Summary |
Kant’s conception of judgment both marks a pivotal moment in
the development of logic and is at the center of his own philosophy. For Kant,
judgment is the discursive rational activity par excellence, and it is in part because of Kant’s influence that
subsequent philosophers, like Frege, have taken judgments to be the fundamental
units of semantic content. Kant’s conception of the distinction between
analytic and synthetic judgments has also had a continuing impact. Given how
influential Kant’s theory of judgment has continued to be for philosophy in
general, it is likely unsurprising that it is also at the crux of his own
thought. Broadly, Kant’s power of judgment splits into two parts. Reflecting
judgment finds the concept or universal for given particulars. Determining
judgment subsumes particulars under a given universal. As the paradigmatic
rational activity, judgment is involved in the formation of concepts through
the understanding, the making of inferences through reason, in judging
theoretically or practically, aesthetically or teleologically, and in relating
our immediate sensible representations of objects to concepts.
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