In this paper I explore the influence of Kant's theory of imagination on a specific aspect of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty's thought, viz., their theories of understanding. 1 argue that the theories of Verstehen that Heidegger presents in Being and Time and of comprendre that Merleau-Ponty presents in Phenomenology of Perception can be helpfully read as elaborations of Kant's account of imagination.

Following Husserl’s analyses of perception and imagination, the paper introduces two basic modes of intelligibility – the normalizing and the imagining – and argues that they are deeply intertwined, despite radical qualitative differences between them. What sets these two modes apart are their distinctive teleological orientations. To show this, the paper looks closely at the ways in which we experience difference in these respective modes. This discussion requires, however, that we challenge Husserl’s own framework for analyzing the imagination, which emerges (...) as non-exhaustive, perhaps even misleading. What transpires is that imagining consciousness exhibits a unique critical dimension, a potentially powerful resource for socio-cultural critique. (shrink)