Shortly after X-ray technology was discovered, it was utilized in war medicine. In this paper, the authors consider how the challenging context of war created fertile conditions for learning, as early radiologists were forced to find solutions to the unique problems posed during wartime. The “battlefield” became the “classroom” where radiologists constructed knowledge in X-ray instrumentation, methods, and education, as well as in medicine generally. Through an examination of two broad historical wartime examples, the authors illustrate how X-rays were used (...) as part of war medicine and offer a detailed sketch of instances of knowledge construction in war radiology. With a sociology of knowledge perspective, they conclude that the knowledge generated in war belongs also to civilian medicine. An understanding of war radiology’s role as a “springboard” for knowledge construction is thus crucial for a complete understanding of the history of radiology. (shrink)

Shortly after X-ray technology was discovered, it was utilized in war medicine. In this paper, the authors consider how the challenging context of war created fertile conditions for learning, as early radiologists were forced to find solutions to the unique problems posed during wartime. The “battlefield” became the “classroom” where radiologists constructed knowledge in X-ray instrumentation, methods, and education, as well as in medicine generally. Through an examination of two broad historical wartime examples, the authors illustrate how X-rays were used (...) as part of war medicine and offer a detailed sketch of instances of knowledge construction in war radiology. With a sociology of knowledge perspective, they conclude that the knowledge generated in war belongs also to civilian medicine. An understanding of war radiology’s role as a “springboard” for knowledge construction is thus crucial for a complete understanding of the history of radiology. (shrink)

Discussions of reproductive responsibility generally draw heavily upon the principles of nonmaleficence and beneficence. However, these principles are typically only applied to women due to the incorrect belief that only women can cause fetal harm. The cultural perception that women are likely to cause fetal and child harm is reflected in numerous social norms, policies, and laws. Conversely, there is little public discussion of men and fetal and child harm, which implies that men do not (or cannot) cause such harm. (...) My goal in this paper is to begin to fill the void in the academic literature about men’s reproductive responsibility by highlighting the health-related, economic, and social harms men can cause to potential fetuses and children and then examining what it would mean to hold them responsible for preventing these harms. Applying the principles of nonmaleficence and beneficence to men, I conclude that men have a moral duty to use contraception if their behavior—past, current, or future—could harm the potential fetuses and children who result from their unprotected sexual behavior. (shrink)

Discussions of reproductive responsibility generally draw heavily upon the principles of nonmaleficence and beneficence. However, these principles are typically only applied to women due to the incorrect belief that only women can cause fetal harm. The cultural perception that women are likely to cause fetal and child harm is reflected in numerous social norms, policies, and laws. Conversely, there is little public discussion of men and fetal and child harm, which implies that men do not (or cannot) cause such harm. (...) My goal in this paper is to begin to fill the void in the academic literature about men’s reproductive responsibility by highlighting the health-related, economic, and social harms men can cause to potential fetuses and children and then examining what it would mean to hold them responsible for preventing these harms. Applying the principles of nonmaleficence and beneficence to men, I conclude that men have a moral duty to use contraception if their behavior—past, current, or future—could harm the potential fetuses and children who result from their unprotected sexual behavior. (shrink)

Taking post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) as an example, we present a concept for transdisciplinary cooperation between life sciences and humanities. PTSD is defined as a long-term persisting anxiety disorder after severe psychological traumata. Initially recognized in war veterans, PTSD also appears in victims of crime and violence or survivors of natural catastrophes, e.g., earthquakes. We consider PTSD as a prototype topic to realize transdisciplinary projects, because this disease is multifacetted from different points of view. Based on physiological and molecular biological (...) research to understand the causes of this disease, conventional academic medicine (to Western medicine) and pharmacology can offer a panel of drugs for treatment, albeit only with limited success. Hence, other treatment options are indispensable. Chinese medicine is frequently regarded as alternative to complement Western medicine. In fact, Chinese medicine offers a large array of both pharmacological and non-pharmacological treatments for PTSD patients. Narrative therapy represents a non-pharmacological approach combating PTSD both in Western medicine as well as in Chinese medicine to improve quality of life of affected patients. Narratives on traumatic experiences form a new genre of life writing in Asian American literature, whose excitement is considerably fueled by the tension between fictitious and very personal narratives taken from reality. Systematic academic reflections on narratives from PTSD patients in the field of Asian American studies may support the improvement of narrative therapy in medical practice. Chinese medicine has a strong philosophical background and may, therefore, serve as junction between life sciences with their strong rational and reductionistic way to generate new knowledge and more holistic approaches in traditional medicines and humanities. In this regard, Chinese medicine may represent a missing link between life science and life writing. (shrink)

Taking post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) as an example, we present a concept for transdisciplinary cooperation between life sciences and humanities. PTSD is defined as a long-term persisting anxiety disorder after severe psychological traumata. Initially recognized in war veterans, PTSD also appears in victims of crime and violence or survivors of natural catastrophes, e.g., earthquakes. We consider PTSD as a prototype topic to realize transdisciplinary projects, because this disease is multifacetted from different points of view. Based on physiological and molecular biological (...) research to understand the causes of this disease, conventional academic medicine (to Western medicine) and pharmacology can offer a panel of drugs for treatment, albeit only with limited success. Hence, other treatment options are indispensable. Chinese medicine is frequently regarded as alternative to complement Western medicine. In fact, Chinese medicine offers a large array of both pharmacological and non-pharmacological treatments for PTSD patients. Narrative therapy represents a non-pharmacological approach combating PTSD both in Western medicine as well as in Chinese medicine to improve quality of life of affected patients. Narratives on traumatic experiences form a new genre of life writing in Asian American literature, whose excitement is considerably fueled by the tension between fictitious and very personal narratives taken from reality. Systematic academic reflections on narratives from PTSD patients in the field of Asian American studies may support the improvement of narrative therapy in medical practice. Chinese medicine has a strong philosophical background and may, therefore, serve as junction between life sciences with their strong rational and reductionistic way to generate new knowledge and more holistic approaches in traditional medicines and humanities. In this regard, Chinese medicine may represent a missing link between life science and life writing. (shrink)

The reorganization of psychiatric knowledge at the turn of the twentieth century derived from Emil Kraepelin’s clinical classification of psychoses. Surprisingly, within just few years, Kraepelin’s simple dichotomy between dementia praecox (schizophrenias) and manic-depressive psychosis (bipolar disorders) succeeded in giving psychiatry a new framework that is still used until the present day. Unexpectedly, Kraepelin’s simple clinical scheme based on the dichotomy replaced the significantly more differentiated nosography that dominated psychiatric research in the last three decades of the nineteenth century (Janzarik (...) in Themen und Tendenzen der deutschsprachigen Psychiatrie. Springer, Berlin, 1974 ). Moreover, although all the components of the future development were already available shortly after 1868, the real course, which led to Kraepelin’s dichotomy, was unpredictable then. This paper explores the ways in which the unpredictability of psychiatric knowledge and the postulate of a rationality underlying psychopathological phenomena interacted in the debates regarding the classification of psychoses. It examines the “natural antagonism” between the practical aspirations of an increasingly specialized medical nosology and unitary conceptions, which, in a psychopathological countermovement, emphasized that no somatic criteria can be specified for the majority of psychic abnormalities and that all nosological distinctions are not binding (Janzarik 1974, 20). In this context, this paper investigates the revival of unitary theories of psychosis in postwar German psychiatry and seeks to understand why the forms of thinking that dominated nineteenth-century psychiatry have proved to be very lasting. Furthermore, this paper emphasizes the perspectivity underlying psychiatric research on psychoses and explores the ways in which writing the history of the schizophrenia concept involves inevitably writing the history of the entire psychiatry. (shrink)

The reorganization of psychiatric knowledge at the turn of the twentieth century derived from Emil Kraepelin’s clinical classification of psychoses. Surprisingly, within just few years, Kraepelin’s simple dichotomy between dementia praecox (schizophrenias) and manic-depressive psychosis (bipolar disorders) succeeded in giving psychiatry a new framework that is still used until the present day. Unexpectedly, Kraepelin’s simple clinical scheme based on the dichotomy replaced the significantly more differentiated nosography that dominated psychiatric research in the last three decades of the nineteenth century (Janzarik (...) in Themen und Tendenzen der deutschsprachigen Psychiatrie. Springer, Berlin, 1974 ). Moreover, although all the components of the future development were already available shortly after 1868, the real course, which led to Kraepelin’s dichotomy, was unpredictable then. This paper explores the ways in which the unpredictability of psychiatric knowledge and the postulate of a rationality underlying psychopathological phenomena interacted in the debates regarding the classification of psychoses. It examines the “natural antagonism” between the practical aspirations of an increasingly specialized medical nosology and unitary conceptions, which, in a psychopathological countermovement, emphasized that no somatic criteria can be specified for the majority of psychic abnormalities and that all nosological distinctions are not binding (Janzarik 1974, 20). In this context, this paper investigates the revival of unitary theories of psychosis in postwar German psychiatry and seeks to understand why the forms of thinking that dominated nineteenth-century psychiatry have proved to be very lasting. Furthermore, this paper emphasizes the perspectivity underlying psychiatric research on psychoses and explores the ways in which writing the history of the schizophrenia concept involves inevitably writing the history of the entire psychiatry. (shrink)

In a critical review of late twentieth-century gene-culture co-evolutionary models labelled as ‘global phylogeny’, the authors present evidence for the long legacy of co-evolutionary theories in European-based thinking, highlighting that (1) ideas of social and cultural evolution preceded the idea of biological evolution, (2) linguistics played a dominant role in the formation of a unified theory of human co-evolution, and (3) that co-evolutionary thinking was only possible due to perpetuated and renewed transdisciplinary reticulations between scholars of different disciplines—especially within the (...) integrative framework of the ‘humanid’ and the ‘hominid’ branches of anthropology. (shrink)

In a critical review of late twentieth-century gene-culture co-evolutionary models labelled as ‘global phylogeny’, the authors present evidence for the long legacy of co-evolutionary theories in European-based thinking, highlighting that (1) ideas of social and cultural evolution preceded the idea of biological evolution, (2) linguistics played a dominant role in the formation of a unified theory of human co-evolution, and (3) that co-evolutionary thinking was only possible due to perpetuated and renewed transdisciplinary reticulations between scholars of different disciplines—especially within the (...) integrative framework of the ‘humanid’ and the ‘hominid’ branches of anthropology. (shrink)

Each time patients and their families are asked to make a decision about resuscitation, they are also asked to engage the political, social, and cultural concerns that have shaped its history. That history is exemplified in the career of Claude S. Beck, arguably the most influential researcher and teacher of resuscitation in the twentieth century. Careful review of Beck’s work discloses that the development and popularization of the techniques of resuscitation proceeded through a multiplication of definitions of death. CPR consequently (...) remains unique among medical treatments, because it is indicated precisely when a person dies, depending always on how each event of death becomes defined practically by patients, families, and medical professionals present at the time. It is therefore as an occasion to manage a surplus of definitions of death, and not as an occasion to determine the physiological efficacy of resuscitation, that one should approach analysis of contemporary challenges in decision-making about resuscitation. (shrink)

Each time patients and their families are asked to make a decision about resuscitation, they are also asked to engage the political, social, and cultural concerns that have shaped its history. That history is exemplified in the career of Claude S. Beck, arguably the most influential researcher and teacher of resuscitation in the twentieth century. Careful review of Beck’s work discloses that the development and popularization of the techniques of resuscitation proceeded through a multiplication of definitions of death. CPR consequently (...) remains unique among medical treatments, because it is indicated precisely when a person dies, depending always on how each event of death becomes defined practically by patients, families, and medical professionals present at the time. It is therefore as an occasion to manage a surplus of definitions of death, and not as an occasion to determine the physiological efficacy of resuscitation, that one should approach analysis of contemporary challenges in decision-making about resuscitation. (shrink)

Stress presents an interesting case for the application of medicalization theory. From the 1950s to the 1980s, stress became an established, if not fully deciphered, component of the matrix within which illness developed, as understood by physicians and patients, scientists, and laypeople alike. While the various iterations of the medicalization thesis are useful for analyzing the information flows between the multiplicity of actors engaged in the production and interpretation of the stress concept, they cannot account for all aspects of the (...) evolution of the incorporation of stress into both the medical lexicon and the popular vernacular. To account for the significance of physical explanations for the physiological and pathological effects of stress on the body, this essay expands the model of medicalization to include biologization. This modified model is further deployed as an analytical framework to develop the central argument of this essay: that the medicalization of stress allowed for an expansion of therapeutic options available to practitioners and recipients of mainstream medicine by opening up space for the legitimation of alternative healing practices. Biologization looks to the system of ideas on which medical approaches are based to explain how the reductionist project to find molecular mechanisms of disease causality brought stress and other social and psychological phenomena into the domain of medicine. This expanded model of medicalization can usefully characterize late twentieth and early twenty-first century attitudes toward a wide variety of human disorders whose causes have been found to be molecular in origin. By folding biology into the medicalization thesis, social scientists can train a fresh analytical lens on the role of medicine in recent and contemporary American life. (shrink)

Stress presents an interesting case for the application of medicalization theory. From the 1950s to the 1980s, stress became an established, if not fully deciphered, component of the matrix within which illness developed, as understood by physicians and patients, scientists, and laypeople alike. While the various iterations of the medicalization thesis are useful for analyzing the information flows between the multiplicity of actors engaged in the production and interpretation of the stress concept, they cannot account for all aspects of the (...) evolution of the incorporation of stress into both the medical lexicon and the popular vernacular. To account for the significance of physical explanations for the physiological and pathological effects of stress on the body, this essay expands the model of medicalization to include biologization. This modified model is further deployed as an analytical framework to develop the central argument of this essay: that the medicalization of stress allowed for an expansion of therapeutic options available to practitioners and recipients of mainstream medicine by opening up space for the legitimation of alternative healing practices. Biologization looks to the system of ideas on which medical approaches are based to explain how the reductionist project to find molecular mechanisms of disease causality brought stress and other social and psychological phenomena into the domain of medicine. This expanded model of medicalization can usefully characterize late twentieth and early twenty-first century attitudes toward a wide variety of human disorders whose causes have been found to be molecular in origin. By folding biology into the medicalization thesis, social scientists can train a fresh analytical lens on the role of medicine in recent and contemporary American life. (shrink)

Over the last decade in Germany, a number of neuroscientists—and among them most prominently Wolf Singer—have claimed to be able to offer scientific evidence derived from neurophysiologic findings to conclusively negate the existence of human free will. In this paper, Singer’s position is examined according to its principal characteristics in order to answer the question whether it is a novel position as opposed to a position pertaining to one of the traditions of western philosophy and anthropology. Furthermore, we try to (...) judge whether the neurobiological findings Singer and others use to justify their position are apt to satisfy the criteria for the presence of scientific evidence, i.e., if they are good reasons to believe that human will is unfree. (shrink)

Over the last decade in Germany, a number of neuroscientists—and among them most prominently Wolf Singer—have claimed to be able to offer scientific evidence derived from neurophysiologic findings to conclusively negate the existence of human free will. In this paper, Singer’s position is examined according to its principal characteristics in order to answer the question whether it is a novel position as opposed to a position pertaining to one of the traditions of western philosophy and anthropology. Furthermore, we try to (...) judge whether the neurobiological findings Singer and others use to justify their position are apt to satisfy the criteria for the presence of scientific evidence, i.e., if they are good reasons to believe that human will is unfree. (shrink)