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  1. No point of view except ours?Luke Elson - forthcoming - Topoi:1-11.
    I argue that it’s quite comprehensible to get upset about metaethical nihilism, to indulge what I call nihilistic despair. When we lose the objective moral or normative point of view, we lose the promise of luck-immune guidance and categorical importance, things many of us hope for. This is all quite Williams-friendly, but I reject his puzzling but suggestive remarks that nihilistic despair must be a self-pitying muddle. Finally, I argue that internalism about reasons is even more depressing than outright nihilism, (...)
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  2. Evolutionary debunking of (arguments for) moral realism.Arnon Levy & Itamar Weinshtock Saadon - 2023 - Synthese 201 (5):1-22.
    Moral realism is often taken to have common sense and initial appearances on its side. Indeed, by some lights, common sense and initial appearances underlie all the central positive arguments for moral realism. We offer a kind of debunking argument, taking aim at realism’s common sense standing. Our argument differs from familiar debunking moves both in its empirical assumptions and in how it targets the realist position. We argue that if natural selection explains the objective phenomenology of moral deliberation and (...)
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  3. Disagreeing over evaluatives: Preference, normative and moral discourse.Justina Diaz Legaspe - 2015 - Manuscrito 38 (2):39-63.
    Why would we argue about taste, norms or morality when we know that these topics are relative to taste preferences, systems of norms or values to which we are committed? Yet, disagreements over these topics are common in our evaluative discourses. I will claim that the motives to discuss rely on our attitudes towards the standard held by the speakers in each domain of discourse, relating different attitudes to different motives –mainly, conviction and correction. These notions of attitudes and motives (...)
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  4. What is Goodness? An Introduction.Deborah Achtenberg - 1982 - Dissertation, New School for Social Research
    The inquiry is an introduction to the question, what is goodness? In it, realist and anti-realist accounts are considered. In Part I, two kinds of anti-realism are considered, subjectivist and strict. Subjectivism is the belief that goodness is belief-, affect-, or convention-dependent. It is suggested that subjectivism is based on an equivocation, is circular or is difficult consistently to maintain. Strict anti-realism is the belief that there is and can be no such thing as goodness. Three strict anti-realists are considered: (...)
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  5. What a Noncognitivist might tell a Moral Realist.Arend Kulenkampff & Frank Siebelt - 2000 - ProtoSociology 14:355-377.
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  6. The Judgements of Joan. [REVIEW]R. A. - 1962 - Review of Metaphysics 16 (2):396-396.
    A guide to the different views of Joan of Arc as they have varied from her time until World War II, with emphasis on the political and ideological shifts which lay behind them. The chief chroniclers, sources, and commentators are referred to and their viewpoints briefly described. The author emphasizes the fairness of her trial by the standards of her day, and the political motives underlying her rehabilitation. Joan, he concludes, was a highly complex character, and in her story the (...)
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  7. What Is Moral Philosophy?Louis P. Pojman - 1997 - In Kristin Shrader-Frechette & Laura Westra (eds.), Technology and Values. Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 11--24.
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  8. 16 How to be an Ethical Antirealist.Simon Blackburn - 1995 - In Paul K. Moser & J. D. Trout (eds.), Contemporary Materialism: A Reader. Routledge. pp. 357.
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  9. Moral Philosophy. [REVIEW]B. P. H. - 1964 - Review of Metaphysics 18 (1):179-180.
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  10. Broad’s Critical Essays in Moral Philosophy. [REVIEW]M. G. - 1973 - Review of Metaphysics 27 (1):121-122.
    This volume brings together sixteen of C. D. Broad’s valuable papers on moral philosophy written between 1914 and 1964. Unlike his widely read Five Types of Moral Theory where he was chiefly concerned to provide an accurate interpretation of various historically important moral philosophers, this volume contains essays which critically examine a variety of normative and meta-ethical issues. Broad never presented a developed moral position of his own, but his careful classifications of possible positions, subtle distinctions, and elaboration of logical (...)
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  11. Précis de Patrologie. [REVIEW]Gerald G. Walsh - 1932 - Thought: Fordham University Quarterly 7 (1):159-164.
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  12. Metaethics and Teleology.Jonathan Jacobs - 2001 - Review of Metaphysics 55 (1):41 - 55.
    THERE IS AN IMPORTANT RESPECT in which virtue-centered ethical realism needs to be more Aristotelian than it is typically willing to admit. This concerns the way in which teleological considerations need to be more explicitly acknowledged. Reflection on moral phenomenology, discourse, and practice supports realism and also reveals that teleological considerations cannot be entirely disowned by it. The teleology is not a grand teleology, however; it is not the view that there is a unique perfection of human nature, and it (...)
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  13. Expressivist Relativism? [REVIEW]Stephen Darwall - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):183-188.
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  14. An Irrealist Theory of Self.Jonardon Ganeri - 2004 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 12 (1):60-79.
    It has become a common-place to read the ‘no-self’ theory of the Buddhist philosophers as a reductionist account of persons. In Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit himself seemed to endorse the association, having learned of the Buddhist theory from his colleague at All Souls College, Bimal Krishna Matilal. The Buddha’s denial that there are real selves metaphysically distinct from continuous streams of psycho-physical constituents lends itself, to be sure, to a reductionist interpretation. I believe, nevertheless, that there are good grounds (...)
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  15. Empiricism in science and ethics.Stefan Sencerz - 1993 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 31 (4):449-470.
    We elucidate the conditions under which any hypothesis is explanatorily relevant by analyzing several tests of explanatory relevance and explanations based on those tests. A new causal criterion of explanatory relevance is developed and defended. We show how the causal criterion succeeds in establishing, at the very least, a very strong presumption against moral facts.
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  16. Two views of virtue: absolute relativism and relative absolutism.F. F. Centore - 2000 - Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press.
    This work penetrates difficult ethical issues by examining human experience and reasoning in conjunction with actual choices of action.
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  17. Essays in ethical theory.Richard Mervyn Hare - 1989 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    R.M. Hare is one of the most widely discussed of today's moral philosophers. In this volume he has collected a number of essays, including one which is previously unpublished, which fill in the theoretical background of his thought. Each essay is self-contained, but together they give a connected picture of his views on such questions as the objectivity and rationality of moral thinking, the issue between the ethical realists and their opponents, the place in our moral thought of appeals to (...)
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  18. Error. [REVIEW]David A. Horner - 2007 - Review of Metaphysics 61 (2):443-444.
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  19. Moral anti-realism.Richardn D. Joyce - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    It might be expected that it would suffice for the entry for “moral anti-realism” to contain only some links to other entries in this encyclopedia. It could contain a link to “moral realism” and stipulate the negation of the view there described. Alternatively, it could have links to the entries “anti-realism” and “morality” and could stipulate the conjunction of the materials contained therein. The fact that neither of these approaches would be adequate—and, more strikingly, that following the two procedures would (...)
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  20. Error and the new realism.A. O. Lovejoy - 1913 - Philosophical Review 22 (4):410-423.
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  21. Persons and values.Joan Mackie - 1985 - Oxford: Clarendon Press. Edited by Joan Mackie & Penelope Mackie.
    This collection of John Mackie's papers on personal identity and topics in moral and political philosophy, some of which have not previously been published, deal with such issues as: multiple personality; the transcendental "I"; responsibility and language; aesthetic judgements; Sidgwick's pessimism; act-utiliarianism; right-based moral theories; cooperation, competition, and moral philosophy; universalization; rights, utility, and external costs; norms and dilemmas; Parfit's population paradox; and the combination of partially-ordered preferences.
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  22. Experts, practitioners, and practical judgement.Onora O'Neill - 2007 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (2):154-166.
    Kant challenges the well-worn view that practitioners do not need to rely on theory. He acknowledges that experts with a deep knowledge of theory may fail as practitioners both in technical matters, and in matters of morality and justice. However, since action-guiding theories are intended to shape rather than to fit the world, practitioners have no point of reference other than the theories or principles that they seek to enact. If theories of duty appear to offer too little guidance for (...)
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  23. Realism-Without Error?Francis Parker - 1967 - The Monist 51 (2):224-237.
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  24. The Intellectually Modest Criminal.Tamler Sommers - unknown
    Michael Smith’s The Moral Problem gives an admirably straightforward condition for moral rightness: an act is morally right in circumstance C only if under conditions of full rationality we would all want to perform that act. I will assume that this condition, if met, would make acts objectively right and therefore vindicate a robust form of metaethical realism. There remains the question, however, of whether this condition can be met. Smith considers several arguments that it cannot, and this paper will (...)
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  25. The logic of ethical cognitivism.Kyle Wallace - 1970 - Ethics 80 (4):313-318.
    The argument is that on moore's analysis of normative language, which is both nonnaturalistic and cognitivistic, one must adopt two distinct criteria of truth. and that any theory which fundamentally assumes two distinct and independent types of truth need not be committed to a logical dualism, that there are some sets of deductive rules homomorphic to the rules of propositional logic which validate certain arguments the premises of which may be true in different ways, and that a system having these (...)
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  26. Supposition and truth in ockham's mental language.Mikko Yrjönsuuri - 1997 - Topoi 16 (1):15-25.
    In this paper, Ockham's theory of an ideal language of thought is used to illuminate problems of interpretation of his theory of truth. The twentieth century idea of logical form is used for finding out what kinds of atomic sentences there are in OckhamÕs mental language. It turns out that not only the theory of modes of supposition, but also the theory of supposition in general is insufficient as a full theory of truth. Rather, the theory of supposition is a (...)
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  27. Objectivism and mr. Hare's language of morals.Sidney Zink - 1957 - Mind 66 (261):79-87.
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Moral Emotivism and Sentimentalism
  1. Origins of Moral Relevance: The Psychology of Moral Judgment, and its Normative and Metaethical Significance.Benjamin Huppert - 2015 - Dissertation, Universität Bayreuth
    This dissertation examines the psychology of moral judgment and its implications for normative ethics and metaethics. Recent empirical findings in moral psychology, such as the impact of emotions, intuitions, and situational factors on moral judgments, have sparked a debate about whether ordinary moral judgments are systematically error-prone. Some philosophers, such as Peter Singer and Joshua Greene, argue that these findings challenge the reliability of moral intuitions and support more "reasoned", consequentialist approaches over deontological ones. The first part of the dissertation (...)
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  2. The Heart of an AI: Agency, Moral Sense, and Friendship.Evandro Barbosa & Thaís Alves Costa - 2024 - Unisinos Journal of Philosophy 25 (1):01-16.
    The article presents an analysis centered on the emotional lapses of artificial intelligence (AI) and the influence of these lapses on two critical aspects. Firstly, the article explores the ontological impact of emotional lapses, elucidating how they hinder AI’s capacity to develop a moral sense. The absence of a moral emotion, such as sympathy, creates a barrier for machines to grasp and ethically respond to specific situations. This raises fundamental questions about machines’ ability to act as moral agents in the (...)
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  3. Dudgeon, William (1705/6–1743), freethinker and philosopher.Paul Russell - 2004 - In Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. Oxford: Oxford Univerrsity Press.
    Dudgeon, William (1705/6–1743), freethinker and philosopher, is of unknown origins. A tenant farmer who resided at Lennel Hill Farm, near Coldstream, Berwickshire, he was one of several philosophers active in the borders area of Scotland during this period. Other figures in this group include Andrew Baxter, Henry Home (Lord Kames), and most importantly David Hume.....
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  4. Considerations for Effective Use of Moral Exemplars in Education: Based on the Self-Determination Theory and Data Syntheses.Hyemin Han & Marja Graham - forthcoming - Theory and Research in Education.
    The present study aimed to examine how to improve the effectiveness of moral exemplar-applied interventions based on the pillars of the Self-Determination Theory (SDT) framework, autonomy, competence, and relatedness. Past research has mainly focused on the relatedness and attainability of moral exemplars for predicting motivation outcomes. The data for this study consisted of synthesized data sets from previous studies examining the motivational impacts of distinct moral exemplars and intervention methods. The main syntheses for these data sets used Multilevel Modeling (MLM) (...)
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  5. Los sentimientos ante la (nada terrible) muerte en la filosofía estoica.F. Miguel Ortiz Delgado - 2018 - Stoa 9 (17):7-25.
    En el presente art´ıculo exploramos la carencia de valor que tiene la muerte, el cese de la vida de una persona, para la filosof ´ıa estoica, que con-sidera a aquella como uno de los factores indiferentes o adi´aphora (“no prefe-ribles”) para la felicidad humana. La idea del “temor hacia la muerte”, comoun sentimiento incorrecto, repercuti´o en la pol´ıtica cotidiana de la Roma im-perial; seg´un concluimos, esta circunstancia demuestra el car´acter pragm´aticoy terap´eutico de la Stoa, escuela que siempre busc´o eliminar tal (...)
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  6. Collective Agents as Moral Actors.Säde Hormio - forthcoming - In Säde Hormio & Bill Wringe (eds.), Collective Responsibility: Perspectives on Political Philosophy from Social Ontology. Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality series, Springer.
    How should we make sense of praise and blame and other such reactions towards collective agents like governments, universities, or corporations? Collective agents can be appropriate targets for our moral feelings and judgements because they can maintain and express moral positions of their own. Moral agency requires being capable of recognising moral considerations and reasons. It also necessitates the ability to react reflexively to moral matters, i.e. to take into account new moral concerns when they arise. While members of a (...)
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  7. Do Emotions Represent Values and How Can We Tell?A. Grzankowski - manuscript
    Do emotions represent values? The dominant view in philosophy has it that they do. There is wide disagreement over the details, but this core commitment is common. But there is a new comer on scene: the attitude view. According to it, rather than representing value properties, there is a value-relevant way you represent the targets of emotion. For example, in feeling angry with someone you stand to them in the relation of representing-as-having-wronged-you. Although a recent view, it has quickly generated (...)
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  8. Do Moral Beliefs Motivate Action?Rodrigo Díaz - 2023 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 26 (3):377-395.
    Do moral beliefs motivate action? To answer this question, extant arguments have considered hypothetical cases of association (dissociation) between agents’ moral beliefs and actions. In this paper, I argue that this approach can be improved by studying people’s actual moral beliefs and actions using empirical research methods. I present three new studies showing that, when the stakes are high, associations between participants’ moral beliefs and actions are actually explained by co-occurring but independent moral emotions. These findings suggest that moral beliefs (...)
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  9. “Emotion and the Ethical A Priori”.Tanner Hammond - 2023 - Phänomenologische Forschungen.
  10. On the Self‐Undermining Functionality Critique of Morality.Matthieu Queloz - 2023 - European Journal of Philosophy 31 (2):501-508.
    Nietzsche’s injunction to examine “the value of values” can be heard in a pragmatic key, as inviting us to consider not whether certain values are true, but what they do for us. This oddly neglected pragmatic approach to Nietzsche now receives authoritative support from Bernard Reginster’s new book, which offers a compelling and notably cohesive interpretation of Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morality. In this essay, I reconstruct Reginster's account of Nietzsche’s critique of morality as a “self-undermining functionality critique” and (...)
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  11. Desire, imagination, and the perceptual analogy.Kael McCormack - 2023 - Philosophical Explorations 26 (2):234-253.
    According to the guise of the good, a desire for P represents P as good in some respect. ‘Perceptualism’ further claims that desires involve an awareness of value analogous to perception. Perceptualism explains why desires justify actions and how desires can end the regress of practical justification. However, perception paradigmatically represents the actual environment, while desires paradigmatically represent prospective states. An experience E is an awareness of O when the nature of E depends on the nature of O. How could (...)
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  12. El tiempo del ensueño. Memoria y duración en Rousseau.Pablo Pavesi - 2021 - Disputatio. Philosophical Research Bulletin 10 (16):47-75.
    The time of the Reverie. Memory and duration in Rousseau There are three modes adopted by the temporal succession to which we are subjected: succession of desires, succession of identities and succession of instants. But happiness is a permanent state; therefore, it is not a state that corresponds to man. We propose that succession is the horizon from which Rousseau thinks about the possibility of happiness that, being discontinuous and brief, can achieve a permanence that results from another experience of (...)
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  13. The role of emotional awareness in evaluative judgment: evidence from alexithymia.Rodrigo Díaz & Jesse Prinz - 2023 - Scientific Reports 13 (5183).
    Evaluative judgments imply positive or negative regard. But there are different ways in which something can be positive or negative. How do we tell them apart? According to Evaluative Sentimentalism, different evaluations (e.g., dangerousness vs. offensiveness) are grounded on different emotions (e.g., fear vs. anger). If this is the case, evaluation differentiation requires emotional awareness. Here, we test this hypothesis by looking at alexithymia, a deficit in emotional awareness consisting of problems identifying, describing, and thinking about emotions. The results of (...)
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  14. Hassen: Warum es so schwierig ist, damit aufzuhören.Íngrid Vendrell-Ferran - 2023 - In Konrad Paul Liessmann (ed.), Der Hass. Anatomie eines elementaren Gefühls. Zsolnay. pp. 94 - 112.
    In meinem Aufsatz möchte ich die Frage danach behandeln, warum es so schwierig ist, mit dem Hassen aufzuhören. Um diese Frage zu beantworten, werde ich zunächst auf die Struktur des Hasses eingehen: Ich werde für die These plädieren, dass der Hass als eine Gesinnung zu verstehen ist, die aus einem Prozess der Sedimentierung feinlicher Gefühle entsteht. Der Hass hat eine Geschichte. Diese Geschichte werde ich mich danach widmen, um die Hartnäckigkeit und Beharrung des Hasses besser zu verstehen. Denn seine Geschichte (...)
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  15. Sentimento religioso e struttura confessionale nella Russia pre-sovietica.Angela Dioletta - 2014 - In Stefano Caroti & Alberto Siclari (eds.), Filosofia e religione. Studi in onore di Fabio Rossi. Parma: E-theca OnLineOpenAccess Edizioni. pp. 290-329.
    In Russia, on the eve of the Revolution, the religious phenomenon was analyzed by scholars in specific works and in public discussions in its various aspects: historical, political, social, institutional. Of particular interest is the attempt to bring it back to an original expression of emotional consciousness, which marks a continuity with the Sentimentalism of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. This cultural current attempted to grasp a more certain truth in the immediacy of sentiment than in demonstrative reason, (...)
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  16. Against and for Ethical Naturalism Or: How Not To "Naturalize" Ethics.Berit Brogaard & Michael Slote - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (4):327-352.
    Moral realism and ethical naturalism are both highly attractive ethical positions but historically they have often been thought to be irreconcilable. Since the late 1980s defenders of Cornell Realism have argued that the two positions can consistently be combined. They make three constitutive claims: (i) Moral properties are natural kind properties that (ii) are identical to (or supervene) on descriptive functional properties, which (iii) causally regulate our use of moral terms. We offer new arguments against the feasibility of Cornell realism (...)
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  17. Is Morality Subjective?Leslie Allan - manuscript
    Subjectivists claim that the absence of a theological or metaphysical grounding to moral judgements renders them all as simply statements about our subjective wants and preferences. Leslie Allan argues that the subjectivists' case rests on a misunderstanding of the nature of moral objectivity. He presents the view that subjectivists mistakenly counterpoise the ideal of moral objectivity with the expression of individual preferences. Being objective in moral deliberation, Allan argues, should be regarded instead as the antithesis of parochial and biased reasoning. (...)
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  18. Moral judgment and the content-attitude distinction.Uriah Kriegel - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (4):1135-1152.
    Let cognitivism be the view that moral judgments are cognitive mental states and noncognitivism the view that they are noncognitive mental states. Here I argue for moral judgment pluralism: some moral judgments are cognitive states and some are noncognitive states. More specifically, according to my pluralism some judgments are moral because they carry a moral content (e.g., that genocide is wrong) and some are moral because they employ a moral attitude (e.g., indignation, or guilt); the former are the cognitive moral (...)
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  19. Are psychopaths moral‐psychologically impaired? Reassessing emotion‐theoretical explanations.Rasmus Rosenberg Larsen - 2022 - Mind and Language 37 (2):177-193.
    Psychopathy has been theorized as a disorder of emotion, which impairs moral judgments. However, these theories are increasingly being abandoned as empirical studies show that psychopaths seem to make proper moral judgments. In this contribution, these findings are reassessed, and it is argued that prevalent emotion‐theories of psychopathy appear to operate with the unjustified assumption that psychopaths have no emotions, which leads to the hypothesis that psychopaths are completely unable to make moral judgments. An alternative and novel explanation is proposed, (...)
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  20. Hume vs. Kant On the Nature of Morality.Irfan Ajvazi - 2022 - Tesla Academy 1:7.
    The moral debates continued to see good as merely that which gives happiness or pleasure. \"…it was assumed that what we ought to do is always a function of what it would be good to bring about: action can only be right because it produces good (J.B. Schneewind 'Modern Moral Philosophy'). It was the breaking away from this idea that was perhaps the most important aspect of the works of both Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) and David Hume (1711-1776). Hume's moral theory (...)
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  21. What Roles Do Emotions Play in Morality?Antti Kauppinen - 2024 - In Andrea Scarantino (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Emotion Theory. Routledge.
    This chapter offers an overview of four key debates about the roles of emotion in morality. First, many believe that emotions are an important psychological mechanism for explaining altruistic behavior and moral conscience in humans. Second, there is considerable debate about the causal role of affective reactions in moral judgment. Third, some philosophers have argued that emotions have a constitutive role in moral thought and even moral facts. Finally, philosophers disagree about whether affective influence undermines the justification of moral beliefs (...)
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  22. Thick and Perceptual Moral Beauty.Ryan P. Doran - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-18.
    Which traits are beautiful? And is their beauty perceptual? It is argued that moral virtues are partly beautiful to the extent that they tend to give rise to a certain emotion— ecstasy—and that compassion tends to be more beautiful than fair-mindedness because it tends to give rise to this emotion to a greater extent. It is then argued, on the basis that emotions are best thought of as a special, evaluative, kind of perception, that this argument suggests that moral virtues (...)
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  23. Which Attitudes for the Fitting Attitude Analysis of Value?Julien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni - 2021 - Theoria 87 (5):1099-1122.
    According to the fitting attitude (FA) analysis of value concepts, to conceive of an object as having a given value is to conceive of it as being such that a certain evaluative attitude taken towards it would be fitting. Among the challenges that this analysis has to face, two are especially pressing. The first is a psychological challenge: the FA analysis must call upon attitudes that shed light on our value concepts while not presupposing the mastery of these concepts. The (...)
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