Kripke-Putnam argument for natural kind essentialism can be said to depend on placeholder essentialist intuitions. But some argue that such philosophical intuitions are merely preschooler cognitive biases which are not supported by scientific knowledge of natural kinds. Chemical substances, for instance, whether elements or compounds do not have such privileged set of underlying properties (‘same substance’ relation) which are present in all members of the kind and which provide necessary and sufficient condition for kind membership. In this paper, I argue (...) that placeholder essentialism works for at least some of the scientific natural kinds especially for the basic chemical natural kind, i.e., element. I argue that the dual sense of the element (the basic substance and the simple substance) along with microstructuralism helps explain the essence of an element not only at the abstract level but also at the more concrete level. Based on this essentialist account of element, I conclude that placeholder essentialism is not completely without merit, and it fits nicely with at least some of our scientific natural kinds. (shrink)

Dr. K. Wray (2022) questioned my suggestion that T. W. Richards should be included as one of the scientists who contributed to the discovery of isotopes. This article provides additional support for inclusion of Richards as a contributor to the discovery.

The concept of green chemistry dominated the imagination of environmentally-minded chemists over the last thirty years. The conceptual frameworks laid by the American Environmental Protection Agency scholars in the 1990s constitute today the core of a line of thinking aimed at transforming chemistry into a sustainable science. And yet, in the shadow of green chemistry, a broader, even if less popular, concept of sustainable chemistry started taking shape. Initially, it was either loosely associated with green chemistry or left undefined as (...) a distinct but generaly different approach. In such a vague form, it was endorsed by the organizations such as OECD and the IUPAC in the late 1990s. It was not until the 2010s however, when it solidified as a separate more embracing and more overarching tradition that could compete with green chemistry by offering insights that the latter lacked. Sustainable chemistry seeks to transcend the narrow focus on chemical synthesis and embrace a much more holistic view of chemical activities including social responsibility and sustainable business models. Due to an interesting historical coincidence, it was in Germany where sustainable chemistry took roots and became institutionalized for the first time. It was thanks to German exceptionalism and the unwillingness of German scholars to embrace the “green” terminology originating from the US, the concept of sustainable chemistry could safely mature and develop in the German-speaking world, before reaching a high degree of formalization with dedicated journals, founding articles, and programmatic principles aspiring to transform the entire chemical enterprise in the years to come. (shrink)

The debate between ontological reductionists and emergentists in chemistry has revolved around quantum mechanics. What Franklin and Seifert (BJPS 2020) add to the long-running dispute is an attention to the measurement problem. They contend that all three realist interpretations of the quantum formalism capable of resolving the measurement problem also obviate any need for chemical emergence. I push their argument further, arguing that the realist interpretations of quantum mechanics actually subvert the basis for reduction as well, by undercutting the idea (...) that fundamental physical particles are actual parts of molecules. With both reduction and traditional synchronic emergence pictures ruled out, the only option for realists about quantum chemistry is strong Thomistic emergence. (shrink)

In modern German ‘Anschauung’ is translated as intuition. But in Kant’s technical philosophical context, it means an intuition derived from previous visualizations of physical processes in the world of perceptions. The nineteenth century chemists’ predilection for Kantian Anschauung led them to develop an intuitive representation of what exists beyond the bounds of the senses. Molecular structure is one of the illuminating outcomes. (Ochiai 2021, pp. 1–51) This mental habit seems to be dominant among chemists even in the twentieth century, as (...) is illustrated by the electronic theory of organic chemistry and the frontier orbital theory as well. The former assumes that (1) bonds are paired electrons shared by bonded atoms—in fact, electrons in molecules are not localized in bonds; (2) the difference of electronegativities between bonded atoms causes electron drifts—expressed by the curly arrow—that result in bond formation or bond cleavage. The latter focuses on the orbitals that make the greatest contribution to the energy of a system undergoing electron delocalization, while the LCAO method says, as is suggested by the word Linear Combination of Atomic Orbitals, molecular orbitals should be constructed from all of the atomic orbitals that have the appropriate symmetry. In other words, every molecular orbital contributes to some extent to the electronic state of a molecule. The curly arrow in the electronic theory and the orbital lobe in the frontier orbital theory illustrate an intuitive character of these theories. Although both theories rely on such simple and qualitative models rather than mathematically rigid quantum mechanical calculations, they are successful in explaining, predicting, and designing chemical reactions. What makes these prima facie intuitive theories so successful? In this study we address this problem from a historical and philosophical as well as scientific point of view. The key to solve this problem is that they are concerned with only bond formation or bond cleavage, in which the localized-bond principle holds. (shrink)

I put forward an inferentialist account of Lewis structures (LSs). In this view, the role of LSs is not to realistically depict molecules, but instead to allow surrogate reasoning and inference in chemistry. I also show that the usage of LSs is a central part of a person’s identity as a chemist, as it is defined within educational identity theory. Taking these conclusions together, I argue that the inferentialist approach to LSs and chemistry identity theory can be studied in parallel, (...) as two complementary sides of the same research programme. (shrink)

This article describes a descriptive-qualitative method for analyzing and reviewing several textbooks for high school as samples commonly used by teachers and students in their teaching–learning to reveal possible misconceptions. This study focused on the subjects of quantum numbers and electronic configuration. From the advanced literature review to analyze the samples the occurrence of various misconceptions was noted. All textbooks described correctly the four symbols of quantum numbers, but none correlates correctly the magnetic-angular quantum number to the Cartesian labeled orbitals. (...) All textbooks consider mistakenly the meaning of aufbau as the building-up energy of orbitals by following (n + ℓ, n) rules on describing the electronic configuration for all atoms. Only one textbook states that the electronic configuration of transition metal atoms (3d series) can be described in the following order of shell (n), thus giving rise to two types of electronic configurations, [Ar] 3d 4s (Type I) beside [Ar] 4s 3d (Type II), leading further misconception. All textbooks described favorably an unpaired electron of ms = + ½ due to the specific agreement, which is a potential misconception in applying Hund’s rule. In drawing the diagram boxes of orbitals, they are arranged in increasing or decreasing the numeric mℓ, due to the specific agreement, and again leading to a potential misconception on describing the quantum number of electrons issued. Three textbooks introduced the terms of the last and the xth electron associated with the quantum numbers, leading to serious further misconceptions. No books stated that the ordering energy of the (n + ℓ, n) rule is true only for the first twenty atoms. (shrink)

We argue for an account of chemical reactivities as chancy propensities, in accordance with the ‘complex nexus of chance’ defended by one of us in the past. Reactivities are typically quantified as proportions, and an expression such as “A + B → C” does not entail that under the right conditions some given amounts of A and B react to give the mass of C that theoretically corresponds to the stoichiometry of the reaction. Instead, what is produced is a fraction (...) α < 1 of this theoretical amount, and the corresponding percentage is usually known as the yield, which expresses the relative preponderance of its reaction. This is then routinely tested in a laboratory against the observed actual yields for the different reactions. Thus, on our account, reactivities ambiguously refer to three quantities at once. They first refer to the underlying propensities effectively acting in the reaction mechanisms, which in ‘chemical chemistry’ (Schummer in Hyle 4:129–162, 1998) are commonly represented by means of Lewis structures. Besides, reactivities represent the probabilities that these propensities give rise to, for any amount of the reactants to combine as prescribed. This last notion is hence best understood as a single case chance and corresponds to a theoretical stoichiometric yield. Finally, reactivities represent the actual yields observed in experimental runs, which account for and provide the requisite evidence for/against both the mechanisms and single case chances ascribed. (shrink)

Based upon the demarcation between Elementalism and Atomism Chemistry from the perspective of the long-term history of chemistry, the authors re-examine the Berthollet-Proust controversy on the three types of chemical compounds, pointing out that Berthollet proposed the law of indefinite proportions by deduction, while Proust proposed the law of definite proportions by induction. The controversy is beyond the framework of affinity chemistry and entail a synthesis of meta-chemical thinking and experiments. Proust’s discovery of the law of definite proportions not only (...) function as Bacon’s “instances of lamp” to invoke Dalton and other atomism chemists to envision atomism, but also served as a bridge linking the two meta-chemistries. John Dalton, the third choice, envisioned his atomism by abduction. The case study on “the Berthollet-Proust controversy and Dalton’s resolution” mandates a reinvestigation of the crucial role of the system of experiments and the evolution of chemistry according to the demarcation between the established branches of Elementalism and Atomism Chemistry. (shrink)

Examples are given of applications by Pauling, Mulliken, Marcus and G.E.Kimball of the three Pythagorian means to formulate the scales of electronegativity of the elements, to the calculations of rate constants of electron transfer cross-reactions, to the calculation of the observed rate constant as function of activation and diffusion rate constants in the case of mixed reaction-diffusion rates and to the calculation of the effective diffusion coefficient in solution of a salt AB as a whole from the diffusion coefficients of (...) the ions in which it dissociates. (shrink)

Despite decades of research and thought on the meaning and identification of revolutions in science, there is no generally accepted definition for this concept. This paper presents 13 different characteristics that have been used by philosophers and historians of science to characterize revolutions in science, in general, and in chemistry, in particular. These 13 characteristics were clustered into six independent factors. Suggestions are provided as to the use of these characteristics and factors to evaluate historical events as to their possible (...) categorization as revolutions in chemistry. Challenges to the goal of creating a consensus definition of “revolutions in science” are also presented in this publication. (shrink)

Recent publications by several leading philosophers of chemistry have focused on the definition, scope, utility, and nomenclature of issues dealing with acidity and basicity. In this paper, molecular orbital theory is used to explain all acid–base reactions, concluding that the interaction of the highest occupied molecular orbital (HOMO) of one substrate, “the base,” with the lowest unoccupied molecular orbital (LUMO) of a second substrate, “the acid,” determines the reactivity of such systems. This paradigm provides an understanding of all acid–base reactions (...) as well as other reactions which, on the surface, may not seem like acid–base reactions but which have fundamental underpinnings of that kind of chemistry. Rather than being unable to determine a unified understanding of acidity and basicity as suggested in the philosophy of chemistry literature, we propose that acidity and basicity fit securely in a classification of many other reactions that, using classical chemistry knowledge, pre-quantum chemistry, would not be possible. We strongly support the use of all scientific knowledge and experience in the development of the ideas in the philosophy science. We further suggest increased interactions between philosophers of science and scientists, so that all scholars benefit from the values, knowledge, and perspectives of other disciplines. (shrink)

According to process ontology in the philosophy of biology, the living world is better understood as processes rather than as substantial individuals. Within this perspective, an organism does not consist of a hierarchy of structures like a machine, but rather a dynamic hierarchy of processes, dynamically maintained and stabilized at different time scales. With this respect, two processual approaches on enzymes by Stein (Hyle Int J Philos Chem 10(4):5–22, 2004, Process Stud 34:62–80, 2005, Found Chem 8:3–29, 2006) and by Guttinger (...) (Everything Flows: Towards a Processual Philosophy of Biology, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2018) allows to think of macromolecules as relational and processual entities. In this work, I propose to extend their arguments to another case study within the biochemical domain, which is the case of ligand receptors and receptor-mediated biosignaling. The aim of this work is to analyze the case of G Protein-Coupled Receptors and biosignaling under the consideration of a processual ontology. I will defend that the processual ontology framework is adequate for the biochemical domain and that it allows accounting for the current biochemical knowledge related to the case study. (shrink)

It is a fundamental cornerstone of thermodynamics that entropy (SU,V\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$S_{U,V}$$\end{document}) increases in spontaneous processes in isolated systems (often called closed or thermally closed systems when the transfer of energy as work is considered to be negligible) and achieves a maximum when the system reaches equilibrium. But with a different sign convention entropy could just as well be said to decrease to a minimum in spontaneous constant U, V processes. It would then (...) change in the same direction as the thermodynamic potentials in spontaneous processes. This article discusses but does not advocate such a change. (shrink)

We provide a detailed history of the concepts of atomic number and isotopy before the discovery of protons and neutrons that draws attention to the role of evolving interplays of multiple aims and criteria in chemical and physical research. Focusing on research by Frederick Soddy and Ernest Rutherford, we show that, in the context of differentiating disciplinary projects, the adoption of a complex and shifting concept of elemental identity and the ordering role of the periodic table led to a relatively (...) coherent notion of atomic number. Subsequent attention to valency, still neglected in the secondary literature, and to nuclear charge led to a decoupling of the concepts of elemental identity and weight and allowed for a coherent concept of isotopy. This concept received motivation from empirical investigations on the decomposition series of radioelements and their unstable chemical identity. A new model of chemical order was the result of an ongoing collaboration between chemical and physical research projects with evolving aims and standards. After key concepts were considered resolved and their territories were clarified, chemistry and physics resumed autonomous projects, yet remained bound by newly accepted explanatory relations. It is an episode of scientific collaboration and partial integration without simple, wholesale gestalt switches or chemical revolutions. (shrink)

Many philosophers attribute extraordinary importance to the idea of natural kinds seemingly intimating that the very possibility of certain kinds of activity are ontologically beholden to the existence of kinds. Specifically, regarding chemistry, Brian Ellis intimated that the success of any plausible metaphysical essentialism depends upon its “reliance on examples from chemistry.” Ellis’s view is representative of a tradition in analytic philosophy that has utilized chemical examples as paradigmatic natural kinds. In this regard, Kripke and Putnam emerge as the architects (...) of an entrenched research program dedicated to the chemical tradition of natural kinds in analytic philosophy. The emergence of a critical body of literature by philosophers of chemistry and others has shattered the complacent reliance upon chemical examples as exemplary kinds. On the basis of this emerging critical literature, I will critically explore the way in which chemical practice and inquiry affects the natural kind debate. So, instead of the pretense that we simply carve nature at its joints, we need to become better grounded in the practice of science, and especially with regard to the debate about natural kinds in chemical practice. Consistent with this orientation, we need to make the practice turn, that is, eradicate the fantasy of logical reconstruction and become involved with the interpretative and historical challenges of understanding the nuances of practice. The point here is quite clear, metaphysical questions regarding natural kind should be imminent to scientific practice. Indeed, any legitimate metaphysics of natural kinds should be appropriately informed and grounded in practice and not operate on the basis of a priori sovereignty. I will insert this critical discussion within the analytical context of the notion of interpretive communities and make the case that philosophers should not assume that appeals to the purity of philosophy can substitute for the complexity and practical orientation of chemical practice. (shrink)