Interactive dualism is notorious for supporting genuine and autonomous mental causation that is allegedly impossible for its confliction with basic principles of physics. The purpose of this essay is to show the invalidity of this commonplace view, by arguing to the contrary in three different steps. First, I will deal with the objection about the non-scientific character of interactive dualism, as it is conceived of in present-day philosophy of mind. Second, I will illustrate and critically examine three contemporary models of (...) dualistically understood mental causation. Finally, I will summarise the chief assumptions made in these models and try to lay down my own proposal. (shrink)

In recent years numerous attempts have been made by analytic philosophers to naturalize various different domains of philosophical inquiry. All of these attempts have had the common goal of rendering these areas of philosophy amenable to empirical methods, with the intention of securing for them the supposedly objective status and broad intellectual appeal currently associated with such approaches. This volume brings together internationally recognised analytic philosophers, including Alvin Plantinga, Peter van Inwagen and Robert Audi, to question the project of naturalism. (...) The articles investigate what it means to naturalize a domain of philosophical inquiry and look at how this applies to the various sub-disciplines of philosophy including epistemology, metaphysics and the philosophy of the mind. The issue of whether naturalism is desirable is raised and the contributors take seriously the possibility that excellent analytic philosophy can be undertaken without naturalization. Controversial and thought-provoking, Analytic Philosophy Without Naturalism examines interesting and contentious methodological issues in analytic philosophy and explores the connections between philosophy and science. (shrink)

The idea of omnipotence plays a crucial role within the framework of classical theism. God is typically considered omnipotent, that is, able to perform any action. Sometimes, it is said that for God there is no difference between will and action; everything he wishes happens. However, as one reflects on the concept of omnipotence, some rather complex questions arise; the range of God’s possible “actions” is not clear. What are the boundaries of the power of an omnipotent being, if these (...) boundaries exist at all? In this paper, we will examine an interesting question: is it possible that two omnipotent beings exist? Or, does the property of omnipotence necessarily imply the uniqueness of its instantiation? Intuitively, the existence of more than one omnipotent being seems to be contradictory. However, we will demonstrate that under some conditions the existence of two omnipotent beings is possible. (shrink)

The main aim of this essay is to try to clarify a central question concerning the coherence of emergent dualism. The question is approximately this: how should we articulate and defend emergent dualism, if emergence is mostly interpreted as a kind of supervenience, and supervenience is rejected by the supporters of dualism together with the dependence of the mental on the physical. What should an adequate conception of emergence look like? This essay will be part of an attempt to provide (...) an answer to this question. (shrink)

The idea of omnipotence plays a crucial role within the framework of classical theism. God is typically considered omnipotent, that is, able to perform any action. Sometimes, it is said that for God there is no difference between will and action; everything he wishes happens. However, as one reflects on the concept of omnipotence, some rather complex questions arise; the range of God’s possible “actions” is not clear. What are the boundaries of the power of an omnipotent being, if these (...) boundaries exist at all? In this paper, we will examine an interesting question: is it possible that two omnipotent beings exist? Or, does the property of omnipotence necessarily imply the uniqueness of its instantiation? Intuitively, the existence of more than one omnipotent being seems to be contradictory. However, we will demonstrate that under some conditions the existence of two omnipotent beings is possible. (shrink)

Quantum physics, unlike classical physics, suggests a non-physicalistic metaphysics. Whereas physicalism implies a reductive position in the philosophy of mind, quantum physics is compatible with non-reductionism, and actually seems to support it. The essays in this book explore, from various points of view, the possibilities of basing a non-reductive philosophy of mind on quantum physics."--Back cover.

Between the 1970s and the 1980s social practices were the object of theoretical research in some areas of sociology and cultural anthropology, to meet the need to integrate structuralist, functionalist or Marxist objectivist theories of society by using more sensitive types of approach to social actors, who were viewed as subjects capable of individual decisions, actions and interpretations. In particular, the role of reflexion on social practices became more relevant in the critique of society as an organic, unified whole, also (...) stressing an alternative to liberal outlooks and describing society in the basic terms of relationships between individuals. Social practices are constituted by an organic set of base elements usually applicable also outside structured practices but assuming a peculiar network of relationships within them. This studies is an attempt to show the distinct traits that rationality criteria take while operating inside social, cooperative practices, also pointing to the consequences that this configuration has in the relationship between practictioners and institutions. (shrink)