Rights Against Slavery

In the 1780s through the end of 1790s, Kant made various references to slavery (in its different forms) and the transatlantic slave trade in the context of his political philosophy or philosophy of right; he thereby had opportunities to speak in favor of abolitionism, which was gaining momentum in parts of Europe, or at least to articulate a normative critique of the race-based chattel slavery or Atlantic slavery and the associated slave trade qua (legalized) INSTITUTIONS; but he did neither. Why? (...) In raising and seeking an answer to this question, I am not interested in what Kant’s normative silence about the institutions of Atlantic slavery and slave trade may tell us about him as a person (for example, whether he was blinded by his own racist prejudices or whether he was affected by some kind of cognitive dissonance). Rather, I will focus on what it may tell us about certain limitations of his political philosophy, limitations that might have made it THEORETICALLY DIFFICULT for him to figure out exactly what to DO about those institutions as entrenched political realities. (shrink)

Whereas Aristotle defended the appropriateness of slavery and Seneca derided only its cruelty, Dio Chrysostom vehemently opposed any argument in favor of keeping slaves. And he did it in the 1st Century CE Greco-Roman world, a society comfortable with slavery. This paper analyzes Dio’s dialogue _The Tenth Discourse: Diogenes or on Servants_ to try to understand how Cynics addressed the wrongs of slavery when so many other philosophers did not. The paper argues that Cynic commitments to self-sufficiency, freedom, and nature (...) helped them to recognize the immorality and injustice of owning slaves. And Dio’s work, which derided injustices that most others defended, shows that philosophers should resist excusing thinkers as mere products of their time, especially canonical figures such as Aristotle and Seneca. Not only were Aristotle and Seneca wrong, but so are contemporary philosophers if they do not hold such historical figures to account by acknowledging and discussing their limitations and faults as thinkers in relation to the historical circumstances they faced. (shrink)

Este capítulo se propõe a analisar os fundamentos utilizados por Aristóteles (2006) para justificar a escravidão. Para isso, é tomada como chave de leitura a categorização das atividades humanas fundamentais proposta por Hannah Arendt (2008). A escravidão no mundo grego antigo era tida como uma forma de liberar o cidadão dos afazeres domésticos e do trabalho para que pudesse ter ócio e, assim, dedicar-se às atividades entre seus iguais, sobretudo à política.

It is morally impossible, Locke argued, for individuals to consensually establish absolute rule over themselves. That would be to transfer to rulers a power that is not ours, but God’s alone: owner...

A number of non-equivalent definitions of slavery have been offered by historians, sociologists, bodies of international governance, and legal scholars. None is clearly adequate. Here I review extant definitions of slavery found in or suggested by Lovejoy, Patterson, Honoré, Bales, Ingram, and the League of Nations 1926 Slavery Convention, and argue that each is subject to counterexample. I then attempt to formulate and defend a more adequate definition, one focusing on consent, control, and the intentions of the slaveholder, and relevant (...) for the present as well as the past. (shrink)

The Article analyzes the notion of legal “thinghood” in the context of the person–thing bifurcation. In legal scholarship, there are numerous assumptions pertaining to this definition that are often not spelled out. In addition, one’s chosen definition of “thing” is often simply taken to be the correct one. The Article scrutinizes these assumptions and definitions. First, a brief history of the bifurcation is offered. Second, three possible definitions of “legal thing” are examined: Things as nonpersons, things as rights and duties, (...) and things as property. The first two definitions are rejected as not being very interesting or serving any heuristic function. Conversely, understanding legal things as property is meaningful, useful, and helps to understand what it means to say that animals are legally things. Defining things as property has certain rather important implications, which are analyzed at the end of the Article. For instance, not everything needs to be either a person or a thing: The historical institution of outlawry involved treating individuals neither as legal persons nor as legal things. One must conclude that the person–thing bifurcation is less fundamental than is often assumed. (shrink)

The slavery contract is not a rights violation since the right not to be enslaved and the right not to give out a benefit are waivable and the conjunction of their voluntary waiver is not itself a rights violation. The case for the contract being pejoratively exploitative is not clear. Hence given the general presumption in favor of liberty of contract, such a transaction ought to be permitted. The contract is also not invalid on the grounds that the wrongdoer’s consent (...) to it necessarily reflects involuntariness or irrationality or on the grounds that it is logically impossible for the wrongdoer to satisfy the contract. Allowing such contracts may not have desirable consequences, but for the liberal this by itself is not a sufficient reason against allowing them. One case where the slavery contract might be relevant is where a victim’s agent or the state agrees to waive its claim to harsh punishment in return for the offender agreeing to be enslaved. (shrink)