This chapter examines autonomism. Autonomism is roughly the view that an artwork’s ethical properties do not bear on its aesthetic or artistic value. The author sketches some of the view’s history before describing various versions of it defended over the last quarter-century. These are divided into ‘radical’, ‘robust’, and ‘moderate’ forms of autonomism. The author considers the strengths and weaknesses of each. The author also devotes some space to the ‘interactionist’ views against which contemporary autonomism is typically opposed. In doing (...) so, he considers the so-called ‘qua problem’ at some length, as well its bearing on these various autonomist positions. (shrink)

This study investigates “dark ecology” – an ecological theory formulated by Timothy Morton, based on an object-oriented ontology and claimed to offer a new perspective on how humans can and should coexist with other “objects” in the world in a better, less hostile way. Dark ecology is a critique of both an anthropocentric and a biocentric worldview, aiming to erase the dichotomy between human/nature and subject/object. This essay performs an internal critique of dark ecology, analyzing and interpreting Morton’s books Dark (...) Ecology (2016) and Being Ecological (2018) through the lens of two central concepts – “responsibility” and “agency” in order to extract the premises of importance to the theory. These premises are then presented in Aristotelian syllogisms, based on which the validity of dark ecology is evaluated. The aim of the essay is to find an answer to the question as to whether dark ecology is logically coherent and consistent – and thus can really be seen as a fruitful perspective on how humankind should act in relation to the environment or not. The result from this investigation is that dark ecology is an invalid theory since it suffers from both incoherence and inconsistency. Based on this, it is concluded that dark ecology fails to achieve what it is presented to do. The answer to the research question of this essay, “Is dark ecology a theory that, if applied, leads to a change in humans’ relationship with the biosphere for the better?” is therefore “no”. (shrink)

Understanding causation in social-ecological systems (SES) is indispensable for promoting sustainable outcomes. However, the study of such causal relations is challenging because they are often complex and intertwined, and their analysis involves diverse disciplines. Although there is agreement that no single research approach (RA) can comprehensively explain SES phenomena, there is a lack of ability to deal with this diversity. Underlying this diversity and the challenge of dealing with it are different causal reasonings that are rarely explicit. Awareness of hidden (...) assumptions is essential for understanding how the causal reasoning of an RA is constituted, and for promoting the integration, translation, or juxtaposition of different RAs. We identify the following elements as particularly relevant for understanding causal reasoning: methods, frameworks and theories, accounts of causation, analytical focus, and causal notions. We begin with the idea that one of these elements typically figures as an entry point to an RA. This entry point is particularly important because it generates a path dependence that orients causal reasoning. In a subsequent step, when an approach is applied, causal reasoning concretizes as a result of a particular constellation of the remaining elements. We come to these insights by studying the application of four different RAs to the same social-ecological case (the collapse of Baltic cod stocks in the 1980s). On the basis of our findings we developed a guide for the analysis of causal reasoning by raising awareness of the assumptions, key elements, and the relations between these key elements for a given RA. The guide can be used to elicit the causal reasoning of RAs, facilitate interdisciplinary collaboration, and support disclosure of ethical/political dimensions that underlie management/governance interventions that are formulated on the basis of causal findings of research studies. (shrink)

Ancient therapeutic practices have influenced the development of cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) theories such as Albert Ellis's rational emotive behavior therapy and Aaron Beck's cognitive therapy. By drawing inspiration from Socratic questioning, the importance of philosophy in evidence-based practices in human mental health can be acknowledged. Stoicism has also informed CBT, notably its emphasis on establishing psychological distance from emotions. Cognition and emotion are two aspects of mental processes, and irrational demands are processed through rational deliberation. Using mental imaging techniques (...) and acceptance strategies (to accept oneself and the world as imperfect), avoiding catastrophic interpretations and acknowledging emotions are also included among such practices. MethodsWe will explore the use of values across CBT, acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT), and radically open dialectical behavioral therapy (RO DBT) to clarify their use of values. ResultsIn this framework, values are conceptualized as life-orienting principles and are now widely used across CBTs, such as acceptance and commitment therapy and radically open dialectical behavioral therapy. In recent years, the development of CBT has involved a renewed relationship with philosophy through the use of values, interest in dialectics and development of self-questioning practices reminiscent of classical Socratic principles. This movement from applied clinical psychology toward philosophical skills has also encouraged the recent emergence of philosophical health considerations. The opposition between psychological and philosophical health can be questioned, and the fundamental issue of philosophical skills implemented in psychiatric treatment (and not solely as practices of enhancement for the sane) needs to be considered. (shrink)

Recent research papers and tests in real life point in the direction that machines in the future may develop some form of possibly rudimentary inner life. Philosophers have warned and emphasized that the possibility of artificial suffering or the possibility of machines as moral patients should not be ruled out. In this paper, I reflect on the consequences for moral development of striving for AGI. In the introduction, I present examples which point into the direction of the future possibility of (...) artificial suffering and highlight the increasing similarity between, for example, machine–human and human–human interaction. Next, I present and discuss responses to the possibility of artificial suffering supporting a cautious attitude for the sake of the machines. From a virtue ethical perspective and the development of human virtues, I subsequently argue that humans should not pursue the path of developing and creating AGI, not merely for the sake of possible suffering in machines, but also due to machine–human interaction becoming more alike to human–human interaction and for the sake of the human’s own moral development. Thus, for several reasons, humanity, as a whole, should be extremely cautious about pursuing the path of developing AGI—Artificial General Intelligence. (shrink)

In Meaning as Species, Mark Richard provides an argument to the conclusion that stipulation can transiently create perfect intralinguistic synonymy. The key to achieve this is the notion of meaning as "abstracted common ground” (ACG). In this thesis, I argue that Richard’s argument is not enough to ensure the existence of perfect synonymy. It remains possible to coin a new term, stipulate that it has the same meaning(-cum-ACG) as a previous one, and yet make the case that the coined term (...) is only an instance of the original term. This is important if we use a notion of perfect synonymy for which it is necessary, for two words to be synonyms, that they are different words. To defend my claim, I deal with two distinct notions of perfect synonymy, the criterion of equinormality, and the distinction between word-instances and word-types. (shrink)

In this paper, I provide a rich account of the mental content representing the intentionality of empathic emotion in cases concerning activist art. At the core of this account is a distinction between intentional content and what I call mediating content. Intentional content is, with regard to empathic emotion, a proposition referring to the relationship between the emotion empathised with and its intentional object. Mediating content is a proposition representing the emotion empathised with which also attributes that emotion to the (...) person empathised with. I argue that this distinction is necessary to account for when a person’s affective empathy is provoked by activist art. This is because the emotion empathised with is, in such cases, not per se an actually occurring emotion. I suggest that the emotion empathised with is instead a hypothetical emotion which attributes to a description of the people within the situations symbolised by activist art. (shrink)

In this research, Lua Nazerian examines the conceptualization of three different statements given by leaders of the Bahá'í, Catholic, and Tibetan Buddhist faiths on the topic of world peace. Moreover, through a comparative analysis, each conceptualization was examined in light of the different degrees they agree or contradict each other and whether a coherent contribution could be made to a common concept of world peace. The research was conducted in two stages, first, through the thematic analysis method some major principles (...) and overarching themes specific to each statement and relevant to the concept of world peace were identified, followed by a comparative analysis with the support of two operative questions. Furthermore, as there are multiple challenges with studying the abstract and complex concepts of peace and religious voices, the study was conducted through the lens of the statements rather than through religions to avoid this pitfall. It was found that while determining the overall coherence of each perspective, some common philosophical premises and core understandings of human nature and interconnectedness appeared to cohere. Meanwhile, some fundamental differences arose on the level of theological starting points that affected the overarching approach to world peace as such. However, these differences did not contradict a coherent contribution of a common conceptualization of world peace. Although the findings of this research are in the emerging stages of the evolution of further research, the contribution of its undertaking is of value to the field of religion in peace and conflict studies. (shrink)

Book review : The philosophy of person‐centred healthcareBy Derek Mitchell, Michael Loughlin, Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. 2023.201 pp. £64.99. ISBN (10): 1‐5275‐9058‐5, ISBN (13): 978‐1‐5275‐9058‐8.

In this review study, we ask ourselves if decoherence theory can solve the problems of measurement in quantum mechanics. After an introduction to decoherence theory, we present the problem of preferred basis, the problem of non-observability of interference and the problem of definite outcomes. We present Zurek's theory of environment induced superselection rules and find that the problem of preferred basis and the problem of non-observability of interference can be solved through decoherence theory, but not the problem of outcomes, if (...) we accept the eigenstate-eigenvalue link and the Born statistical interpretation. We reveal that these two concepts are essential in the Copenhagen interpretations of quantum mechanics, and give an account for von Neumann's and Wigner's conscious collapse interpretation as well as a detailed description of Bohr's and Heisenberg's interpretation. We discuss how Bohr's and Heisenberg's interpretation relates to decoherence with a special emphasis on the irreducibility of classical concepts as interpreted by Don Howard. During the discussion, we critique Wigner's use of the word "consciousness" as opposed to von Neumann's use, as well as Howard's decisively ontological approach to Bohr through an antithetical Kantian approach. We conclude by stating that decoherence theory cannot decisively solve the problem of definite outcomes of quantum mechanics, even when considering it in relation to the Copenhagen interpretation. (shrink)

I argue that talking about aesthetic injustice implies reflection about some failures on the exercise of aesthetic judgment due to mechanisms of oppression, which have a negative impact on the development of potential aesthetic agents. I claim that mechanisms of oppression like aesthetic identity prejudice, oppression or lack of recognition of sensitivities, and aesthetic dysfunctionality in sites of enunciation continue undermining the degree of validation of potential aesthetic agents - who mostly belong to historical oppressed groups like women, black people, (...) indigenous, native Americans, among others. Overall, my aim is to analyze how these mechanisms of oppression continue undermining, marginalizing, and immobilizing the development of potential aesthetic agents. My proposal resides in the idea that these mechanisms of oppression enable aesthetic injustice on three levels: testimonial aesthetic injustice, hermeneutical aesthetic injustice, and aesthetic dysfunction. (shrink)

The general aim was to explore philosophy of life, expectations and optimism in patients and spouses in two different cancer situations, and to determine whether these aspects had relevance for psychological distress and quality of life. The first situation was being newly diagnosed with advanced cancer. Data on philosophy of life, optimism and psychological distress were gathered on one occasion. In addition, changes in life were described using a qualitative approach in a sub-sample. The second situation was having completed curative (...) cancer treatment. Data on expectations for the recovery period, optimism, psychological distress and quality of life were gathered on three occasions. Moreover, expectations and how these turned out were described using a qualitative approach in a sub-sample. The results show that being diagnosed with an advanced cancer influenced aspects of patients’ and spouses’ philosophy of life, including that existential questions were common and were related to higher psychological distress. All experienced substantial mental changes in life, often also physical, practical and sometimes positive changes. Patients more often seemed to accept their situation and prepared themselves for death, whereas spouses had more difficulties in handling the situation. Patients who had completed curative treatment generally had higher expectations for the recovery period than did their spouses, and patients expectations were fulfilled to a lesser degree, however, this generally had little importance for psychological distress or quality of life. Patients’ expectation for their recovery period was generally that they would get well. For those whose recovery period had been tough, expectations were often unfulfilled, but they were often satisfied with their current life anyway owing to positive changes. Being optimistic was the most beneficial for decreased psychological distress in both samples, as well as for better quality of life in the recovery group. (shrink)

This thesis poses the question ‘What is the critique of democracy in Plato’s Republic?’ It is not the first to do so. But contrary to standard readings, this thesis does not assume neither epistemological nor elitist explanations. Rather, it sees the Kallipolis, ‘the beautiful city in words’ as predicated on a particular anthropology. This theory of human nature, which claims that it is human to be greedy for wealth, sex, and power is contributed by Glaucon, Socrates’ main interlocutor in the (...) dialogue. Noting this, the argument of this thesis makes the following interpretational claims about the Republic: First, I claim that the Kallipolis should be read as an answer to the following question: What would a just city look like given the anthropology of Glaucon? The second claim informing this thesis is the following: Reading the Republic itself as challenging this anthropology, the function of the anthropology it provides is not so much a positive theory of human nature as it is revealing of what Glaucon, in most regards a paradigmatic Athenian citizen, thinks is human nature. His ideas and character are thus central to my reading of the Republic. What has this got to do with democracy? Glaucon’s beliefs, ideas, and his character can not be understood without reference to the society which has produced him, that is, the democratic polis of Ancient Athens. This premise is inserted by the city-soul analogy, a central tenet of the argument of the Republic. As this thesis argues, the tripartite soul provides an explanatory model which accounts for why and how the human soul is moldable and plastic. Furthermore, the thesis contributes to the issue of akrasia, by that it based on this interpretation becomes possible to say that cases of akrasia, – breakdowns of rationality – differ in its causes like the souls of humans differ in their internal constitutions: Humans, the Republic postulates, simply attribute different weight to different reasons, depending on what part of our soul rules, and hence, what the soul has set as its ‘good’. Building on this account of individual decision-making, this thesis offers a twofold analysis of how the interaction between regime and man is portrayed in the Republic, first with regard to the social institutions, secondly with regard to the political institutions. This analysis is based on the premise that the Kallipolis represents an implicit critique against democratic Athens, but rather than being an ideal to offset democratic shortcomings, I argue that the Kallipolis is the realization of democratic desires combined with a need for justice. If, and only if, Glaucon’s is the true anthropology of man, is Kallipolis the most just state. But, as this thesis will show, Glaucon’s anthropology is not universalizable, but is rather an expression of the particularly democratic anthropology. Ultimately, Socrates will show that if allowed to evolve unchecked, the natural culmination of the democracy is tyranny. In order to make this argument, the Republic mobilizes tropes related to tyranny which already abound within democratic and dissenting discourse, in order to posit the democratic value of ‘freedom’ as closely related to the tyrannical lust for power. Following this interpretation, the answer to the initial question is that the Republic criticizes democracy’s institutional practices, poetic tradition, and theoretical ideals showing how democracy instills in its citizens the kind of desires and values that will make them susceptible to the tyrannical coups which the Athenians of the fifth century seemed more than eager to avoid. In my reading of the Republic, the main threat was not outside forces, but their own desires and internal constitutions. Only through developing self-knowledge in the philosophical sense can the Athenian, represented by Glaucon, truly learn to guard himself against tyranny from within. (shrink)

This thesis seeks to shed light on a remarkable figure in Russian history, Father Alexander Men’. How and why did Men’ identify Vladimir Solovyov, Nikolai Berdyaev, and other pre-revolutionary cultural figures as representatives of authentic Russian religious culture? Why would a popular Russian Orthodox priest present the writings of mystics, anarchists, and the Silver Age counterculture as the antidote for seventy years of Soviet materialism? What role did Judaism and the Russo-Jewish intellectual tradition have on Men’s identifications as an Orthodox (...) priest? I use a semiotic theory of culture following Yuri Lotman and the Tartu–Moscow Semiotic School as a framework to analyze the historical development of Orthodox personalism. Through this we find a coherent justification for Men’s cultural project. This thesis traces this line of thought from theories of cultural unity by Pyotr Chaadayev, through Christian universalism in Vladimir Solovyov, the existential personalism of Nikolai Berdyaev, and finally through Men’s personal relationship with Nadezhda Mandelstam. (shrink)

This paper considers some uses of Free Indirect Discourse within non-fictional discourse. It is shown that these differ from ordinary uses in that they do not attribute actual thoughts or utterances. I argue that the explanation for this is that these uses of Free Indirect Discourse are not assertoric. Instead, it is argued here that they are fictional uses, that is, they are used with fictional force like utterances used to tell a fictional story. Rather than making assertions about the (...) actual world, these occurrences of Free Indirect Discourse introduce localized fictional scenarios from which audiences are meant to learn factual information. As such, they exhibit some of the ways in which the involvement of perspective in historical fiction has been shown to facilitate learning and retention of information. (shrink)

This article presents and illustrates an analytical framework designed to open-up the black-box of what and how people learn while trying to tackle sustainability problems and to investigate the potential of learning processes and outcomes to enable transitions. It consists of an analytical method: practical epistemology analysis, and two analytical models: transactional learning theory and the multi-level perspective on sustainability transitions. The framework is empirically illustrated with an analysis of what/how people learn through participating in workshops to develop scenarios for (...) creating a more sustainable urban food system. The article presents three different learning situations, reveals how diverse learning processes have varied potential to enable sustainability transitions and discusses how such studies can provide guidance for improving learning in the context sustainability transitions. (shrink)

The issues raised in this thesis concern the adverse effects of EU's wildlife trade regulations, mainly the unequal treatment of captive and wild-born endangered animals. The nature of these regulations is analyzed from an animal law perspective. The purpose of the analysis is to determine whether the regulations are anthropocentric and, if so, what issues arise from it. Previous research has studied the legal personhood of animals in relation to animal welfare. This thesis continues that discussion by examining legal animal (...) rights as a potential solution to the issues of wildlife trade. The analysis is pragmatic and employs a non-formalistic view of law. Consequentially, it uses a doctrinal and legal philosophical approach, meaning that sources outside of law are integral to the discussion. The results of the analysis show that EU’s wildlife trade regulations are anthropocentric and that this has led to severe issues regarding the welfare of endangered animals. In addition, the practical enforcement of the regulations has proven defective. Legal rights for animals seem to provide a viable solution to these issues, yet their practical implementation is complicated. The reasons for this are primarily financial and opinion-based. Therefore, a step-by-step approach, starting with limited fundamental rights and resulting in full legal personhood for animals, is recommended for this approach to be successful. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with the examination of Caspar Hare's de dicto approach to the non-identity problem and specifically the non-identity case of The Inconsiderate Mother. On the de dicto approach an act can be wrong if it makes things de dicto worse for a role, even if that act does not make things worse for any actual person that fills that role. In this paper I provide a brief overview and reconstruction of Hare's argument. I argue that objections to (...) Hare's arguments due to David Wasserman do not give us reason to dismiss the de dicto approach. Lastly I consider an objection to the effect that Hare's solution to the non-identity problem is ad hoc. I conclude that the de dicto approach faces some challenges but that we cannot readily dismiss it. (shrink)

This dissertation explores and analyzes interpretive skepticism in literary theory. It argues that traditional interpretive theories and debates often harbor unacknowledged forms of skeptical thinking and arguments. As these forms of skepticism are seldom recognized as skepticism, the problem tends to remain hidden and unresolved. The dissertation further argues that interpretive skepticism is (i) the result of a philosophical confusion, and (ii) practically harmful when used in order to regulate interpretive practice. Accordingly, a central purpose of the dissertation is to (...) offer an analysis and taxonomy of what interpretive skepticism is. Only once we are in a position to understand and recognize it in its many guises will we be able to criticize and challenge it. The first part of the dissertation thus aims at identifying a specific structure of skeptical reasoning within the theory of literary interpretation. In articulating this taxonomy and analysis, the study builds on the American philosopher Stanley Cavell’s reinterpretation of epistemological skepticism in terms of tragedy, avoidance and repudiation of grammatical criteria. The second part of the study explores, in greater detail, interpretive skepticism within New Criticism. It centers on analyses of two classics within interpretive theory: “The Intentional Fallacy” by Monroe C. Beardsley (and W.K. Wimsatt) and “The Heresy of Paraphrase” by Cleanth Brooks. The study argues that Beardsley becomes both a so-called “skeptical twin” about literary interpretation and a straightforward literary other-minds skeptic with regard to authorial intentions. Brooks, for his part, becomes a straightforward skeptic about poetic interpretation and a “skeptical twin” about poetic meaning. Both theorists are investigated in comparison with Cavell’s explorations of the themes of intention, overinterpretation, fraudulence, modernism, and aesthetic judgment in art, literature and criticism. Despite these skeptical findings, the study also argues that there are important similarities between Cavell’s non-skeptical approach to literature and criticism, and New Critical “close reading.” The dissertation concludes with a chapter that leaves the confines of the New Critical idiom to explore interpretive skepticism within the tradition of so-called “hermeneutics of suspicion.” Through readings of Susan Sontag, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, and Cora Diamond, it argues that suspicious or paranoid hermeneutics is not skeptical in itself but can become so through the skeptical temptations of dogmatism, authoritarianism, and fraudulence. (shrink)

Does the regulation of migration constitute a blatant case of arbitrary law-making? What is arbitrary law-making? And how does it manifest itself in contemporary migration policy? These are pressing issues that the scholars who come together in this special issue seek to engage with, by exploring international migration from the point of view of arbitrary power. When does legitimate state discretion slide into an exercise of arbitrary power? Since we cannot address what we do not understand, the urgency of the (...) matter addressed in this special issue speaks for itself. Deciding who may enjoy the right of abode, the right to remain, the right to asylum and to citizenship is a key power of the state: it is a regal prerogative, an act of sovereignty, limited only by deliberately accepted commitments, such as the respect for human rights. This makes migration policy an exceptionally interesting ground to test the limits of discretion and the forms of arbitrariness. Power can be understood to be of a discretional nature if it acts freely within the boundaries defined by law, whereas arbitrariness qualifies discretional power exceeding the limits of law. (shrink)

In this chapter, I argue that empirical research of religious belief demands reconsidering the role of doctrinal commitments in religious life. Empirical evidence shows that believers are commonly incorrect about the content of doctrinal statements, and apparently not much interested in that content. Therefore, I propose the hypothesis that, in many cases, doctrinal beliefs are held by believers as sacred artefacts, without a proper understanding of their propositional contents, but with a strong adherence to them. I compare the way doctrinal (...) statements are held by believers with their treatment of icons, which rather present sacred objects and states of affairs than representing them. Icons are developed by religious authorities and supplied to believers in a ready-made form. This approach has important ramifications for religious diversity: if doctrines are developed by religious authorities together with other sacred religious objects, and commonly treated by believers as sacred artefacts, then the content of highly developed doctrines does not represent the essence and scope of religious belief and religious diversity. Hence, doctrinal diversity should be treated on par with cultural diversity, or a diversity of artistic styles. (shrink)

Multidimensional property supplementation is a grounded theory method for analysis that conceives of concepts as multidimensional spaces of possibilities. It is applied in an iterative process comprising four steps: expansion, whereby vague codes are split and contraries postulated; abstraction of practically significant differences in terms of properties and dimensions; geometrization of properties to create conceptual subspaces that supplant subcategories and have additional, emergent qualities; and unification of the concept by validating it against data and relieving it of properties that do (...) not tie in sufficiently with other concepts. Multidimensional conceptual models encourage the researcher to elaborate properties that explain, predict, or guide action. Fully developed, they can be easily connected to others in a process and function, by virtue of their emergent qualities, as falsifiable hypotheses in their own right. For these reasons, multidimensional property supplementation is open to epistemological justification without presuming acceptance of techniques specific to grounded theory. (shrink)

The essay is an attempt to make sense of the apparently special relation between self-knowledge and agency. To achieve that goal, the essay translates the account of what it is like to be a human self offered by Sartre into the language of evolutionary psychology. In L’être et le néant, Sartre describes the phenomenology of the self as a series of inescapable choices in a contingent set of circumstances. This essay identifies Sartre’s description with what Baumeister, Maranges and Sjåstad call (...) a matrix of maybe: the mechanism of nonfactual pragmatic prospection found in humans. Consequently, it defines the self as a matrix of maybe operating within a contingency matrix and reflecting on its own operation. Self-knowledge, the essay concludes, seems special because we routinely and erroneously ascribe to the self features of its contingency matrix. Most of our true first-person claims should not be read as I PREDICATE. Instead, they can be explicated as I have to act in a world where C PREDICATE, where C is the relevant part of the contingency matrix. (shrink)

In today’s society, it becomes increasingly important to assess which non-human and non-verbal beings possess consciousness. This review article aims to delineate criteria for consciousness especially in animals, while also taking into account intelligent artifacts. First, we circumscribe what we mean with “consciousness” and describe key features of subjective experience: qualitative richness, situatedness, intentionality and interpretation, integration and the combination of dynamic and stabilizing properties. We argue that consciousness has a biological function, which is to present the subject with a (...) multimodal, situational survey of the surrounding world and body, subserving complex decision-making and goal-directed behavior. This survey reflects the brain’s capacity for internal modeling of external events underlying changes in sensory state. Next, we follow an inside-out approach: how can the features of conscious experience, correlating to mechanisms inside the brain, be logically coupled to externally observable properties? Instead of proposing criteria that would each define a “hard” threshold for consciousness, we outline six indicators: goal-directed behavior and model-based learning; anatomic and physiological substrates for generating integrative multimodal representations; psychometrics and meta-cognition; episodic memory; susceptibility to illusions and multistable perception; and specific visuospatial behaviors. Rather than emphasizing a particular indicator as being decisive, we propose that the consistency amongst these indicators can serve to assess consciousness in particular species. The integration of scores on the various indicators yields an overall, graded criterion for consciousness, somewhat comparable to the Glasgow Coma Scale for unresponsive patients. When considering theoretically derived measures of consciousness, it is argued that their validity should not be assessed on the basis of a single quantifiable measure, but requires cross-examination across multiple pieces of evidence, including the indicators proposed here. Current intelligent machines, including deep learning neural networks and agile robots, are not indicated to be conscious yet. Instead of assessing machine consciousness by a brief Turing-type of test, evidence for it may gradually accumulate when we study machines ethologically and across time, considering multiple behaviors that require flexibility, improvisation, spontaneous problem-solving and the situational conspectus typically associated with conscious experience. (shrink)

This dissertation is a study of Thomas Aquinas’s and Godfrey of Fontaines’s moral philosophies. In this study, I conduct a detailed analysis of two Aristotelian commitments concerning the character virtues, namely, The Plurality of the Character Virtues and The Connection of the Character Virtues. Both Aquinas and Godfrey think that there are many distinct character virtues, however, one cannot possess these character virtues in separation from each other. In Chapter I, it is established that Aquinas believes in the plurality of (...) the character virtues not because of a specific account of the human soul, but because he is committed to a plurality in what he calls “the notion of goodness.” In Chapter II, it is argued that Aquinas’s account of virtuous action requires that there be a likeness between a person and their actions in terms of the notion of goodness explored in Chapter I. Chapters III through V lay out my account of how to reconstruct both Aquinas’s and Godfrey’s arguments for The Connection of the Character Virtues. The focus here lies on finding an interpretation that provides a valid argument for the connection of the character virtues. I argue that we ought to focus on a dependence between prudence and the character virtues. A central problem for this analysis is how to account for prudence as a unified virtue. On this issue, Godfrey provides an explicit argument that conceives of prudence as unified because prudence strikes a balance between the character virtues. Chapter VI investigates whether different groups, such as men and women, possess different types of character virtues. Godfrey offers a novel argument for the impossibility of male- and female-specific virtues. Finally, Chapter VII explores the question of how we should understand Godfrey’s account of prudence itself. I show that his discussion emphasizes the variable nature of ethics and that he endorses a view that has certain affinities with ethical particularism. (shrink)

When discussing any question in which a human being has a moral claim or a moral choice to make we need to address the justification of those claims and actions. Hence one can ask the question whether we can discuss a justification of moral judgments without having any specific knowledge about any corresponding fact or if it is possible to justify a moral judgment without having that kind of knowledge. This thesis has critically assessed Rainer Forst’s justification theory in relation (...) to moral epistemology, aiming at clarifying his position on the matter. The study shows that Forst’s position is one of a cognitivist nature with a form of rational constructivism. The thesis suggests an alternative approach to Forst’s justification theory. Forst should take on an empiricist explanation when it comes to justifying moral judgements and therefore an epistemology that is not rationalism. Therefore, I suggest a form of realism when it comes to the discussion of his ontology. (shrink)

This dissertation, by presenting comprehensive analyses of six poems by the Hungarian poet Sándor Weöres, investigates the poetical forms and the poetical philosophies in these texts. The poems represent specific philosophic spheres of Weöres' poetry. The analyses emerge from the formal elements, and aim to shed light upon the structural coherences between the texts and their philosophical contexts. This method of analysis also complies with Weöres' views on the aesthetics of poetics and his method of writing, where form and structure (...) always played an outstandingly important role. The complex methods used in the analyses are very much influenced by the views and methods of a text stylistics that looks at the literary work as a global entity. Taken together, these analyses illustrate the focal points of a remarkable poetical form and a most profound philosophical context in the poems of an outstanding Hungarian poet. (shrink)

When the German constitutional court expressed itself in the Lisbon ruling, on the 30th of June 2009, the famous German newspaper Der Bild published the corrosive headline “the end of federalism”. The aim of this paper is to present and discuss the arguments of the Court concerning the nature of the EU as a confederation, the illegitimacy of further development towards a federal state and the determination of the EU’s ‘core competences’, in order to shed light on why, within the (...) EU, the relationship between federalism and democracy appears to be so tense. The point is that the claim that the EU cannot legitimately become a federation without calling for the constituent power of the German people is grounded in a circular logic that ultimately depends on the definition of citizenry adopted. Two connected issues will thus be deepened. On one hand, we look at the problem of jurisdictional competence attribution, the ‘ultra vires’ and ‘domaine réservé’ doctrines. In particular, the adoption of criteria for determining the state’s core competences on the basis of the principle of essentiality will be assessed. On the other hand, the focus is on the theory of democracy that the German constitutional court embraces, according to which ‘the democratic legitimacy derives from the interconnection between the action of European governmental entities and the parliaments of the Member states’. (shrink)

Many people seem to share some version of what has been called the “intuition of neutrality” aboutcreating new people, which, roughly, says that there exists a certain range of levels of well-beingsuch that creating people within this range is, in itself, morally neutral, but creating people with alevel of well-being outside this range is not morally neutral. In this paper, I will discuss differentinterpretations of this intuition, and specifically distinguish between what I will call counterfactualinterpretations and Do-interpretations of the intuition. (...) I will argue that it is hard to interpret theintuition in a way that does not give rise to antinatalist moral reasons, i.e. reasons favoring an emptyfuture population, when it comes to choices of social policy. In particular, this holds if we assume aconception of relevant outcomes of actions reflecting consequentialist moral intuitions. In the end, I will formulate a normative principle of welfare promotion which I argue respects the most plausiblecounterfactual version of the neutrality intuition. (shrink)

The Maastricht Treaty first introduced the status of EU citizenship. The twentieth anniversary of the signing of the Treaty, marked in 2013, was declared the European Year of the Citizen. Union citizenship has been understood as the world’s first post-national citizenship, although it is still complementary to national citizenships. EU citizens enjoy rights that have been expanded, modified, and reinterpreted in light of the EU integration process. The Court of Justice of the European Union has been a driving force in (...) this process. This twentieth anniversary has provided the occasio for this special issue. Indeed, much has happened over the last two decades. The Maastricht Treaty entered into force on the heels of German reunification, and afterwards, a series of EU treaties followed: The Amsterdam Treaty, the Nice Charter of Fundamental Rights, the aborted constitutionalization process and the Rome Treaty in 2004, and the Treaty of Lisbon. The Euro took over former national currencies in 2002; the enlargement process led to today’s twenty-eight Member States. But the ratio of this special issue is based on other events as linked to the 2008 financial crisis, bailouts, the fiscal compact, and similar measures. In a nutshell, the timeliness of this volume is linked to the current financial disarray. Since prognosis presupposes diagnosis, no further words are necessary as to the importance of this task. It is self-evident that before taking action and preparing for the future, one needs to address the very first question: Nosce te ipsum... (shrink)

It is well known that Josephus was not at all a dispassionate historian. There are biases and heavy interests modeling his accounts. Nevertheless, the claim that Judas the Galilean and the Fourth Philosophy are nothing but Josephus’ fabrication is an exceedingly bold contention. In this article it is argued that the initial skepticism towards that contention is fully justified. On the basis of a whole set of arguments it is concluded that the traditional view, according to which the core of (...) Josephus’ account is trustworthy, is by far the most plausible one. Even if we should not credulously believe every point of Josephus’ presentation, his accounts of Judas and the Fourth Philosophy seem to be reliable. (shrink)

This paper examines Foucault’s attempt to displace the constitutive role of the subject of knowledge and to replace it with the concrete practices that constitute subjects. The prevalent tendency to transform discourse analysis into a new form of epistemology, here exemplified through the works of Paul Veyne, is criticized. It is suggested that Veyne’s reading of Foucault is subject to an illusion similar to what Kant once called “transcendental illusion,” and gives rise to a new form of metaphysics which repeats (...) the problematic that Foucault originally aimed to overcome. (shrink)

The Benacerraf challenge is a well-known objection to Platonism in mathematics. Its proponent argues that, if mathematical entities are, as Platonists claim, mind-independent, causally inert, and existent beyond space and time, then we are led to a skeptical stance according to which it is not possible to explain how it is that we have cognitive access to the mathematical realm or how it is that our mathematical beliefs are reliable. It has been argued that a similar objection could be leveled (...) against those forms of moral realism that fall under what in Section 2 was called “robust moral realism.” In “Moral Skepticism and the Benacerraf Challenge,” Folke Tersman considers whether, unlike the argument from the best explanation, the argument from disagreement, and the argument from evolution, the moral version of the Benacerraf challenge can undermine moral knowledge without appealing to empirical claims that moral realists deem controversial. His verdict is negative: to successfully counter certain responses to the moral version of the challenge, its proponent needs to have recourse to empirical considerations taken from some of the above arguments. (shrink)

“The question of finding a merciful God. Understanding Martin Luther’s relation to metaphysics and ontology” Myrén, Anna. 2017, Master’s Thesis, 30 credits. E-mail: [email protected] The Department of Theology, Uppsala University, Engelska Parken, Thunbergsv. 3B, Box 511, SE-751 20 UPPSALA, Sweden, [email protected] This thesis examines arguments and premises for understanding Luther’s relationship to metaphysics and ontology. The main theoretical sources are firstly research that, on the one hand argue that Luther’s doctrine of justification has ontological structures and on the other treat (...) his relation to metaphysics, and secondly sources that treat Luther’s development of theological themes and issues from a history of ideas perspective. The thesis concludes that the arguments of Finnish Luther scholars Tuomo Mannermaa and Sammeli Juntunen are helpful for understanding the relationship between Luther, metaphysics and ontology. Their conclusions display different levels of structures in his doctrine; thematic as well as re-oriented structures of thought, showing that Luther is occupied with metaphysical and ontology and presenting strong arguments for his doctrine of justification as ontological. Luther’s doctrinal development can be understood both as a result of criticism of substance-metaphysics, as well as itself ultimately displaying metaphysical and ontological issues. Such contents in his theology should be viewed in the larger perspective of forming theology, a history of ideas context that broadens the question to one of structures of thought, involving themes, issues, forming of doctrine as processual development. However, their thematic, doctrinal focus risks not giving full account for understanding Luther’s relation to metaphysical and ontological issues. An intricacy of the question is displayed and possible to trace when Luther’s theology is addressed from systematical as well as historical perspectives. The thesis finally argues with the help of a history of ideas perspective that the theologia crucis - specifically with its concept of the hidden God, the deus absconditus – is a resource for further inquiry of Luther and metaphysics, in understanding his theology as describing reality. Keywords: Luther, metaphysics, ontology, doctrine of justification, Mannermaa, Juntunen, themes, structures of thought, theologia crucis, deus absconditus. (shrink)

The present thesis explores Article 19 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which recognizes the right of all persons with disabilities to live in the community, with choices equal to others. The relationship between Article 19 and the other articles of the Convention are explored, in order to discuss the role of Article 19 in the Convention. The thesis examines whether the right to live in the community, set out in Article 19, can be (...) considered as the most central right of the Convention. The thesis applies the legal analytical method, and it is based on the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities; the communications of the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities; official reports of the United Nations as well as international non-governmental organizations; and scientific articles from books and journals. By using Arendt’s idea of “the right to have rights” as a theory, this thesis argues that the right to live in the community, contained in Article 19, constitutes the right to have rights for persons with disabilities and therefore it can be considered as the most central right of the Convention. (shrink)

The United Nation’s mandate to engineer international peacecraft is correlated with the promotion of universal human rights. Universal human rights are held to apply consistently to everyone everywhere without conceivable exception. There is some debate as to whether universal human rights possibly exist. This debate centers around two difficulties: 1) the task of identifying a single trait or capability that all human beings necessarily share, and 2) the task of relating human rights to this trait or capability. Conventional epistemic justifications (...) defending the existence of universal human rights attempt to address both difficulties. However, they have become the focus of numerous criticisms. By conducting systematizing and critically reviewing text analyses, I will conclude that conventional epistemic justifications are unable to refute standard criticisms satisfactorily. In their place, I will introduce an epistemic justification from the philosophy of mind. I will attempt to demonstrate that this justification is capable of 1) identifying a single trait that all human beings necessarily share, 2) relating human rights to this trait, and 3) satisfactorily refuting the standard criticisms raised against conventional epistemic theories. I have produced this paper in the hope of further legitimizing the UN’s mandate to engineer international peacecraft by providing a more philosophically optimal justification of claims affirming the existence of universal human rights. (shrink)

This dissertation is a discussion of the challenge that cases of over-determination pose to Act-Consequentialism. Although there are many realistic examples of such cases – for example, pollution, overfishing, or the election of an inappropriate politician – I consider structurally purer examples, one of which I call “Case One.” Suppose that you and I independently shoot and kill a third person called “Victim.” Our bullets arrive at the same time and each shot would have killed Victim by itself. Finally, Victim (...) would not have been killed, if neither of us had pulled the trigger. According to the Standard Version of Act-Consequentialism, an action is wrong if and only if it has an alternative whose consequences would be intrinsically better. Case One challenges the Standard Version because there does not seem to be such an alternative to my action: Victim would have died by your shot if I had not shot him, and similar remarks apply to your action. The dissertation is structured as follows. After Chapter One, which briefly introduces the main issues of the dissertation, I turn to Chapter Two – “Preliminaries” – where I outline the Standard Version and highlight the main characteristics of over-determination cases. These cases are divided into cases of redundant difference making and cases of redundant causation. Cases of redundant causation are subdivided further into cases of causal over-determination and pre-emption. I make an important stipulation in this chapter. I say that our actions in Case One and similar cases are “redundant negative difference makers.” In Chapter Three – “Replies” – I consider whether the proponent of Act-Consequentialism might question the intuition that you and I, respectively, act wrongly in Case One. The proponent might accept that we have this intuition but explain it away, or she might deny that we have the intuition and instead point to something else that is wrong in this kind of case. For example, she could suggest that although neither you nor I act wrongly individually, we act wrongly together. I argue that these replies are problematic. For instance, explaining away this intuition might also force us to explain away intuitions that support the Standard Version. In Chapter Four – “Causal Consequences” – I discuss an alternative version of Act-Consequentialism that might seem to fare better. The Standard Version interprets the term “outcome of an action” as referring to the entire possible world that would obtain, if the action were performed. The version I have in mind, the “Causal Consequences Version of Act-Consequentialism,” understands “outcome of an action” as instead referring to the causal consequences of the action. It seems clear that you and I, respectively, cause the state of affairs that Victim dies in Case One. However, I show that the Causal Consequences Version has a number of unattractive implications. In Chapter Five – “the Non-Standard Version” – I suggest another alternative version of Act-Consequentialism. This version – the Non-Standard Version – implies that you and I act wrongly in Case One. Roughly, the Non-Standard Version says that an action is wrong if and only if it has an alternative whose consequences would be intrinsically better, or is a redundant negative difference maker. The Non-Standard Version is similar to a principle suggested by Derek Parfit. However, I shall argue that the Non-Standard Version is preferable to Parfit’s principle. In Chapter Six – “Further Cases” – I discuss a number of cases that challenge the Non-Standard Version. For example, what would the Non-Standard Version imply in a case very similar to Case One but where I would have killed another person, if I had not shot Victim? I argue that the Non-Standard Version handles this and other problematic cases, and that it is therefore a plausible alternative to the Standard Version. (shrink)

Two central issues in literature discussing legal authority seems to the the questions of what the law has when it has authority and under what conditions the law can be said to have authority. This thesis analyses an answer to these two questions as it has been developed by legal philosopher Joseph Raz. The analysis is conducted through scrutinizing the relation within and between three central concepts in Raz´s theory on legal authority; authority as normative power, the service conception and (...) the obligation to obey. As for the concept of normative power, Raz seems to alternate between defining normative power as the ability to change protected reasons for action and as being a protected reason for action. The question the thesis aims to answer is whether normative power is best understood as the ability to change protected reasons for action or as being a protected reason for action? Raz does not seem to make a distinction between the two and thus, he regards both definitions as plausible. However, the analysis suggests that while it might be plausible to use both definitions as a definition of normative power, they are not interchangeable, but rather seems to represent two different levels of normative power. The analysis of the second concept, the service conception, examines Raz´s statement that justified exclusionary reasons entail a moral obligation to obey the law. Here the thesis asks if a moral obligation to obey is a plausible consequence of justified exclusionary reasons, given Raz´s own definition of obedience. The analysis suggests that a moral obligation to obey is not a plausible consequence of exclusionary reasons being justified and thus, that there seems to be incoherence between the two. Lastly, the thesis asks about the coherence between Raz´s two statements A. that justified exclusionary reasons entail a moral obligation to obey and B. that there is no moral obligation to obey the law. This last question had to be somewhat revised as the first statement had already been suggested to be incoherent by the previous analysis. As such, this last question was revised into asking how the law can have legitimate authority when its legitimacy is tied to a moral obligation to obey, which is denied by Raz? The analysis suggests that these two statements are incoherent and that, as such, it is implausible that the law has the possibility to have legitimate authority at the same time as there exists no moral obligation to obey, as the former is dependent on the latter. The thesis ends in a number of concluding reflections. (shrink)

Turkey-origin families in Denmark have long been suffering for their children’s future due to the challenges of criminal gangs and violent religious extremist organizations. Hizmet movement which is a non-governmental civic movement offers a solution to the afore-mentioned problems of youths through education. Hizmet movement is a voluntary, transnational, faith-inspired civil movement which was founded in Turkey 50 years ago by a Muslim scholar and preacher Fethullah Gülen and now is globally active. The purpose of this thesis is to understand (...) Hizmet movement educational philosophy and its role in the success and popularity of Hay school which is situated in the capital of Denmark, Copenhagen and known as a Hizmet-inspired school. After having made a literature review about Hizmet educational philosophy, I tried to understand if this philosophy plays an important role in the success and popularity of Hay school by the data collected through institutional documents and semi-structured interviews. The conclusion is that Hay school, have many similar aspects with other Hizmet-inspired schools and Hizmet education philosophy plays an important role in the success and popularity of Hay school. That is; The Hizmet-educational philosophy which is an important factor to ensure Hay school as a safe haven for pupils against criminality and radicalism contributes a lot to the success and popularity of the school. (shrink)

This paper examines how human beings may be able to reach certain kinds of understanding. On either side of the how, a cognitive apparatus and evidence will be theoretically presupposed. Though this examination will frequently spill over into the domains of cognition and evidence, there is no presupposition that the solution will be found exclusively in either; rather, answers will be sought in a conceptually unprejudiced how.

Lean has become a popular management concept in the last decade, especially in the management consultant industry in Sweden. However, regardless of the popularity, it has been criticized in academia for its inconsistency. Researchers have questioned the validity for Lean as a concept. The lack of consistency in the management literature also makes Lean a target for misinterpretation by practitioners, which also influences the success rate for implementing the concept. Success in the implementation stage is critical and management consultants are (...) often the change agents in this process. The management consultant industry has therefore an important role in how the management concept is set into practice. This thesis explores how Swedish management consultants perceive and implement the concept Lean. Interviews with management consultants were conducted in order to retrieve this information. The findings indicated that the inconsistency in the literature of the field affects how management consultants perceive the content of the Lean concept. It was discovered that all the participating consultants had their own unique version of what Lean is and how it should be implement. (shrink)

The dissertation concerns F. A. Hayek’s critique of legislation. The purpose of the investigation is to clarify and assess that critique. I argue that there is in Hayek’s work a critique of legislation that is distinct from his well-known critique of social planning. Further that the main claim of this critique is what I refer to as Hayek’s legislation tenet, namely that legislation that aims to achieve specific aggregate results in complex orders of society will decrease the welfare level. The (...) legislation tenet gains support; from the welfare claim – according to which there is a positive correlation between the utilization of knowledge and the welfare level in society; from the dispersal of knowledge thesis – according to which the total knowledge of society is dispersed and not available to any one agency; and from the cultural evolution thesis – according to which evolutionary rules are more favorable to the utilization of knowledge in social cooperation than are legislative rules. More specifically, I argue that these form two lines of argument in support of the legislation tenet. One line of argument is based on the conjunction of the welfare claim and the dispersal of knowledge thesis. I argue that this line of argument is true. The other line of argument is based on the conjunction of the welfare claim and the cultural evolution thesis. I argue that this line of argument is false, mainly because the empirical work of political scientist Elinor Ostrom refutes it. Because the two lines of argument support the legislation tenet independently of each other, I argue that Hayek’s critique of legislation is true. In this dissertation, I further develop a legislative policy tool as based on the welfare claim and Hayek’s conception of coercion. I also consider Hayek’s idea that rules and law are instrumental in forging rational individual action and rational social orders, and turn to review this idea in light of the work of experimental economist Vernon Smith and economic historian Avner Greif. I find that Smith and Greif support this idea of Hayek’s, and I conjecture that it contributes to our understanding of Adam Smith’s notion of the invisible hand: It is rules – not an invisible hand – that prompt subjects to align individual and aggregate rationality in social interaction. Finally, I argue that Hayek’s critique is essentially utilitarian, as it is concerned with the negative welfare consequences of certain forms of legislation. And although it may appear that the dispersal of knowledge thesis will undermine the possibility of carrying out the utilitarian calculus, due to the lack of knowledge of the consequences of one’s actions – and therefore undermine the legislation tenet itself – I argue that the distinction between utilitarianism conceived as a method of deliberation and utilitarianism conceived as a criterion of correctness may be used to save Hayek’s critique from this objection. (shrink)

According to the dominant tradition in Christianity and many other religions, human beings are both knowers and actors: beings with conscious beliefs about the world who sometimes act intentionally guided by these beliefs. According to philosopher of mind Robert Cummins the “received view” among philosophers of mind is epiphenomenalism, according to which mental causation does not exist: neural events are the underlying causes of both behavior and belief which explains the correlation (not causation) between belief and behavior. Beliefs do not, (...) in virtue of their semantic content, enter the causal chain leading to action, beliefs are always the endpoint of a causal chain. If that is true the theological anthropology of many religious traditions is false. JP Moreland draws attention to two different ways of doing metaphysics: serious metaphysics and shopping-list metaphysics. The difference is that the former involves not only the attempt to describe the phenomena one encounter, it also involves the attempt of locating them, that is explaining how the phenomena is possible and came to be given the constraints of a certain worldview. For a physicalist these constraints include the atomic theory of matter and the theories of physical, chemical and biological evolution. Mental properties are challenging phenomena to locate within a physicalist worldview, and some physicalists involved in “serious metaphysics” have therefore eliminated them from their worldview. Most however accept them, advocating “non-reductive physicalism” according to which mental properties supervene on physical processes. Even if one allow mental properties to supervene on physical processes, the problem of mental causation remains. If mental properties are irreducible to and therefore distinct from physical properties, as the non-reductive physicalists claim, they cannot exert causal powers if one accepts the causal closure of the physical domain – which one must, if one is a “serious physicalist” according to physicalist philosopher of mind Jaegwon Kim. Alvin Plantinga, in his Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism, shows that if mental properties, such as the propositional content of beliefs, are causally inefficacious, then evolution has not been selecting cognitive faculties that are reliable, in the sense of being conducive to true beliefs. If the content of our beliefs does not affect our behavior, the content of our belief is irrelevant from an evolutionary standpoint, and so the content-producing part of our cognitive faculties are irrelevant from an evolutionary standpoint. The “reliability” – truth-conduciveness – of our cognitive faculties can therefore not be explained by evolution, and therefore not located within the physicalist worldview. The only way in which the reliability of our cognitive faculties can be located is if propositional content is relevant for behavior. If we however eliminate or deny the reliability of our cognitive faculties, then we have abandoned any chance of making a rational case for our position, as that would presuppose the reliability that we are denying. But if propositional content is causally efficacious, then that either – if we are non-reductive physicalists and mental properties are taken to be irreducible to physical properties – implies that the causal closure of the physical domain is false or - if we are reductive physicalists and not eliminativists regarding mental properties - it shows that matter qua matter can govern itself by rational argumentation, in which we have a pan-/localpsychistic view of matter. Either way, we have essentially abandoned physicalism in the process of locating the reliability of our cognitive faculties within a physicalist worldview. We have also affirmed the theological anthropology of Christianity, in so far as the capacity for knowledge and rational action is concerned. Keywords: Philosophy of mind, mental causation, reductionism, physicalism, the evolutionary argument against naturalism, the myth of nonreductive materialism, Alvin Plantinga, Jaegwon Kim. (shrink)

BackgroundInternational codes of ethics play an important role in guiding professional practice in developing countries. In the occupational health setting, codes developed by international agencies have substantial import on protecting working populations from harm. This is particularly so under globalisation which has transformed processes of production in fundamental ways across the globe. As part of the process of revising the Ethical Code of the International Commission on Occupational Health, an Africa Working Group addressed key challenges for the relevance and cogency (...) of an ethical code in occupational health for an African context through an iterative consultative process.DiscussionFirstly, even in the absence of strong legal systems of enforcement, and notwithstanding the value of legal institutionalisation of ethical codes, guidelines alone may offer advantageous routes to enhancing ethical practice in occupational health. Secondly, globalisation has particularly impacted on health and safety at workplaces in Africa, challenging occupational health professionals to be sensitive to, and actively redress imbalance of power. Thirdly, the different ways in which vulnerability is exemplified in the workplace in Africa often places the occupational health professional in invidious positions of Dual Loyalty. Fourth, the particular cultural emphasis in traditional African societies on collective responsibilities within the community impacts directly on how consent should be sought in occupational health practice, and how stigma should be dealt with, balancing individual autonomy with ideas of personhood that are more collective as in the African philosophy of ubuntu. To address stigma, practitioners need to be additionally sensitive to how power imbalances at the workplace intersect with traditional cultural norms related to solidarity. Lastly, particularly in the African context, the inseparability of workplace and community means that efforts to address workplace hazards demand that actions for occupational health extend beyond just the workplace.SummaryA stronger articulation of occupational health practice with advocacy for prevention should be an ethical norm. Ethical codes should ideally harmonize and balance individual and community needs so as to provide stronger moral authority guidelines. There is a need to consider an African Charter on Bioethics as complementary and strengthening of existing codes for the region. (shrink)

This book is a synthesis of more than three decades of research into the concept of time and its semiotic nature. If traditional philosophy – and philosophy of time should be no exception – in the shadow of advancing biology can be said to have reached an impasse, one important reason for this, in harmony with Wittgenstein’s vision, appears to have been its lack of appropriate tools for explicating language. The present theory of time proceeds, accordingly, from the exploration of (...) temporal expressions in language as an evolutionary fact. It derives in a hypothetical, coherent feedback process of hierarchically ordered distinctions the semantics of time from its biologically dictated perceptual and cognitive-pragmatic origins. The corresponding abductive-regulative model is anchored in the assumption of biological rhythmization as the very foundation of perception and mental/physical action. Understood to originate in space and spatial perspective, time reveals itself as an instrument for temporal perspective on motion (events and situations) in a process of analysis, i.e., discontinuation of chaos made divisible and continuous by the rhythmical screen. Whereas traditional philosophy of time paid attention almost exclusively to the temporal category of tense, the biopragmatic model sees strong evidence in the perspectival nature of time for ascribing the decisive, and probably universal, role in temporal analysis to the linguistic category of aspect. Aspect may, according to the present findings, be assumed to partake already of change-of-state and cause-effect analysis without which man’s adaptation to new situations – and precondition for survival – would be inconceivable. The proposed model of space/time cognition, inspired by Hegelian dialectics, Heidegger-Gadamer’s hermeneutic circle and Peircean logic, makes Kantian a priori superfluous and liberates time from its enigmatic appearance. For the first time in temporal studies it thus appears possible to derive hypothetically linguistic expressions of time all the way from pretemporal, homogeneous continuity effected by biological rhythmization, via pretemporal metonymic (Gestalt), chunk-wise partitioning – as a general precondition for the perception and, based on primary metaphorization, the cognition of things, space and motion – to temporal analysis/discontinuation proper, primarily by aspectual perspective, and the subsequent synthesized, heterogeneous continuity of temporally ordered events. The conception of time, so disastrous for modern temporal logic, i.e., as moving object assigned extension, divisible continuity (‛linearity’) and direction, can be shown to have emerged as a result of secondary metaphorization. (shrink)

This is a thesis which contributes to research in two different fields: theoretical physics and physics education research. The common link between these two research areas is that both involve explorations of abstract physics and mathematical representations, but from different perspectives. The first part of this thesis is situated in theoretical physics. Here a cosmological scenario is explored where a de Sitter phase is replaced with a phase described with a scale factor a ~ tq, where 1/3<1. This scenario could (...) be viewed as an inflationary toy model, and is shown to open up the possibility of an information paradox. This potential paradox is resolved even in the worst case scenario by showing that the time scales involved for such a paradox to occur is of the order of magnitude of the recurrence time for the de Sitter space. The second part of this thesis is situated in physics education research. A number of learning situations that are experienced as abstract by students are explored: probability in one dimensional quantum tunnelling; the mindsets that students adopt towards understanding physics equations used in typical teaching scenarios; and what students focus on when presented with physics equations. The results for the quantum scattering study are four phenomenographic categories of description, for the mind sets study, six epistemological components of mindsets and for the focus on physics equations study, three foci creating five levels of increasing complexity of ways of experiencing physics equations. Pedagogical implications of these results are discussed. (shrink)