The latest academic discussion has focused on the potential and risks associated with technological systems. In this perspective, defining a set of legal rules could be the priority but this action appears extremely difficult at the European level and, therefore, in the last years, a set of ethical principles contained in many different documents has been published. The need to develop trustworthy and human-centric AI technologies is accomplished by creating these two types of rule sets: legal and ethical. The paper (...) aims to critically analyse and compare these rule sets in order to understand their possible relationships in the regulation of legal problems, not only theoretically but also, where present, in some practical applications of AI, such as self-driving cars, smart toys, smart contracts and legal design. Indeed, the purpose is to identify how legal rules and ethical principles can interact for adequate regulation of AI, with particular regard to the fields of application that will be analysed. (shrink)

In the contemporary debate about values, information technology constitutes an important source of hard ethical questions and in turn is a testing area for the moral theory of values. Values are difficult to track down and yet there are a number of inquiries starting from economics, social psychology, ethics, and political theory that engage with the cognitive, epistemic, and moral status of values. This paper is a contribution to an account of values in connection with information technology. It argues that (...) information technology may provide further support to a theory of values that is able to embrace the transformative effects of the digital revolution. In particular, it is plausible that a non-ideal reflection on digital wrongdoings is better equipped to produce substantive knowledge about values that have been undermined than a different approach focused on ideal guiding values. Moreover, information technology overcomes the vaunted fact/value dichotomy and supports the fact/value entanglement. As the principal concern of data-mining and machine-learning communities are ways of remedying a remarkable number of biases and conformism in techno-social systems, it is within the bounds of possibility to supplement the non-ideal theory from this new practical angle. I therefore call for a fully conceptual consideration of values drawing on the experience and reflection that is growing in the field of information technology. (shrink)

Until now, the mass spread of fake news and its negative consequences have implied mainly textual content towards a loss of citizens' trust in institutions. Recently, a new type of machine learning framework has arisen, Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) – a class of deep neural network models capable of creating multimedia content (photos, videos, audio) that simulate accurate content with extreme precision. While there are several areas of worthwhile application of GANs – e.g., in the field of audio-visual production, human-computer (...) interactions, satire, and artistic creativity – their deceptive uses, at least as currently foreseeable, are just as numerous and worrying. The main concern is linked to the so-called “deepfakes”, fake images or videos that simulate real events with extreme precision. When trained on a human face, GANs can make the face assume hyper-realistic movements, expressions and (verbal and non-verbal) communication abilities. This technology poses an urgent threat to the governance of democratic processes concerning the production of public opinions and political discourses, with significant potential for reality-altering and disinformation. After a short introduction of their current technical state-of-the-art, in this paper we want to enquire the GANs` socio-technical system alongside different and intertwined philosophical accounts. Firstly, we will argue about the conditions that make perceived a GANs-generated content as trustworthy, arguing also about the general effects GANs might have on the perceived trustworthiness of individuals. Thereafter, we will discuss about the inadequacy to approach GANs only as perception-altering technology. Against this backdrop, we will propose a theoretical turn that considers the human-machine relationships of trustworthiness as elements of a broader hybrid socio-technical systems. This turn come up with political repercussions that we will discuss in the last part of the paper. (shrink)

In this article, we address the problem of the potential crisis in people’s life’s meaning due to massive automation-driven technological unemployment. Assuming that the problem of (re)distribution of economic resources to the whole of society in such a scenario will be solved (e.g. through provision of a Universal Basic Income), the question arises concerning the meaning of people’s lives in a world in which almost everyone does not have to (or even could not) work in order to live. Here, we (...) side with many current proposals that paid work is not the only possible source of meaning and hence, that a meaningful life could indeed be led in a post-work society. We especially focus on one of the most developed accounts, Danaher’s Virtual Utopia (Danaher, 2016, 2019, 2022). According to him, living immersed in playful virtual worlds where new, expanded and personalized possibilities of personal and collective experiences and actions, could not only be perfectly meaningful lives, but furthermore, “be the utopia we are looking for” (Danaher, 2019, p. 270). However, our analysis will suggest that although it is a very well thought and carefully articulated position, it suffers from various important problems. Our criticism will be based on an alternative framework to think about life’s meaning and the conditions for leading a good life in general. This alternative is based on the philosophy of buen vivir (“good living”). This notion has its roots in common aspects of various Latin American indigenous cultures regarding a community-centered way of life where humans, society and nature are taken to be deeply interconnected and interdependent, and where the notions of respect, harmony and balance are at the core of this interrelationship (Gudynas, 2011; Acosta, 2008; Beling et al., 2021). Buen vivir has many facets, but we will focus on three: the importance of healthy human communities, the human-nature relationship, and the intrinsic value of nature. Based on these, we argue that the Virtual Utopia is not a good candidate for human’s post-work utopia because i) it unnecessarily augments the environmental damage that is already involved in massive labor automation; ii) it entails an unnecessary and detrimental dependence on technology for human relationships; and iii) increases the severance of the link between humanity and nature. We conclude that the buen vivir approach is a promising candidate for an alternative utopian project, but one that needs further construction. (shrink)

Our main hypothesis is that an extended moral agent cannot fulfill their expectation of “extendedness” without a dynamical and evolutionary ecosystem where the agent develops and behave properly. It is important to establish a bridge between extended moral agents and ecosystems for two reasons: first, because there is not an enough direct theoretical reflection about this link. The scholars focus has been independently in improving the “extended agent theory”, the concepts of “ecosystem” or “ecosystem of innovation”. Second, if we want (...) to understand the wide scope of the decentered ethics in design of mobile robots and AI these two theoretical frames cannot be seen separately but in join interdependency. (shrink)

The debate over the ethical repercussions of Artificial Intelligence (AI) cannot disregard the “sum total of ideas that bring into evidence a system of ethical reference that justifies that profound dimension of technology as a central element in the attainment of a ‘finalized’ perfection of man”(Galvan 2001). This implies an analysis of the ancient processes that might help to understand the complexities of contemporary society and the new challenges posed to human development. Being at the core of the dichotomy between (...) the human and the machine, biometrics will be central to the analysis carried out in this paper. Its measurement of physiological characteristics and behavioural patterns has politico-philosophical and legal consequences in terms of recognition and personal identity, as the use of artificial intelligence has shown. In information society, customs and traditions, cultural and communication processes, language and the self-determination of the individual have gradually acquired a stretched dimension that has led to a re-definition of the social structures within which the exchange of knowledge and data takes place, with AI-based technological devices playing a key role in such a scenario. The issue of biometric identity becomes highly complex when combined with the potential of digital services, as it is at this level that it shows the large number of interconnections deriving from social and political choices. The benefits of increased interconnection are limited by the risk of intrusion into the (social, personal or private) human sphere, which might pose a threat to both the physical, biological body, with its related freedoms (habeas corpus), and the digital body, in its multiple forms and media representations (habeas data). (shrink)

In this paper we examine how the use of robots in caring for elders can impact the meaningfulness of elders’ lives. We present a framework for understanding ‘meaningfulness in life’, and then apply that framework in discussing ways in which the use of robots to assist in activities of daily living can preserve, enhance or undermine the meaningfulness of elders’ lives. We conclude with a discussion of if and how having false beliefs about companion robots can affect meaningfulness in the (...) life of the person having those false beliefs. (shrink)

Through a comparison between phenomenology and quantum physics, the paper aims to show that naturalising phenomenology can also mean bringing it into a critical and fruitful relationship with some of the most complex and fundamental questions of contemporary physics, thus showing both the truly ever-open potential of Husserlian and Heideggerian thinking and the need for the sciences to receive a theoretical light without which they risk remaining either magical, arbitrary and esoteric knowledge or technical, reductionist and epistemologically sterile.

This contribution aims to be a concrete proof of how fertile, rich and innovative dialogue and confrontation between transcendental phenomenology and naturalising sciences can be. Through the phenomenological-transcendental analysis of the neurodegenerative pathology of dementia, an attempt will be made to propose, within the debate on the possible naturalisation of phenomenology, the perspective of an actual mutual enlightenment, as proposed by Gallagher. Not a naturalisation of consciousness in the sense of a reduction to neural process, but a pluralisation of the (...) valid and rigorous perspectives through which it can be investigated. The phenomenological-transcendental eidetic study of dementia thus becomes complementary to the neurobiological one, revealing what the subject feels ‘from within’, his losses, but also what persists in the patient until the most advanced stages. Such a study, in synergy with the biological one, would greatly help in the holistic understanding of dementia in this particular case and, in general, of consciousness phenomena. (shrink)

In this contribution I aim at developing some critical considerations about the possibility of establishing a dialogue between Husserlian phenomenology and embodied cognitive science to which both partners can participate with equal dignity, apart from any concession to radical forms of naturalism. Phenomenology and cognitive science are different theoretical enterprises, each of which relies autonomously on its own methods and categorial apparatus. This does not prevent of course that both disciplines can influence each other by exerting some kind of constraints. (...) Phenomenology alone cannot provide a full explanation of our conscious experiences as regards their sub-personal mechanisms and needs therefore to be integrated in a unitary framework which allows for its communication with the empirical sciences of mind, without any need to distort phenomenology’s transcendental features. On the other side, cognitive science should seriously take into account phenomenological and eidetic descriptions of first-person experience and avoid superimposing on it its own ontological and methodological assumptions. In the first part of the paper, I try first of all to highlight how Husserl’s phenomenology amounts to a theory of experience which keeps itself equidistant from both extremes of scientism and idealism and then to illustrate the necessity of downplaying Husserl’s transcendental philosophy through a critical assessment on its attitude toward natural sciences and by highlighting at the same time its right to conduct its inquiries autonomously. In the second part I explore the mediating role of psychological phenomenology in allowing a mutual exchange between phenomenology and embodied cognitive sciences, as far as it falls on the side of naturalistic attitude. In the third part I proceed to a critical evaluation of the encounter between embodied phenomenology and embodied cognitive sciences by underlining some ontological and methodological shortcomings in which some of their representatives incur. In the fourth part, I argue for a mild naturalization of phenomenology by confronting it with some forms of non-reductionist naturalism (e.g. liberal and enactive naturalism) for the purpose of safeguarding its fundamental tenets. In the fifth and final part I discuss the topic of lived body and embodiment as the turning point which allows for the mutual transition from the transcendental to the empirical level. To this aim, I try to focus on the intrinsic belongingness of lived body to the essential features of transcendental subject to the extent that it plays a major role in disclosing an oriented worldly space through its kinaesthetic powers. (shrink)

Being conscious or experiencing the world with all its vivid qualities is something humans intimately cherish. The fact that consciousness provides us with a lively phenomenology is what makes life worth living. Yet, when it comes to understanding how consciousness fits into the natural world, we feel deeply puzzled. In this context, one important claim about consciousness consists in the idea that our awareness is not only about the world but also reveals an intimate subjectivity. This aspect of phenomenal consciousness (...) is often referred to as pre-reflective self-consciousness. It is often held that this type of self-awareness is intrinsic and essential to any form of conscious experience, i.e. there is no conscious experience without also being implicitly self-conscious. Being of such importance to the nature of consciousness, the recent literature mainly discusses two ways of accounting for pre-reflective self-consciousness, its role for conscious experience and how it fits into the natural world. On the one hand, there are relational views; on the other hand, there are non-relational accounts. This paper will argue that both approaches are not sustainable as they stand, since either important aspects are lost or not sufficiently embedded in the natural world. Consequently, I will argue for an alternative that allows for both a functional and an embodied nature of pre-reflective self-consciousness. (shrink)

The methodological differences of understanding, versus explaining, have been at the centre of a century-long methodenstreit debate (and disagreement) among philosophers and scientists. Karl Jaspers managed to import this discussion to the realm of psychiatry and psychopathology in a significant, but unresolved, manner. Side-tracked by the advent of various changes in psychiatry during the 20th century, phenomenology and philosophy of psychiatry have made a comeback in the last decades and, since then, developed new contributions to this subject. Quite similarly, the (...) study of time experience, standing on the shoulders of notorious philosophers, has too witnessed a similar renaissance, with groundbreaking developments across several conditions, including depression. The present essay is essentially exploratory, but during its development, after addressing the concepts of the methodenstreit debate, and tackling both meaningful and causal connections behind time dysperception in depression, I argue that understanding, at least in this context and at present time, is not entirely reducible to causal explanations, for some things are only gained in understanding, such as the feeling of being understood and the implications it carries for a therapeutic relationship and the treatment plan. (shrink)

In his late lecture course titled “Nature and Logos: The Human Body” (1959-1960), Merleau-Ponty proposed that we understand human symbolism, language, and reason by viewing the human being initially as a variant on animal embodiment and perception prior to being a rational animal. To elaborate this project, he outlined an “esthesiology” informed by the study of evolution. However, in the sketches that survive of “Nature and Logos,” we find neither a detailed explanation of how Merleau-Ponty understood this approach nor its (...) concrete execution with respect to the human body. In this paper I reconstruct Merleau-Ponty’s esthesiology. An animate body possesses two “sides”: it is a sensing organism open onto the world and a sensible part of the natural world. Visual animals such as humans can see, see themselves, and be seen by others. To understand their way of life, we must study not only the body’s capacities for perception and action, but also how those capacities are seen by other organisms, especially conspecifics. The body’s visibility shapes the social prospects of a species and its potential for developing complex sociality, language, and cognition. I apply this basic esthesiological principle to study the human eye. Both in its vision and its visibility, the human eye is a distinctive variation of animality and one that conditions and shapes human sociality and cognition. I develop this insight with respect to a central philosophical theme of Merleau-Ponty’s late work, the relation of the visible and the invisible. I conclude by discussing the importance of Merleau-Ponty’s esthesiology for his late thought and current discussions of the naturalization of phenomenology. (shrink)

The negation constitutes one of the main troubles for attempts to naturalise the semantics of the logical vocabulary, as shown by the problems related to the interpretation of disjunction in the treatment of error (Fodor) or to the definition of contraries in the analysis of reidentification abilities (Millikan). There seems to be no way out between “no (naturalized) negation, no grip of logic on the world” and “no (truth-functional) negation, no logic”. Unexpected help may come from the cognitive phenomenology of (...) negation. For three reasons: • Firstly, because it allows a distinction to be made between semantic analysis, identification of the possession conditions and psychology of the acquisition of the notion of negation, a distinction whose absence produces many misunderstandings between those who support a naturalization of semantics and those who oppose it. • Then because it places negation at the level of the contrast between beliefs, a terrain that is hostile to some naturalizers. • Finally, because it makes it possible to define a peculiar type of liberalised naturalization of semantics and, consequently, to present a hypothesis for the naturalization of cognitive phenomenology. (shrink)

The sciences are in a state of crisis. Due to factors like hyperspecialization and an all too naive and uncritical faith in their own method, the sciences have lost sight of their initial goal. The idea that sciences are in a state of crisis can of course famously be found in Edmund Husserl’s Crisis of the European Sciences. What is less well-known, however, is that Martin Heidegger also discusses and analyzes a crisis of the sciences in his 1928/29 lecture course (...) Einleitung in die Philosophie. There are interesting similarities between the nature of the crisis the two thinkers observe, but key differences when it comes to the relation between science and philosophy and the question of whether or not the crisis can be resolved. The aim of my article will be to provide a thorough comparative analysis of Husserl’s and Heidegger’s accounts of the crisis, the of Galileo’s mathematization of nature in their analyses, and what this means for their ideas concerning the relation between science and philosophy. The goal of this analysis is to provide some conceptual clarity regarding the prospect of naturalizing phenomenology. (shrink)

I now intend to return to Husserl’s argument against psychologism in logic, aiming to frame it within the broader antinaturalistic controversy and see how recent proposals of a natural (or naturalized) epistemology could affect it.

In this paper, we examine the metaphilosophical relevance of the phenomenon of sleep, suggesting that it has the potential to not only enrich the analysis of limit cases but also to test some of the ideas concerning the possibility of naturalizing phenomenology and its limits. Insofar as sleeping allows for both a first personal and a third personal description and challenges the usual primacy of the first-person point of view, exploring sleeping under the prism of its import for the phenomenological (...) method allows to illuminate the relationships between a first personal transcendental phenomenology and a third personal naturalized one. We do this by examining Husserl’s treatment of sleep as a limit-case, and the problem of accounting for deep sleep from a first-personal perspective. Drawing from a Heidegger-inspired account of sleep, we argue that sleep demands for a type of approach that can be fairly described as ontological, and which reveals a new understanding of subjectivity as a dynamic unity of different modes of being. Although this approach challenges a first-personal based approach, it does not, however support the naturalization of phenomenology or undermine the project of a transcendental philosophy of experience. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine the prospect of naturalizing phenomenology within the framework of Francisco Varela’s neurophenomenology. In doing so, I follow two main objectives. The first is exegetical. Namely, there is a pronounced discrepancy between Varela’s earlier works on neurophenomenology and his later works on naturalizing phenomenology, with the former receiving considerable scholarly attention and the latter remaining comparatively unknown. This discrepancy is further exacerbated by the fact that, due to his untimely death, Varela failed to produce a comprehensive (...) view of naturalization, leaving us with a plethora of suggestive fragments scattered throughout his later works (some of them published posthumously). Thus, briefly recapitulating the original neurophenomenological program in Section I, I bring some of these fragments together in Section II and make an attempt at elucidating Varela’s position on the topic. My second objective is critical. Section III thus opens with a question of whether the idea of naturalizing phenomenology in the context of neurophenomenology makes sense. I argue that it does not and should therefore be discarded. The reason for this is twofold. First, a strong case could be made that the idea of naturalization is ultimately at odds with the spirit of neurophenomenology; secondly, and relatedly, Varela’s lax use of the term naturalization not only puts it at odds with the more ordinary interpretations of naturalism but also risks emptying it of any substantive content. (shrink)

The search for spaces of cooperation between the methodology of natural sciences (cognitive sciences in particular) and the phenomenological approach has gained importance over time. However, it is necessary not to lose sight of the fact that Husserlian phenomenology was first and foremost characterized by a profound critique of ontological naturalism, a critique crucial for understanding the ethical sense of the phenomenological operation. To clarify this point, it is necessary to clarify the problematic role that naturalism has played - and (...) continues to play - on the ethical level, and the way in which phenomenological criticism is able to neutralize it. In the following pages we will first try to illustrate the impact of ontological naturalism on the contemporary ethical vision and then to show how the phenomenological perspective is best understandable as a way to reveal the blind spots of naturalism, to denounce its implicit reductionism, and to reopen an ethical perspective that the historical establishment of a naturalistic worldview had artificially closed. (shrink)