Jules Salomone-Sehr argues that an activity is cooperative if and only if, roughly, it consists of several participants’ actions that are (i) coordinated for a common purpose (ii) in ways that do not undermine any participant’s agency. He argues that guidance by shared intention is neither necessary nor sufficient for cooperation. Thereby, he claims to “topple an orthodoxy of shared agency theory." In response, we argue that Salomone-Sehr’s account captures another notion of cooperation than the sociopsychological notion shared agency theory (...) has focused on. Furthermore, we argue that Salomone-Sehr’s interpretation of (ii) is too demanding; it implausibly makes cooperation incompatible with exploitation. (shrink)

Structural injustice is either wrong or not. A deontic view, on which there is no injustice except agents’ wrongdoing, may have trouble reaching such intuitive cases as structural sexism, and especially structural class inequality. An alternative telic approach, on which injustice is bad but not wrong, can reach those cases. But how could injustice in that telic sense warrant resentment or righteous anger, as it seems injustice must? I press the dilemma to scrutinize not only the current idea of structural (...) injustice but also a wider swath of views about justice, and I critically consider possible ways out of it. (shrink)

Bernard Williams described the case of a lorry driver who runs over a child through no fault of his own. In this article, I pursue two aims. First, I want to motivate a puzzle about Williams’s case, which I call the Lorry Driver Paradox and which consists of three individually plausible but jointly inconsistent claims. Second, I want to offer a solution to this paradox based on a novel approach to so-called strict moral answerability. I conclude by responding to the (...) objection that strict answerability is a contradiction in terms. (shrink)

I defend a novel way of working out the Balancing View of Ought, that is, the view that whether one ought to take some action depends on nothing but the balance of the reasons for the action and those against it or for its alternatives. I show that the Balancing View needs to be complemented by certain principles of reason transmission, at least one of which might seem rather surprising. The result is an attractive theoretical package that allows for compelling (...) explanations of noteworthy normative phenomena, including ones that the Balancing View has been claimed to be at odds with. (shrink)