In her article “Die Irrealität des Kunstwerkes,” first published in 1938, Hedwig Conrad-Martius delves into the question of the artistic representation of the real reality of the world, which basically concerns the classical distinction between art and nature. It is in this context that Conrad-Martius rejects idealism and the concomitant assumption that an artwork imitates the “living reality” of Nature. She clearly distinguishes between the task of phenomenology and that of art: while phenomenology should surpass the sphere of mere sensuous (...) appearances and inquire into the “real reality” (wirkliche Wirklichkeit) of the world, phenomenological aesthetics should conversely deal with the expressive character of appearances and assume their inherent “irreality” (Irrealität), such that phenomenological ontology and aesthetics involve distinctive ontological realms that vary according to the subject-matter. However, while she clearly distances herself from Husserl’s phenomenology in her search for the consciousness-independent facticity of the world, she concurs with him in her eidetic enquiries and in the assertion of the creative potential of art, which lies in the creation of a new, even “irreal,” world. For this purpose, I will explore confluences and divergences between their respective conceptions. (shrink)

This essay reconstructs Oskar Becker’s idiosyncratic conception of aesthetics and its importance for phenomenology. For Becker, the aesthetic is not simply one type of phenomenon among others; rather, it occupies a privileged position as, first, that phenomenon which is itself “wholly phenomenal,” and, second, that phenomenon which discloses the ontological structure of phenomenality itself (and is thus what he calls “hyperontological”). The paper first reconstructs Becker’s descriptive phenomenology of the aesthetic (which he restricts to the realm of masterpieces of fine (...) art). For Becker, the key characteristic for understanding the givenness of beauty is its sense of fragility, which he uses to reveal a complicated interweaving of temporality and modality at the heart of the aesthetic. This essay then shows how this is rooted in Becker’s larger ontological project of developing a phenomenology of the non-historical in dialogue with Heidegger’s early work, a project which began in 1927 with the publication of his magnum opus Mathematical Existence. (shrink)

The article compares Fritz Kaufmann and Ernst Cassirer’s conceptions of aesthetics, focusing in particular on their characterisation of the experience of apprehension of art objects. Firstly, analysing Kaufmann’s early investigation of the experience of the reception of art images and Cassirer’s observations on art as a symbolic form, it argues that the two philosophers conceptualise the reception of art objects in a similar way, as an experience structured across different layers of meaning constitution that are based on specific functions of (...) consciousness. While these similarities seem to suggest a convergence between Kaufmann’s early phenomenological reflections and Cassirer’s revised Marburg Neo-Kantianism, an account of Kaufmann’s direct confrontation with Cassirer shows that there remain profound differences regarding their final understanding of the aims of their philosophical inquiries as well as of the epistemological premises of their approaches. These differences become clearer in Kaufmann’s later reflections where he articulates the implications of his interpretation of transcendental phenomenology, stressing in particular the role of eidetic reduction. (shrink)

This article critically examines the usual characterisation of aesthetics as a fragmented, marginal or secondary field within phenomenology. The author argues in particular that phenomenological aesthetics was consciously and systematically articulated as an explicit programme in at least two distinct contexts of early phenomenology: the international project to establish a general science of art known as the Allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft, and the Soviet State Academy of Art Studies (GAChN). The article explores the impact of these institutions on the development of early (...) phenomenological aesthetics, highlighting how that development was conditional on the idea of a general science of art. It suggests, in conclusion, that these two attempts to mobilise phenomenology as a science of art, while abortive, cast important light not only on early phenomenological aesthetics, but on phenomenology’s fundamental relation with aesthetics. (shrink)

Vasily Sesemann’s aesthetics is a transcendental philosophy that seeks to answer the question of how an experience of beauty is possible. Sesemann insists that aesthetics should focus on the study of the aesthetic object itself, and through it go to the problematics of the act of perception and creativity. Sesemann states that not only the relationship between the work of art and the perceiver is important in order to understand the aesthetic object, but also the relationship between the work of (...) art and the creator. The aesthetic object in its sedimented form not only retains indications of the act of creation, but also makes demands on the perceiving subject. Aesthetic objects are sedimented passive structures that can be activated by the performative actions of the perceiver when she discovers the appropriate way of perception. Sesemann, like Moritz Geiger, claims that aesthetics is impossible without an analysis of feelings. He, like Geiger, recognizes the importance of empathy in aesthetic experience. However, Sesemann develops the concept of aesthetic empathy using Max Scheler’s arguments. Empathy is necessary, because the perceiver must be able to understand expressions. The aim of this paper is to analyse the phenomenological aspects of Vasily Sesemann’s aesthetics. Firstly, this paper analyzes the Sesemann’s phenomenology of aesthetic experience. Secondly, it shows that the analysis performed by Sesemann demonstrates why empathy plays a leading role in aesthetic experience. (shrink)

Recent years have witnessed a surge of interest in the early phases of the phenomenological movement. However, early phenomenological aesthetics has so far received very little attention in the current “Renaissance” of early phenomenology, albeit that the early phenomenologists made significant contributions to aesthetics and even argued for a special affinity between aesthetics and phenomenology. They also took part in the exceptionally lively debates of early 20th-century German aesthetics, which in general has remained all too underappreciated in today’s research. This (...) special issue of the Journal of Aesthetics and Phenomenology aims to kindle new interest in early phenomenological aesthetics and its wider intellectual contexts. In this introductory article, I will first provide a short overview of early phenomenology and then describe the main topics, proponents, and publications of early phenomenological aesthetics, setting them in the context of early 20th-century German aesthetics. (shrink)

As phenomenology rose to prominence at the beginning of the 20th century, several aestheticians tried to establish the Husserlian method of “phenomenological reduction” in the field of aesthetics. These ventures were met with resistance from psychological aesthetics, which was the predominant form of aesthetics in the German-speaking world at the time. This paper examines, first, practical attempts to apply the method of “phenomenological reduction” in aesthetics. Using Waldemar Conrad and Moritz Geiger as examples, I try to trace what aestheticians actually (...) did when they applied this method in their investigations. Secondly, I reconstruct the four central objections with which psychological aesthetics reacted to such attempts. I have identified four central counterarguments in the work of Johannes Volkelt and Oswald Külpe, who were among the most eminent critics of phenomenological aesthetics: the transcendental argument, the susceptibility-to-errors argument, the constructivism argument, and the non-normativity argument. Finally, I also discuss the refusal of psychological aesthetics to acknowledge that a genuine phenomenological method even existed and the consequences of this refusal. (shrink)

In The Phenomenology of Aesthetic Consciousness and Phantasy: Working with Husserl, Paul Crowther undertakes the challenging task of presenting the intricate nuances of Husserl’s aesthetic theory i...

This paper explores Moritz Geiger’s work on the role of emotions in aesthetic appreciation and shows its potential for contemporary research. Drawing on the main tenets of Geiger’s phenomenological aesthetics as an aesthetics of value, the paper begins by elaborating his model of aesthetic appreciation. I argue that, placed in the contemporary debate, his model is close to affective models which make affective states responsible for the apprehension of the aesthetic value of an artwork, though Geiger also makes important concessions (...) to the intellectualist. Indeed, like proponents of the affective model, Geiger argues that a work’s aesthetic values are extracted by means of an affective state though the affective state in question is neither an emotion nor a feeling but a “liking”. In fact, like the intellectualist, he considers that a focus on the emotions might on certain occasions interfere in the aesthetic appreciation of the artwork. Next, I reconstruct Geiger’s distinction between surface and depth effects in terms of a distinction between two types of emotional responses to artworks. It is argued that Geiger’s distinction offers a powerful tool to distinguish those emotions that are intrinsically related to aesthetic values from those that are not and that this distinction can be useful to understand how different kinds of emotions contribute to aesthetic appreciation. I proceed to examine the historical sources of Geiger’s distinction between surface and depth effects in Theodor Lipps’s aesthetics and compare Geiger’s account with the works of other early phenomenologists working on values. In the final part, I illustrate the place of Geiger’s model in the contemporary discussion by means of an example. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In the work of Ernesto Laclau, populism is treated as a hegemonic challenge. Hegemony describes the usurpation of the image of society as a totality by a particular and underdetermined social imaginary. Seen through the lens of what Johann P. Arnason terms “post-transcendental phenomenology”, this concerns the way in which a society sees and experiences both itself and the world it inhabits. This article suggests that hegemonic social imaginaries are built into a society’s public spaces, and are in turn (...) experienced by citizens moving through these spaces, meaning that the built environment is central to the development of populist imaginaries. The article discusses how the neoliberal city exemplifies the way social imaginaries are inscribed into the physical landscape by highlighting three moments in the city; the institution of a certain imaginary as dominant; its sedimentation within the urban fabric over time; and finally, the re-activation of the original moment of institution, which opens up the possibility for new beginnings to overwrite the imaginaries encoded in the city. These three moments describe how physical, built spaces make concrete the power relations and horizons of possibility of the hegemonic imaginary—making possible and encouraging certain ways of being while discouraging (and hiding) others. This hegemonic logic of occupying a public space in the name of a particular subset of the population is a not only parallel to the form of populist politics, but populist sentiment is—at least in part—provoked by the experiences of inhabiting these spaces. (shrink)

As the editors of the series, New Literary Theory, proclaim in the preface of the book, the purpose of the series is to make more room in literary theory for playful and accessible approaches to li...

ABSTRACT Graham Harman’s Object-Oriented Ontology prioritises aesthetics as first philosophy, and finds increasing interest from those working across art, architecture and the humanities in general. This article tests the application of Harman’s ideas by applying them to a thorny issue related to the domain of serial art, and serially developed drawing in particular. The issue concerns the productive role of the beholder in constituting the serial artwork as a unified thing, wherein it appears manifestly deeper than the sum of its (...) physical parts. Referring to an artwork produced by contemporary artist Stefana McClure, I build upon prior propositions on serial art put forward by Christy Mag Uidhir and Nicolas de Warren to make the case for seeing serially. This uses Harman’s understanding of aesthetics to claim that imagined iterations constitute an integral element to serial drawing, brought into play when the beholder reflects upon the loose relationship between the array of qualities the artwork palpably presents and its withdrawn reality as a unified object. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This paper explores philosophically the experiences of laughter and irony, focusing on Japanese sources but with a cross-cultural outlook. I ask whether globally unfavorable attitudes towards the comic in the European canon might have left unexplored or misunderstood several insights offered by the bodily and spiritual dimension revealed by laughter, and examine them through Japanese sources. Following a short but poignant triad of examples in Kuki Shūzō’s work, the paper analyses three instances of Japanese laughter and irony: the orgiastic (...) laughter of the gods luring Amaterasu out of the Heavenly Cave in Kojiki; the anthropomorphic animal scrolls of Chōjūgiga, and the “Tiger Cubs Crossing” stone garden in Ryōanji, Kyoto, concluding how each one of them offers an important insight on the bodily and conceptual phenomenological cluster of laughter and irony. I conclude with a further exploration of laughter in Zen, a religious tradition with a unique stress on the spiritual potential of humor, following Nishitani’s reading of Mumonkan and his connection to the experience of “emptiness”. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In this essay, I shall discuss Gadamer’s interpretation of Celan’s dialogical poetry in his essay “Wer bin Ich und wer bist Du?” (“Who am I and Who are You?”). One may argue that this is Gadamer’s articulation of the problem of the self-other relationship. To understand the question of self and other, it is first of all necessary to return to the poetic word from which the question arises. Speaking is, for Gadamer, the most profoundly self-forgetful action, because when (...) one speaks, one is so deeply “within the word” that one is not turned toward the word but, rather, to what one wants to say with the word. For hermeneutics, interpreting means putting oneself on the task of the poetic text. The proximity between poetizing and interpreting emerges, also in its specificity concerning the proximity between poetizing and thinking. Such a proximity, in turn, divides itself into two extremes: the word that sublates itself, and the word that stands for itself. It is hence the uncertain fullness of language, where, unsurprisingly, both poetizing and interpreting come into themselves, which constitutes the link between the one and the other. Therefore, the interpreted word, intertwined with the poetic word does not replace what it indicates, but merely points beyond itself, to what is other than itself. Both pursue a meaning that points toward an open realm. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In a passage from the addendum to “The Origin of the Work of Art” often ignored in the secondary literature, Heidegger expands on how art institutes the unconcealment of the truth of Being with reference to the ontological difference—the difference between Being and beings which cannot rely on the comparison of predicates for clarification. The relationship between art and the ontological difference is not immediately obvious and lacks further explication in Heidegger’s other texts. This paper argues that there are (...) two fundamental elements to the ontological difference that Heidegger focuses on that can be used to elucidate art as a strife of world and earth: “the Nothing” [das Nichts] outlined in “What is Metaphysics?” (1929) and world-projection described in The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics (1929–30). Understanding these two elements of the ontological difference (world-projection and the Nothing) as present together in the event of unconcealment (aletheia) thereby clarifies for the notorious concepts of earth, world, strife, and rift (Riß) that characterize the work of art. Recourse to the ontological difference as an explanatory mechanism for conceptualising Heidegger’s philosophy of art is a useful way of avoiding common issues in the prevailing literature that will be laid out below. (shrink)

As the editors of the series, New Literary Theory, proclaim in the preface of the book, the purpose of the series is to make more room in literary theory for playful and accessible approaches to li...

This essay elaborates the nature and consequences of compression and noise, understood as interdependent phenomena determining current aesthetic regimes and modes of perception in the “cognitive co...

Generative art theory involves any artistic practice where an artist uses external systems (rules, algorithms, organic processes) to complete an artwork. Commonly utilized in video game design, gen...

The task of negotiating present ecological breakdowns is entangled crucially with the logistics of managing a globally distributed observing infrastructure. Composed of sensors aboard orbiting sate...

1. Artificial Intelligence is an ambiguous umbrella term. Until today there is no uniform definition of AI and the term carries several meanings. As exemplary, I will give two definitions of AI tha...

1. In the last decade, technological systems based on Artificial Intelligence (AI) architectures entered our lives at an increasingly fast pace. Virtual assistants facilitate our daily tasks, recom...

1 The question of expression is essential for artistic practices; it designates how a material is articulated through sculptural gestures, how a musical idea is shaped by the dancer’s movements, an...

1234Coming from the current context permeated by technological systems of Artificial Intelligence (AI), we discern a growing and recurring concern for the future, for its images and imaginaries, wh...

… the new figure of an event-machine would no longer be even a figure. It would not resemble, it would resemble nothing, not even what we call, in a still familiar way, a monster. But it would ther...

Modern and contemporary transhumanism (distinct from posthumanism, see endnote i) is a philosophical movement that seeks the enhancement of the human body and mind though technological means.1 Its...

The aim of this paper is establish the difference between aesthetics and the philosophy of art. Part of the argument is that only a philosophy of art can give an adequate philosophical account of works of art. The argument is advanced drawing on the writings of Immanuel Kant and Gunter Figal.

Aesthetics and social cognition are two disciplines rarely merged, despite the penetration of artworks into social, moral, and political concerns. In particular, participatory artworks involve direct social interaction and perception, and are more often than not motivated by, and aim towards, ethico-political ends. In the following, I fuse considerations aesthetic with considerations intersubjective, arguing that participatory artworks engage and exploit empathy’s biased character towards a recalibration of our social relationships, namely inclusion and exclusion. Although critics of empathy suggest that its (...) biased, manipulable, and narrow characteristics are detrimental to its moral promise, I argue that participatory artworks are successful intervention methods just insofar as they use these characteristics for their ethico-political gain. This is stimulated by their facilitation of affective, primary intersubjectivity, something I argue is unique to participatory art. After detailing these operations, I suggest that works that seek to address exclusion, rather than those that facilitate inclusion, have a greater potency in addressing and recalibrating empathy, in part owing to their provocation of empathy-related emotions and forms of fellow-feeling such as shame and compassion. (shrink)

Sleep is soothing, silent, and serene, until it is not. Sleep is often troubled, disturbed, or even “disordered” as the medical literature describes it. This paper begins from an extreme form of such disturbance—terrified sleep. Night terrors (pavor nocturnus), in which sleep is violently interrupted, offer important insights into sleep and the methods by which it is studied. The sanitising nature of the medical classification of night terrors as part of a continuum with sleepwalking and yet strikingly distinct from nightmares, (...) leads us into the arms of a more traditional, first-person, phenomenological investigation of night terrors. Without denying the power of both approaches, this paper offers a deconstructive alternative reading of this troubling of sleep through Jean-Luc Nancy’s rethinking of the body, its suffering and materiality. Nancy, and Derrida, help us tarry with the body terrified and trembling in night terrors. First the paper explores the medical incisions within sleep that carve out night terrors, as a delimited phenomenon. This is followed by a consideration of what phenomenology can, and crucially cannot, add to our understanding of night terrors. Next a deconstructive critique of the phenomenological concepts of Leib and Körper is utilised to return to the material body gripped by the night terror. This in turn leads to an alternative account of this parasomnia through a post-Nancean phenomenology of terror as distinct from fear and Angst. The paper closes by drawing out several conclusions about the body, sleep, and phenomenology’s limits when approaching the somnolent. (shrink)

As I sat down to sketch this review of Richard Kearney’s new book on touch, I happened to have received just then in the post a record I had ordered some time ago. It was an album by the French gro...

This article looks closely at one of Paul Cézanne’s portraits of Vallier painted the last year of his life to examine how his (“fugitive”) vision works through his use of colors. The French philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who in his phenomenology views the body as the primary locus of having and therefore knowing the world, emphasizes the vital role of the body of the artist that must be offered to the world in order to truly manifest the world in painting. It (...) is no wonder that Cézanne’s artwork and thought are stitched into the structure of Merleau-Ponty’s aesthetics in his essay “Eye and Mind,” for Cézanne’s painting bears witness to his own account of aesthetic experience. Merleau-Ponty’s emphasis on the lived vision that seeks the depth of Being, the lived qualities of the visible world, takes Cézanne’s vision manifested in his portrait of Vallier further to see where the painting as well as Cézanne himself stand in relation to the visible world. (shrink)

The release of Emmanuel Levinas’s Prison Notebooks (Carnets de captivité) as a part of the first tome of his collected works has further illuminated the extent of the philosopher’s preoccupation with art, especially literature. Levinas’s own literary efforts have been well documented, but less attention has been paid to the relationship between the Prison Notebooks and Levinas’s early philosophy of art. In this article, I suggest that much of what Levinas has to say apropos art in his early philosophy can (...) be traced back to meditations undertaken in captivity. I will unearth the influence of the Prison Notebooks in three articles from the 1940ʹs “L’autre dans Proust,” “La réalité et son ombre,” and “La transcendance des mots.” I argue that in Levinas’s early philosophy of art follows two distinct “paths”: the path of eros and the path of sensation. On one hand, Levinas questions how and if literature can do justice to the question of alterity, whereas on the other he seeks to make sense of the relationship between art and sensibility. I argue that in his notebooks Levinas offers an account of the meaning of sensations that forms the basis of his early aesthetics. Thus, the study of the Prison Notebooks is important as it allows us to see how Levinas’s early philosophy of art, including his seminal “La réalité et son ombre,” functions as a continuation of a philosophical project already begun during his time in captivity. (shrink)