Truthmaking non-maximalism usually assumes that some truths do not have truthmakers. I suggest, however, that non-maximalism can be understood more specifically, and that different types of non-maximalism can be distinguished. To do so, I refer to two positions. The first is deflationary truthmaking, some of whose proponents assume that no truths have truthmakers. The second distinguishes between truths that do not have truthmakers but depend on being, and truths that do not have truthmakers and moreover do not depend on being. (...) Given the combinations of these positions, I propose a new classification indicating the positions available to a non-maximalist. I argue that one of these positions is particularly worth adopting because of its advantages over the other options. (shrink)

Truth about matters of fact is objective. This is not just because truth is objective. It is also because facts are objective. An objective fact makes an assertion of that fact true. The objectivity of the fact adds a further element of objectivity to the objective truth of the assertion. True assertions of fact are true because truth is objective and because the facts that make them true are objective. True assertions of fact are objective twice over. Their objectivity is (...) twofold. Or, at least, that is the point I seek to establish here. (shrink)

The paper is a discussion of the book by Witold Wachowski entitled Poznanie rozproszone: Od heurystyk do mechanizmów (Distributed Cognition: From Heuristics to Mechanisms). At the beginning, I introduce the theoretical context of the reviewed publication. Then, I discuss the content of the publication and the research thesis. In the further part, I draw attention to certain difficulties related to the application of ecological heuristics and the possibility of its connection with the research tradition developed on the basis of the (...) so-called free energy principle. In the last part, I indicate the importance of the discussed publication for the contemporary debateconducted on the basis of the philosophy of cognitive science. (shrink)