue with God challenges God to defend themself in court. In God’s answer, however, one is introduced to a different God than as portrayed by Job’s friends. Moreover, God’s boastful reply, which lacks any justification for Job’s suffering, makes God appear fragile and weak. As such, this article argues that the book of Job may not merely deconstruct dominant ideology, but also God itself. (shrink)

While many scholars have realized that the Enlightenment period was much more religious than previously thought, the deists are still seen as basically secular figures who believed in a distant and inactive deity. This article shows that the hundred and thirteen French Revolutionary deists who wrote prayers and hymns to God believed in a caring, loving, and active deity. They maintained that God wanted people to be free, and so God actively helped the French Revolution by leading the French armies (...) to victory and revealing enemy plots. The majority of these prayers and hymns were said at government-sponsored religious festivals. It is a mistake, however, to dismiss this religious language as being about sacralizing the new nation. Instead, there were places in the festivals where individuals could express their own religious views. Furthermore, most of these prayers and hymns were written while Maximilien Robespierre was pushing his deist civil religion and labelling irreligious people as enemies of the French republic. However, the same views about God were expressed after his death by the Theophilanthropists. Thus, these deists were not merely echoing the party line while Robespierre was alive, but were expressing their true religious feelings. (shrink)

This paper explores the structural similarities between Hegel’s conception of spirit and the Jewish medieval text, the Zohar’s, figuration of Shekhinah. The formal logic of spirit’s self-actualization is historically exemplified by Shekhinah in her existence as divinity’s indwelling presence in the world and her mythic embodiment of Jewish history. This study reads Shekhinah’s journey towards union with God as analogous to spirit’s passage towards absolute knowledge, a passage which concludes with what is often referred to as spirit’s ‘return to its (...) elf.’ Contrary to some popular interpretations of Hegel, spirit’s return is an iterative, tautological return to itself as differentiated in itself. The discussion concludes with the claim that Shekhinah’s eschatological journey towards harmonious reunion with God occurs through a proleptic movement in which biblical past and prophesied future, or the Jews’s historically first and theoretically final redemption from exile, coalesce in a here and now in a similarly iterative manner which precludes it from a determinate, apocalyptic end. (shrink)

This article compares two attempts to return to realism after Kant’s ‘Copernican Revolution’. Quentin Meillassoux, representing the ‘speculative realism’ school, rejects both Kantian and post-Kantian idealism in favour of a materialism based on the epistemology of the modern sciences. But Meillassoux is unaware of the element of choice in his philosophical position, and he does not solve the essential problem posed by idealism which concerns the place of the subject in being. Ricœur, on the other hand, sublates Kant by a (...) deeper embrace of finitude that leads to the self-displacement of the subject, and a ‘Second Copernican Revolution’, one that he freely admits can only be arrived at by Jaspersian ‘Philosophical Faith’. The article concludes by showing how crossing the border into theological faith offers a virtue-ethical perspective on the question of realism and idealism: it is in fact the choice between a childlike humility that receives reality as it is, and an arrogant self-positing that puts the subject in the position of God. (shrink)

Genesis – known by many, understood by few. After reading his lectures, there is no doubt that Viktor von Weizsäcker falls under the second category. Weizsäcker was not a philosopher by profession,...

This article aims to elucidate the relationship between Agamben’s notion of messianism and his project of philosophical archaeology. Whereas the former relates to political and ethical aspects of Agamben’s philosophy, the latter belongs to the domain of methodology of philosophical research itself. The main thesis of the paper argues that these two components rely on each other and constitute one and the same project. The author demonstrates that Agamben’s notion of messianic action and scholarly activity of philosophical archaeology overlap, which (...) leads to a problematization of political dimension of Agamben’s messianism. The orientation towards the past in Agamben’s understanding of the messianic is its crucial presupposition that imposes limits on its applicability to the realm of politics. This thesis is substantiated by an investigation of the problem of relation between theory and practice in Agamben’s thought and by a close reading of the ‘Mystery of Anomia’ section in The Time that Remains. Beginning with the problem of the possibility of a transition from the tragic narrative elaborated in the Homo Sacer project to the messianic state of lawlessness, the author demonstrates that in Agamben’s thought this transition is made possible only by means of an archaeological inquiry. (shrink)

In the present paper, I investigate the ways in which the grammar of God-talk in David B. Burrell’s philosophical theology comes to meet Muhammad Husiyn-i Tabatabai’s account of divine names, which has been developed in his theory of religious language. I begin the first part of the paper by introducing Tabatabai’s innovative articulation of the concept of Mental Construct and its relevance to his account of language and meaning. I, then, clarify how he proceeds to elucidate his conception of religious (...) language in terms of what he calls ‘focal meaning’, i.e. his idea of a true sense underlying the application of a word. In the second part of the article, Burrell’s methodology of God-talk is introduced and briefly discussed, before proceeding with interlocutory explanations as well as an examination of Tabatabai’s semantics of divine names. On the basis of Burrellian reading of via analogia, I propose a novel interpretation of the principle of focal meaning. This interpretation is particularly concerned with the most appropriate manner in which we can comprehend the literality of religious language. I conclude by explaining the way in which Burrell’s analysis is useful and elucidating for a contemporary interpretation of Tabatabai’s work. (shrink)

Hope beyond certainty is a significant element in contemporary theological discourse after the death of God. This relation between hope and uncertainty is not new. In the nineteenth century, a growing number of intellectuals started to call themselves agnostic, but did not always end up in scepticism and nihilism. On the contrary, new ways to search for meaning and fulfilment in life beyond the traditional answers of institutional religions (i.e. the church) were explored. The Dutch intellectual Allard Pierson (1831–1896) is (...) a good case in point. From a contemporary postsecular perspective and radical theology, this article argues that Pierson’s agnosticism should not be seen as an attitude of indifference, but as opening up the possibility for an eschatological hope beyond certainty. First, the (im)possibility of hope is discussed by debating the views of David Newheiser, Richard Kearney, and John D. Caputo. Second, the article analyses Pierson’s view by focusing upon hermeneutics instead of epistemology, an openness to transcendence, and imagination. The article thereby contributes to the understanding of nineteenth-century religious and secularisation developments as well as to contemporary theological debates on the (im)possibility of faith and hope after the death of God. (shrink)

Since the work of the late Jacques Derrida often found a more positive reception in the United States than in Europe, it is perhaps fitting that the Derrida-influenced writings of John Caputo have...

The hypothesis that we may be living in a digital simulation is utilized as a ‘thought experiment’ to help clarify important questions in theology and philosophy, including the nature of God, the significance and importance of an afterlife, and the ultimate nature of reality. It is argued that a consideration of the simulation hypothesis renders problematic traditional conceptions of a personal, creator, omnipotent deity, makes the theological significance of a purported afterlife far less significant, and paradoxically undermines the very materialistic (...) view of reality that underlies the simulation hypothesis in the first place. It is concluded that the simulation hypothesis renders ‘science’ virtually irrelevant to ultimate questions in philosophy and theology and elevates ethics and axiology to fundamental status for our understanding of reality and any defensible conception of the divine. (shrink)

The book argues for the relevance of Mary Wollstonecraft’s intellectual legacy for the contemporary debate on ethics. The study is based on the whole of Wollstonecraft’s literary corpus and is char...

Recent discussions about Eucharistic practice in the United States have received increased public attention with stories of pro-life politicians being excluded from participation. In this practice of exclusion, there is a depiction of protecting the Eucharist from impurity, with the priests citing the pro-life framework as the basis for inclusion. Using this site for reflection, this article seeks to interrogate these representations of (im)purity specifically with reference to the abortion debate and the Eucharist. Taking the concept of impurity found in (...) the works of Judith Butler and Bruno Latour and placing it in conversation with ‘purity culture’ and the disproportional focus on bodies of women in cases of abortion, I seek to address constructed boundaries between dualisms such as pure and impure, as well as Church and the world. More specifically, I aim to reconfigure impurity away from being an ‘evil that must be avoided’ (Thomas Bauer) by the Church and instead ask how this can serve as a rich resource for scholars reflecting on religious practices today, rethinking the Body of Christ as one of inherent interdependency and porosity – not a space in need of protection from ‘impurity’, but one that further divides representations of purity and impurity altogether. (shrink)

Can rational choice theory justify hope and patience in dealing with calamities such as financial collapse or terminal illness? The Book of Job is a good entry-point. Three friends of Job counsel him to avoid hopelessness and bitterness arising from frustration regarding calamities. They do so on non-rational grounds. They argue that Job should ignore the evidence and instead blindly uphold the belief ‘God is just.’ However, such blindness permits magic, superstitions, and cultish beliefs. The specter of such beliefs is (...) probably what prompted the fourth friend, Elihu, to dismiss the arguments of the three friends. Elihu reasons that one should be rational, i.e., acknowledge the evidence. This need not entail the conclusion ‘God is unjust’ – as God cannot perform miracles on a daily basis. That is, given the evidence, one cannot sustain hopeful beliefs that God will interfere and reverse the course of natural catastrophes and shocks from which humans, as well as other living beings, suffer. One at best can be patient, accept suffering considering worse counterfactuals. Based on Elihu’s critique of the arguments of the three friends, and building on Maimonides’s interpretation, this paper concludes that standard rational choice theory can explain patience, but not hope. (shrink)

In this paper, I offer an account of the structural differences, neglected in the literature, between Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Emmanuel Levinas, showing how Bonhoeffer’s account of persons and responsibility is differentiated through creation, fall, and redemption, whereas Levinas’s account of ethical selfhood offers itself as a kind of transcendental account of persons in which the self is structured by its encounter with the other which commands responsibility. This difference (situationally differentiated vs. transcendental) plays out in two ways – the role (...) of the will in ethical selfhood and the identity of the primal governing agent in the encounter with others. Bonhoeffer’s account, through its differentiation into different modes of existence, allows for the possibility of different stages and modes of the encounter with the other, and thus allows for the incorporation of one model of encounter at one stage, and another model at a different stage. As a consequence, Bonhoeffer’s account includes and develops upon the kind of demand-based account Levinas offers. This can serve as an advantage over Levinas’s model insofar as it provides a ‘multi-modal’ framework to absorb other views into one’s own in a way that a transcendentally conceived framework of selfhood does not. (shrink)

Luther, a controversial figure during his lifetime is the subject of Lyndal Roper’s research. She responds to the ongoing fascination with Luther and his constant presence in contemporary self-fash...

In this article, we present for the first time Schelling’s early critique of absolute idealism within his middle metaphysics (1804–1820), which has great relevance and influence on the subsequent course of German philosophy, and, more broadly considered, on later systematic thinking about the categories of unity and duality. We aim to show how Schelling defends a form of metaphysical duality, from 1804 onwards, without relapsing into a stronger Kantian dualism. In this sense, our author rejects both the dualism between nature (...) and spirit, necessity and freedom, as well as the monist-immanent metaphysical stance later associated with Hegelian panlogism. Against Hegel, Schelling increasingly vindicates the reality of the finite and degrades the infinite to mere ideality in a movement that resembles later existentialism. Furthermore, we defend Schelling against the accusation of irrationalism that sections of Hegelianism formulated against him and present the concept of infinity without the notion of totality, which he thinks of, much like Fichte, in the light of the concept of an ‘infinite task’. Schelling’s later criticisms of Hegel are shown to be influenced by his early idealist critique of the period at hand. (shrink)