Conduct of War

Academics working on military ethics and serving military personnel rarely have opportunities to talk to each other in ways that can inform and illuminate their respective experiences and approaches to the ethics of war. The workshop from which this paper evolved was a rare opportunity to remedy this problem. Our conversations about First Lieutenant (1LT) Portis’s experiences in combat provided a unique chance to explore questions about the relationship between oversight, accountability, and the idea of moral risk in military operations. (...) In this paper, we outline a particular experience of 1LT Portis’s that formed the basis of our discussions, before elucidating the ethical issues this experience raised. In particular, we see 1LT Portis’s experience as, first, illustrative of the problem of moral risk – when military personnel are placed in situations of moral temptation. The problem of moral risk, we propose, is best understood through the framework of the military’s duty of care. Second, we see his experience as highlighting tensions within the dominant moralized warrior model of the military profession. What we call a toxic warrior identity — a distorted form of the moralized warrior identity — can negatively affect the attitudes of military personnel toward rules, policies, procedures, and accountability mechanisms, particularly in relation to non-combat related roles and duties and when leaders must choose between competing bureaucratic demands. We see 1LT Portis’s experience as illustrative of these tensions, yet his experiences also highlight important concerns about the impact of increasing bureaucratic demands on military functioning. In the conclusion, we address the need to balance concerns about toxic warrior identity with legitimate criticisms of overly demanding bureaucracy and suggest avenues for further research on this issue. (shrink)

In dit hoofdstuk presenteer ik de belangrijkste bevindingen en uitspraken uit mijn diepte-interviews met de respondenten. Ik geef hiermee antwoord op de deelvragen ‘Wat voor beeld wordt er gevormd in Nederlandse kranten over geweldpleging door de Staat in Nederlands-Indië?’, ‘Welk beeld in Nederlandse kranten is exemplarisch voor positieve of negatieve berichtgeving over geweldpleging door de Staat in Nederlands-Indië?’, ‘Wat zijn de belangrijkste reacties geweest van media, Staat of andere betrokkenen op de berichtgeving in kranten over Nederlandse oorlogsmisdaden in Indië?’ en (...) ‘Hoe kijken representatoren voor media, Staat, betrokkenen en/of nabestaanden zelf aan tegen de beeldvorming over de misdragingen in Nederlands-Indië?’ De vijf geïnterviewde experts hebben zich uiteraard uitgelaten over beeldvorming in Nederlandse kranten over verschillende perioden. Ik heb de paragrafen daar voor het gemak tevens chronologisch naar ingedeeld. (shrink)

In the current geopolitical environment, liberal democracies vie for influence and prosperity with autocratic governments, such as those of China and Russia. While the great powers do not shy away from using aggressive force, much of their rivalry today takes place below the threshold of armed conflict, in a conceptual and practical 'grey zone' between war and peace. Autocratic states operate in this grey zone to target the vulnerabilities of liberal democracies, creating hybrid threats that rely on instruments ranging from (...) economic, diplomatic, legal, and informational pressure all the way to military coercion. -/- Law plays a critical role in this context. In the ethically and legally ambiguous grey zone, international law serves as a normative, yet malleable, framework within which geopolitical rivals compete. State and non-State actors invoke the law as the source of authority, while simultaneously hoping to shape the international legal order in their own strategic interests. -/- Hybrid Threats and Grey Zone Conflict offers the first in-depth assessment of the legal and ethical aspects of hybrid threats and grey zone conflict. It explores the responses available to democratic nations for countering hybrid and grey zone threats whilst adhering to liberal democratic values and the rule of law. Bringing together diverse scholarly and practitioner perspectives, the volume introduces readers to the conceptual and practical difficulties arising in this area, the rich debates the topic has generated, and the challenges that countering hybrid threats and grey zone conflict poses for liberal democracies. (shrink)

I here consider the reasonableness of punishing future autonomous military robots. I argue that it is an engineering desideratum that these devices be responsive to moral considerations as well as human criticism and blame. Additionally, I argue that someday it will be possible to build such machines. I use these claims to respond to the no subject of punishment objection to deploying autonomous military robots, the worry being that an “accountability gap” could result if the robot committed a war crime. (...) (Sparrow 2007). But these robots will be blameworthy and morally responsible for their wrongful conduct. I then show that we have reasons to punish them based both on good effects and the impact on the robot, itself. (shrink)

Space warfare is warfare that takes place in outer space. It involves ground-to-space, space-to-ground, and space-to-space violence between nations or peoples. The violence can involve kinetic weapons, directed energy weapons, or electronic destruction. International law, specifically, the Outer Space Treaty and SALT I, currently bans weapons of mass destruction from being put into space, although one wonders if one country were to violate the ban whether others would follow suit. In this paper, I argue that that if there is a (...) non-consequentialist morality of space war, then one country can unjustly attack a second country’s space vehicles. This in turn depends on property rights. But there is no adequate theory of property rights with regard to space war. Hence, there is no non-consequentialist morality of a space war. (shrink)

A philosophical review of Beatrice Heuser's monography, War: A Genealogy of Western Ideas and Practices.

This chapter conceptually analyzes the post-traumatic stress injuries called moral injury, moral fatigue or exhaustion, and broken spirit. It then identifies two puzzles. First, soldiers sometimes sustain moral injury even from doing right actions. Second, they experience moral exhaustion from making decisions even where the morally right choice is so obvious that it shouldn’t be stressful to make it; and even where rightness of decision is so murky that no decision could be morally faulted. The injuries result of mistaken moral (...) self-evaluation. Methods of preventing and treating these injuries are defended, including training in self-forgiveness, moral off-loading of actions and decisions to persons and devices less likely to feel inappropriate guilt, and the use of drugs to prevent such guilt. The foregoing has been about moral injury erroneously resulting from the non-violation of a correct moral code. But the chapter then introduces the concept of moral pseudo-injury—felt moral injury that has in reality resulted from violation of a false moral code, so that no one has really been morally injured. This can be used as a method in warfighting. And since the injuries it produces are illusory, this would be morally superior to physical violence. For it causes less injury to its victims, and should cause less guilt in those who must inflict it. Historical precedents are considered. Finally, our enemies often use moral pseudo-injury against us, in the form of terrorist violence against civilians. Terrorism causes comparatively few harms, yet we mistakenly see it as more morally horrific than conventional combat that causes much worse loss of life among armed forces members. Here we need the nuancing and clarifying power of philosophy to restore a sense of proportion, thence to prevent or therapize the moral pseudo-injury we may experience from these sorts of attacks. (This is a pre-penultimate version of the published version, available from OUP at the external link, which contains minor variances. The paper was earlier known as "PTSD Weaponized: A Theory of Moral Injury"; that now superseded version is archived under "past conferences" on the Center for Ethics and the Rule of Law website.). (shrink)

In this chapter, we consider the plausibility and consequences of the use of the term “honest errors” to describe the accidental killings of civilians resulting from the US military’s drone campaigns in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. We argue that the narrative of “honest errors” unjustifiably excuses those involved in these killings from moral culpability, and reinforces long-standing, pernicious assumptions about the moral superiority of the US military and the inevitability of civilian deaths in combat. Furthermore, we maintain that, given (...) the knowledge-distorting practices within the US military’s organizational structure, few if any civilian deaths from drone strikes meet the criteria of a genuinely morally excusing “honest mistake”. Instead, these accidental killings often reflect objectionable attitudes of relative disregard for the safety of civilians. These attitudes are, we argue, sufficient to warrant the attribution of blame and moral responsibility, both with respect to certain individual actions and with respect to the US military as an institution. In light of this, we propose incorporating a Principle of the Moral Equality of Non-combatants into military assessments of what counts as “acceptable risk” to civilians. This would go some way, we argue, to redressing the ongoing injustice inflicted on the victims of civilian killings by the failure of the US military and US political leadership to take moral responsibility for unjustified civilian deaths. (shrink)

Proportionality matters. Intuitively, proportionality sets the ceiling on the amount of defensive violence that is permissible. A plausible view is that what justifies proportionality also justifies other defensive-violence requirements—for example, discrimination and necessity—and shows why other purported requirements are mistaken—for example, imminence. I argue that if defensive-violence proportionality is a part of moral reality, then there is a systematic justification of it. If there is a systematic justification of proportionality, then there is an adequate equation for it. There is no (...) adequate equation for proportionality. Hence, proportionality is not part of moral reality. As a result, non-consequentialism does not justify defensive violence. The last part of this paper briefly applies these findings to vaccine mandates. (shrink)

Recent decades have witnessed tremendous progress in artificial intelligence and in the development of autonomous systems that rely on artificial intelligence. Critics, however, have pointed to the difficulty of allocating responsibility for the actions of an autonomous system, especially when the autonomous system causes harm or damage. The highly autonomous behavior of such systems, for which neither the programmer, the manufacturer, nor the operator seems to be responsible, has been suspected to generate responsibility gaps. This has been the cause of (...) much concern. In this article, I propose a more optimistic view on artificial intelligence, raising two challenges for responsibility gap pessimists. First, proponents of responsibility gaps must say more about when responsibility gaps occur. Once we accept a difficult-to-reject plausibility constraint on the emergence of such gaps, it becomes apparent that the situations in which responsibility gaps occur are unclear. Second, assuming that responsibility gaps occur, more must be said about why we should be concerned about such gaps in the first place. I proceed by defusing what I take to be the two most important concerns about responsibility gaps, one relating to the consequences of responsibility gaps and the other relating to violations of jus in bello. (shrink)

Please contact me at [email protected] if you are interested in reading a particular chapter or being sent the entire manuscript for private use. -/- The thesis offers a comprehensive argument in favor of a regulationist approach to autonomous weapon systems (AWS). AWS, defined as all military robots capable of selecting or engaging targets without direct human involvement, are an emerging and potentially deeply transformative military technology subject to very substantial ethical controversy. AWS have both their enthusiasts and their detractors, prominently (...) advocating for a global preemptive ban on AWS development and use. Rejecting both positions, the author outlines a middle-of-the-road regulationist approach that is neither overly restrictive nor overly permissive. The disqualifying flaws of the rival prohibitionist approach are demonstrated in the process. After defining the core term of autonomy in weapon systems, the practical difficulties involved in applying an arms control regime to AWS are analyzed. The analysis shows that AWS are an extremely regulation-resistant technology. This feature when combined with their assumed high military utility makes a ban framework extremely costly to impose and enforce. As such it is ultimately very likely to fail at the benefit of the most unscrupulous international actors and at a very substantial risk to those abiding with international law. Consequently, to be ethically viable, a prohibitionist framework would need to offer substantial moral benefits impossible to attain through the rival regulationist approach. The remainder of the thesis undertakes to demonstrate that this is not the case. Comparing the considerations of military and strategic necessity to humanitarian concerns most commonly voiced by prohibitionists requires finding a common denominator for all values being referred to. Consequently, the thesis proceeds to show that both kinds of concerns are ultimately reducible to respect for basic human rights of all stakeholders, and so that the prohibitionist and regulationist approach may ultimately be compared in terms of consequences their adoption would generate for basic human rights realization. The author then evaluates both the potential humanitarian benefits, and the potential humanitarian hazards of AWS introduction. The benefits of leaving frontline combat to machines are outlined, with the unique kinds of suffering that would be abolished by such a development being described in detail. The arguments against AWS adoption are then divided into three classes: arguments related to alleged impossibility of compliance with The Laws of Armed Conflict, non-consequentialist and broad consequentialist arguments. This analysis, which comprises the greater part of the entire thesis, shows that the concerns behind compliance arguments are indeed substantial and have to be accommodated via a complex framework of best practices, regulations and localized restrictions on some kinds of AWS or AWS use in particular environments. They do not, however, justify a universal ban on using all the diverse forms of AWS in all environments. Non-consequentialist objections are found either reducible to other classes of arguments or thoroughly unconvincing, sometimes to the point of being actually vacuous. Broad consequentialist concerns are likewise found to be accommodable by regulation, empirically unfounded or causally disconnected from the actions of legitimate actors acquiring AWS, and therefore irrelevant to the moral permissibility of such actions. The author concludes that the proponents of prohibitionism are unable to point to moral benefits substantial enough to justify the costs and risks inherent in the approach. A global ban is, in fact, likely to have a worse humanitarian impact that well-regulated AWS adoption even if the strategic risks are disregarded. On the other hand, the analysis shows that there indeed exists an urgent need to regulate AWS through a variety of technological, procedural and legal solutions. These include, but are not limited to, a temporary moratorium on anti-personnel AWS use, development of internationally verified compliance software and eventual legal requirement of its employment, a temporary moratorium on AWS proliferation to state actors and a ban on their proliferation to non-state agents. (shrink)

The 2016-17 Iraqi offensive that recaptured the city of Mosul from the Islamic State have demonstrated the inability of contemporary armed forces to retake urban areas from a determined and ruthless enemy without either suffering debilitating casualties or causing thousands of civilian deaths and virtually destroying the city itself. The enemy’s willingness to refuse civilian evacuation via a humanitarian corridor and effectively take the inhabitants hostage is all it takes to impose this tragic dilemma on an attacking force. The civilian (...) death toll of the battle of Mosul alone is estimated to have reached between seven and forty thousand, with almost one million people internally displaced and large portions of the city levelled. Avoiding another such tragedy should be a priority for all practitioners and theorists of urban warfare. Indeed, confronting and defeating this challenge may be the most important task for ethics, theory and practice of urban combat in the coming decade. I argue that the only viable way of escaping the hostage siege dilemma consists of incorporating large numbers of unmanned and autonomous weapon systems into the blue force structure and using these to substitute for artillery and aerial fires presently being used to overpower defenders. While other measures may be used to marginally improve the outcome of hostage city assaults, only the automatization of the assault can dramatically change the calculus and in result either discourage rogue actors from creating hostage city dilemmas or defeat them decisively while suffering unequivocally proportional casualties. I proceed as follows: first, I provide an account of the 2016-17 Coalition assault on Mosul, giving special attention to the events and features relevant to the hostage city dilemma. I then use this case study to introduce the theoretical concept of the hostile city and the ethical dilemma it creates, discussing possible objections and making the case that the circumstances of the Battle of Mosul are bound to repeatedly transpire in the future. This generates a duty to find a way out of the hostage city dilemma. I argue that widespread use of unmanned and autonomous weapon platforms constitutes a viable way of assaulting hostage cities in a manner that assures respect for the ius in bello principles, proposing several ways in which such weapons may be designed and used to drastically limit both military and civilian casualties. Concluding that it may be not only permissible but morally required to employ autonomous weapons in the hostage city scenario, I briefly discuss the implications of this conclusion for a wider debate concerning the moral feasibility of autonomous weapons. (shrink)

In Ethics, Security, and the War-Machine, Ned Dobos highlights several negative consequences the preparation for war has for individuals and states. But he misses what I consider perhaps the most significant consequence of military mobilization for states, especially democracies: how war and the preparation for it affect deliberative politics. While many argue that all states, including democracies, require strong militaries—and there is some evidence that long wars can build democracies and states—I focus on the other effects of militarization and war (...) on democratic states. War and militarism are antipodal to democracy and undermine it. Their normative bases are conflicting—democracy takes force off the table, whereas force is legitimate in war. Thus, while militarism and militarization can sometimes yield liberalization and the expansion of civil rights, they are arguably more likely to undermine democratic norms and practices. (shrink)

Autonomous and automatic weapons would be fire and forget: you activate them, and they decide who, when and how to kill; or they kill at a later time a target you’ve selected earlier. Some argue that this sort of killing is always wrong. If killing is to be done, it should be done only under direct human control. (E.g., Mary Ellen O’Connell, Peter Asaro, Christof Heyns.) I argue that there are surprisingly many kinds of situation where this is false and (...) where the use of Automated Weapons Systems would in fact be morally required. These include cases where a) once one has activated a weapon expected then to behave lethally, it would be appropriate to let it continue because this is part of a plan whose goodness one was best positioned to evaluate before activating the weapon; b) one expects better long-term consequences from allowing it to continue; c) allowing it to continue would express a decision you made to be resolute, a decision that could not have advantaged you had it not been true that you would carry through with it; d) the weapon is mechanically not recallable, so that, to not allow it to carry through, you would have had to refrain from activating it in the first place, something you expected would have disastrous consequences; e) you must deputize necessary killings to autonomous machines in order to protect yourself from guilt you shouldn’t have to bear; f) it would be morally better for the burden of responsibility for the killing to be shared among several agents, and the agents deputizing killing to machines can do this, especially where it’s not predictable which machine will be successful; g) a killing would be morally better done with elements of randomness and lack of deliberation, and a (relatively stupid) machine could do this where a person could not; h) the machine would be acting as a Doomsday Device, so that it could not have had its hoped for deterrent effect had you not ensured that you would be unable to recall it if enemy action activated it; i) letting it carry through is a necessary part of its own learning process, and you expect that this learning will have salutary effects later on; j) human intervention in the machine’s operation would disastrously impair its precision, or its speed and efficiency; k) using non-automated methods would require human resources you just don’t have in a task that nevertheless must be done (e.g., using land-mines to protect remote installations); l) the weapon has such horrible and indiscriminate power that it is doubtful whether it could be actually used in ways compatible with International Humanitarian Law and the Laws of War, which require that weapons be used only in ways respecting distinctness, necessity and proportionality, but its threat of use could respect these principles in affording deterrence provided human error cannot lead to their accidental deployment, this requiring that they be controlled by carefully designed autonomous and automatic systems. I then consider objections based on conceptions of human dignity and find that very often dignity too is best served by autonomous machine killing. Examples include saving your village by activating a robot to kill invading enemies who would inflict great indignity on your village, using a suicide robot to save yourself from a less dignified death at enemy hands, using a robotic drone to kill someone otherwise not accessible in order to restore dignity to someone this person killed and to his family, and using a robot to kill someone who needs killing, but the killing of whom by a human executioner would soil the executioner’s dignity. I conclude that what matters in rightful killing isn’t necessarily that it be under the direct control of a human, but that it be under the control of morality; and that could sometimes require use of an autonomous or automated device. (This paper was formerly called "Fire and Forget: A Defense of the Use of Autonomous Weapons in War" on Philpapers; the current title is the title of the published version.). (shrink)

Academics working on military ethics and serving military personnel rarely have opportunities to talk to each other in ways that can inform and illuminate their respective experiences and approaches to the ethics of war. The workshop from which this paper evolved was a rare opportunity to remedy this problem. Our conversations about First Lieutenant (1LT) Portis’s experiences in combat provided a unique chance to explore questions about the relationship between oversight, accountability, and the idea of moral risk in military operations. (...) In this paper, we outline a particular experience of 1LT Portis’s that formed the basis of our discussions, before elucidating the ethical issues this experience raised. In particular, we see 1LT Portis’s experience as, first, illustrative of the problem of moral risk – when military personnel are placed in situations of moral temptation. The problem of moral risk, we propose, is best understood through the framework of the military’s duty of care. Second, we see his experience as highlighting tensions within the dominant moralized warrior model of the military profession. What we call a toxic warrior identity — a distorted form of the moralized warrior identity — can negatively affect the attitudes of military personnel toward rules, policies, procedures, and accountability mechanisms, particularly in relation to non-combat related roles and duties and when leaders must choose between competing bureaucratic demands. We see 1LT Portis’s experience as illustrative of these tensions, yet his experiences also highlight important concerns about the impact of increasing bureaucratic demands on military functioning. In the conclusion, we address the need to balance concerns about toxic warrior identity with legitimate criticisms of overly demanding bureaucracy and suggest avenues for further research on this issue. (shrink)

The article critically analyzes one of the central assumptions of Michael Walzer’s version of just war theory, as presented in his main work devoted to war ethics. As requested by the author of Just and Unjust Wars, the controversial nature of the principle of the moral equality of soldiers is revealed by discussing the actual course of events of a historical military conflict – namely, the outbreak of World War II, one of the main issues dealt with in Walzer’s book. (...) The exclusion of individual responsibility of people involved in a military operation which finds no moral justification seems to entail a number of consequences that put a heavy burden on Walzer’s overall model of military ethics. In order to ensure the necessary level of coherence of just war theory one may need to modify Walzer’s principle of the moral equality of soldiers – at least in relation to the participants of total war. (shrink)

In the Anabasis, his autobiographical account on the retreat of the Greek mercenary army after the defeat of the Persian prince Cyrus the Younger, Xenophon mentions a significant number of sacrifices. This paper deals with the analysis of the ritual, pragmatical, and narratological functions of these references as well as of their lexis and complexity. Therefore also a short overview of the role of sacrifices in the ancient Greek religion with a focus on military contexts is given.

If people have stringent moral rights, then the doctrine of double effect is false or unimportant, at least when it comes to making acts permissible or wrong. There are strong and weak versions of the doctrine of double effect. The strong version asserts that an act is morally right if and only if the agent does not intentionally infringe a moral norm and the act brings about a desirable result (perhaps the best state of affairs available to the agent or (...) a promotion of the common good). The weak version asserts that, other things being equal, it is deontically worse to intentionally infringe a norm than to foreseeably do so. A person’s intention or mere foresight might still be relevant to his or her blameworthiness or virtue, but this is a separate issue. (shrink)

This book develops a new contractualist foundation for just war theory, which defends the traditional view of the moral equality of combatants and associated egalitarian moral norms. -/- Traditionally it has been viewed that combatants on both sides of a war have the same right to fight, irrespective of the justice of their cause, and both sides must observe the same restrictions on the use of force, especially prohibitions on targeting noncombatants. Revisionist philosophers have argued that combatants on the unjust (...) side of a war have no right to fight, that pro-war civilians on the unjust side might be targetable, and that lawful combatants on the unjust side might in principle be liable to prosecution for their participation on the unjust side. This book seeks to undercut the revisionist project and defend the traditional view of the moral equality of combatants. It does so by showing how revisionist philosophers fail to build a strong foundation for their arguments and misunderstand that there is a moral difference between collective military violence and a collection of individually unjustified violent actions. Finally, the book develops a theory defending the traditional view of military ethics based on a universal duty of all people to support just institutions. (shrink)

Future weapons will make life-or-death decisions without a human in the loop. When such weapons inflict unwarranted harm, no one appears to be responsible. There seems to be a responsibility gap. I first reconstruct the argument for such responsibility gaps to then argue that this argument is not sound. The argument assumes that commanders have no control over whether autonomous weapons inflict harm. I argue against this assumption. Although this investigation concerns a specific case of autonomous weapons systems, I take (...) steps towards vindicating the more general idea that superiors can be morally responsible in virtue of being in command. (shrink)

Law and Morality at War offers a broadly instrumentalist defense of the authority of the laws of war: these laws serve combatants by helping them come closer to doing what they have independent moral reason to do. We argue that this form of justification sets too low a bar. An authority’s directives are not binding, on instrumental grounds, if the subject could, within certain limits, adopt an alternative, and superior, means of conforming to morality’s demands. It emerges that Haque’s argument (...) fails to vindicate the law’s authority over all combatants. (shrink)

I argue that the lives of domestic and enemy civilians should not receive equal weight in our proportionality calculations. Rather, the lives of enemy civilians ought to be “partially discounted” relative to the lives of domestic civilians. We ought to partially discount the lives of enemy civilians for the following reason (or so I argue). When our military wages a just war, we as civilians vest our right to self-defense in our military. This permits our military to weigh our lives (...) more heavily. Before arguing for this view I first explain why recent accounts attempting to show the opposite – that enemy civilians ought to be weighed more heavily – are mistaken. (shrink)

Why do we consider killing and letting someone die to be two different things? Why do we believe that a doctor who refuses to treat a terminally ill patient is doing anything less than administering a lethal substance? After all, the consequences are the same, and perhaps the moral status of these acts should be judged accordingly. -/- Reviewed: Jonathan Glover, Questions de vie ou de mort (Causing Death and Saving Lives), translated into French and introduced by Benoît Basse, Genève, (...) Labor et Fides, 2017, 386 pp. (shrink)

In discussion surrounding the destruction of cultural heritage in armed conflict, one often hears two important claims in support of intervention to safeguard heritage. The first is that the protection of people and the protection of heritage are two sides of the same coin. The second is that the cultural heritage of any people is part of the common heritage of all humankind. In this article, I examine both of these claims, and consider the extent to which they align with (...) the current practices that they are intended to justify. (shrink)

Combatants who attempt to obey the laws of war often have to take considerable risks in order to effectively discriminate between legitimate and illegitimate targets. Sometimes this task is made even more complicated by systemic factors which influence their ability to discriminate effectively without unduly risking their lives or the mission. If they fail to do so, civilians often pay the price. In this paper, I argue that to the extent that non-combatants benefit from the attempt to fight justly, and (...) to the extent that wars in which combatants attempt to fight justly can be understood as a system of social cooperation which produces both burdens and benefits, non-combatants have a responsibility to shoulder their fair share of these burdens. Thus, if combatants (and by extension enemy non-combatants) are disproportionately burdened in a conflict, non-combatants ought to take on some costs, for instance in order to reduce the strain imposed on combatants by systemic factors such as the availability and distribution of resources. (shrink)

Even in just wars we infringe the rights of countless civilians whose ruination enables us to protect our own rights. These civilians are owed compensation, even in cases where the collateral harms they suffer satisfy the proportionality constraint. I argue that those who authorize or commit the infringements and who also benefit from those harms will bear that compensatory duty, even if the unjust aggressor cannot or will not discharge that duty. I argue further that if we suspect antecedently that (...) we will culpably refrain from compensating those victims post bellum, then this makes satisfying the war’s proportionality constraint substantially more difficult at the outset of the war. The lesson here is that failing to take duties of compensation in war seriously constrains our moral permission to protect ourselves. (shrink)

This book explores topical issues in military ethics by according peace a central role within an interdisciplinary framework. Whilst war and peace have traditionally been viewed through the lens of philosophical enquiry, political issues and theological ideas - as well as common sense - have also influenced people's understanding of armed conflicts with regards to both the moral issues they raise and the policies and actions they require. Comprised of fourteen essays on the role and application of peace, the book (...) places emphasis on it's philosophical, moral, theological, technological, and practical implications. Starting with an overview of Kantian perspectives on peace, it moves to discussions of the Just War debates, religious conceptualizations of peace, and the role of peace in modern war technology and cyber-security. Finally concluding with discussions of the psychological and medical impacts of war and peace on both the individual and the larger society, this collection offers a contribution to the field and will be of interest to a wide audience. Chapters 4, 6 and 10 of this book are available open access under a CC BY 4.0 license at link.springer.com. (shrink)

This article presents a new understanding of the problem of cosmopolitan motivation in war, comparing it to the motivational critique of social justice cosmopolitanism. The problem of cosmopolitanism’s “motivational gap” is best interpreted as a political one, not a meta-ethical or ethical one. That is, the salient issue is not whether an individual soldier is able to be motivated by cosmopolitan concerns, nor is it whether being motivated by cosmopolitanism would be too demanding. Rather, given considerations of legitimacy in the (...) use of political power, a democratic army has to be able to motivate its soldiers to take on the necessary risks without relying on coercion alone. Patriotic identification offers a way to achieve this in wars of national defense, but less so in armed humanitarian interventions (AHIs). Two potential implications are that either AHIs should be privatized or that national armies should be transformed to become more cosmopolitan. (shrink)

Just war scholars are increasingly focusing on the importance of jus post bellum – justice after war – for the legitimacy of military campaigns. Should something akin to jus post bellum standards apply to terrorist campaigns? Assuming that at least some terrorist actors pursue legitimate goals or just causes, do such actors have greater difficulty satisfying the prospect-of-success criterion of Just War Theory than military actors? Further, may the use of the terrorist method as such – state or non-state – (...) jeopardize lasting peace in a way that other violent, for instance military, strategies do not? I will argue that there appears to be little reason to believe that terrorist campaigns are in principle less able to secure or at least contribute to a lasting peace than military campaigns; quite to the contrary. Or, put differently, if terrorism is an unlikely method for securing peace, then war is an even more unlikely one. (shrink)

Two case studies are presented illustrating how leaders of chemical enterprises addressed ethical questions posed by the incendiary napalm. The first one examines how the chemist Louis Fieser grappled with the ethical questions posed by his development of the napalm incendiaries used against military and civilian targets in the Second World War. The second involves the Dow Napalm Controversy, in which Dow Chemical engaged protests over its role as a supplier of napalm to the American military in Vietnam. Dow weighted (...) the protesters’ charges that napalm was being used indiscriminately on civilians against what it saw as an obligation to support the American government and soldiers in their aims of defending South Vietnam against a communist insurrection. Both cases are examined from a Just War viewpoint to illustrate chemists’ responsibilities in the weapons development pipeline and the dilemmas that can arise in weapons development and over foreseeable misuses of chemical products. (shrink)

According to just war theory, a resort to war is justified only if it satisfies the right intention condition. This article offers a critical examination of this condition, defending the thesis that, despite its venerable history as part of the just war tradition, it ought to be jettisoned. When properly understood, it turns out to be an unnecessary element of jus ad bellum, adding nothing essential to our assessments of the justice of armed conflict.

Why does it matter that those who fight wars be authorized by the communities on whose behalf they claim to fight? I argue that lacking authorization generates a moral cost, which counts against a war's proportionality, and that having authorization allows the transfer of reasons from the members of the community to those who fight, which makes the war more likely to be proportionate. If democratic states are better able than non-democratic states and sub-state groups to gain their community's authorization, (...) this means that some wars will be proportionate if fought by democracies, disproportionate if not. (shrink)

Recent work on the ethics of war has struggled to simultaneously justify two central tenets of international law: the Permission to kill enemy combatants, and the Prohibition on targeting enemy noncombatants. Recently, just war theorists have turned to collectivist considerations as a way out of this problem. In this paper, I reject the argument that all and only unjust combatants are liable to be killed in virtue of their complicity in the wrongful war fought by their side, and that noncombatants (...) are not permissible targets because they are not complicit. I then argue that just combatants have some reason to direct force against unjust combatants rather than unjust noncombatants, because they should respect the reasonable self-determining decisions of other political communities, when those communities settle on the distribution of a negative surplus of cost for which they are collectively but not individually responsible. These collectivist reasons will not fully justify the Permission and the Prohibition, but they can contribute to that justification. (shrink)

In this paper, I address the question whether drones, which may soon possess the ability to make autonomous choices, should be allowed to make life-and-death decisions and act on them. To this end, I examine an argument proposed by Rob Sparrow, who dismisses the ethicality of what he calls “killer robots”. If successful, his conclusion would extend to the use of what I call autonomous killer drones, which are special kinds of killer robots. In Sparrow’s reasoning, considerations of responsibility occupy (...) centre stage. Though I reject his argument, I agree both with Sparrow’s conclusion and with his basic contention that the idea of responsibility should play an important role in the investigation of the problem at hand. Therefore, I propose a different argument to show that we should not allow autonomous robots and more specifically autonomous drones to make life-and-death decisions. This argument also invokes the concept of responsibility. But it does so in a way that is different from Sparrow’s use and is congenial to an account of responsibility that I favour. It assumes the simple principle that morally significant choices should only be made by subjects who are capable of responsibility, which can be reconciled both with a deontological and a consequentialist view of morality. Since killer robots, and in particular autonomous killer drones, seem to lack that capability, it follows that they should not be entrusted to make life-and-death decisions and act on them. (shrink)

This paper considers the implications of Chiara Lepora and Robert Goodin's On Complicity and Compromise (OUP, 2013) for our understanding of international law. That volume systematizes and evaluates individuals’ ethical choices in getting (too) close to evil acts. For the law of nations, these concepts are relevant in three critical ways. First, they capture the dilemmas of those charged with implementing international law, e.g., Red Cross delegates pledged to confidentiality learning of torture in a prison. Second, they offer a rubric (...) for understanding when a state may use coercion against certain actors, e.g., international law's rules for when one state may use force against another based on the latter's ties to terrorist acts. Third, they offer a moral grounding for many international obligations of states based on the need to avoid their own complicity in others' wrongs, e.g., by not expelling refugees to a state persecuting them or by preventing private actors from committing human rights abuses. In the case of the last two, the law reflects decisions by states about how much complicity they will tolerate – either complicity by others or complicity by the states themselves. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe aim of this paper is to draw attention to an issue which has been largely overlooked in contemporary just war theory – namely the impact that the conditions under which an army is assembled are liable to have on the judgments that are made with respect to traditional principles of jus ad bellum and jus in bello. I argue that the way in which an army is assembled can significantly alter judgments regarding the justice of a war. In doing (...) so, I present and defend a principle of ‘just assembly’ and argue that satisfying this principle is an essential part of any deliberation regarding the justice of a particular conflict. (shrink)

:In this essay, I defend a theory of liability to defensive force. The theory contains two elements. The first is a dual Lockean-inspired condition. The second aims to make this first condition consistent with problems arising from uncertainty. Drawing on recent work by Michael Zimmerman, I argue that the rights-based condition should be made sensitive to the evidence available to defenders.

According to International Humanitarian Law and many writing on just war theory, combatants who foresee that their actions will harm or kill innocent non-combatants are required to take some steps to reduce these merely foreseen harms. However, because often reducing merely foreseen harms place burdens on combatants – including risk to their lives – this requirement has been criticised for requiring too much of combatants. One reason why this might be the case is that combatants have duties to each other (...) and to their compatriots, such as duties to keep them safe, which are weighty enough to override their duties to foreign non-combatants. In this article, I argue that arguments against the requirement to limit merely foreseen harms which rely on combatants' associative duties fail to establish that it is permissible for combatants to prioritise their own safety over the reduction of merely foreseen harms. Although the argument based on associative duties might work in individual cases, factors peculiar to the situation of combatants mean that such justifications are not normally available to them. (shrink)

Killing civilians is worse than killing soldiers. Although this principle is widely affirmed, recent military practice and contemporary just war theory have undermined it. This article argues that killing an innocent person is worse the likelier it was, when you acted, that he would be innocent: riskier killings are worse than less risky killings. In war, killing innocent civilians is almost always riskier than killing innocent soldiers. So killing innocent civilians is worse than killing innocent soldiers. Since almost all civilians (...) are innocent in war, and since killing innocent civilians is worse than killing liable soldiers, killing civilians is worse than killing soldiers. (shrink)

Killing civilians is worse than killing soldiers. If any moral principle commands near universal assent, this one does. Few moral principles have been more widely and more viscerally affirmed. And yet, in recent years it has faced a rising tide of dissent. Political and military leaders seeking to slip the constraints of the laws of war have cavilled and qualified. Their complaints have been unwittingly aided by philosophers who, rebuilding just war theory from its foundations, have concluded that this principle (...) is at best a useful fiction. Sparing Civilians aims to turn this tide, and to vindicate international law, and the ruptured consensus. In doing so, Seth Lazar develops new insights into the morality of harm, relevant to everyone interested in normative and applied ethics. (shrink)

Proportionality in the resort to war determines a limit to the amount of harm it can be permissible to cause for the sake of achieving a just cause. It seems to follow that if a war has caused harm up to that limit but has not achieved the just cause, it should be terminated. I argue, however, that this is a mistake. Judgments of proportionality are entirely prospective and harms suffered or inflicted in the past should in general be ignored. (...) Yet past losses that could be partially redeemed by the achievement of the just cause may be an exception. (shrink)

Since cyberattacks are nonphysical, standard theories of casus belli — which typically rely on the violent and forceful nature of military means — appear inapplicable. Yet, some theorists have argued that cyberattacks nonetheless can constitute just causes for war — generating a unilateral right to defensive military action — when they cause significant physical damage through the disruption of the target's computer systems. I show that this view suffers from a serious drawback: it is too permissive concerning the types of (...) actions that generate casus belli since many essentially peaceful and non-violent mechanisms can nonetheless cause physical damage. I resolve this difficulty by developing a sovereignty-based account of casus belli and applying it to cyberwarfare. I argue that legitimate states have a constrained right to unilaterally respond with military force to unfriendly actions that bypass or overwhelm the political deliberations of the target state in order to force a change in behaviour contrary to the determinations of the people of the target state. This new account of casus belli avoids the problems of the consequence-based view by plausibly restricting the types of unfriendly action that give rise to casus belli and yet offers an attractive explanation for why some cyberattacks nonetheless do generate a potential right to a unilateral defensive response. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is the analysis of both legal and ethical ways of justifying targeted killings. I compare two legal models: the law enforcement model vs the rules of armed conflicts; and two ethical ones: retribution vs the right of self-defence. I argue that, if the targeted killing is to be either legally or ethically justified, it would be so due to fulfilling of some criteria common for all acceptable forms of killing, and not because terrorist activity is (...) somehow distinguished and gives special privileges to a state that fights it. The practical implication of my analysis is that one of the most spectacular targeted killings, which was the targeting and killing of Osama bin Laden in May 2011, was not justified, because it was only supposed to be a retribution for the September 11th terrorist attacks. (shrink)

The destruction wrought by even just wars lends undeniable appeal to radical pacifism, according to which all wars are unjust. Yet radical pacifism is fundamentally flawed. In the past decade, a moderate and more defensible form of pacifism has emerged. According to what has been called ‘contingent pacifism’, it is very unlikely that it is morally permissible to wage any given war. This chapter develops the doctrine of contingent pacifism by distinguishing and developing various versions of it, and by assessing (...) the merits and drawbacks of each. According to ‘proportionality-based’ contingent pacifism, almost all wars with just causes are unjust ‘tout court’ because the in bello harms such wars impose on the innocent are too great relative to the relevant evils averted by achieving the war’s aims. After arguing against this view, the chapter introduces a novel, more defensible form of contingent pacifism, called ‘epistemic-based’ contingent pacifism, according to which the prevalence of mistaken judgements regarding the justness of wars, combined with the devastating harmfulness of unjust wars, requires imposing prohibitions against waging war, where the strength of the prohibition varies according to whether the government has a history of mistakes or deception regarding the justness of wars. (shrink)

Most people believe that it is sometimes morally permissible for a person to use force to defend herself or others against harm. In Defensive Killing, Helen Frowe offers a detailed exploration of when and why the use of such force is permissible. She begins by considering the use of force between individuals, investigating both the circumstances under which an attacker forfeits her right not to be harmed, and the distinct question of when it is all-things-considered permissible to use force against (...) an attacker. Frowe then extends this enquiry to war, defending the view that we should judge the ethics of killing in war by the moral rules that govern killing between individuals. She argues that this requires us to significantly revise our understanding of the moral status of non-combatants in war. Non-combatants who intentionally contribute to an unjust war forfeit their rights not to be harmed, such that they are morally liable to attack by combatants fighting a just war. (shrink)

How We Fight: Ethics in War contains ten groundbreaking essays by some of the leading philosophers of war. The essays offer new perspectives on key debates including pacifism, punitive justifications for war, the distribution of risk between combatants and non-combatants, the structure of 'just war theory', and bases of individual liability in war.

The principle of non-combatant immunity protects non-combatants against intentional attacks in war. It is the most widely endorsed and deeply held moral constraint on the conduct of war. And yet it is difficult to justify. Recent developments in just war theory have undermined the canonical argument in its favour – Michael Walzer's, in Just and Unjust Wars. Some now deny that non-combatant immunity has principled foundations, arguing instead that it is entirely explained by a different principle: that of necessity. In (...) war, as in ordinary life, harms to others can be justified only if they are necessary. Attacking non-combatants, the argument goes, is never necessary, so never justified. Although often repeated, this argument has never been explored in depth. In this article, I evaluate the necessity-based argument for non-combatant immunity, drawing together theoretical analysis and empirical research on anti-civilian tactics in interstate warfare, counterinsurgency, and terrorism. (shrink)

Wars are large-scale conflicts between organized groups of belligerents, which involve suffering, devastation, and brutality unlike almost anything else in human experience. Whatever one’s other beliefs about morality, all should agree that the horrors of war are all but unconscionable, and that warfare can be justified only if we have some compel- ling account of what is worth fighting for, which can justify contributing, as individu- als and as groups, to this calamitous endeavour. Although this question should obviously be central (...) to both philosophical and politi- cal discussion about war, it is at the forefront of neither. In recent years, philosophical discussion of warfare has bloomed, but the debate has focused on whom we may kill, on the assumption that our aims are justified.1 Political debate, meanwhile, is more concerned with matters of prudence, international law, and public justification, than with reassessing what is worth fighting for. For wars of intervention to halt or prevent massive humanitarian crises, this gap is not so troubling. When warfare is the only means to prevent the mass killing or enslavement of the innocent, the purposes of military force are clear enough (though undoubtedly many other problems remain). The problem is more pressing, how- ever, for the justification of national defence.3 Although common-sense morality and international law view national defence as the paradigm case of justified warfare, grounding this consensus is surprisingly difficult.4 We typically believe that any state is justified in using lethal force to protect its territory against any form of uninvited military incursion by any other state. And yet we lack a good argument to explain why this should be so. In this chapter, I explain why one familiar and otherwise plausible approach to the justification of killing in war cannot adequately ground common-sense views of permissible national defence.5 Reductionists believe that justified warfare reduces to an aggregation of acts that are justified under ordinary principles of interpersonal morality.6 The standard form of reductionism focuses on the principles governing killing in ordinary life, specifically those that justify intentional killing in self- and other-defence, and unintended but foreseen (for short, collateral) killing as a lesser evil. Justified warfare, on this view, is no more than the coextension of multiple acts justified under these two principles. Reductionism is the default philosophical approach to thinking through the ethics of killing in war. It makes perfect sense to ask what principles govern permissible kill- ing in general, before applying them to the particular context of war. If it cannot deliver a plausible set of conclusions about when national defence is permitted, then we must either revise our beliefs about which conclusions count as plausible, or else face the significant challenge of developing a different theoretical model for justifying war- fare—an exceptionalist model, which views war as an exception to the regular moral landscape, to which principles apply which apply to nothing else but war.7 We must show, in other words, that there is something worth fighting for in wars of national defence, which is not engaged when we use force in any other context. The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 sets out the argument against reduc- tionism.8 Section 2.3 considers and rebuts one common response to the argument, which has often been thought sufficient grounds to disregard its conclusion. Section 2.4 then asks whether a modified reductionism would survive unscathed by the argu- ment. Finally, section 2.5 sets out some desiderata on a plausible exceptionalist alterna- tive. Section 2.6 concludes. (shrink)

In addition to the traditional reliance on rules and codes in regulating the conduct of military personnel, most of today’s militaries put their money on character building in trying to make their soldiers virtuous. Especially in recent years it has time and again been argued that virtue ethics, with its emphasis on character building, provides a better basis for military ethics than deontological ethics or utilitarian ethics. Although virtue ethics comes in many varieties these days, in many texts on military (...) ethics dealing with the subject of military virtues the Aristotelian view on virtues is still pivotal. Developing virtues is by some authors seen as the best way to prevent misconduct by military personnel, it being considered superior to rules or codes of conduct imposed from above. The main argument these authors offer is that these solutions are impotent when no one is around, and lack the flexibility often thought necessary in today’s world. Finally, rules and codes try to condition behavior, leaving less room for personal integrity. At first sight, then, there is a great deal to say in favor of virtue ethics as being the best way of enhancing the chances of soldiers behaving morally. However, this preference for steering conduct by means of promoting certain desirable dispositions is not without any problems that, as it stands, are hardly ever addressed. To begin with, there are a few practical concerns. For instance, even if we assume that military virtues can assist military personnel to do their work in a morally sound manner, it is still not clear to what extent virtues can, in fact, be taught to them. It is an assumption of virtue ethics that they can, but is this really the case? And if so, how should they be taught? – virtues are supposedly developed by practicing them, yet how much room is there for practicing virtues in for instance the ethics education as followed in military academies and school battalions? Secondly, it appears that the traditional military virtues, such as honor, loyalty, courage, and obedience, are, especially in their common interpretation, mainly beneficial to colleagues and the organization, not so much to the local population of the countries military personnel are deployed to. Changes in the military’s wider environment have led to a shift from traditional of self-defense tasks to new, more complex tasks, and especially in today’s missions one could expect that the proper virtues are not necessarily solely the more martial ones. (shrink)