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  1. Locke on perception.Michael Jacovides - forthcoming - In Matthew Stuart (ed.), A companion to Locke. Blackwell.
    Michael Jacovides For Locke, the first step in inquiring into perception should be reflection: “What Perception is, every one will know better by reflecting on what he does himself, when he sees, hears, feels, etc. or thinks, than by any discourse of mine” (2.9.2). As a second step, I say, we may learn from reading him. Locke’s use of the term ‘perception’ is somewhat broad. At one point, he tells us that “having Ideas and Perception” are “the same thing” (2.1.9). (...)
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  2. Locke on sense perception.Walter Ott - 2021 - In Jessica Gordon-Roth & Shelley Weinberg (eds.), The Lockean Mind. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 116-126.
    Much recent philosophy of perception is preoccupied with finding a place for phenomenal character in a physical world. By contrast, Locke’s philosophy of sensory perception is an episode in his ‘Historical, plain method’ and seeks to map out the processes by which we experience ordinary objects. On Locke’s account, our ideas of primary and secondary qualities enter the mind ‘simple and unmixed’; having an idea of a colour, for example, is not necessary for the visual experience of a shape. An (...)
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  3. Locke on the role of judgment in perception.Walter Ott - 2020 - European Journal of Philosophy 28 (3):670-684.
    How much is given in perceptual experience, and how much must be constructed? John Locke's answer to this question contains two prima facie incompatible strands. On the one hand, he claims that ideas of primary qualities come to us passively, through multiple senses: the idea of a sphere can be received either by sight or touch. On the other hand, Locke seemingly thinks that a faculty he calls “judgment” is needed to create visual ideas of three‐dimensional shapes. How can these (...)
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  4. Il paradosso della percezione.Paolo Spinicci - 2019 - Milano: Mimesis Edizioni.
    Che natura ha l'oggetto della percezione? E come dobbiamo pensare le proprietà che lo caratterizzano percettivamente? Sono questi i temi che vengono discussi in queste pagine che cercano di far luce sul concetto di percezione, riflettendo sulla filosofia di Locke, Berkeley, Reid e sulle diverse forme del realismo diretto.
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  5. Is Locke’s answer to Molyneux’s question inconsistent? Cross-modal recognition and the sight–recognition error.Anna Vaughn - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy:1-19.
    Molyneux’s question asks whether someone born blind, who could distinguish cubes from spheres using his tactile sensation, could recognize those objects if he received his sight. Locke says no: the newly sighted person would fail to point to the cube and call it a cube. Locke never provided a complete explanation for his negative response, and there are concerns of inconsistency with other important aspects of his theory of ideas. These charges of inconsistency rest upon an unrecognized and unfounded assumption (...)
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  6. The Idea of Power and Locke's Taxonomy of Ideas.Patrick J. Connolly - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (1):1-16.
    Locke's account of the idea of power is thought to be seriously problematic. Commentators allege that the idea of power causes problems for Locke's taxonomy of ideas, that it is defined circularly, and that, contrary to Locke's claims, it cannot be acquired in experience. This paper defends Locke's account. Previous commentators have assumed that there is only one idea of power. But close attention to Locke's text, combined with background features of his theory of ideas, supports the drawing of a (...)
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  7. On the view that we cannot perceive movement and change: Lessons from Locke and Reid.Christoph Hoerl - 2017 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 24 (3-4):88-102.
    According to the snapshot view of temporal experience, instances of movement and change cannot, strictly speaking, be objects of sensory perception. Perceptual consciousness instead consists of a succession of individual momentary experiences, none of which is itself an experience of movement or change. The snapshot view is often presented as an intuitively appealing view of the nature of temporal experience, even by philosophers who ultimately reject it. Yet, it is puzzling how this can be so, given that its central claim (...)
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  8. Locke's Image of the World.Michael Jacovides - 2017 - [Oxford, United Kingdom]: Oxford University Press.
    Michael Jacovides provides an engaging account of how the scientific revolution influenced one of the foremost figures of early modern philosophy, John Locke. By placing Locke's thought in its scientific, religious, and anti-scholastic contexts, Jacovides explains not only what Locke believes but also why he believes it.
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  9. Lockean Empathy.Colin Marshall - 2016 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 54 (1):87-106.
    This paper offers an epistemic defense of empathy, drawing on John Locke's theory of ideas. Locke held that ideas of shape, unlike ideas of color, had a distinctive value: resembling qualities in their objects. I argue that the same is true of empathy, as when someone is pained by someone's pain. This means that empathy has the same epistemic value or objectivity that Locke and other early modern philosophers assigned to veridical perceptions of shape. For this to hold, pain and (...)
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  10. The Knowledge-As-Perception Account of Knowledge.Thomas D. Senor - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Research 41 (9999):91-109.
    William Alston once argued that justification is not necessary for knowledge. He was convinced of this because he thought that, in cases of clear perception, one could come to know that P even if one’s justification for believing P was defeated. The idea is that the epistemic strength of clear perception is sufficient to provide knowledge even where justification is lacking; perceiving (and believing) that P is sufficient for knowing that P. In this paper, I explore a claim about knowledge (...)
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  11. Presenti a se stessi: la centralità della coscienza in Locke.Chiara Giuntini - 2015 - Firenze: Le lettere. Edited by Brunello Lotti & Lia Mannarino.
  12. The Speed of Thought. Experience of Change, Movement, and Time: A Lockean Account.Jiri Benovsky - 2012 - Locke Studies 12:85-110.
    This paper is about our experience of change and movement, and thus about our experience of time – at least under the reasonable assumption that we (can only) experience time by having experiences of change. This assumption is shared by Locke, whose view on temporal experience, expounded in Book II, Chap.14 of his Essay, will be the main focal point of my paper. Some of the most influential accounts of temporal experience embrace the notion of a "specious present" as an (...)
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  13. Locke and the Visual Array.Michael Jacovides - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (1):69-91.
    A.D. Smith opens his excellent paper, “Space and Sight,” by remarking, One of the most notable features of both philosophy and psychology throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is the almost universal denial that we are immediately aware through sight of objects arrayed in three-dimensional space. This was not merely a denial of Direct Realism, but a denial that truly visual objects are even phenomenally presented in depth (481). Times have changed. As Smith writes, “It is hard to think of (...)
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  14. Instrumental or Immersed Experience: Pleasure, Pain and Object Perception in Locke.Lisa Shapiro - 2010 - In CT Wolfe & O. Gal (eds.), The Body as Object and Instrument of Knowledge: Embodied Empiricism in Early Modern Science. Springer. pp. 265--285.
  15. Ideas, pictures, and the directness of perception in Descartes and Locke.Lex Newman - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 4 (1):134-154.
    How are we to understand philosophical claims about sense perception being direct versus indirect? There are multiple relevant notions of perceptual directness, so I argue. Perception of external objects may be direct on some notions, while indirect on others. My interest is with the sense in which ideas count as perceptual mediators in the philosophy of Descartes and Locke. This paper has two broader aims. The first is to clarify four main notions of perceptual directness. The second is to support (...)
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  16. Locke's theory of reflection.Kevin Scharp - 2008 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 16 (1):25 – 63.
    Those concerned with Locke’s Essay have largely ignored his account of reflection. I present and defend an interpretation of Locke’s theory of reflection on which reflection is not a variety of introspection; rather, for Locke, we acquire ideas of our mental operations indirectly. Furthermore, reflection is involuntary and distinct from consciousness. The interpretation I present also explains reflection’s role in the acquisition of non-sensory ideas (e.g., ideas of pleasure, existence, succession, etc.). I situate this reading within the secondary literature on (...)
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  17. Lockean operations.Matthew Stuart - 2008 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 16 (3):511 – 533.
  18. The Coherence of Consciousness in Locke's Essay.Shelley Weinberg - 2008 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 25 (1):21-40.
    Locke has been accused of failing to have a coherent understanding of consciousness, since it can be identical neither to reflection nor to ordinary perception without contradicting other important commitments. I argue that the account of consciousness is coherent once we see that, for Locke, perceptions of ideas are complex mental acts and that consciousness can be seen as a special kind of self-referential mental state internal to any perception of an idea.
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  19. Locke on Sensory Representation.Martha Brandt Bolton - 2004 - In Ralph Schumacher (ed.), Perception and Reality: From Descartes to the Present. Mentis.
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  20. Locke and the objects of perception.G. A. J. Rogers - 2004 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (3):245–254.
    It is common to assume that if Locke is to be regarded as a consistent epistemologist he must be read as holding that either ideas are the objects of perception or that (physical) objects are. He must either be a direct realist or a representationalist. But perhaps, paradoxical as it at first sounds, there is no reason to suppose that he could not hold both to be true. We see physical objects and when we do so we have ideas. We (...)
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  21. The irrelevance of resemblance for Lockian perception of bodies.Dan Yim - 2004 - Locke Studies 4:123-143.
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  22. Color, space, and figure in Locke: An interpretation of the Molyneux problem.Laura Berchielli - 2002 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 40 (1):47-65.
    Laura Berchielli - Color, Space and Figure in Locke: An Interpretation of the Molyneux Problem - Journal of the History of Philosophy 40:1 Journal of the History of Philosophy 40.1 47-65 Color, Space, and Figure in Locke: An Interpretation of the Molyneux Problem Laura Berchielli THIS IS HOW LOCKE, in the second edition of his Essay Concerning Human Understanding , introduces a question that had been suggested to him in a letter from William Molyneux: . . . I shall here (...)
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  23. The Empiricist Conception of Experience.Jennifer Nagel - 2000 - Philosophy 75 (293):345 - 376.
    One might think that a healthy respect for the deliverances of experience would require us to give up any claim to nontrivial a priori knowledge. One way it might not would be if the very admission of something as an episode of experience required the use of substantive a priori knowledge -- if there were certain a priori standards that a representation had to meet in order to count as an experience, rather than as, say, a memory or daydream. This (...)
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  24. Locke and Representative Perception.J. L. Mackie - 1998 - In Vere Chappell (ed.), Locke. Oxford University Press.
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  25. The disenchanted world and beyond: toward an ecological perspective on science.Michael Ben-Chaim - 1997 - History of the Human Sciences 10 (5):101-127.
    Positivism and, especially, Max Weber's vision of the modern disen chantment of the world are incoherent because they separate human culture from the environment in which human agents pursue their life- projects. The same problem is manifested, more blatantly, in current social studies of science, which take the project of disenchantment further by disenchanting science itself. A different image of science is traced to classical empiricism, whose paradigm of learning is belief and, more specifically, the practical nature of the believer's (...)
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  26. Locke's Criterion for the Reality of Ideas: Unambiguous but Untenable.Cornelis de Waal - 1997 - The Locke Newsletter 28:29-50.
    The paper argues against the claim held, e.g., by Leibniz, that Locke employs a double standard for determining whether an object before the mind (i.e., an idea) is real. Using Locke's ectype-archetype distinction it is shown that this charge is the result of confusing Locke's criterion of reality with its application. Depending on whether it applies to a simple, substance or mode idea, the criterion works out differently. Next it is argued that although Locke maintains only a single criterion, this (...)
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  27. Locke, Boyle, and the Percieving of Corpuscles.David F. Wolf Ii - 1997 - Southwest Philosophy Review 13 (2):43-56.
  28. A Lockean theory of memory experience.David Owens - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (2):319-32.
    The paper aims to provide an account of the phenomenological differences between perception, recognition and recall. In the first section, recall is distinguished from non-experiential forms of memory. In the second section, it is argued that we can't distinguish perceptual experience from the experience of recall by means of perception's present tense content because it is possible to perceive as well as to recall the past. The Lockean theory of recall as a revival of previous perceptual experience is then introduced, (...)
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  29. Locke and the Senses. Hall - 1995 - Locke Studies 26:13-28.
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  30. The Rhetoric of Empiricism. [REVIEW]Edwin Martin - 1995 - Review of Metaphysics 48 (4):908-909.
    The author takes empiricism to be "accused of privileging the visual over the discursive, the literal over the rhetorical, the static over the temporal, and totalizing explanations over dialectical processes." It is, he says, his "goal to unsettle these binary oppositions and to argue that at the heart of empiricism lies a sophisticated, dynamic, and dialectical account of the relationship between language and visual perceptions that [is] fruitful for literary study".
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  31. Locke and Sensory Experience--Another Look at Simple Ideas of Sensation.R. Hall - 1994 - Locke Studies 25:11.
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  32. Locke's Simple Ideas, The Blooming, Buzzing Confusion, and Quasi-Photographic Perception.T. Heyd - 1994 - Locke Studies 25.
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  33. A Reassessment of Locke's Theory of Cognition of the External World.Thomas Heyd - 1993 - Dissertation, The University of Western Ontario (Canada)
    Locke's Essay concerning Human Understanding has generally been read as primarily concerned with epistemology. In particular, it has been claimed that the Essay attempts to defeat epistemological skepticism, but fails in this enterprise because of the veiling character of Locke's ideas. By way of reexamination of the texts in question I show that epistemological skepticism is not the topic of the Essay, and that there is not sufficient reason to claim that Locke's account of knowledge leads to epistemological skepticism. I (...)
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  34. The rhetoric of empiricism: language and perception from Locke to I.A. Richards.Jules David Law - 1993 - Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
    Introduction EMPIRICISM DOES NOT stand in very high repute among literary theorists these days. Regarded generally as a discredited philosophical paradigm ...
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  35. Are corpuscles unobservable in principle for Locke?Lisa Jeanne Downing - 1992 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 30 (1):33-52.
  36. "Ideas" and "Objects": Locke on Perceiving "Things".Ian Tipton - 1992 - In Phillip D. Cummins & Guenter Zoeller (eds.), Minds, Ideas, and Objects: Essays in the Theory of Representation in Modern Philosophy. Ridgeview Publishing Company.
  37. John Locke on Reflection: A Phenomenology Lost.Douglas Rabb - 1988 - Philosophie Et Culture: Actes du XVIIe Congrès Mondial de Philosophie 4:79-84.
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  38. Locke on Ideas and the Intuition of the Self.Robert J. Roth - 1988 - International Philosophical Quarterly 28 (2):163-169.
  39. J. Douglas Rabb, John Locke On Reflection: A Phenomenology Lost. [REVIEW]P. Dwyer - 1986 - Philosophy in Review 6:242-244.
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  40. John Locke on reflection: a phenomenology lost.J. Douglas Rabb - 1985 - Washington, D.C.: University Press of America.
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  41. Locke’s Causal Theory of Reflection.Kaila Obstfeld - 1983 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 21 (1):47-55.
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  42. A Defense of Locke and The Representative Theory of Perception.Martha Brandt Bolton - 1978 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 8 (sup1):101-120.
    This paper is a defense of the “representative theory of perception” in general, and Locke's views about perception in particular. It is intended only as a limited defense, but one against those objections which recently have been taken thoroughly to discredit both the general theory and Locke's particular position. The chief of these objections is that the representative theory leads inevitably to skepticism about the existence of objective material things. George Pitcher finds this objection to the representative theory completely persuasive (...)
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  43. Perception and the external world: A historical and critical account.Athanasios P. Fotinis - 1974 - Philosophia 4 (2-3):433-448.
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  44. Locke on feeling another's pain.William R. Carter - 1972 - Philosophical Studies 23 (4):280-285.
  45. A Study of the Psychology of Cognition in John Locke's "Essay.".Peter John White - 1972 - Dissertation, York University (Canada)
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  46. Locke's Doctrine of Intuition Was Not Borrowed from Descartes.Thomas A. O'Kelley - 1971 - Philosophy 46 (176):148 - 151.
  47. Selective History Of Theories Of Visual Perception, 1650-1950.Nicholas Pastore - 1971 - New York: Oxford University Press.
  48. Materialism and the Concept of Motion in Locke's Theory of Sense-Idea Causation.P. J. White - 1971 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 2 (2):97.
  49. Locke's Doctrine of Representative Perception.Richard David Palmer - 1970 - Dissertation, The Ohio State University
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  50. Locke's Concept of Experience.John W. Yolton - 1968 - In C. B. Martin & David M. Armstrong (eds.), Locke and Berkeley. University of Notre Dame Press. pp. 40--52.
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