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  1. Halfway Up To the Mathematical Infinity I: On the Ontological & Epistemic Sustainability of Georg Cantor’s Transfinite Design.Edward G. Belaga - manuscript
    Georg Cantor was the genuine discoverer of the Mathematical Infinity, and whatever he claimed, suggested, or even surmised should be taken seriously -- albeit not necessary at its face value. Because alongside his exquisite in beauty ordinal construction and his fundamental powerset description of the continuum, Cantor has also left to us his obsessive presumption that the universe of sets should be subjected to laws similar to those governing the set of natural numbers, including the universal principles of cardinal comparability (...)
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  2. The Residual Access Problem.Sharon Berry - manuscript
    A range of current truth-value realist philosophies of mathematics allow one to reduce the Benacerraf Problem to a problem concerning mathematicians' ability to recognize which conceptions of pure mathematical structures are coherent – in a sense which can be cashed out in terms of logical possibility. In this paper I will clarify what it takes to solve this `residual' access problem and then present a framework for solving it.
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  3. Thomistic Foundations for Moderate Realism about Mathematical Objects.Ryan Miller - forthcoming - In Proceedings of the Eleventh International Thomistic Congress. Rome: Urbaniana University Press.
    Contemporary philosophers of mathematics are deadlocked between two alternative ontologies for numbers: Platonism and nominalism. According to contemporary mathematical Platonism, numbers are real abstract objects, i.e. particulars which are nonetheless “wholly nonphysical, nonmental, nonspatial, nontemporal, and noncausal.” While this view does justice to intuitions about numbers and mathematical semantics, it leaves unclear how we could ever learn anything by mathematical inquiry. Mathematical nominalism, by contrast, holds that numbers do not exist extra-mentally, which raises difficulties about how mathematical statements could be (...)
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  4. Quantile regression model on how logical and rewarding is learning mathematics in the new normal.Leomarich Casinillo - 2024 - Palawan Scientist 16 (1):48-57.
    Learning mathematics through distance education can be challenging, with the “logical” and “rewarding” nature proving difficult to measure. This article aimed to articulate an argument explaining the “logical” and “rewarding” nature of online mathematics learning, elucidating their causal factors. Existing data from the literature that involving students at Visayas State University, Philippines, were utilized in this study. The study used statistical measures to capture descriptions from the data, and quantile regression analysis was employed to forecast the predictors of the logicality (...)
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  5. Mathematics and Metaphilosophy.Justin Clarke-Doane - 2022 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    This book discusses the problem of mathematical knowledge, and its broader philosophical ramifications. It argues that the challenge to explain the (defeasible) justification of our mathematical beliefs (‘the justificatory challenge’), arises insofar as disagreement over axioms bottoms out in disagreement over intuitions. And it argues that the challenge to explain their reliability (‘the reliability challenge’), arises to the extent that we could have easily had different beliefs. The book shows that mathematical facts are not, in general, empirically accessible, contra Quine, (...)
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  6. Mary Shepherd on the role of proofs in our knowledge of first principles.M. Folescu - 2022 - Noûs 56 (2):473-493.
    This paper examines the role of reason in Shepherd's account of acquiring knowledge of the external world via first principles. Reason is important, but does not have a foundational role. Certain principles enable us to draw the required inferences for acquiring knowledge of the external world. These principles are basic, foundational and, more importantly, self‐evident and thus justified in other ways than by demonstration. Justificatory demonstrations of these principles are neither required, nor possible. By drawing on textual and contextual evidence, (...)
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  7. Not so distinctively mathematical explanations: topology and dynamical systems.Aditya Jha, Douglas Campbell, Clemency Montelle & Phillip L. Wilson - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-40.
    So-called ‘distinctively mathematical explanations’ (DMEs) are said to explain physical phenomena, not in terms of contingent causal laws, but rather in terms of mathematical necessities that constrain the physical system in question. Lange argues that the existence of four or more equilibrium positions of any double pendulum has a DME. Here we refute both Lange’s claim itself and a strengthened and extended version of the claim that would pertain to any n-tuple pendulum system on the ground that such explanations are (...)
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  8. Coincidence Avoidance and Formulating the Access Problem.Sharon Berry - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (6):687-701.
    In this article, I discuss a trivialization worry for Hartry Field’s official formulation of the access problem for mathematical realists, which was pointed out by Øystein Linnebo. I argue that various attempted reformulations of the Benacerraf problem fail to block trivialization, but that access worriers can better defend themselves by sticking closer to Hartry Field’s initial informal characterization of the access problem in terms of general epistemic norms of coincidence avoidance.
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  9. Benacerraf, Field, and the agreement of mathematicians.Eileen S. Nutting - 2020 - Synthese 197 (5):2095-2110.
    Hartry Field’s epistemological challenge to the mathematical platonist is often cast as an improvement on Paul Benacerraf’s original epistemological challenge. I disagree. While Field’s challenge is more difficult for the platonist to address than Benacerraf’s, I argue that this is because Field’s version is a special case of what I call the ‘sociological challenge’. The sociological challenge applies equally to platonists and fictionalists, and addressing it requires a serious examination of mathematical practice. I argue that the non-sociological part of Field’s (...)
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  10. Deflationary Nominalism and Puzzle Avoidance.David Mark Kovacs - 2019 - Philosophia Mathematica 27 (1):88-104.
    In a series of works, Jody Azzouni has defended deflationary nominalism, the view that certain sentences quantifying over mathematical objects are literally true, although such objects do not exist. One alleged attraction of this view is that it avoids various philosophical puzzles about mathematical objects. I argue that this thought is misguided. I first develop an ontologically neutral counterpart of Field’s reliability challenge and argue that deflationary nominalism offers no distinctive answer to it. I then show how this reasoning generalizes (...)
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  11. Rejecting Mathematical Realism while Accepting Interactive Realism.Seungbae Park - 2018 - Analysis and Metaphysics 17:7-21.
    Indispensablists contend that accepting scientific realism while rejecting mathematical realism involves a double standard. I refute this contention by developing an enhanced version of scientific realism, which I call interactive realism. It holds that interactively successful theories are typically approximately true, and that the interactive unobservable entities posited by them are likely to exist. It is immune to the pessimistic induction while mathematical realism is susceptible to it.
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  12. What is the Benacerraf Problem?Justin Clarke-Doane - 2017 - In Fabrice Pataut Jody Azzouni, Paul Benacerraf Justin Clarke-Doane, Jacques Dubucs Sébastien Gandon, Brice Halimi Jon Perez Laraudogoitia, Mary Leng Ana Leon-Mejia, Antonio Leon-Sanchez Marco Panza, Fabrice Pataut Philippe de Rouilhan & Andrea Sereni Stuart Shapiro (eds.), New Perspectives on the Philosophy of Paul Benacerraf: Truth, Objects, Infinity (Fabrice Pataut, Editor). Springer.
    In "Mathematical Truth", Paul Benacerraf articulated an epistemological problem for mathematical realism. His formulation of the problem relied on a causal theory of knowledge which is now widely rejected. But it is generally agreed that Benacerraf was onto a genuine problem for mathematical realism nevertheless. Hartry Field describes it as the problem of explaining the reliability of our mathematical beliefs, realistically construed. In this paper, I argue that the Benacerraf Problem cannot be made out. There simply is no intelligible problem (...)
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  13. Debunking Arguments: Mathematics, Logic, and Modal Security.Justin Clarke-Doane - 2017 - In Michael Ruse & Robert J. Richards (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Evolutionary Ethics. New York: Cambridge University Press.
    I discuss the structure of genealogical debunking arguments. I argue that they undermine our mathematical beliefs if they undermine our moral beliefs. The contrary appearance stems from a confusion of arithmetic truths with (first-order) logical truths, or from a confusion of reliability with justification. I conclude with a discussion of the cogency of debunking arguments, in light of the above. Their cogency depends on whether information can undermine all of our beliefs of a kind, F, without giving us direct reason (...)
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  14. Autonomy Platonism and the Indispensability Argument. By Russell Marcus. Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2015. Pp. xii + 247. [REVIEW]Nicholas Danne - 2017 - Metaphilosophy 48 (4):591-594.
  15. Review of Leibowtiz and Sinclair (eds.) Explanation in Ethics and Mathematics: Debunking and Dispensability. [REVIEW]Karl Schafer - 2017 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2017.
  16. Debunking and Dispensability.Justin Clarke-Doane - 2016 - In Uri D. Leibowitz & Neil Sinclair (eds.), Explanation in Ethics and Mathematics: Debunking and Dispensability. Oxford University Press.
    In his précis of a recent book, Richard Joyce writes, “My contention…is that…any epistemological benefit-of-the-doubt that might have been extended to moral beliefs…will be neutralized by the availability of an empirically confirmed moral genealogy that nowhere…presupposes their truth.” Such reasoning – falling under the heading “Genealogical Debunking Arguments” – is now commonplace. But how might “the availability of an empirically confirmed moral genealogy that nowhere… presupposes” the truth of our moral beliefs “neutralize” whatever “epistemological benefit-of-the-doubt that might have been extended (...)
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  17. To bridge Gödel’s gap.Eileen S. Nutting - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (8):2133-2150.
    In “Mathematical Truth,” Paul Benacerraf raises an epistemic challenge for mathematical platonists. In this paper, I examine the assumptions that motivate Benacerraf’s original challenge, and use them to construct a new causal challenge for the epistemology of mathematics. This new challenge, which I call ‘Gödel’s Gap’, appeals to intuitive insights into mathematical knowledge. Though it is a causal challenge, it does not rely on any obviously objectionable constraints on knowledge. As a result, it is more compelling than the original challenge. (...)
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  18. The Modal Status of Contextually A Priori Arithmetical Truths.Markus Pantsar - 2016 - In Francesca Boccuni & Andrea Sereni (eds.), Objectivity, Realism, and Proof. FilMat Studies in the Philosophy of Mathematics. Cham, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing. pp. 67-79.
    In Pantsar (2014), an outline for an empirically feasible epistemological theory of arithmetic is presented. According to that theory, arithmetical knowledge is based on biological primitives but in the resulting empirical context develops an essentially a priori character. Such contextual a priori theory of arithmetical knowledge can explain two of the three characteristics that are usually associated with mathematical knowledge: that it appears to be a priori and objective. In this paper it is argued that it can also explain the (...)
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  19. Justification and Explanation in Mathematics and Morality.Justin Clarke-Doane - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 10.
    In his influential book, The Nature of Morality, Gilbert Harman writes: “In explaining the observations that support a physical theory, scientists typically appeal to mathematical principles. On the other hand, one never seems to need to appeal in this way to moral principles.” What is the epistemological relevance of this contrast, if genuine? This chapter argues that ethicists and philosophers of mathematics have misunderstood it. They have confused what the chapter calls the justificatory challenge for realism about an area, D—the (...)
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  20. Morality and Mathematics: The Evolutionary Challenge.Justin Clarke-Doane - 2012 - Ethics 122 (2):313-340.
    It is commonly suggested that evolutionary considerations generate an epistemological challenge for moral realism. At first approximation, the challenge for the moral realist is to explain our having many true moral beliefs, given that those beliefs are the products of evolutionary forces that would be indifferent to the moral truth. An important question surrounding this challenge is the extent to which it generalizes. In particular, it is of interest whether the Evolutionary Challenge for moral realism is equally a challenge for (...)
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  21. Moral Epistemology: The Mathematics Analogy.Justin Clarke-Doane - 2012 - Noûs 48 (2):238-255.
    There is a long tradition comparing moral knowledge to mathematical knowledge. In this paper, I discuss apparent similarities and differences between knowledge in the two areas, realistically conceived. I argue that many of these are only apparent, while others are less philosophically significant than might be thought. The picture that emerges is surprising. There are definitely differences between epistemological arguments in the two areas. However, these differences, if anything, increase the plausibility of moral realism as compared to mathematical realism. It (...)
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  22. On Field’s Epistemological Argument Against Platonism.Ivan Kasa - 2010 - Studia Logica 96 (2):141-147.
    Hartry Field's formulation of an epistemological argument against platonism is only valid if knowledge is constrained by a causal clause. Contrary to recent claims (e.g. in Liggins (2006), Liggins (2010)), Field's argument therefore fails the very same criterion usually taken to discredit Benacerraf's earlier version.
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  23. Epistemological objections to platonism.David Liggins - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (1):67-77.
    Many philosophers posit abstract entities – where something is abstract if it is acausal and lacks spatio-temporal location. Theories, types, characteristics, meanings, values and responsibilities are all good candidates for abstractness. Such things raise an epistemological puzzle: if they are abstract, then how can we have any epistemic access to how they are? If they are invisible, intangible and never make anything happen, then how can we ever discover anything about them? In this article, I critically examine epistemological objections to (...)
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  24. The Epistemology of Geometry I: the Problem of Exactness.Anne Newstead & Franklin James - 2010 - Proceedings of the Australasian Society for Cognitive Science 2009.
    We show how an epistemology informed by cognitive science promises to shed light on an ancient problem in the philosophy of mathematics: the problem of exactness. The problem of exactness arises because geometrical knowledge is thought to concern perfect geometrical forms, whereas the embodiment of such forms in the natural world may be imperfect. There thus arises an apparent mismatch between mathematical concepts and physical reality. We propose that the problem can be solved by emphasizing the ways in which the (...)
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  25. Uma Solução para o Problema de Benacerraf.Eduardo Castro - 2009 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 13 (1):7-28.
    The Benacerraf’s problem is a problem about how we can attain mathematical knowledge: mathematical entities are entities not located in space-time; we exist in spacetime; so, it does not seem that we could have a causal connection with mathematical entities in order to attain mathematical knowledge. In this paper, I propose a solution to the Benacerraf’s problem supported by the Quinean doctrines of naturalism, confirmational holism and postulation. I show that we have empirical knowledge of centres of mass and of (...)
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  26. Reliabilism, Intuition, and Mathematical Knowledge.Jennifer Wilson Mulnix - 2008 - Filozofia 62 (8):715-723.
    It is alleged that the causal inertness of abstract objects and the causal conditions of certain naturalized epistemologies precludes the possibility of mathematical know- ledge. This paper rejects this alleged incompatibility, while also maintaining that the objects of mathematical beliefs are abstract objects, by incorporating a naturalistically acceptable account of ‘rational intuition.’ On this view, rational intuition consists in a non-inferential belief-forming process where the entertaining of propositions or certain contemplations results in true beliefs. This view is free of any (...)
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  27. What mathematical knowledge could not be.Philip A. Ebert - 2007 - Aporia 1 (1):46-70.
    This is an introductory survey article to the philosophy of mathematics. I provide a detailed account of what Benacerraf’s problem is and then discuss in general terms four different approaches to ….
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  28. Mathematical Knowledge.Mary Leng, Alexander Paseau & Michael D. Potter (eds.) - 2007 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
    What is the nature of mathematical knowledge? Is it anything like scientific knowledge or is it sui generis? How do we acquire it? Should we believe what mathematicians themselves tell us about it? Are mathematical concepts innate or acquired? Eight new essays offer answers to these and many other questions.
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  29. What is the problem of mathematical knowledge?Michael Potter - 2007 - In Michael Potter, Mary Leng & Alexander Paseau (eds.), Mathematical Knowledge.
    Suggests that the recent emphasis on Benacerraf's access problem locates the peculiarity of mathematical knowledge in the wrong place. Instead we should focus on the sense in which mathematical concepts are or might be "armchair concepts" – concepts about which non-trivial knowledge is obtainable a priori.
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  30. Epistemological Challenges to Mathematical Platonism.Øystein Linnebo - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 129 (3):545-574.
    Since Benacerraf’s “Mathematical Truth” a number of epistemological challenges have been launched against mathematical platonism. I first argue that these challenges fail because they unduely assimilate mathematics to empirical science. Then I develop an improved challenge which is immune to this criticism. Very roughly, what I demand is an account of how people’s mathematical beliefs are responsive to the truth of these beliefs. Finally I argue that if we employ a semantic truth-predicate rather than just a deflationary one, there surprisingly (...)
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  31. Some Recent Appeals to Mathematical Experience.Michael J. Shaffer - 2006 - Principia 10 (2):143-170.
    ome recent work by philosophers of mathematics has been aimed at showing that our knowledge of the existence of at least some mathematical objects and/or sets can be epistemically grounded by appealing to perceptual experience. The sensory capacity that they refer to in doing so is the ability to perceive numbers, mathematical properties and/or sets. The chief defense of this view as it applies to the perception of sets is found in Penelope Maddy’s Realism in Mathematics, but a number of (...)
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  32. Conjoining Mathematical Empiricism with Mathematical Realism: Maddy’s Account of Set Perception Revisited.Alex Levine - 2005 - Synthese 145 (3):425-448.
    Penelope Maddy's original solution to the dilemma posed by Benacerraf in his 'Mathematical Truth' was to reconcile mathematical empiricism with mathematical realism by arguing that we can perceive realistically construed sets. Though her hypothesis has attracted considerable critical attention, much of it, in my view, misses the point. In this paper I vigorously defend Maddy's account against published criticisms, not because I think it is true, but because these criticisms have functioned to obscure a more fundamental issue that is well (...)
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  33. Ontology, Modality, and Mathematics: Remarks on Chihara's Constructibility Theory.Stephen Puryear - 2000 - Dissertation, Texas a&M University
    Chihara seeks to avoid commitment to mathematical objects by replacing traditional assertions of the existence of mathematical objects with assertions about possibilities of constructing certain open-sentence tokens. I argue that Chihara's project can be defended against several important objections, but that it is no less epistemologically problematic than its platonistic competitors.
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  34. Reliability in mathematical physics.Michael Liston - 1993 - Philosophy of Science 60 (1):1-21.
    In this paper I argue three things: (1) that the interactionist view underlying Benacerraf's (1973) challenge to mathematical beliefs renders inexplicable the reliability of most of our beliefs in physics; (2) that examples from mathematical physics suggest that we should view reliability differently; and (3) that abstract mathematical considerations are indispensable to explanations of the reliability of our beliefs.
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  35. Mathematics, science and ontology.Thomas Tymoczko - 1991 - Synthese 88 (2):201 - 228.
    According to quasi-empiricism, mathematics is very like a branch of natural science. But if mathematics is like a branch of science, and science studies real objects, then mathematics should study real objects. Thus a quasi-empirical account of mathematics must answer the old epistemological question: How is knowledge of abstract objects possible? This paper attempts to show how it is possible.The second section examines the problem as it was posed by Benacerraf in Mathematical Truth and the next section presents a way (...)
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  36. Between Mathematics and Physics.Michael D. Resnik - 1990 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990:369 - 378.
    Nothing has been more central to philosophy of mathematics than the distinction between mathematical and physical objects. Yet consideration of quantum particles shows the inadequacy of the popular spacetime and causal characterizations of the distinction. It also raises problems for an assumption used recently by Field, Hellman and Horgan, namely, that the mathematical realm is metaphysically independent of the physical one.
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  37. Realism, Mathematics & Modality.Hartry H. Field - 1989 - New York, NY, USA: Blackwell.
  38. Testing the philosophy of mathematics in the history of mathematics.Eduard Glas - 1989 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 20 (1):115-131.
    Recent philosophical accounts of mathematics increasingly focus on the quasi-Empirical rather than the formal aspects of the field, The praxis of how mathematics is done rather than the idealized logical structure and foundations of the theory. The ultimate test of any philosophy of mathematics, However idealized, Is its ability to account adequately for the factual development of the subject in real time. As a text case, The works and views of felix klein (1849-1925) were studied. Major advances in mathematics turn (...)
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  39. Realism, Mathematics, and Modality.Hartry Field - 1988 - Philosophical Topics 16 (1):57-107.
  40. Benacerraf and mathematical truth.Richard Creath - 1980 - Philosophical Studies 37 (4):335 - 340.
  41. Mathematical truth.Paul Benacerraf - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (19):661-679.