BOOK REVIEW Umberto Galimberti L’ETICA DEL VIANDANTE, Feltrinelli, 2023, ISBN: 788807493645 (paper), ISBN: 9788858858530, (e-book) Paperback, 20,90 EUR, e-book: 12,99 EUR.

Nazovi epistemološke osnove na kojima bismo racionalno trebali odrediti naše ontološke (ili aletiološke) obveze u vezi s entitetom njegov arbitar postojanja (ili arbitar istine). Uobičajeno je mišljenje da arbitri postojanja i istine mogu biti dani putem naših praksi. Ovaj rad tvrdi da takva gledišta imaju nekoliko implikacija: (1) veza između arbitara i naših metafizičkih obveza sastoji se u neophodnosti, (2) realistička gledišta o vrsti entiteta trebala bi se podudarati s vrstama praksi koje pružaju arbitre za tu vrstu entiteta s obzirom (...) na njihove metafizičke ovisnosti, (3) ako realisti smatraju da vrsta prakse pruža temelje na kojima se potvrđuje postojanje vrste entiteta, trebali bi se referirati na iste temelje koje koriste kada pokušavaju pružiti epistemologiju relevantnog područja. (shrink)

Call the epistemological grounds on which we rationally should determine our ontological (or alethiological) commitments regarding an entity its arbiter of existence (or arbiter of truth). It is commonly thought that arbiters of existence and truth can be provided by our practices. This paper argues that such views have several implications: (1) the relation of arbiters to our metaphysical commitments consists in indispensability, (2) realist views about a kind of entity should take the kinds of practices providing that entity’s arbiters (...) to align with respect to their metaphysical dependencies, (3) if realists take a kind of practice to provide grounds on which to affirm the existence of a kind of entity, they should turn to those same grounds when seeking to provide an epistemology of the relevant domain. (shrink)

L.A. Paul calls “deep” the kind of essentialism according to which the essential properties of objects are determined independently of the context. Deep essentialism opposes “shallow essentialism”, of which David Lewis is said to be a prominent advocate. Paul argues that standard forms of deep essentialism face a range of issues (mainly based on an interpretation of Quinean skepticism) that shallow essentialism does not. However, Paul claims, shallow essentialism eliminates the very heart of what motivates essentialism, so it is better (...) to be deep than shallow. Accordingly, she proposes a very sharp novel account of essentialism, which, while attempting to preserve some of the advantages of shallow essentialism over the classical forms of deep essentialism, can be deemed to be deep. In this paper, I compare Paul’s proposal for a kind of deep essentialism with Lewis’s account, as it is presented by Paul. My aim is to show that the differences between the two approaches are not as significant as Paul takes them to be, and that Paul’s account can be taken to be deeper than Lewis’s only at the cost of sacrificing the very idea at the bottom of deep essentialism. This might be taken to suggest that, if Paul is correct in asserting that shallow essentialism is better equipped to address some skeptical challenges, but it is generally preferable to be deep than shallow, then Lewis’s account should be re-evaluated, since, as shallow as it can be, it might be deeper than it looks. (shrink)

U ovom radu, koristeći Mark Schroederov (2008a) semantički okvir za ekspresivistički normativni jezik kao studiju slučaja, identificirat ću poteškoće s kojima će se čak i ekspresivistička semantička teorija sposobna za rješavanje Frege-Geach problema susresti pri objašnjenju logičke mogućnosti moralnih dilema. U tu svrhu, oslonit ću se na klasičnu zagonetku koju je formulirao McConnell (1978)a pokazuje da se logička mogućnost moralnih dilema sukobljava s nekim od naizgled opravdanih aksioma standardne deontičke logike, među kojima je i aksiom da obaveza implicira dopuštenost. Na (...) temelju tentativne pretpostavke da zastupnici etičkog ekspresivizma trebaju općenito biti posvećeni osiguravanju logičke mogućnosti moralnih dilema u svojim semantičkim teorijama, istražit ću da li i kako ekspresivisti mogu uspješno opovrgnuti aksiom da obaveza implicira dopuštenje unutar okvira koji je razvio Schroeder. Studija slučaja konačno otkriva da to može biti zaista težak zadatak za ekspresiviste. Generalizirajući iz studije slučaja, sugerirat ću da izvor poteškoće leži u mentalističkoj pretpostavci ekspresivističkog semantičkog projekta da bi logičko-semantički odnosi prikazani normativnim rečenicama trebali biti modelirani pomoću psiholoških stavova koje govornici izražavaju izgovarajući ih. Moj konačni cilj će biti pokazati da je poteškoća s kojom se ekspresivisti susreću u suočavanju s logičkom mogućnosti moralnih dilema odraz općeg problema da njihova predanost mentalističkoj pretpostavci sprječava fleksibilno usvajanje ili odbacivanje aksioma u njihovim semantičkim teorijama kako bi dobili ispravne tehničke rezultate. (shrink)

In this paper, using Mark Schroeder’s (2008a) expressivist semantic framework for normative language as a case study, I will identify difficulties that even an expressivist semantic theory capable of addressing the Frege-Geach problem will encounter in handling the logical possibility of moral dilemmas. To this end, I will draw on a classical puzzle formulated by McConnell (1978) that the logical possibility of moral dilemmas conflicts with some of the prima facie plausible axioms of the standard deontic logic, which include obligation (...) implies permission. On the tentative assumption that proponents of ethical expressivism should be generally committed to securing the logical possibility of moral dilemmas in their semantic theories, I will explore whether and how expressivists can successfully invalidate obligation implies permission within the framework developed by Schroeder. The case study eventually reveals that this can indeed be a hard task for expressivists. Generalizing from the case study, I will suggest that the source of the difficulty ultimately lies in the mentalist assumption of the expressivist semantic project that the logico-semantic relations exhibited by normative sentences should be modeled in terms of the psychological attitudes that speakers express by uttering them. My final goal will be to show that the difficulty expressivists face in dealing with the logical possibility of moral dilemmas is a reflection of the more general problem that their commitment to the mentalist assumption prevents them from flexibly adopting or dropping axioms in their semantic theories to get the right technical results. (shrink)