Despite thinking that an appropriately nonanthropocentric approach to the more-than-human world requires understanding phenomena to be ontologically basic, Karen Barad engages with phenomenology only fleetingly. Here, I suggest that Barad ought to take Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology more seriously for two reasons. First, Barad’s objections to his prospects for a suitably nonanthropocentric phenomenology rely upon a misdirected charge of representationalism. Second, Merleau-Ponty offers theoretical and methodological tools corrective to our tendencies toward metaphysical and behavioral colonialism which align with Barad’s project, yet, (...) insofar as her agential realism remains committed to a very strong metaphysical naturalism, appear unavailable to her. (shrink)

This essay rereads the Kantian sublime both as an epitome of humanism and as a lesson for posthumanist thought. First, I unfold “On the Dynamically Sublime” as a failed dialectic in which “reason” seeks to sublate the power of “nature.” But Kant’s sublime is irreducible to the “Analytic,” I argue: it exemplifies a quasi-dialectical relation between human and nonhuman that recurs across the third Critique and defines its humanist teleology as a whole. Rereading Kant against that telos, and heeding the (...) natural-historical concerns animating his project, I uncover paths towards a posthumanist or “natural-historical” sublime of “nature” as anarchic phusis. (shrink)

The article analyzes the experience of climate anxiety. The investigation is phenomenological in the sense that I will attempt to show that contemporary climate anxiety has a distinctive structure and philosophical meaning, which make it different from both psychological anxiety and existential anxiety, as commonly understood. I will also draw out the consequences of my phenomenological analysis for climate politics. My contention is that forms of prefigurative climate politics can respond to the profound disorientation and apathy regarding our future and (...) help us face down the hyperbolic nihilism shadowing us. (shrink)

Multiple concepts of nature are at play in environmental theory and practice. One that has gripped several theorists is the idea of nature as referring to that which is independent of humans and human activity. This concept has been subject to forceful criticism, notably in the recent work of Steven Vogel. After clarifying problematic and promising ways of charac­terizing independent nature, I engage Vogel’s critique. While the critique is compelling in certain respects, I argue that it fails to appreciate what (...) I take to be an important motivating concern of those drawn to the concept of independent nature, or something like it. I offer a characterization of that concern—a worry about problematic instrumentalization of the nonhuman world—and suggest why this concern, and the idea of independent nature which helps to make it intelligible, should continue to inform environmental theory and practice. In offering a qualified defense of the concept of independent nature, and of its value, I assume that such a concept is only one possible tool in a multi-pronged approach to environmental theorizing, deliberation, action, and policy. (shrink)

We are in places. Some places beckon us, some are to be avoided, and some are banal. However, this emplacement urges reflection. In this essay I consider the role of place in environmental experiences, beginning with analysis of the concepts of place and space that motivate the development of four environmental imaginaries (extractive, wilderness, managed, and reciprocal). Ultimately, through a discussion of fences, I aim to show how place-meanings are materially inscribed on the landscape while evidencing the value of place-based (...) analysis to understanding the ways these landscapes are shaped by and serve to shape experience. (shrink)

Recent posthuman theories of nature recognition seek to move beyond Hegel’s anthropological starting point. This article serves as a critical rejoinder to such posthuman attempts by taking aim at posthumanism’s flat ontology and concept of agency. Instead, it is suggested that a genuine Hegelian starting point is better suited to discern the complex interrelationship between the human and nonhuman. It is argued that a Hegelian theory of recognition that takes Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature and Philosophy of Mind into consideration can (...) give nature its due while simultaneously preserving humans as the primary locus of agency in answering current environmental problems. (shrink)

This essay reflects on my academic work and personal experience as a bonsai enthusiast. Specifically, I plan to point out how Deleuzian theory informs my bonsai practice. First, I situate bonsai gardening as an encounter with the vegetal world. Then I consider this encounter as a form of Deleuzian becoming. Becoming reifies a transformation of the two species to become another version of itself—one that occurs between a bonsai and its carer. As a bonsai carer myself, I find becoming as (...) a precise illustration of my relationship with bonsais; hence, a vegetal encounter in the making. (shrink)

Davi Kopenawa and Bruce Albert’s 2010 collaborative work, The Falling Sky: Words of a Yanomami Shaman, centers on a prophetic warning of impending apocalyptic collapse due to anthropogenic environmental destruction. An indigenous contribution to the contemporary burst of eco-apocalyptic writing and the search for a new ecological social order, The Falling Sky challenges the temporal vector of Euroamerican eco-apocalypticism. Instead of the teleological axis of anthropocentric temporality (the emergence of homo sapiens as the pinnacle of evolution), it refers us to (...) a temporality of terrestrial life, where homo sapiens is just one more living species in the web of life. (shrink)

Sean McGrath has produced an interesting interpretation of Renaissance Hermeticism in the context of environmental philosophy. By recovering this esoteric current he combines deep ecological criticism of anthropocentrism with humanistic critique of one-sidedly ecocentric views. After summarizing McGrath’s position and arguing for its profound potential, I will point out a problem in McGrath’s use of one of his key conceptions: disenchantment. Countering McGrath, I argue that the conception of disenchantment is not suitable for distinguishing overly ideological or superficial forms of (...) esotericism from those with actual philosophical and political potential. (shrink)

I present an interpretation of Adorno’s concept of nature that prompts a confrontation with both the domination of nature and the romanticization of nature. This interpretation would situate a normative stance toward human engagement with nature not in the idealization of a pre-social or pre-human nature, but in the (missed) possibilities of past human engagements with non-human nature. Experience of art, such as Edward Burtynsky’s photography, can push us toward such a stance. This stance forces a reconsideration of the dominant (...) form of self-preservation in most contemporary societies; nature cannot be realized until our species understands itself as a species. (shrink)

In this paper I suggest an alternative reading of the value of Hegel’s systematic approach to nature from the perspective of environmental philosophy. Taking the paradigmatic example of the “new materialist” ontologies, I present the problems with an inflationary justification for the argument for the need of a shift in the “scientific” representation of nature. On the basis of these problems, I suggest that Hegel’s view of nature as axiologically impotent sheds light into why emancipatory environmental theory needs not hinge (...) on a determinate understanding of nature. In my reading, this rejection can be harmonized with the asymmetric nature of our responsibility towards non-human nature. (shrink)