Martin Heidegger is still subject to controversial discussions about his political views. The question in the centre of the discussions is not if he was politically on the far right, but how far right he was, and also how far right his philosophy is. However, the details of Heidegger’s political approaches in his work are largely disguised and hidden behind Heidegger’s typical writing style, which has remained undefined for so long. There is a short essay in Heidegger’s work that may (...) shed light on the roots and details of his ethnic-identity thinking: “Memorial Address”. (shrink)

The defense argument in favor of abortion sees the fetus as an invader, a trespasser, someone against whom violence is justified, since this very young person (the fetus) has initiated violence against his mother. Hewitt [30] rejects this argument. The present paper maintains the justification of this defense argument. My perspective is based on the private property rights of the mother. She owns her person. It is as if her body is her house, and a trespasser has invaded it. Surely, (...) she has the right to evict such a person. This analogy is relatively easy to see in the case of rape. The unwanted fetus, now occupying a part of her body is in effect a intruder. If she really owns her body, which I contend she certainly does, she has a right to expel this person from her property. I also argue that voluntary sexual intercourse does not constitution an “invitation” for the pre-born baby to occupy her premises for nine months. (shrink)

The purpose of this study is to look at femicide from a different perspective, even though it may seem unrelated at first. Accordingly, it investigated the existence of a link between foreign exchange, which was a major cause of the crises and unemployment, and femicide, which was the outcome of violence against women other than murder. The data were acquired from the We Will Stop Femicide Platform and the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey in light of the study’s (...) goal. According to the findings of the investigation, there is a long-term cointegrating association between the foreign exchange rate and femicide in Turkey. After 22.6 days, the deviation induced by a 1% change in the currency rate could be balanced. This study is notable for approaching femicide from a hitherto overlooked economic perspective, as well as demonstrating that exchange rate changes are “vital” in terms of non-economic reality and public health. (shrink)

Why are teleological arguments based on biological phenomena so popular? My explanation is that teleological properties are presented in our experiences of biological phenomena. I contrast this with the view that the attribution of teleological properties to biological phenomena takes place at an intellective level – via inference, and as belief or similar propositional attitude. I suggest five ways in which the experiential view is the better explanation for the popularity of such teleological arguments. Experiential attributions are more easy, impactful, (...) and implastic. The experiential view accommodates cases of conflicting attributions, and it makes sense of the readiness with which we follow such teleological arguments. I respond to objections and explain how my view builds on existing answers to this question found in the philosophical literature. (shrink)

In the United States, the rise in income inequality and downward intergenerational social mobility since the 1970s represent twin problems facing community and economic development today. This paper proposes a Structure of Labor theory to apply at the local and regional level to address these development challenges. The objective is to provide a simple local approach to development that maximizes upward economic mobility and enables individuals and communities to achieve their development goals in the 21st century development landscape of the (...) United States. The proposed theory fuses free-enterprise principles with state-planned dirigiste efforts to maximize the best of both theoretical perspectives. After reviewing pertinent literature and articulating the Structure of Labor theory, the latter sections of the paper explicate its implications for community and economic development practice. (shrink)

Organizational culture paves the way for employees, shows how one should function in a given organization – it aims to keep it together by adhering to similar values. Thanks to conditions prevailing there, specific rules employees know how they can perform their duties, properly cooperate with others and also how looks like the possibility of professional development, which is very important in the development of human capital. Human capital is people, their skills, creativity and qualifications. Development of capital through competence (...) development has a positive impact on further functioning of the organization, but also on the satisfaction of employees themselves. In the case of retired officers of the Polish Army, who acquired specialized knowledge and valuable skills during their service, it is important to use their capital after the end of service. They can be supplemented with additional courses, training that will enrich their existing potential, and also enable them to find work in the civilian market. A survey was conducted among retired Army officers and employers/supervisors hiring retired officers from 2019 to 2021. The snowball method was used. A qualitative method was used – a survey questionnaire. (shrink)

This paper considers the matter of representation in Vedānta by examining key claims in the Ṛgveda and the Upaniṣads, which are some of its principal texts. Specifically, we consider the logic behind the paradoxical verses on creation and the conception of consciousness as the ground on which the physical universe exists. This also is the template that explains the logical structure underlying the principal affirmations of the Upaniṣads. The five elements and consciousness are taken to pervade each other, which explains (...) how gross matter is taken to consist of all the four different kinds of atoms that get manifested in different states of the substance. The verses on creation are an example of the use of catuṣkoṭi in Indian philosophy prior to the use of it by Nāgārjuna in the Madhyamaka tradition. It also contrasts central ideas of Vedānta with the corresponding contemporary scientific ideas on consciousness. (shrink)

Vedānta is one of the oldest philosophical systems. While there are many detailed commentaries on Vedānta, there are very few mathematical descriptions of the different concepts developed there. This article shows how ideas from theoretical computer science can be used to explain Vedānta. The standard ideas of transition systems and modal logic are used to develop a formal description for the different ideas in Vedānta. The generality of the formalism is illustrated via a number of examples including saṃsāra, Patañjali’s Yogasūtras, (...) karma, the three avasthās from the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad and the key difference between advaita and dvaita in relation to mokṣa. (shrink)

This paper is devoted to the methodology of history of philosophy. There are considered two approaches: the Hegelian and Schellingian ones. It is shown that the Hegelian approach has many weak points. Both approaches are demonstrated on the material of Indian philosophy. The Schellingian approach was hammered out then by Foucault as archeology of philosophy.

The author enters an already old dispute, that is, whether a countеrpart of the notion of philosophy could be encountered in the traditional India, upholds the view that the term ānvīkṣikī (lit. “investigation”) was nearest to it and traces its meaning along the texts on dharma, politics, poetics and philosophy properly. Two main avenues to the understanding of philosophy’s vocations in India have been paved in the Mānavadharmaśāstra, along with the commentaries thereon and by Kamandaki, the author of the Nītisāra (...) (as the knowledge of Ātman) and in the Arthaśāstra and the Nyāya texts composed by Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara (as a metascience helping the other branches of knowledge bear their fruits). Therefore philosophy in India as well was regarded as the duality of ideological and methodological constituents, while the emphasis on analytic practice in the definitions of ānvīkṣikī (Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy as a practice is also referred to in this context) paves a good promise for comparative philosophy. (shrink)

According to the Navya Naiyāyikas, inference is the knowledge, which is produced out of consideration. But what is to be understood by the term ‘consideration’ or ‘parāmarśa’? According to them, parāmarśa or consideration is the factor through the operation of which the inferential conclusion can be attained. Parāmarśa has been defined as the knowledge of the existence of the hetu or reason in the pakṣa or subject, which reason is characterized by its being concomitant with the sādhya, the knowledge in (...) the form of parāmarśa is actually caused by the knowledge of invariable concomitance of probans (hetu) with the probandum (sādhya) and the knowledge of the existence of the hetu in the subject (pakṣa). It has been said by Viśvanātha that the cognition of the existence of probans or hetu in the subject of inference along with the cognition of the prabans or hetu as pervaded by sādhya is called parāmarśa (pakṣasya vyāpyavṛttitvadhīḥ parāmarśa ucyate). The invariable co-existence in the form ‘where there is smoke, there is fire’ is known as vyāpti or invariable concomitance. Here the invariable coexistence (avyabhicārī sāhacarya) between the probans and probandum (i.e., smoke and fire) is the definition of vyāpti. The term ‘co-existence’ means remaining in the same locus of the probans with the probandum, which is not the counter positive of the absolute negation existing in the locus of the hetu. To Gangeśa, the knowledge of the co-existence of the probans and probandum along with the absence of the knowledge of deviation of the probans is the cause of ascertaining vyāpti. Repeated observations, of course, sometimes act as a promoter (prayojaka) in ascertaining vyāpti by removing the doubt of deviation. The doubt of deviation can be removed sometimes by Tarka or sometimes by the absence of the collocation of causes of doubt, which is called svataḥsiddhaḥ. Gangeśa admits sāmānyalakṣaṇā as a pratyāsatti in ascertaining vyāpti between smoke-in-general and fire-in-general. To him, the super-normal connection through universal (sāmānyalakṣaṇā pratyāsatti) has got a prominent role in ascertaining vyāpti. If somebody challenges about the validity of the syllogistic argument in the form “The mountain is fiery as it possesses smoke” (parvato vahnimān dhūmāt), the philosophers of Nyāya and Navya-nyāya persuasion will justify the same with the help of five constituents (avayava-s). The process is called parāthānumāna (syllogistic argument for making others understand). The constituents of a syllogism are proposition (pratijňā), reason (hetu), example (udāharaṇa), application (upanaya), and conclusion (nigamana). (shrink)

In the paper, the author addresses the question of Dharmakīrti’s philosophical identity afresh. While acknowledging both the elements, external realism of Sautrāintika and idealism of Yogācāra, the author does disagree with the claim which is sometimes made, that Dharmakīrti’s idealism as his ultimate position and accepts realism only at conventional level. The author shows how Dharmakīrti in Pramāṇavārttika oscillates between the two positions and that he must have been attracted to both the positions for different reasons. He was attracted to (...) idealism from critical point of view, when he was critical about the limitations of Sautrāntika realism (which itself can be called critical realism). He was attracted to realism for its capacity to explain the diverse phenomena and lead human beings to their goals. The author denies the claim made by some scholars that Dharmakīrti’s idealism can be called just an epistemic one. He argues that it did have a metaphysical dimension which is hard to defend. The author shows that Dharmakīrti’s idealist stance has adverse implications to the realist epistemology and logic which constitute his mainstream position; the implications, which Dharmakīrti does not take up for discussion. (shrink)

In Jaina philosophy, pramāṇa is accepted as a definitive knowledge of an object and knowledge itself. There are many treatises on Jaina pramāṇa-śāstra which include epistemology and logic according to Jainism. Since Siddhasena’s Nyāyāvatra more than forty texts and commentaries are available on this subject. Five types of knowledge i.e. matijñāna (knowledge through sense organs and mind), śrutajñāna (scriptural of verbal knowledge), avadhijñāna (clairvoyance), manaḥparyayajñāna (knowing the modes of others’ minds) and kevaljñāna (knowledge of all substances and modes) as mentioned (...) in the canonical literature are the basis of the development of Jaina pramāṇa-śāstra. Contributions of Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka (720–780), Vidyānanda (775–840), Ananatavirya (950–990), Vādiraj (1025), Abhayadevasuri (10th century), Prabhācandra (980–1065), Vādi devasśūri (1086–1169, Hemacandra (1088–1173), Dharmabushaṇa (15th century), Yaśovijaya (18th century) are very important in the development of Jaina pramāṇa-śāstra, the Tattvārthasūtra and its commentarial literature has also a significant role in developing the Jaina pramāṇa-śāstra. This development has three aspects-conceptual, analytical and logical. The Tattvārthasūtra is the first text which established the classification of knowledge as two types of pramāṇa – pratyakṣa (perception) and parokṣa (indirect pramāṇa). An intensive discussion on Jaina epistemology or pramāṇa-śāstra is seen in the commentarial literature of the Tattvārthasūtra. (shrink)

The Jaina tradition is known for its distinctive approach to prima facie incompatible claims about the nature of reality. The Jaina approach to conflicting views is to seek an integration or synthesis, in which apparently contrary views are resolved into a vantage point from which each view can be seen as expressing part of a larger, more complex truth. Viewed by some contemporary Jaina thinkers as an extension of the principle of ahiṃsā into the realm of intellectual discourse, Jaina logic (...) marks quite a distinctive stance toward the concept of logical consistency. While it does not directly violate the law of excluded middle, it does, one might say, navigate this principle in a highly and potentially useful way. The potential usefulness of Jaina logic includes the possibility of its use in arguing for the position known as religious pluralism or worldview pluralism. This is a view which many philosophers see as holding great promise in developing a way to think about differences across worldviews in ways that do not lead to the kind of conflict and polarization that all too often characterizes ideological differences in today’s world. (shrink)

This special issue on Indian logic consists of nine research papers dealing with different aspects of Indian logic by nine distinguished authors. It is divided into three sections, such as Nyāya logic, Buddhist logic and Jaina logic. The papers deal with the issue of inference and allied concepts from both historical and conceptual considerations. Indian logic followed linguistic model and thereby in India it gives the foundation of epistemology and the development of philosophy of language.

There are two major ways in which Buddhist logic is developed. The first one is represented by Nāgārjuna-Candrakῑrti tradition through the use of dialectics and the second way of development is found in the works of Diṅnāga and Dharmakῑrti through the use of hetu (probans). This second way of logic has further been developed by the works of Jinendrabuddhi and Ratnakῑrti. The paper is an attempt to show the historical development of epistemic logic as developed by the Buddhist philosophers and (...) their relevance for our time. (shrink)

As the title of the present article shows, it highlights the three philosophically integrated areas – (1) pramāṇa-epistemology (theory of comprehensive knowledge involving both perception and inference), (2) logic (although a part of pramāṇa-epistemology, it has two modes, namely, inductive reasoning and deductive reasoning), and (3) language (or semantics, i.e. the double negation theory of meaning, which falls under inference). These are interconnected as well as overlapping within the Buddhist mainstream tradition of the process philosophy as opposed to the substantialist (...) philosophy. The same is the case with the three celebrated Buddhist thinkers – Vasubandhu, Dignāga (also spelt as Diññāṇa), and Dharmakīrti – who develop their radical and critical views focusing on these areas in historical-cum-philosophical order. It is worth noting that within the same mainstream Buddhist tradition, each one of the three thinkers picks up the problematic issues from their predecessors – from the Buddha to their immediate predecessors respectively – for their solutions against the backdrop of the two conflicting mainstream traditions – Buddhist and non-Buddhist. The central focus of these thinkers is first to identify the crucial issues, doctrinal principles, terminology, and methodology in their own ways and conceptual frameworks, which generate not only the mutual conflicts in the course of dialogues but also strengthen their positions by means of their new radical ideas, innovations, terminologies, methodologies, and doctrinal principles. As a result, the three selected areas and their crucial issues are explained, elaborated, and interpretated for better understanding. All of which are rooted in the Buddha’s path of wisdom, ethics, and liberation from the human predicament (duḥkha-nivṛtti). In this grand project of the deepest concerns, the Buddha utilized multiple strategies like understanding and controlling the problematic nature of the mind (Pāli citta, manasa) and its concomitance (Pāli cetasika, dhammā) by means of the concentrative meditation (Pāli jhāna, Sanskrit (hereafter Skt., dhyāna), cultivation of knowledge (Pāli vijjā, Skt. vidyā) and conduct/moral purity (Pāli caraṇa, Skt. ācaraṇa), destruction of afflictions/defilements (Pāli kilesa, Skt. kleśa), critical and logical thinking with valid arguments, and so on. His disciples also treat him as the possessor of valid method, arguments, meaning, practice, and purpose (Skt. pramāṇabhūta, the term used by Dignāga). He believed in the common humanity as the community of sufferers and the autonomy of every human being (Pāli attakāra), but strongly rejected the hierarchy of humanity on the basis of caste, birth, and dogmatic religious identity. For these reasons, following the Buddha and his celebrated followers like Vasubandhu, Dignāga, and Dharmakīrti, my task in this article is how to clearly and elaborately discuss the above identified issues and theories, first to understand them for myself and then logically prove the whole process of knowledge and the designed purpose through communication to those who have the intention to hear and understand the framework of common language for their benefits. I wish the readers like students and young teachers benefit from my research work. Further, since my learning of the Tibetan language is zero, but comfortable in Sanskrit and Pāli, I have been heavily dependent on three great modern thinkers who have widely written independently and also translated the Buddhist Tibetan texts, which were translated from the original Sanskrit texts now lost, into English in the areas of Buddhist epistemology, logic, and semantics. These modern scholars are Masaaki Hattori, Shoryo Katsura, and Richard Hayes. Besides them, I have also little benefitted from some other scholars who have worked in the same areas. (shrink)

This paper presents an integralist approach to Jaina logic. This is built around an analysis of the pivotal notion of antarvyāpti in Jaina logic. It is shown in this connection why antarvyāpti needs to be considered the ‘Core Perspective/problem’ of Jaina logic. Next, it is shown how all the salient features of Jaina logic (as viewed from its language-oriented perspective and the epistemic perspective respectively) stand intimately related to the so-called core perspective. In the remaining sections of the paper topics (...) like relationship of the core perspective i) to various non-standard systems of logic [DL, FL, NMR etc.,], ii) to the four pillars and to the eight MPC’s of Jaina philosophy, iii) to some bluntly unimaginative ways of looking at Jaina logic [e.g., Ducko-Rabbitism], iv) to the scheme of classification of propositions in Jaina logic, v) to the resulting conceptual economies related to methodology, and especially to a unified theory of Hetvābhāsa and, finally, vi) to a re-assessment of Frege-Husserl discord in the light of the significance of Jñānātmakatā vs Vākyātmakatā in Jaina logic, etc., have been discussed. (shrink)

The paper discusses anumāna and its variety in general from the point of view of inferential cognition for the sake of oneself as well as for the sake of others; i.e. svārthānumāna and parārthānumāna as given in the Buddhist tradition of logic, especially with parārthānumāna, its nature and role. The paper argues that the Buddhist intent of division of anumāna into svārthānumāna and parārthānumāna was to bring Buddha-vacanas under the category of parārthānumāna and to save them from being classified under (...) śabda pramāṇa. It contends that such a division was not just an epistemological demand, but had a deeper philosophical significance in the Buddhist conceptual framework. Such a division is, therefore, intended to reject the role of śabda as an extra causal means or pramāṇa. The paper identifies the logical commitment in Buddhist tradition as hetu-centric commitment as it differs from the Nyāya tradition of vyāpti-centric one. (shrink)