African Philosophy

This article reconsiders Molefi Asante’s idea of Afrocentrism. It discusses Eurocentrism and the search for identity that provoked Afrocentrism as an intellectual paradigm. It details some basic tenets of the Afrocentric paradigm and makes some critical remarks on certain issues in the conceptualisation of the Afrocentric paradigm. Essentially, those remarks revolve around the notions of multiculturalism, identity and language. First, the article argues that the Afrocentric paradigm, through its openness to anyone interested in it – an extension of its claim (...) to multiculturalism – drags itself back into the problem of identity that it initially set out to resolve. This is because it provokes the dilemma of extreme inclusivity and extreme exclusivity. Second, it uses the language of Eurocentrism to fight against Eurocentrism, which seems absurd. Third, it glosses over the fact that, apart from Africa, other cultural civilisations might have significantly influenced the intellectual development of the ancient Geeks. The article argues, therefore, using the methods of analysis and critical argumentation typical of philosophical writing, first, that Afrocentrists may need to re-articulate the Afrocentric paradigm in such a way that would address the problem of identity which it set out to resolve by properly delineating its boundaries. Second, they need to address the language question, which is an important aspect of the problem of identity. Third, they need to recognise and respect the contributions of other cultural civilisations to the Greek intellectual development. This does not upset their multiculturalist programme. (shrink)

It is incontrovertible that the problem of insecurity is part of the ravening realities in the current civil society. It is a general problem facing the whole world. However, it is more pronounced in some parts of the world than in others. In African countries, especially in Nigeria, insecurity has been a seemingly insurmountable problem. It has rendered all attempts made by the government and individuals to stabilize the country thereby strengthening the principle of social co-operation, harmony and peaceful coexistence (...) among citizens, abortive. This paper argued that security seems to be an illusion in an African country like Nigeria because all attempts by the government to ensure stability do not put into consideration the ‘six paradoxes of violence’ largely responsible for insecurity. The paper examined the problem of insecurity in Nigeria and the paradoxes that need to be addressed if the nation ever hopes to deal meaningfully and honestly, with the challenge of insecurity that is drifting it apart. The paper identified the sixparadoxes of violence as outlined by Ali Mazrui, then analysed how these six paradoxes serve as the major barriers to the peaceful coexistence of people in Nigeria, and how they persistently threaten the unity of the nation at any slight provocation. The paper also suggested some ways by which these paradoxes can be addressed thereby ensuring a level of peace and social stability. (shrink)

Presby raises an important criticism of Oruka; she notes that in his critique of Tempels and Mbiti, he assumes, without providing adequate evidence, that myths and the traditions which transmit them are static and that, consequently, they lack the openness to criticism and transformation that characterizes genuine philosophical discourse. Presby responds that ‘those who study oral traditions or ritual practices will note that traditions are always changing, even when people think they are merely reproducing them’ (108). However, one can defend (...) Oruka by pointing out that there is a vast difference between an intellectual tradition whose adherents are aware of the fact that it is constantly changing based on a dialectic characterized by arguments, objections to arguments, and responses to objections on the one hand, and on the other hand, an intellectual tradition that is changing but whose adherents at any given moment are unaware of the fact that this intellectual tradition is subjected to change. In the latter case, individuals are likely to think of criticism as a futile activity and perhaps as unnecessary given the fact that this tradition has proved to be functionally adequate for that society’s requirements, and they would be unaware of the fact that this tradition has maintained its functional adequacy precisely because it has changed as a function of time. (shrink)

Cet article vise à comprendre comment les études africaines en Égypte ont été influencées par le préjugé d’une différence essentielle entre « l’Égypte » et l’Afrique du Nord, d’une part, et « l’Afrique subsaharienne » de l’autre. Il est communément admis que la plupart des Égyptiens ne se considèrent pas comme des Africains. Dans cet article, je cherche à explorer la manière dont les études africaines en Égypte ont été façonnées par cette conception populaire de soi, et comment cette dernière (...) a été influencée par les discours académiques. J’y discute les origines coloniales et raciales des études africaines modernes en Égypte. J’y souligne également l’importance de l’existence d’un discours contre-hégémonique, incarné par la vie et l’œuvre d’Helmi Sharawy. Helmi Sharawy est aujourd’hui à la tête du Centre de recherche arabo-africain du Caire, et il a été politiquement actif pendant la période nassérienne en tant qu’agent de liaison entre le gouvernement de Nasser et les divers mouvements de libération africains qui ont établi des bureaux au Caire pendant cette période. Ce qui est particulièrement important dans la vie et la pensée de Sharawy, c’est que sa critique des études africaines égyptiennes a été élaborée en dehors de l’académie ; elle est le produit de son travail autodidacte combiné à son immersion dans les luttes politiques. Je soutiens que nous pouvons identifier dans le travail d’Helmi Sharawy une critique des paradigmes raciaux et coloniaux qui ont survécu dans les études africaines égyptiennes contemporaines, une critique que je relie aux débats sur le racisme dans la société égyptienne. (shrink)

In this dissertation, I consider a hitherto underexplored concept of ‘human minimum’ as proposed by H. Odera Oruka to obligate responsibility as an approach to tackling extreme poverty in Africa and beyond. I aim to establish, among other things, why it is morally problematic and economically counterproductive to demand equal moral responsibility from all moral agents irrespective of their economic differences to ensure the implementation of the human minimum or the elimination of extreme poverty. To achieve the aforementioned, I attempt (...) to answer two significant questions, to wit: What are some of the moral implications of ensuring that a society attains the human minimum as an approach to fighting extreme poverty? Who has a greater moral responsibility for ensuring the attainment of the human minimum between the government, non-governmental/nonprofit organisations, and individual members of society? In Oruka’s philosophy, enforcement of a global human minimum is the equal moral obligation of all moral agents—all those situated above the poverty line. I will demonstrate why ignoring the economic differences – and inequalities – of those who qualify as moral agents in Oruka’s conceptualisation of extreme poverty, particularly in continental Africa, risks plunging more of those who live a little above the human minimum threshold into poverty. I then argue that a disproportionate distribution of responsibility that is sensitive to the economic disparities that exist among the non-poor population holds a better promise for success in the fight against extreme poverty in Africa. (shrink)

Dans cet article, j’examine comment Augustin Dibi Kouadio répond à la question du début de l’histoire de la philosophie. En suivant son argumentation telle qu’elle se déploie dans son livre majeur et dans d’autres textes, je découvre que Dibi Kouadio est influencé d’une part par G. W. F. Hegel lorsqu’il s’agit de définir la philosophie, et d’autre part par Paulin Hountondji, pour ce qui concerne la critique de l’ethnophilosophie. Combinées, ces deux influences conduisent Dibi Kouadio à tenir, en rapport avec (...) la philosophie africaine, une position que je me propose de dévoiler et de critiquer, à savoir l’absence de philosophie dans le passé du continent. (shrink)

In his battle against postmodernism, French structuralism appears as one of Nkolo Foé’s main philosophical opponents. It is in this respect that this school of thought is discussed in his book, 'Le Postmodernisme et Le Nouvel Esprit du Capitalisme.' I propose to analyze the genealogy, the concepts, as well as the categories of such a critique, in order to expose it in extension and in intension.

This chapter examines the three projects that constitute contemporary African epistemology and suggests various ways in which they can be put on a firmer footing, and by so doing advance the epistemic goal of the discipline. These three projects include ethno-epistemology, analytic African epistemology and what one might call ameliorative African epistemology. Ethno-epistemology is the study of the phenomenon of knowledge from the perspective of particular African communities as revealed in their cultural heritage, proverbs, folklores, traditions, and practices. Analytic African (...) epistemology involves the philosophical study of concepts such as ‘knowledge,’ ‘justification,’ ‘belief’ and ‘truth’ from the African perspective using the methods of analysis, criticism, arguments, ordinary language philosophy, and so on. And finally, ameliorative African epistemology addresses the predicament of African knowledge systems and voices in the global knowledge and credibility economy within the broader context of the problem of epistemic injustice suffered by historically marginalized groups. (shrink)

To explain Paulin J. Hountondji’s intellectual trajectory, I offer a critical account of his conception of the relationship between science and philosophy. Mapping the shift from his well-known critical writings on ethnophilosophy to his later work on scientific dependency is possible only if we recognize that Hountondji conceives of philosophy as essentially a theory of science (Wissenschaftslehre). Adequately characterizing Hountondji’s metaphilosophical orientation, however, requires greater specificity. The two most influential philosophers on Hountondji’s conception of the relationship between science and philosophy, (...) Edmund Husserl and Louis Althusser, would both have assented to the claim that philosophy is fundamentally a Wissenschaftslehre. However, they each adhered to different (and indeed contradictory) understandings of this claim. While Hountondji explicitly recognizes the dual influence of Husserl and Althusser on his conception of philosophy as a theory of science, he does not attempt to resolve the contradictions between Husserl’s understanding of the relationship between philosophy and science and Althusser’s conception of that relationship. By examining Hountondji’s relatively neglected later writings on scientific dependency, it becomes clear that his emphasis on the significance of the history and sociology of science points toward an Althusserian conception of philosophy qua theory of science rather than a Husserlian conception of what it is for philosophy to be a Wissenschaftslehre. (shrink)

Such a bewildering and contradictory welter of behaviors and traits are connoted by “honor” and its best equivalents in other languages that analyses of the concept have daunted philosophers, anthropologists, sociologists, political scientists, historians, and literary scholars for millennia. Is it an external good given — and revoked just as easily — by others? Or does “honor” name an inner good that’s absolutely in our control: our integrity, our very commitment to right conduct? Is honor a central moral virtue — (...) as when we might say that “all was lost, save our honor”? Or is it a good quality that’s not-quite “moral,” or indeed even an antiquated virtue hostile to true morality? Is the honorable man a heroic figure who protects the weak, or one who can be expected to bully the weak, as in the case of “honor killings”? Is honor aristocratic and inegalitarian, and thus a virtue that enables and ennobles what’s essentially oppression? Or is honor a signal virtue of fair-dealing, fair-fighting, and fair competition, as evidenced in sportsmanship? (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that the concept of culture industry developed by Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno had a decisive influence on Jean Godefroy Bidima’s critique of black African modernity. Drawing on some of his writings, I seek to demon- strate how Bidima’s philosophical endeavor inherits the concept of culture industry and applies it to the modern context of black Africa, where it is transformed into the concept of colonial industry. In both cases, the same critical perspective is (...) at play, namely to formulate a broad critique of how cultural products (artworks in Horkheimer and Adorno, and philosophy in Bidima) are deprived of their substance to align with the mystification of the masses. The critique of the culture industry, which serves in Adorno as a fundamental criticism of the production of modern art and its decadence into mass production serves, revisited in Bidima, as a critique of the modern black African philo- sophical discourse. With the light provided by this connection, I propose a rereading of Bidima’s critique of Fabien Eboussi Boulaga, the latter being presented as a promoter of a “discourse of mastery” in black African modern philosophy. (shrink)

African cultural values connote core principles and ideals that maintains good, right, fair and just in African societies. This culture is developed over a long period of time, preserved and promoted by all members of a given group or society. Corruption as a phenomenon on the other hand has been variously described as a societal vice. Though research shows that some levels of corruption exist in almost every human society, it is over accommodated in some societies or nations and as (...) such it has notoriously continued to destroy such societies/nations. This is particular to a number of African nations, with Nigeria being among (if not) the worse corrupt nation(s) in the continent. It is not difficult to understand that the value placed on corruption in Nigeria is synonymous to the way cultural values are cherished by people in some nations of the world. In view of this, there is a serious and immediate need to educate the Nigerian public about the consequences of developing a culture of corruption in the country. It seems that some Nigerians take corruption to be a normal way of life, thereby, equating the vice to acceptable cultural values. Today, many Nigerians are not interested in developing and/or preserving amiable cultural values for the nation. Rather, more attention is focus on the promotion of corrupt practices that enables the destruction of even the good cultural values of the nation that were left behind by our forefathers. Therefore, this paper seeks to unmask the importance of developing and preserving good African cultural values that will guarantee unity, patriotism, social cohesion and sustainable development in Nigeria. (shrink)

Este artigo visa analisar, em linhas gerais, a “práxis” filosófica brasileira tal como delineada, historicamente, pela pedagogia estruturalista do Departamento de Filosofia da USP. Parte-se do princípio de que essa pedagogia, fundamentada na tradição filosófica ocidental norte-cêntrica, eliminou as filosofias produzidas por comunidades políticas e geopolíticas não ocidentais – entre elas, as Filosofias da Quebrada – no âmbito do ensino de filosofia no Brasil, favorecendo somente a mera formação em história da filosofia, em detrimento do filosofar. Isto posto, para modificar (...) a pedagogia estruturalista, defendemos um filosofar desde o quilombo e, por conseguinte, desde as Comunidades Autofilosóficas da Quebrada (CAQ). Para tanto, o presente texto pauta-se em considerações filosóficas quilombistas, decoloniais e libertárias, tendo como aporte teórico, fundamentalmente, o conceito de quilombo, movimento contínuo de resistência cultural, proposto pela filósofa, Beatriz Nascimento e pelo filósofo, Abdias do Nascimento. (shrink)

O artigo pretende analisar a questão do ‘não lugar’ epistemológico da Filosofia Africana nos livros didáticos de filosofia aprovados pelo Programa Nacional do Livro e Material Didático – PNLD de 2012. Parte-se do pressuposto de que o cerne deste problema é o racismo epistêmico/eurocêntrico, engendrado no período da modernidade e que corrobora o estatuto do nascimento da filosofia na Grécia antiga. O objetivo é apresentar certo viés do pensamento filosófico moderno e contemporâneo, notadamente Kant e Hegel, que caracterizam os africanos (...) como primitivos, não reconhecendo neles a capacidade estética e filosófica; descrever, sucintamente, o processo histórico/legal que estabelece a obrigatoriedade do ensino de História e Cultura Afro-Brasileira no currículo oficial da rede de ensino e a filosofia como disciplina obrigatória nos currículos do ensino médio no Brasil e explicitar a relação entre o conteúdo de Filosofia Africana e o livro didático, tendo como cerne o Guia do PNLD de 2012. Para tanto, a metodologia aplicada pauta-se, fundamentalmente, na pesquisa bibliográfica, tendo como aporte teórico os seguintes pensadores: o filósofo congolês Théophile Obenga, o filósofo sul-africano Mogobe B. Ramose, o filósofo afro-estadunidense Molefi Kete Asante, o filósofo britânico-ganês Kwame Anthony Appiah e os filósofos brasileiros Renato Noguera e Wanderson Flor. (shrink)

A discussion of the political theory of Walter Rodney and Samir Amin, focusing on Rodney's How Europe Underdeveloped Africa and Amin's Eurocentrism.

Dans cet article, j’essaie de dévoiler le contenu de vérité de la préface que Sartre rédigea pour Les damnés de la terre de Frantz Fanon. Je tenterai précisément de montrer que ce texte sert — et a effectivement servi — à paralyser l’analyse de Fanon et à la neutraliser. J’argumenterai donc en faveur de la résistance vis-à-vis d’une telle situation.

The idea of change seems to be a vital part of human life and culture. With the concept of change, people, communities, and cultural practices have significantly evolved. Change has transformed some communities, traditions, cultural values and practices, communication methods, education, art, and literature. Thus, in this paper, I focus on the idea of change, African cultural practices, and the African sense of community. I aim to show how the concept of change has meddled with African cultural practices and the (...) African sense of community. I intend to achieve this by using the Ifá divination system, the idea of storytelling, and homosexuality or the LGBTIQA+1 people as examples. (shrink)

Philosophy has long been seen as a crucial instrument for living a meaningful life. Nonetheless, for more than a decade, systematic philosophical study in Africa has been dominated by a single compound question: Is there an African philosophy, and if so, what is its nature? When it comes to Africa and philosophy, there is a lot of debate about whether or not Africans have a philosophy. Africans have long been accused of being irrational. Some Western scholars’ interpretations of African philosophy (...) may help us comprehend it better. The Aime Cesaire-led Negritude movement, the Harlem Revolution, the South African Apartheid movement, and others are all examples of recent literature expressing opposition to the perspective of black inferiority and various insults directed at black Africans. Some European scholars did accuse Africans of being irrational beings. These claims provided the impetus for the spread of various beliefs and ideologies masquerading as African philosophy. In light of this, the purpose of this essay is to disprove prejudicial claims made against Africans and African philosophy. The works of Western thinkers such as Immanuel Kant, Georg W. F. Hegel, and Lucien Levy-Bruhl would be highlighted. (shrink)

Since Kenya gained independence from Britain in 1963, women’s rights in the country have made slow gains and suffered some setbacks. However, the rights of women and their guaranteed participation in politics was outlined in Kenya’s 2010 Constitution. This paper will survey some of those gains as well as describe the social backlash experienced by women leaders who have been trailblazers in post-colonial Kenyan politics.

The challenges of building community based on a common identity that also respects differences has two different kinds of chasms to cross. There is the division of ethnic groups, and there is also the generational gap. Given recent problems of ethnic violence that broke out during the December 2007 elections, can contemporary Kenyans build community, coming to common understanding with others on issues such as value and identity? This is not a new problem. It has often been expressed as the (...) need to develop a common Kenyan “national culture.” After a survey including Okot p’Bitek, Frantz Fanon, Bethwell Ogot and Ngugi wa Thiong’o’s contribution to the topic in the context of the 1960s and 70s, I will then go on to discuss the contribution of Kenyan Philosophy professor Henry Odera Oruka, who was greatly influenced by the ongoing discussions regarding national culture when he began his sage philosophy project – a project he clearly described as being able to play a role in the creation of Kenyan national culture. I explore some of Odera Oruka’s unpublished work on this topic. Chaungo Barasa has continued this project. I move on to survey how current academics in Kenya are working to describe and forge national values as a meaningful alternative to Kenyan government ongoing endeavors to promote culture as a tourist commodity. (shrink)

The communal characteristic of African Societies has frequently been juxtaposed with the individualistic tenets of Western polities. However, the evolution of African societies into liberal democracies with the obligation to promote and protect constitutionalism and individual liberties calls for a philosophical niche to bridge between communality and individuality. This paper argues that Africa’s moral and political philosophy is in an urgent need of a Kantian Copernican revolution to ameliorate the conflictual interface between sociality and individualism. The paper opines that the (...) revolution will help to harmonize the dilemmatic relationship between communitarianism and individual rights. The paper also contends that the Kantian categorical imperatives are necessary in eliminating the unclear deontological/teleological situatedness of African ideological philosophies. (shrink)

This book addresses the relative absence of the voices and ideas of African women in philosophy. Most of the authors (who are mostly African men) bemoan the fact that many voices are missing. Each contributes what they can to highlight the importance of the gap or to address the gap. The co-editors suggest that from its start, African philosophy intended to be egalitarian, emancipatory, and revolutionary, and so the current marginalization of African women should be a prominent concern. The review (...) addresses the chapter's themes in three broad categories. In the first category are five of the women contributors and two of the men, who all write with a focus on the overlooked contributions of African women. Their goal is to encourage appreciation for the contributions already made by women scholars, or to emphasize women's prominent role in society. A second category includes all men, and in these five articles the issue of women's marginalization in African philosophy departments is the central topic. The men bemoan the lack of participation of more women in the field and they speculate as to the cause of their absence. A third, smaller category includes two articles that address current specific situations of women's suffering in Africa, that is, widowhood and rape victims. The book holds out hope that if changes take place, women will feel more comfortable and appreciated in the profession of philosophy. (shrink)

In this study, the idea of the local African community as a social structure ensuring the security of its members is presented. An understanding of the concept of security is first briefly discussed, followed by the meaning of the concept of the local African community. The chapter also makes an a priori distinction between what one can call “moderate” and “radical” types of communal life and two case studies exemplifying them are presented. The chapter aims to analyze the trade off, (...) in terms of provision of security, including economic security, by local communities, for the shaping of a democratic political culture in Sub-Saharan Africa. Most importantly, however, this chapter also highlights the rationality that underpins the seemingly low-quality democratic political activities of members of local African communities. (shrink)

Philosophical writing in the advocatorial mode aims to advance a given position by reasoned argument designed to rationally persuade anyone of its veracity. Philosophical writing in the confessional mode uses theoretical reasoning and critical rigour in the course of arriving at a specific kind of philosophical self-judgment with therapeutic intent. Here I suggest that the best way to read Samantha Vice’s paper (‘How Do I Live in This Strange Place?’) is to treat it as written in the confessional, and not (...) the advocatorial, mode, and that this way of reading the paper provides an alternate way of reflecting on some of the contentious claims Vice makes. (shrink)

v. 1. The Book of the wise philosophers.--v. 2-3. The treatise of Zärʼa Yaʻe̳qob and of Wäldä Ḥe̳ywåt.--v. 4. The life and maxims of Ske̳nde̳s.--v. 5. The Fisalgw̳os.

The problem of evil is a perennial issue in metaphysics, philosophy of religion and theology. In Yorùbá thought, it has been approached, appraised, and conceptualised by scholars from different perspectives, usually in the form of thesis and antithesis. For instance, Ẹ̀bùn Odùwọlé and Kazeem Fáyẹmí disagree on whether or not the problem arises in Yorùbá thought and on its nature or formulation, if it does. Relying on the Western logical formulation of the problem, Odùwọlé maintains that the problem of evil (...) arises in Yorùbá thought exactly like it does in Western thought; hence, for her, the problem of evil is universal. Against this view, Fáyẹmí contends that the philosophical problem of evil does not arise at all in Yorùbá thought; hence, the problem, according to him, is not universal. Employing the methods of critical exposition and analysis, however, I maintain a position different from those of the two scholars mentioned. I contend, on the one hand, that the existence of the philosophical problem of evil in Yorùbá thought does not necessarily imply the logical formulation of the problem as we have in the West. On the other hand, however, I maintain that the absence of the logical formulation of the problem of evil in Yorùbá thought does not directly imply the absence of the philosophical problem of evil in it. I therefore approach the interpretation of the philosophical problem of evil in Yorùbá thought from an existentialist perspective, drawing insights from some relevant verses of Ifá. -/- . (shrink)

Philosophical counselling is typically conceptualised as a praxis going beyond academic and theoretical philosophy. However, two problems soon follow, namely the lack of agreed-upon methods and a substantial neglect of different philosophical traditions informing its practice. In this article, I propose reconceptualising philosophical counselling as a distinct method through which academic philosophy can be practised. This allows me to introduce an understanding of African philosophy, inspired by African philosophers Chimakonam and Serequeberhan, that might encourage the philosophical counsellor to render academic (...) philosophy more applicable to the counselee. Moreover, it allows for embodied voices talking from an embedded African lifeworld to create new and more relevant concepts that emerge from that lifeworld. (shrink)

I aim to establish in this article why Aribiah Attoe, like other determinists before him, got it wrong in arguing for the possibility of predeterminism in a materially evolving universe. I will do this by proving two things: I will first establish the inconsistency of the idea of predeterminism in an evolving universe. Then, I argue that the adirectionality presupposed by an evolutionary universe gives room for free will and negates the argument for a predeterministic universe. I aim to achieve (...) the above by exposing why the view which upholds the universe and all existents within it as lacking free will – or the possibility of adirectionality – stems from a category error on the part of the determinists. Lastly, I defend the position that for predeterminism to stand a chance against the free will of animate things-in-the-world, it must deny the possibility of an evolving/expanding universe that is adirectional and suggestive of boundlessness, and the possibility that some events are not fundamentally necessary reactions to previous states of affairs. (shrink)

Ubuntu, or humanness, has been theorized as a uniquely African contribution to the world. At the same time, others insist that it is a universal ethical principle. This paper particularly wants to look at a sub-theme of ubuntu studies, regarding how some of the authors and researchers have wanted to apply it to business, even suggesting that ubuntu can provide a model for ethical management principles that can also result in better outcomes for businesses. To approach business with an ethical (...) emphasis is clearly better than casting ethics aside in pursuit of profit without concern for human flourishing. But, can ubuntu management principles be used in a global capitalist framework, to soften the hard edges of cutthroat capitalism? Or does the ubuntu management approach without capitalist critique fall short of reaching the goal and practice of humanness? Additionally, perhaps the fault of current practices is not only due to the capitalist global economy, but also, an historical and a current global anti-black racism as well as sexism, which continues to skew the numbers of managers to greatly over-represent white males. This is due to historical privileging of men and the white race. We need to put forth our best efforts to ensure fair treatment of workers, who are valued as persons, and paid a good wage, with profits to go to them so that they can nourish and support their extended families. An ubuntu ethic could indeed be helpful as a guide for deciding which kinds of changes to the larger economic and political structures we should advocate and fight for (Publisher's website includes free full text). (shrink)