David Benatar’s axiological asymmetry argument for antinatalism states that it is always bad for a sentient being to come into existence. There has been a lot of discussion about this argument since its publication in 2006, but this discussion has often been lacking by not accepting some ground rules, or assumptions, that Benatar establishes. In this paper I accept these ground rules, which is the person-affecting view, and the idea that the axiological asymmetry argument provides a lot of explanatory power, (...) by single handedly being able to explain four other, primafacie plausible asymmetries. In this paper I investigate these other asymmetries to see (i) if they are true and (ii) if some other, more plausible theory, can explain them. My investigation shows that two of these asymmetries are false when understood in a theoretical way. When these two asymmetries are understood in a practical way, they are true, but then they don’t lend support to the axiological asymmetry argument. The third asymmetry, while true, is better explained by the so-called existence requirement. The fourth asymmetry, while true, doesn’t lend support to the axiological asymmetry argument since it doesn’t provide anything new to this argument. The conclusion drawn from this is that the explanatory power of the axiological asymmetry argument, with regards to these other asymmetries, is not that strong, which in effect weakens the plausibility of the axiological asymmetry argument for antinatalism. (shrink)

AI is entering clinical care and the healthcare sector in a big way, at the same time, a growing number of scholars are concerned that this technology cannot adhere to current bioethical principles. In particular, there are increasing concerns that AI poses a threat to the autonomy of patients by being irreconcilable with the practice of informed consent. In this essay, I shall defend the thesis that some applications of AI can be reconciled with a revised version of informed consent (...) – what I call AI Adapted Informed Consent. This solution shall not rest on the idea of making black box AI more transparent or explicable. Instead, I shall argue that black box AI does not necessarily withhold the kind of information necessary for informed consent. Rather, patients can be given epistemic access to the kind of information necessary to make an informed decision, as well as being informed as to how the AI is used in the medical decision-making and in the assessment of their medical situation. Hence, this solution offers a re-interpretation of informed consent as information about contextual functioning and role of AI in medical decision-making. Drawing on republican interpretations of freedom as nondomination, I argue that demands for informed consent can only be restrained if it preserves the voluntariness of our decisions. Hence, I shall conclude that my adapted informed consent thesis allows for the possibility that some applications of black box AI in clinical care can be reconciled with informed consent and due respect for patient autonomy – if three specific conditions can be met. (shrink)

Body Integrity Dysphoria (BID) is a rare condition where a person has a desire to become disabled. This desire creates distress so intense that some request, and in a few cases have received, disabling surgery. The condition has raised debate, both concerning the BID suffers autonomy and whether the disabling surgeries conflict with the medical profession's obligations to respect patients’ autonomy, promote well-being and not do harm. In this paper, I argue that some BID sufferers plausibly possess the abilities required (...) for medical decisionmaking, which means that they could be sufficiently autonomous to make a decision about disabling surgery. Further, I argue that if a BID sufferer is decision-making competent, and if disabling surgery is expected to have therapeutic benefits that outweigh the expected harms, and if no other treatments have proven effective for them, then it seems morally permissible for the medical profession to offer them disabling surgery as an experimental treatment. (shrink)

Wouter Kusters argues that madness has much to offer philosophy, as does philosophy to madness. In this paper, i support both claims by drawing on a mad phenomenon which I label Radical Psychotic Doubt, or RPD. First, although skepticism is a minority position in epistemology, it has been claimed that anti-skeptical arguments remain unsatisfying. I argue that this complaint can be clarified and strengthened by showing that anti-skeptical arguments are irrelevant to RPD sufferers. Second, there's a debate about whether so-called (...) hinge commitments are beliefs or not. I argue that RPD can be used to strengthen the case that they are. Moreover, if hinges are beliefs, some madpeople are more epistemically rational than some sane philosophers. Third, drawing on my own mad experiences, I challenge evidentialism by presenting a better candidate for a truly forced cchoice about what to believe than William James' traditional religious example. I further show that in certain psychiatric contexts, evidentialism has more radical implications than Jamesian pragmatism, which comes out as more conservative. Finally, I discuss how philosophical theories like pragmatism and Pyrrhonism can provide inspiration for new and much-needed coping strategies for RPD sufferers. (shrink)

The recent years have seen the revival of neo-Roman republicanism through the works of Philip Pettit, who has replaced Isaiah Berlin’s taxonomy of positive/negative liberty with freedom as nondomination. This essay compares the neo-Roman conception of nondomination to the liberal conception of noninterference, with the purpose of clarifying whether nondomination is a distinct concept of liberty and preferable to that of noninterference. The essay highlights the exchange between Pettit/Skinner and Carter/Kramer, wherein Carter and Kramer make their case for ‘pure negative (...) liberty’, which is claimed to be the proper articulation of negative liberty. Pure-negative theorists believe that nondomination is a strand of negative liberty, adding nothing new to the concept, whereas their republican counterparts disagree. My essay argues that nondomination is a distinct, preferable concept of liberty, thanks to its view on fundamental unfreedom and the mere presence of arbitrary power, which the pure negative view fails to account for satisfactorily. (shrink)

Panpsychism, the view that fundamental physical entities are basic phenomenal subjects, is motivated by a commitment to explaining human subjects of experience, as well as by a rejection of the possibility that phenomenal properties are arbitrarily necessitated – human subjects of experience are thought to only be possible if prefigured by more basic phenomenal subjecthood. In this paper I will consider autopoietic enactivism as an alternative to panpsychism when it comes to explaining human subjects of experience on the basis of (...) subjective precursors. Both of the theories theorise possible subjective precursors but panpsychism is mostly based on speculative, unobservable, fundamental phenomenal subjecthood. Autopoietic enactivism does not require that there is fundamental phenomenal subjecthood. Instead it describes emergent individuals with subjective behaviour at the biological level. This involves a form of bodily subjecthood that may be pre-phenomenal. If autopoietic enactivism involves describing phenomenal subjecthood as possible on the basis of bodily subjecthood, it is not describing an arbitrary but an intelligible necessitation, because phenomenal subjecthood, then, is understandable on the basis of some other subjecthood. However, that other subjecthood is not fundamental. Since autopoietic enactivism does not require fundamental phenomenal subjecthood it is compatible with the NFM which means that it is seamlessly compatible with a form of physicalism that panpsychism is not compatible with. The fundamental question that panpsychists start out with is The Hard Problem of Consciousness, a version of the problem of experience that may contain an unnecessarily wide, or even insurmountable, gap between two types of mutually exclusive properties – phenomenal and physical properties. Autopoietic enactivism has a corresponding problem that is tied to a common denominator between phenomenal and physical properties, namely biological life. The enactivist's Body-Body Problem involves an explanatory gap between the living body and the lived body. Since the phenomenal and the physical are united in biological life, life is a relevant starting point for investigation regarding the problem of consciousness. I will argue that autopoietic enactivism offers a way of understanding the intelligible necessitation of the known subjects of experience on the basis of emergent, and not necessarily fundamental, subjective precursors. Moreover, I will briefly show how autopoietic enactivism also is compatible with panprotopsychism, a view closely related to panpsychism. My argument in favor of autopoietic enactivism, and against the need for fundamental phenomenal subjecthood, may lead undecided panpsychists to choose panprotopsychism over panpsychism. (shrink)

Carl Hoeferʼs “freedom from the inside out” is a compatibilist account of freedom that claims that we can have a robust kind of freedom even if the world is deterministic. The key insight is that determinism belongs in tenseless B-series time in the block universe, not in our everyday notions of the world where time is experienced in a tensed way with a past, a present, and a future, where the past is viewed as fixed and the future as open. (...) The block universe is time symmetric, i.e., determination can go in both temporal direction, and no particular part of the block universe is determined or fixed prior to any other part. Therefore,we do not have to think of deterministic logical relations as placing constraints on our actions in advance. Instead, we are free to view our actions as primary explainers that very partially determine both the future and the past. Since our actions are thought to place constraints on the microscopic past, it will be argued that Hoeferʼs account can question the Consequence Argument, the well-known incompatibilist argument that claims that if the past and the laws are not up to us, the consequences of the past and the laws cannot be up to us either, which includes our present actions. Hence, it will be argued that by rejecting that the past is not up to us, Hoeferʼs account can refute the Consequence Argument, which removes one possible threat to our freedom. (shrink)

The following essay argues that Transnational Civil Disobedience may be justified when it is applied to questions relating to global climate change. Civil Disobedience as a politically motivated form of lawbreaking posits questions regarding political obligation and citizenship and such questions are amplified when applied to the transnational level.Furthermore, this essay focuses on the influential account of Civil Disobedience as it has been formulated by John Rawls. The writer argues that there are potential issues with this formulation when it is (...) applied outside of the greater scope of Rawls’s work. Instead, the essay argues for a formulation of Civil Disobedience that includes a politicizing feature, and to view it as an extra institutional form of political discourse that is detached from notions of state belonging.Finally, it is argued that the All Affected Principle may be used as a necessary condition for justifying acts of Transnational Civil Disobedience. The nature of Global Climate change as an event that affects the human race as a whole, gives rise to the potential for non-citizens to claim a level of political agency in matters that affect them despite lacking formal representation. (shrink)

When interacting with other people, we assume that they have their reasons for what they do and believe, and experience recognizable feelings and emotions. When people act from weakness of will or are otherwise irrational, what they do can still be comprehensible to us, since we know what it is like to fall for temptation and act against one’s better judgment. Still, when someone’s experiences, feelings and way of thinking is vastly different from our own, understanding them becomes increasingly difficult. (...) Delusions and psychosis are often seen as marking the end of intelligibility. In this paper, I argue first for the importance of seeing other people as intelligible as long as this is at all possible. Second, I argue, based on both previous literature and my own lived experience, that more psychotic phenomena than previously thought can be rendered at least somewhat intelligible. Besides bizarre experiences like illusions, hallucinations and intense feelings of significance, I also explain what it is like to lose one’s bedrock, and how this loss impacts which beliefs one has reason to reject. Finally, I give an inside account of some disturbances of reason, and show that there are important similarities between certain psychotic reasoning problems and common non-pathological phenomena. (shrink)

Background: Research suggests that unconscious activity in the supplementary motor area precedes not only certain simple motor actions but also the point at which we become aware of our intention to perform such actions. The extent to which these findings have implications for our understanding of the concepts of free will and personal responsibility has been subject of intense debate during the latest four decades. Methods: This research is discussed in relation to effects of neurosurgical removal of the SMA in (...) a narrative review. Results: Removal of the SMA typically causes a transient inability to perform non-stimulus-driven, voluntary actions. This condition, known as the SMA syndrome, does not appear to be associated with a loss of sense of volition but with a profound disruption of executive function/cognitive control. Conclusions: The role of the SMA may be to serve as a gateway between the corticospinal tract and systems for executive function. Such systems are typically seen as tools for conscious decisions. What is known about effects of SMA resections would thus seem to suggest a view that is compatible with concepts of personal responsibility. However, the philosophical question whether free will exists cannot be definitely resolved on the basis of these observations. (shrink)

This paper criticises the famous “”ought” implies “can”” on the grounds that its main claim - that there can be no unfulfillable obligations - is false. The first part of the paper investigates the use, history and previous literature on the topic, as well as the proper understanding of the principle. The second part presents the main argument, directed at the interpretation of “”ought” implies “can”” as a conceptual truth. It is argued that it must be possible to split the (...) meaning of the term “ought” into component parts, parts that must each be quite capable of functioning on their own. The result is that we cannot conclude that one part of the term “ought” must disappear just because another part of it does so. Finally, in the third part, we tackle some common arguments and intuitions in favour of the principle, and provides a few concluding words and a summary. (shrink)

Panpsychist and panprotopsychist views have become more prominent during the past years, greatlydue to Philip Goff, Galen Strawson, David Chalmers, William Seager and others. Panpsychism isthe view that fundamental entitites have phenomenal properties while panprotopsychism is the viewthat fundamental entities have the potential to realise consciousness under certain conditions, invirtue of their protophenomenal properties. My focus will be, particularly, on constitutive versionsof panpsychism, which entail the commitment to the constitutive grounding of ordinary subjects ofexperience in more fundamental phenomenal entities. More (...) specifically, I will evaluate whethersolutions to its ”combination problems”, which theorise the combination or decombination offundamental entities, can be solutions of the problem of experience. Constitutive panpsychismattempts to avoid the emergence of consciousness altogether by postulating fundamental subjects,so that ordinary subjects should be explained exhaustively in terms of them. Emergentistpanpsychism, by contrast, is a form of intelligible, or non-brute, emergentism which considersordinary subjects to be something more than mere structure. However, I will argue that evenconstitutivism involves a type of emergence, compositional or individualizing emergence, whichmakes it collapse into emergentism. That also takes away its ability to solve the problem ofexperience through a combination problem. Furthermore, the problem of other minds puts epistemiclimitations on our abilities to solve combination problems, which makes it improbable, even ifconstitutivism could avoid subject emergence, that it would be possible to reach an objectivesolution to the problem of ordinary subjects of experience through combination. Also physicalism isa form of emergentism but involves the commitment of the brute emergence of phenomenalproperties from non-mental fundamental entitites. I will show that it too gains an emergenceproblem as a consequence of a small conceptual shift that causes its collapse intopanprotopsychism. By recognising that there are common emergence problems, if not aboutphenomenal properties in general then about ordinary subjects, physicalists and panpsychistscan continue consciousness research as a collected force. I will also be presenting versions ofemergentist panpsychism to exemplify views that already expect emergence problems andformulate questions for future research. (shrink)

This paper aims to provide a critique of commonsense nationalism by means of critiquing the intrinsic argument for the conational partiality thesis. I.e. the thesis that we ought to, in our moral deliberation, prioritize our conationals. In particular the argument that we have associative duties towards our conationals in virtue of the intrinsic value of our conational relationship. Prima facie the intrinsic argument is understood as the most plausible vehicle for the normative claims of commonsense nationalism. The particular accounts of (...) the intrinsic argument that are chosen are the accounts espoused by Thomas Hurka and David Miller respectively. Very simply put, the accounts argue that the conational relationship is intrinsically valuable or valued, and this intrinsic value or valuing constitutes a source of partiality and associative duties. In the end, it is argued that the accounts either fails with regards to their internal plausibility or in the sense that they do not properly account for the normative claims of commonsense nationalism. The intrinsic argument thus fails to provide a sufficient defense of commonsense nationalism. (shrink)

Using the events in Sweden in the autumn of 2015 as a practical example, this paper examines the question of whether there are circumstances when it is morally permissible for rich, democratic states to close their borders to asylum-seekers. To lay a common ground, the author starts by looking at the right of asylum-seekers, who a refugee is, and what obligations a host country have towards them. Thus, after looking at general human rights, and how they apply to the right (...) to seek asylum, the author turns to the question of who a refugee is, and the difference between refugees according to the 1951 Geneva Convention, and people who are in need of subsidiary protection, before choosing to use UNHCR’s wider definition of a refugee. While acknowledging that refugees have specific rights that other persons in need of protection do not, all asylum-seekers are entitled to not be sent back to a place of danger. Though both groups are entitled to stay on in the country, the temporary status for those in need of subsidiary protection raises some questions about integration and their standing in society and therefore the question of membership rights is discussed before the author returns to the events in Sweden in 2015 and argues that there are circumstances when it is morally acceptable for a country to close its borders to refugees, but that there are limitations when this can be done and for how long. Finally, it is argued that a system that prevents countries from having to – or choosing to – close their borders to refugees is needed. The author discusses whether the grounds for such a system could be found in the work that UNHCR does, and if the DAC agreement can be used as a model for fair distribution. (shrink)

This paper aims to establish a conception of humility which can be of use in nurturing interpersonal relationships of intrinsic value. The conception of humility asserted herein is a doxastic one that demands that an individual make an as-accurate-as-possible estimation of her knowledge, merits, and accomplishments in relation to others, in relation to the totality of knowledge, merits, and accomplishments, both actual and possible, of humankind, and in relation to an ideal. This paper asserts that humility consists of both a (...) cognitive and an attitudinal component. The necessary cognitive component is an acknowledgment of the presence of great unknowable mysteries at play in every situation and every interaction between persons, which is further specified as the acknowledgment of the unknowability of the inner lives and consciousnesses of others. It is asserted that the attitudinal component of humility must result from the cognitive component and consists in keeping this acknowledgment consciously in mind in interactions in personal relationships and adopting actions and responses to others which are congruent with this acknowledgement. The conception of humility advocated in this paper takes points from the traditional Jewish conception of humility as presented by Daniel M. Nelson, a later account as formulated by the Jewish philosopher Martin Buber as well the more recent accounts of humility asserted by André Comte-Sponville, Julia Driver, G. Alex Sinha, J.L.A Garcia and Aaron Ben-Ze’ev. (shrink)

Häftets samlingstitel: Unveiling the feminism of Islam. AnA society for Feminist Analyses.

This thesis examines John Berryman’s poetry of loss together with four different theoretical perspectives. It is the purpose of the study to involve Berryman’s poetry and critical theory in a dialogue which attempts to break down the hierarchy that positions theory as the subject and literature or poetry as the object of study. Instead, by focusing on the otherness of each discourse, that is, what could be called the unconscious of Berryman’s poetry of loss and the language of theory, poetry (...) and theory can be seen to presuppose and mutually imply each other. Those of Berryman’s poems mainly analyzed in the thesis, and which could be called his poetry of loss are “The Ball Poem,” Homage to Mistress Bradstreet, and The Dream Songs. The four theoretical perspectives consist of Martin Heidegger’s thinking concerning the word and concept departure, David S. Reynolds’s notion of the subversive in the American Renaissance, Nicolas Abraham’s psychoanalytical concept anasemia, and Maurice Blanchot’s theory of death and poetry in his book The Space of Literature. The theoretical base of the thesis is developed primarily from Shoshana Felman’s “To open the question,” an editorial introduction to a special issue of Yale French Studies entitled Literature and Psychoanalysis. The Question of Reading: Otherwise and Timothy Clark’s study Derrida, Heidegger, Blanchot. (shrink)

A recurrent theme in contemporary narratives of grieving is that there is a gap between the griever’s more or less consciously chosen expression of, and acting out of, grief and loss and other people’s seeming lack of acceptance. Starting from the view that the social context of feelings and emotions are constitutive in making an emotional experience what it is, this article explores what is done and experienced in acts of grief. A phenomenological perspective is applied to analyze the conditioning (...) of these experiences, and what the acts of grieving may accomplish in relation to various aspects of the self, indeed selves—that is, in relation to the surviving relative as well as the deceased. (shrink)

In this I will explore the ethical challenge of global climate change by analysing three accounts of how responsibility for climate change should be distributed. I explore why it is valuable to view climate change as part of a bigger ethical problem of resources, distribution and global justice. Furthermore, I will argue that a road towards change by a cosmo political theory of justice is the most reasonable option. The theme of my argumentation is that the challenge of global climate (...) change should be understood as a problem between human beings, not between states, or via schemes for distribution or rigid systematic solutions. Many theories of justice fail to do so with challenging and potentially dangerous consequences. (shrink)

The concept of moral standing applies to those who are of a direct moral concern, i.e. we have a reason to directly include those with a moral standing in our moral deliberation- they matter for themselves. How one accounts for the concept in question is controversial and thus there are several different accounts that one can consult when pondering what content the concept ought to have. This paper investigates the plausibility of some of the most influential accounts of moral standing, (...) concluding that they, as they stand alone, are insufficient. Instead an alternative account of moral standing with a kantian foundation is offered, an account which is heavily based on Christine Korsgaard’s notion of final goods, with moral standing understood as a comparative concept as its distinguishing component. (shrink)

During face-to-face meetings, humans use multimodal information, including verbal information, visual information, body language, facial expressions, and other non-verbal gestures. In contrast, during computer-mediated-communication, humans rely either on mono-modal information such as text-only, voice-only, or video-only or on bi-modal information by using audiovisual modalities such as video teleconferencing. Psychologically, the difference between the two lies in the level of the subjective experience of presence, where people perceive a reduced feeling of presence in the case of CMC. Despite the current advancements (...) in CMC, it is still far from face-to-face communication, especially in terms of the experience of presence. This thesis aims to introduce new concepts, theories, and technologies for presence design where the core is actions for creating presence. Thus, the contribution of the thesis can be divided into a technical contribution and a knowledge contribution. Technically, this thesis details novel technologies for improving presence experience during mediated communication. The proposed technologies include action robots and a face robot), embodied control techniques, and face reconstruction/retrieval algorithms. The introduced technologies enable action possibilities and embodied interactions that improve the presence experience between the distantly located participants. The novel setups were put into real experimental scenarios, and the well-known social, spatial, and gaze related problems were analyzed. The developed technologies and the results of the experiments led to the knowledge contribution of this thesis. In terms of knowledge contribution, this thesis presents a more general theoretical conceptual framework for mediated communication technologies. This conceptual framework can guide telepresence researchers toward the development of appropriate technologies for mediated communication applications. Furthermore, this thesis also presents a novel strong concept – presence through actions - that brings in philosophical understandings for developing presence- related technologies. The strong concept - presence through actions is an intermediate-level knowledge that proposes a new way of creating and developing future 'presence artifacts'. Presence- through actions is an action-oriented phenomenological approach to presence that differs from traditional immersive presence approaches that are based on rationalist, internalist views. (shrink)

This article discusses the study of educational theories and ideas. Based on analyses of primarily the Danish scene, positing similarities with the other Nordic countries, we identify and investigate three main and today dominating approaches: a philosophical approach focusing on the content of the ‘great’ thinkers’ ideas, their logical-coherence and/or moral-ethical value; a historical approach centering on individuals and their educational ideas expressed as views in a realistic and contextual story; and a Foucauldian approach which analyzes educational ideas and theories (...) through their place in power-knowledge constellations. On the backcloth of analyses of the ontology and epistemology operating in these approaches we conclude that they all ignore the systematic study of the social context in which ideas and theories are conceived and we argue for a social space and social history approach as a way to fill out this epistemological vacuum. (shrink)

According to the Italian philosopher Antonio Rosmini, being is an innate idea that is requisite for contemplating anything. He emphatically claims that it is the one and only innate idea. Rosmini makes a sharp distinction between sensations and perceptions. Perceptions are thought to arise when the undetermined idea of being is combined with sensations, universals when being is combined with perceptions. It is argued here that Rosmini’s explanation of the origin of universals does not work. If the idea of being (...) is regarded as innate, then several others should be similarly regarded, notably the idea of qualitative identity which is an idea necessary for deriving universals. Although Rosmini holds that certain properties are necessarily present in real objects and therefore implicit in the idea of being, the property of being qualitatively identical with something else is not among those properties. Theological motives may have encouraged Rosmini to emphasize being as a peculiarly fundamental idea. However, if the idea of being is more fundamental than other universals, it may be regarded so in virtue of its generality, not because it has a uniquely innate character. (shrink)

The family is commonly regarded as being an important social institution. In several policy areas, evidence can be found that the family is treated as an entity towards which others can have moral obligations; it has needs and interests that require protection; it can be ill and receive treatment. The interests attributed to the family are not reducible to those of its members – and may even come into conflict with them. Using Warren's criteria for moral status, we show that, (...) although the status of the family is not explicitly described in terms of moral status, the way in which it is treated implies that it has such status. (shrink)

Information and Communication Technologies, ICTs, has now for decades being increasingly taken into use for higher education, enabling distance learning, e-learning and online learning, mainly in parallel to mainstream educational practise. The concept Blended learning (BL) aims at the integration of ICTs with these existing educational practices. The term is frequently used, but there is no agreed-upon definition. The general aim of this dissertation is to identify new possible perspectives on ICTs and access to higher education, for negotiating the dichotomy (...) between campus-based and ICT-enabled education. The access options of BL are in focus for this dissertation, although BL is generally seen as a campus phenomenon, and shares a place perspective. The main research questions in the dissertation are 1) how BL can be understood in the context of increased access to education, moreover, (2) how time can be work as a more constructive perspective for designing ICTs in education, compared to place. The dissertation comprises five articles. The first is conceptual and concentrates on place and time in blended learning, and forms a time-based model and perspective, drawing on the tension between synchronous and asynchronous modalities instead of a place-based center-periphery model. The following article examines the differences between North American and European use of the term BL, in education and research, and finds that BL is not much used by European researchers, although the term is frequently used in educational environments. Two design and intervention studies, articles 3 and 4, make experiments using the BL time-based model. In article 3, a group of untraditional learners at a learning centre in Arvidsjaur attends a synchronous co-located study circle group and participates in an asynchronous and global Massive Open Online Course (MOOC). In article 4, nine students in a preparatory year for entering engineering studies volunteer and participate in a pilot distance course experiment, where prevention of procrastination is a high priority. For this, agile framework theory, constructivist learning theory and the time-based model are used in design and analysis. The last article (5) reconnects learning to place by discussing and adapting Triple- and Quadruple Helix theory for regional development in the knowledge society to four regional European cases. At the end of the synthesis, an outline of the access affordances with the time-based model is given, drawing on Adam’s timescape theory. The discussion of ICT integration into education is made drawing on Floridi’s Philosophy of Information, which provides many tools to view discourses of ICTs in education critically, and also envisions the concept of e-ducation in the infosphere, where other blend issues appear connected to weak artificial intelligence and the pervasive power of ICTs. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to explore the roles and potential benefits of axiology and value theory in project research. This is done through (1) an exploration of the essentials of axiology and value theory; (2) a review focused on how values have been used in project research; and (3) a reflection based on the historical–logical development of—and paradigmatic influences on—projects and their management. It is concluded that project research would benefit from a more encompassing philosophical treatment of axiology (...) beyond merely acknowledging values as a thematic concept or as part of a project management methodology. (shrink)

Using social media and norm-breaking material as an empirical touchstone this thesis elaborates, investigates and explores the entangled relationships between humans and technology in social media settings. Guided by uncomfortable, emotional and bodily online sharing the thesis gives voice to stories that are seldom heard, by people whose lives are rarely spoken of. By exploring the performative entanglements of/with/through technology, design and human intent the overall aim is to offer a critical and new understanding of our online togetherness and posthuman (...) becoming. The conceptual framework throughout the thesis is based on posthuman theory and feminist technoscience, two closely connected theories providing a new onto-epistemological way of understanding the world’s becoming. The thesis should be seen as the product of an empirical practice of making theory about digital things, culture, humans and non-humans. By exploring diffraction and touch as not only theoretical standpoints but also hands-on methodology the thesis contributes to the development of new ways of doing research. Important findings arising from the practice of diffraction and touch are Technoemotions – conceptually agents built on a posthuman understanding of how emotions are entangled between and within the phenomenon, becoming important agents in the apparatus creating the phenomenon. Four Technoemotions seem particularly prominent in the material: Trust, Truth, Time and Embodiment. The thesis concludes by providing a discussion on critical alternatives for ethics, politics and power in relation to social media and the norms and norm-breaking practices most of us participate in. The responsibility and ability to respond are addressed, as well as social justice and hope for the future to come. (shrink)

Recent studies of non-conscious processing have indicated that visually processed non-conscious informationcan be used to influence behaviour after as much as 5000 ms. This study further explores the possibilities of nonconsciousvisual working memory retention. Twelve participants were in this study instructed to memorizemasked faces and then make decisions based on what they believe they saw or guess intuitively. Results indicatethat increased working memory load only affected conscious trials, suggesting non-conscious stimulus remainedunperceived. Since no consciousness effect was observed when measuring response (...) times of congruent trials thisstudy do not support non-conscious working memory retention. (shrink)

This paper examines the views of proof held by university level mathematics students and teachers. A framework is developed for characterizing people's views of proof, based on a distinction between public and private aspects of proof and the key ideas which link these two domains.

This article is a critical study of the planning and design process of the Sustaining Arctic Observing Network (SAON). SAON, in its ambition to build a comprehensive, pan-Arctic monitoring system, seeks to integrate all relevant scientific and environmental monitoring sites in the Arctic, guided by an ethic of inclusion regarding the know-ledge of indigenous Arctic peoples (KIAP). It is argued that the logics of inclusion in play, paradoxically, risks limiting the capacity for Arctic indigenous peoples to control their knowledge and (...) its uses, to monitor the activities and outputs of SAON itself, and to appropriate the SAON system and its data for uses they control. This article also suggests an alternative approach: rather than place KIAP within SAON, it calls for planners to consider establishing knowledge relations between SAON and KIAP so that the distinct status of KIAP—in a position of exteriority to the comprehensive monitoring system—is acknowledged. Within these knowledge relations, differences in the production of knowledge can be effectively recognized, a site can be created for reviewing SAON’s monitoring work by local communities and practices, and strategies for open, adaptable data systems for local users can be established. (shrink)